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This thesis explores a new political phenomenon in the Middle East - the 
reconciliation of nationalism and Islamism by Islamic political parties in the 
context of nation states. Although the concept of religious nationalism has been 
discussed substantially before, as for example in Juergensmeyer (1993: 40) 
where the author defines religious nationalism as “the attempt to link religion 
and the nation-state”, this work highlights that a new brand of religious 
nationalism has emerged in the Middle East as the result of the intertwining of 
nationalism and Islamism. The focus of this study is, therefore, on the 
development of religious nationalism in the continuously tumultuous region of 
the Middle East.  The aim of this researchis to investigate whether Islamism in 
Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism, which is an accentuated 
example for the whole Middle East region.  
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that many of the religious nationalists 
themselves have not yet fully acknowledged the existence of the trend of 
merging between Islamism and nationalism. For instance, although the position 
of the Muslim Brotherhood of Kuwait, during the liberation of their state from the 
Iraqi regime, is a clear example of religious nationalism, all other affiliations of 
this organisation around the world at that time viewed the military operation as a 
foreign occupation. Highlighting this historical juncture in the political life of the 
Middle East by studying the Islamism in the Kurdistan region helped to 
elaborate on this new type of politics exceptionally well. This is essentially due 
to the absence of a politically recognised nation state which renders Kurds to be 
particularly susceptible to various manifestations of nationalism. The key finding 
of this project was, therefore, the notion that Islamism in Kurdistan has become 
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A significant political transformation has occurred, and continues still, among 
the political parties in the Middle East. Among these parties, the Islamic political 
parties are particularly affected by this phenomenon. As this thesis 
demonstrates, the Kurdistan Islamic Union in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a 
particularly clear example of this political transformation. 
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) was established in 1994,with its tenets based 
fundamentally on the ideology and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, over the last few years, a significant transformation has occurred with 
respect to the political aims and objectives of this party. In this context, the 
present study focuses on Middle Eastern Islamic political parties in general,but 
on the Kurdistan Islamic Union in particular, as an example of a Middle Eastern 
Islamic Political Party shaped to a formidable degree by the ongoing 
transformation of the regional political landscape.  
 
Background of the study: 
In the late era of the Ottoman Empire, two kinds of nationalism emerged in the 
Middle East. First, a secular nationalism, such as the Kemalist nationalism in 
Turkey that originated in secular movements and has preserved its character 
until the present time. Second, a nationalism propagated by non-secular 
religious figures with neither its movements nor the leaders of these movements 
being secular. It is worth noting in this regard that Kurdish nationalistic 
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movements were led by men such as Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, Shaikh Saaid 
Peeran, Shaikh Mahmood Hafeed, and Mullah Mustafa Barzani who were all 
highly influential religious figures. However the second type of nationalism, 
which the Kurdish nationalistic movements were part of, either disappeared, or 
eventually were transformed into fully-fledged secularism. Thus, the situation 
emerged in which “few Islamists have followed the logic of Islamic community 
as against the nation, and few nationalists have not accorded religion a place of 
honour in the attributes of the nation” Zubaida (2004: 404). 
After the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) by Al-Banna in 1928 in 
Egypt, another type of political movement came into existence in the Middle 
East. This movement, with its emphasis on Islamic teachings and their 
proliferation, was fundamentally different from both abovementioned types of 
nationalism. However, despite having branches all over the Middle East, by the 
1990s, it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood had failed to achieve its 
goals. Therefore, significant changes were observed in the tendencies and 
strategies of the movement. Together, these changes gave rise to a 
phenomenon representing yet another type of nationalism: neo-religious 
nationalism. The existing body of evidence supporting the notion of the 
existence of a new type of nationalism in the region makes a proper 
examination particularly important. Furthermore, the majority of the previously 
conducted works, especially MA dissertations and PhD theses, dealing with 
Kurdish Nationalism focused on its history, without paying much attention to 





Significance of the Study: 
It has been indicated that there is a clear absence of research regarding 
religious nationalism within the context of Kurdish nationalistic movements. 
This, together with the necessity to examine the phenomenon of religious 
nationalism as an emerging political force in the region, then constitutes the 
rationale behind the decision to research this pertinent topic through a PhD 
thesis. Finally, this study can be perceived as being a part of a much larger 
effort to understand how nationalism and religion have been influencing each 
other during the last few decades. 
 
The Aim of the Study: 
This study aims to explore the principles and factors governing the spread and 
political impact of religious nationalism in the Middle East. This will be 
accomplished by conducting a form of case study where the Kurdistan Islamic 
Union (KIU) is evaluated and examined as a political manifestation of religious 
nationalism. It is apparent that the KIU was, originally, ideologically influenced 
by the Muslim Brotherhood. The manner in which the Muslim Brotherhood was 
established, and the way in which it operated, was very different from that of 
nation state nationalism. However, the Brotherhood soon became a 
representative umbrella organisation of pan-ideological political parties, 
spanning not only the Arab world but establishing branches in many other 
countries in the Islamic world. The strategy of the MB included focussing on the 
inner development and transformation of Muslim individuals, Muslim families, 
Muslim societies and Muslim governments in the line with specific Islamic 
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teachings, with the ultimate goal of uniting the lands inhabited by Muslim 
majorities into an Islamic caliphate.  
The argument that this thesis presents, and then intends to substantiate with 
evidence, is based on the assertion that at this point there are two kinds of 
nationalisms active in the Middle East: the secular nationalism and the religious 
nationalism. This thesis examines the latter that is represented here by the KIU. 
The essence of the argument is that although many of the political parties within 
the Muslim Brotherhood, including KIU, have adopted similar political tools and 
strategies, in reality, many of the political parties that have subscribed to 
religious nationalism do not, necessarily, strive to create the Islamic caliphate - 
the ultimate goal of the MB. Indeed, despite the fact that all of them are 
religious, and accordingly share some form of loyalty, these parties, 
nevertheless, represent religious nationalism and thus have aims on a national 
level specific within their states. In other words, each of these parties makes 
every effort within the framework of its nation state. With respect to the KIU, I 
am examining the party‟s nationalistic aims and objectives. Furthermore, I will 
also analyse the perspective of the KIU‟s representatives regarding an array of 
Kurdish standpoints which make the KIU different from other political parties in 
Iraq. This is particularly relevant when comparing the KIU with the Iraqi Islamic 
Party (IIP) which operates in a very similar ideological framework. 
However, regardless of the degree to which their values are shared, the KIU 
has had many disagreements with the IIP over a plethora of significant issues – 
such as the case of Kirkuk. Many differences between other MB nationalist-
religious parties can be highlighted in this regard – for example, the differences 
between the stance of the two abovementioned parties concerning the invasion 
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of Iraq in 2003 and  the rest of parties under the MB. Similarly, the position of 
the MB in Kuwait differed substantially from the viewpoint of all the other MBs 
over the Iraqi invasion of 1990. The foregoing thus constitutes evidence of the 
dominance of the „national‟ aspect of religious nationalism in many parties 
subscribing to political Islam. Another example of this pragmatic religious 
nationalism, prior to the on-going Syrian civil war, was the relationship of the 
Syrian government with Hamas and the Egyptian MB on one side, and the 
Syrian MB on the other.  
The focus of this research is to highlight the gradual shift from Islamism to 
religious nationalism in the Middle East through a case study. It seems from the 
outset that the political motivations of KIU are, like those of all similar 
movements in the region, framed in terms of their own nation states. However, 
the KIU is different from similar religious nationalist movements, given the factor 
of the non-statehood of Kurdistan. On the other hand, for all other comparable 
religious nationalist movements, this is a common model of the nation state in 
the region. Hence, the „levels of identity‟ that Huntington (1993: 24) talks about 
can be easily observed with regard to the KIU and the case of Kurds in Iraq. 
The research question and the related hypothesis are covered in more detail in 
Chapter Three in section 2. 2. 4. 
This thesis is structurally divided into two parts. Part one includes Chapters 
One, Two and Three. Part two comprises Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven and 
Eight. Each chapter starts with its own introduction, detailing the subjects 
covered. Essentially, Chapter One presents the theoretical framework, Chapter 
Two covers the literature review and methodology, Chapter Three deals with 
historical backgrounds (from embracing Islam to the dawn of religious 
13 
 
nationalism), ChapterFour discusses the De-Facto Kurdistan Region and the 
Rise of Religious Nationalism, including some data analysis. Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven thoroughly cover the method of data analysis and discuss its results, 
as follows: Chapter Five deals with Islam and the KIU, Chapter Six focuses on 
democracy and the KIU, Chapter Seven covers nationalism and the KIU, and 
finally, Chapter Eight concludes the whole thesis.   
 
Structure: 
The thesis comprises eight chapters. Part one consists of the first three 
chapters. Chapter One is introductory,covering the background and scope of 
the study, its purpose and rationale, and religion and nationalism, including: 
nation, nationalism, Islam and nationalism and Kurds and nationalism. Other 
relevant subjects such as national identity, religious nationalism and its common 
types are also covered in this chapter. Chapter Two encompasses the literature 
review and the methodology, comprising the participants, methods, rationale of 
the research methods, research question and hypothesis, pilot study, materials 
and challenges. Chapter Three covers the periods beginning with embracing 
Islam until the dawn of religious nationalism.  It includes Islam in Kurdistan, the 
role of Kurds during the Islamic eras, the Kurds in the post-Ottoman 
Empire(from its collapse) – from Kurdish religious nationalism to its dichotomy 
into religious groups and nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic 
awakening in Kurdistan, and Kurdish nationalism.Political issues such as therise 
of Marxism and socialism, political parties and social rebellion, other Islamic 
movements and groups, radical jihadism and terror in Kurdistan, de-
radicalisation, and Salafis are also covered. 
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Part two deals with data analysis and discussion. The analysis of the data is 
based on twenty-six themes that highlight the area examined by my hypothesis. 
Chapter Four contains subjects such as: from revolution to governance, the 
Kurdistan front and the1992 election, self-ruling and challenges, the struggle for 
power and civil war, the emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the raison 
d‟être and role of the KIU, the KIU and the political outcome, elections, ethno-
politics and the KIU, and the KIU‟s second political phase. Chapter Five is 
dedicated to discussion of the themes of universalised Islam (Umma), Islamic 
caliphate, Muslim Brotherhood, sacredness, Shari‟ah, preaching and politics, 
and Muslim-Muslim conflicts and rights. Chapter Six deals with democracy, 
theocracy or civil sovereignty?, Islamism versus secularism, and role of women. 
Finally, chapter Seven explores Kurdish or Muslim?, nationalism, nation state, 
reform, realpolitik; which includes KIU‟s politics in the Kurdistan region, 
















Religious Nationalism and Islam 
 
1.1 Introduction: 
This introductory chapter will focus on the background, scope, purpose and 
rationale of the study, with the main part concentrating on the theoretical 
framework. The principal argument here will conclude that religion and 
nationalism have gone through various turbulent relationships. However, in a 
region such as the Middle East, and in the shadow of a religion such as Islam 
and the different ethnic groups that believe in Islam, nationalism and religion 
have eventually reconciled and both are currently aiming at serving different 
nation states. This phenomenon is a new kind of religious nationalism. In this 
part of the chapter the following subjects are covered: nation, nationalism, 
religion and nationalism, national identity, religious nationalism, neo-religious 
nationalism, Islam and nationalism, and Kurds and nationalism.     
Despite the fact that religions can inspire great service and sacrifice for the sake 
of humanity, conflicts that arise from religious ideology often result in a good 
deal of bloodshed and can be considered as some of the most dangerous 
clashes to occur on earth1. This is attributedto their adherents‟ vehement belief 
                                                          
1
Religion has been a major feature in some historical conflicts and the most recent wave of 
modern terrorism. Woodlock, R. (2013). 
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in the conflict being a true cause, as well as their willingness to sacrifice 
everything for the sake of God, including their lives, as stated by Aslan (2010: 
82):  
"When Pat Robertson, American premier evangelical preacher, heard 
about the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, he was convinced it was part 
of God's master plan for the region.‟ This is God's land' Robinson 
declared, 'and God has strong words about someone who parts and 
divides His land. The rabbis put a curse on Yitzhak Rabin when he 
began cutting up the land'.  
This deeply rooted idea of self-sacrifice for the religious cause manifests itself in 
the bomber‟s belief that his actions are done for the sake of God. His measure 
for this becomes quantitative whereby, in order to maximize reward from God 
and to attain the highest honour in paradise, it is necessary for him to kill as 
many people as possible. This is not necessarily limited to the killing of non-
Muslims in an occupied Muslim land, but can also include fellow Muslims in a 
mosque. This follows a similar rationale to that expressed by the rabbi (see 
above quote) in the assassination of Rabin.  
The purpose of this study is neither to provide any form of religious 
authentication or judgment, nor to validate any political behaviour or ideology. It 
will, however, sometimes highlight the religious motives underlying particular 
political behaviours from the perspective of religious nationalists. Thus, the 
subject of this thesis is religious nationalism. More specifically, it will focus on 
the role of both religion and nationalism in political thought through investigating 
the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) as a core example. This thesis is about the 
new wave of religious nationalism amongst the Kurds, which is represented by 
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the KIU in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. It will explore the different roles of both 
nationalism and religion in the KIU as exemplified through an investigation of its 
political development and political behaviour. For the above mentioned reasons, 
the KIU is the most relevant case in order to achieve the aims of this study.  
 
1.2 Background: 
When the KIU began as a political party in 1994, it was the only non-militant, 
peaceful, civil political party working alongside all other political parties whilst 
simultaneously disregarding matters related to ideology. This situation was all 
the more poignant in that the KIU‟s peacefulness existed as a stark contrast to 
the backdrop of civil war that was occurring between other main political parties, 
who were fighting between themselves. On one hand there existed brutal 
fighting between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). On the other, the on-going battle between 
the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) that continued from 1994 till 
1998 resulted in a division of the region into two sub-regional territories. 
Meanwhile, all the main political parties were splintered between both sub-
regions, and the KIU remained as the only wide spread party in the whole 
region. Continuation of the KIU on its peaceful means of conducting its politics 
made it the second party in each sub-region of the PUK and KDP. 
Consequently, KIU not only became a model for IMIK and the bigger dissident 
of it, the Kurdistan Islamic Komal (Group) (KIK), but also a model for the 





In contrast to other Islamists in Kurdistan, the KIU was and still remains the only 
religious nationalist party that started by balancing its politics between religion 
and nationalism and then shifted from pan-Islamism into religious nationalism. 
As a party its work centres on both the people in the nation state and the Iraqi-
Kurdistan region. Not only was its first statement issued on the day of its 
proclamation on 06/02/1994 illustrative of this, but the party‟s practices 
throughout both the Islamist versus non-Islamist tension, and secular-secular 
party tensions are also indicative of these priorities. As Aslan (2010: 24) 
highlights "the real threat to global security comes from the rise of religious 
trans-nationalist movements, such as Jihadism, which cannot be contained 
within any territorial boundaries". In the Kurdistan region within this time period 
all other organised Islamists were jihadists who were largely inspired by the 
jihadist movement of either Afghanistan or the Islamic republic of Iran, thus 
placing little to no attention on the nationalist demands of the Kurds. However, 
the KIU became a model for other Islamists and non-Islamists entities insofar, 
as abovementioned; it was able to maintain a balance between religion and 
nationalism. Currently both KIK and IMIK are emulating the KIU through 
practicing a political civil life following their de-radicalisation post-2003. 
Nevertheless KIU remains as the pioneer amongst the various parties in terms 
of its nationalism objectives. In its general congress in May 2012 it aimed to 
adopt self-determination2 and striving for an independent nation state as its 
strategy, thus making it the first and the only Kurdish political party up until that 
moment to have publicly called for such a nationalist demand. It is therefore 
                                                          
2
 Also, in the last congress in May 2016, the KIU reiterated the self-determination right for the 
people of Kurdistan in an independent national state of Kurdistan. 
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pivotal in a discussion related to religion and nationalism in Kurdistan and the 
influences this has on the political landscape. 
Kurdistan‟s lack of statehood renders the KIU‟s transformation and nationalist 
focus as more obvious, especially when contrasted with other non-Kurdish MB 
cases in the Middle East (ME). For the MBs in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, or Syria, as 
they have no problem of statehood, it is more possible for them to deny their 
religious nationalism and their motivations as being largely centered around 
working for their own nation states, whereas Kurdish parties are unable to do so 
consequent of their primary focus in acquiring statehood. The KIU is also often 
criticised for not only its transformation from Islamism to a religious nationalism, 
but its call for the right of a nation state. Subsequently in some cases such as 
that of Syria, the Syrian MB denies nation rights for Syrian Kurds, whereby the 
ongoing call for federalism within the state of Syria from Syrian Kurds continues 
up until this day. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the KIU are enjoying federalism 
in Iraqi-Kurdistan. For example, only recently their latest party's general 
congress enhanced its political demand through calling for an independent 
nation state.  
However the KIU as a group, and subsequently the Kurdish call for statehood, 
are oftentimes not considered by other MBs as Islamic causes. This is 
especially evident when the situation is compared with that of Hamas in 
Palestine and the support engendered for Hamas by all other MBs regarding its 
call for an independent state. Arguably this is a result of the occupied party (the 
Palestinians) as being occupied by non-Arabs and non-Muslims (Israel); 
whereas the opposing parties for Kurdish independence, on the other hand, 
include Arab, Muslim countries. This can be in part attributed to the Kurds‟ 
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demands for their nation rights as being perceived as an attempt to further 
weaken other Islamic states. In short, although the MBs call for the rights of 
Palestinians using Islamic support as their basis, the Kurdish case is not viewed 
through the same lens and so garners no status as an Islamic case. This double 
standard can be furthermore seen in the support of Islamist parties as Islamic 
cases in other Arab countries, bar the Kurdish case. Apart from their support to 
Hamas in Palestine, many other examples of the support of the Arab Islamists 
to other non-Kurdish freedom fighters have been seen during the so-called Arab 
spring, such as the support of the MB and the Salafis given to the Syrian 
fighters against Asad.      
Other examples of Islamists who supported Islamic cases include Abdullah 
Azam, the mentor of Bin Laden, who was a MB that dedicated himself for the 
Jihad in Afghanistan. Even though these events took place at the same time as 
the ethnic cleansing, chemical bombardment and genocide operations of the 
Kurds in the Anfal campaign under Saddam Hussain, the Kurds received no 
support from a single mujahid and the Iraqi regime was in no way condemned 
for its massacre of the Kurds.  
 
1.3 Scope of the Study: 
Throughout the Middle East there has been a huge political transformation, 
especially amongst the various political parties. Islamic political parties have, in 
particular, been heavily influenced by the shifting political landscape. This study 
will focus on this transformation with an emphasis on the Kurdistan Islamic 
Union (KIU) in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which is believed to be reflective of 
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this on-going shift. Through a focus on this case study, the thesis willexplore to 
what extent an examination of the Kurdish phenomenon with its specific 
features elucidates this region-wide process. 
The KIU was established in 1994. Initially its ideology and strategies were 
based on that of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). However, over the last few 
years the party has undergone a significant transformation in regards to its 
political aims and objectives.  
There has been little research on religious nationalism in Kurdish Politics. Most 
of the previous work (especially MA and PhD dissertations) on Kurdish 
Nationalism focuses on historical political movements with little analysis of the 
religious nature of these movements. In this context, I feel that an investigation 
of Kurdish religious nationalism (RN) is relevant. This research will also be 
useful insofar as it will offer both a point of comparison and contrast between 
similar phenomena throughout the region.  
A limitation of this study is the relationship between Islamism and Nationalism in 
Kurdistan. In Kurdistan, the KIU is a special paradigm for many reasons, unique 
in character,and is a phenomenon throughout the whole ME region. It is a 
representative case of transforming from Islamism into nationalism. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the Study: 
This study aims to examine the newly emerged political phenomenon that is the 
intersection and subsequent interaction of both religion and nationalism in 
Kurdistan. This will be explored in light of similar Islamists in the Middle East. 
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This study will argue that the Kurdish example is illustrative of a new kind of 
religious nationalism, one that differs from the conventional religious nationalism 
that was observed in the last century. The case study for this project is the KIU 
in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, and aims at exploring the case of the KIU in light 
of it being a new form of religious nationalism. To understand this new 
phenomenon, it is necessary to explore the traditional definition of Religious 
Nationalism, which necessitates a general overview of the basic concepts.  
 
1.5 Rationale of the Study: 
The significance of this project can be highlighted in the following manner: 
1) Religion has had a deep influence on the Middle East, evidenced by the 
many Islamic empires, which existed in the region over the last 13 centuries, 
until the end of the Ottoman Empire. Kurds, in oneway or another, were part of 
this history. Now, increasingly the phenomenon of Islamism generally and 
religious nationalism specifically as a combination of religion and nationalism in 
the political arena is worth such a project. Especially, since there is no clear cut 
academic research highlighting the combination of religion and nationalism in 
Kurdistan. 
2) Despite the foundation of Israel in 1948 as a religious, nationalist state, a 
sense of nationalism was growing among the Islamic movements. The 
establishment of Israel as a religious nation kind of provoked the Islamists. 
Hence, their Islamic dimension was increasing as a reaction to that. However, 
since the 1990s, the nationalist dimension of many Islamists has begun to grow. 
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Understanding this phenomenon among the Kurdish Islamists is extremely 
important.   
3) Looking back at the era of nationalism in the Middle East, particularly from 
the 1950s onwards, there were two paths of movement, nationalism on one 
side, and Islamism on the other.  However, today there is a juncture between 
the two. For instance, in the new Iraq3, you cannot distinguish between the two, 
as almost all the Arab political parties, especially the majority (Shiias), are 
religious and nationalists at the same time. This phenomenon is particularly 
important in the case of Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish nationalism is not yet 
distinctive in the region because it has not yet come to fruition as a nation state. 
In Kurdistan, religious nationalism has grown side-by-side with the nationalist 
movement. Understanding this in the Kurdish political arena is the task of this 
thesis. 
4) Finally, the significance of this study for its target audience, such as 
researchers of the Middle East, diplomats, political science students, Islamism 
and political Islam, Kurdish studies, religious nationalism, and similar situations 
is valuable, because it highlights a new phenomenon which is expanding over 
the region, especially in the margin of the growing democracy. 
The emergence of a new wave of religious nationalism in the region of the 
Middle East is completely different than the nationalist and religious movements 
of the last century. Zubaida (2004: 413) states: “Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism 
have been dreams and aspirations, while the territorial nation-state is the only 
concrete political reality, as nation and as state. But there are many forms of 
articulations between territorial nationalisms and Islam”. Investigation of this 
                                                          
3
The term „new Iraq‟ refers to post Saddam‟s regime which is supposed to be a democratic Iraq. 
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issue will enhance our understanding of the social politics of the region. This 
phenomenon has especially grown in the shadow of the Arab spring. 
Furthermore, it will aid in understanding how nationalism and religion influence 
each other. More importantly, in the Kurdish case, all three elements of 
nationalism, religion, and working towards statehood are still new, and the 
Kurdish followers of religious nationalism show more eagerness than any other 
example, except the Palestinian case.   
 
1.6 Religion and Nationalism: 
Before stepping into the subject of religious nationalism, first, and briefly, nation 
and nationalism need to be examined. 
 
1.6.1 Nation: 
Smith (2003: 24) defines a nation as “a named human population occupying a 
historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, 
and common laws and customs for all members”. According to this definition, 
the Ottoman4, for example, would have been considered as a nation in light of 
this definition. Nonetheless, ideas surrounding the exact definition of the term 
                                                          
4
 Marsh (2008: 101) “throughout almost its entire history from the 13
th
 to the early 20
th
 centuries, 
for example, the Ottoman Empire was ordered along religious lines, not national ones. In fact, 
there was no national identity per se, with all Muslims enjoying the same rights and privileges 
no matter what their ethnic background. Turkic, Arabic, Slavic, or so on. All non-Muslims 
(dhimmi) in the empire, meanwhile, were placed by the Sublime Porte into a confessional 
community, or millet. This system provided a high degree of tolerance for ethnic differences and 




„nation‟ have shifted throughout history according to the way in which various 
nations have been formed5. Nebez (2002: 8) states: 
“The Arabic word of Ummah, which the Arabs currently use as equivalent 
to the European word of nation, similar to the word of Al-Qawmwhich 
existed before the appearance of Islam, and it has been mentioned 67 
times in Quran, of which 13 times in a plural form. However, it seems that 
this word basically had no political meaning. Rather it was referring to a 
community with reference to a particular religion. This will be clarified by 
the following Quranic verse: „and we certainly sent into every nation a 
messenger‟ meaning we have sent to every religious community a 
prophet”. 
Furthermore, the concept of Ummah is explicitly clear from the constitution of 
Madina, that was written by the prophet Muhammad, and the word Ummah is 
referred to as citizens or the community of the diverse state of Madinah. This is 
evident in article 30 of the constitution “the Jews of BanuAwf shall be 
considered a community along with the believers”6. In the actual Arabic text the 
word community is referred to as Ummah.  
For example, when the Kemalists rebuilt Turkey on the basis of Turkish 
racialism and named it Turkey, the land adopted a sense of exclusiveness 
whereby it became the land and nationhood of the Turks. Through doing so 
there was an explicit denial of all other ethnic groups, languages and cultures, 
including their scripts and pronunciations.  All citizens were forced to accept this 
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Bonikowski, B., 2016, “meanings attached to the nation vary within and across populations as 
well as over time”.  
 




new nation, which considered all the citizens of Turkey as Turks, thus 
neglecting other ethnic identities7. This ideology of the Kemalists dated back to 
the late Ottoman era in second half of the 19th century, which was when the 
idea of Turkification first came to exist amongst the Turkish elites, an idea that 
would later pave the way for a Turkish nationalism. Eventually this idea was 
successfully attained and subsequently manifested through an attempt to 
assimilate all other groups. This policy of a nation based on ethnicity also 
existed in other regions in the Middle East and was promoted by similar minded 
nationalists. Hence the concept of nation after the Ottoman Empire referred to 
ethnic groups and this currently remains the case throughout the region. 
Although the Sykes Picot agreement hugely helped in creating nation states 
throughout the Middle East, this new system was unable to unite many Arab 
nation states on the basis of their heavily entrenched existing notions of 
nationalism and ethnic exclusivity.  
 
1.6.2 Nationalism: 
Nationalism as Smith (2003: 24) states is:  
“…commonly used in several senses, most notably to refer to 
sentiments, on the one hands, and ideologies and movements, on the 
other hand. Here, I shall restrict its meaning to the latter, and define 
nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and 
maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population 
                                                          
7
“Article 66 of Turkey‟s constitution: 1- everyone bounds to the Turkish state through the bound 
of citizenship is a Turk”. 
International Constitutional Law Countries. Online:  (www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/tu00000_.html). 
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some of whose members deem it to constitute on actual or potential 
„nation‟”.  
During the later stage of the Ottoman Empire nationalism was perceived as the 
engine that would generate modernity. Unlike the case of Europe, however, 
nationalism in the Middle East resulted in weak, fragmented nation states. 
Nations such as the Kurds were left behind with no equal rights as a result of 
nationalist movements, and so nationalism in this sense was neither the vehicle 
for modernity nor a mean for stability in the region. On the contrary, it led to 
sentiments and extremism between various ethnic groups thatlater caused 
disastrous ethnic wars and tensions. In short, nationalism emerged in the region 
as a movement aimed at establishing a greater sense of modernity, but instead 
shaped itself in the form of political entities with ideological backgrounds. Smith 
(1987: 18) explains:   
“Nationalism, both as ideology and movement, is a wholly modern 
phenomenon, even if, as we shall see, the „modern nation‟ in practice 
incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnie and owes much to 
the general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the 
dawn of the „modern era‟”.  
In a region such as the Middle East, a region that consists of a set of countries 
rife with underlying ethnic and religious tension, nationalism no doubt would 
lead to an intense degree of ethnic conflict. Not only this, but the additional 
tension amongst Arab countries regarding natural resources and borders has in 
the past led to events such as the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi regime in 
1990. Furthermore, the fanatic fervor and strong ethno-centric sentiment that is 
often caused by nationalism would only serve to produce further internal 
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problems. In essence an ethnic-based nationalism, therefore, results in a 
preference by those in power for those of a given ethnicity, which thus creates 
exclusivity. This can be seen in the case of various Arab states that necessarily 
prefer their own people over those of neighbouring countries, a position which is 
further extended when related to a specific city, a sect, or clan. Ethno-centric 
sentiments of this nature are well known amongst extreme nationalists, who 
oftentimes produce many jokes about each other. This mentality sometimes 
leads to a sense of tribalism, nepotism, kinship, and ultimately oligarchy. The 
nationalism of the Arab Baath Socialist Party is an example of this, whereby 
their vision led both Iraq and Syria into funneling down the power into a sense 
of Iraqism and Syrianism, which then extended into the hands of two sects, 
clans, family, a man, and then ultimately their sons. 
Generally the Middle East has always faced problems en masse regarding 
secular nationalism. Contrary to the Western nationalism that Smith (2003: 15-
16) describes as:  
“Nationalism as it appeared in the West was secularizing, if not an 
outright secular and anthropocentric, doctrine. That was certainly the 
case with Revolutionary France, for the Hellenic nationalism of Greek 
intellectuals in Kemalist Turkey, and among several subsequent Marxist 
nationalisms. These were the official nationalisms of the secular elites 
and they have loomed large in the discussion of nationalism”.  
Unlike nationalism in the West, which was based on secularism and exclusion 
of religion, this perspective was never accepted by the masses in the Middle 
East. Even more extreme secular parties such as the Kemalists, who came to 
power in 1908 through a coup, were unable to abolish the caliphate until 1924. 
29 
 
Overall, therefore, nationalism emerged in the Middle East as a hope for 
modernisation, but then transformed into anti-colonialism. Nonetheless, there 
were and still are secular nationalist elites in the Middle East as well as many 
other Islamic countries. As a result, political elites are in a position where not 
only can they not implement a more secular approach in their societies, but also 
for the purpose of remaining in the political arena it is necessary for them to 
sometimes praise Islam and religious figures as this will deter anger from the 
mass public. Hence in the Middle East secularism and nationalism are 
perceived by the people through different lenses. Contrary to Smith (2003: 17)‟s 
remark, people in the Middle East did not realise that “Nationalism may also 
appear as rivals and surrogates for traditional religions”. In addition, in many 
cases even the leaders themselves were religious figures, and the slogans and 
motivations of nationalist mobilisations incorporated Islamic content.  
There do exist, however, some extreme cases in Middle Eastern secular 
nationalism where the case of nationalism vis-à-vis religion came to the light. In 
these circumstances oftentimes political elites dealt literally with the cases and 
so misread Islam, their societies and nationalism8. Smith (2003: 17) describes 
the way in which “In this model, the nation state replaces the deity, history 
assumes the role of divine providence, the leader becomes the prophet, his 
writings and speeches from the sacred texts, the national movement becomes 
the new church, and its celebratory and commemorative rites take the place of 
religious ceremonies”. 
                                                          
8Werleman (2015) quoted “You can take religion out of the state, but not out of the nation,” from 
Karen Armstrong‟s Fields of Blood: the History of Religion and Violence, when the French 
colonised Muslim-majority countries, and “the army officers wanted to secularise, but found 
themselves ruling devout nations for whom a secularised Islam was a contradiction in terms. 





Although most nationalists would not dare to admit the aforementioned, the rival 
Islamists have often employed these ideas and behaviours of nationalists. The 
mainstream Islamists often utilise secular fundamentalism. The hyper-
secularism of the Kemalists, in Turkey, for instance, led to the strong Islamism 
of the AK party and its support by the people. Furthermore, many of the so 
called „Takfiris‟ expiatory groups have built their ideologies on the ideas and 
behaviours of secular nationalists, who perceive secularism as a replacement 
for religion9. Yet, overall, in the Islamic World, all nationalist movements, almost 
always referred to, at least publicly, to Islamic sentiment. For instance, the 
notion of martyrdom was used in all revolutions, wars and even 
demonstrations10. Quite often during such events, one could hear the slogan of 
„Allahu Akbar‟ (Allah is the greatest) being shouted out emphatically. This has 
been done regardless of whether a given event was related to a cause dear to 
secular nationalists or Islamists. In other words, in the Middle East, since the 
early days of embracing nationalism to the present day, nationalism has never 
been accepted as a rival or surrogate to Islam.  
 
1.6.3Religion and Nationalism: 
Generally, nationalism in the Middle East - as well as in other places – has, in 
itself, elements of fanaticism11. In this case, religious elements come into play, 
                                                          
9
 Ibid“An overwhelming majority of Europeans fighting for IS are being recruited from the most 
hyper-secular state on the continent: France”. 
10It is obvious to any political observer in Arab countries that all nationalists, Islamists, socialists 
and even the communists call their killed individuals in their struggle for their cause as martyrs. 
 
11
 According to Hayes, nationalism mobilises a „deep and compelling emotion‟ that is „essentially 
religious‟. Like other religions, nationalism involves faith in some external power, feelings of awe 
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in the sense that similarly to religious exclusiveness, nationalists put often their 
nations on pedestal. There are many arguments with regard to the relation 
between religion and nationalism12. In relation to the purpose of this project, I 
will shed light on four main relevant arguments; the first two remain the most 
relevant to this study. The second two arguments will be dealt with under Islam 
and nationalism.  
Firstly, the idea of sacredness that many followers of nationalism subscribe to, 
such as the idea of sacred land, comes from what Smith (2003: 255-256) 
mentions:  
“Four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundation, drawn from 
earlier religious belief-systems, have been of particular importance in this 
regard: 
A myth of ethnic election, the conviction of being chosen for a 
covenant or mission, or both, by the deity;  
A long-standing attachment to particular terrains regarded as 
sacred and as belonging to the community, and it to them; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and reverence, and ceremonial rites, focused on the flag. Straining a bit to sustain the 
metaphor, Hayes argued that nationalism has its gods – „the patron or the personification of 
[the] fatherland‟; its „speculative theology or mythology‟, describing the „eternal past and . . . 
everlasting future‟ of the nation; its notions of salvation and immortality; its canon of holy 
scripture; its feasts, fasts, processions, pilgrimages and holy days; and its supreme sacrifice. 
But while most world religions serve to unify, nationalism „re-enshrines the earlier tribal mission 
of a chosen people‟, with its „tribal selfishness and vainglory‟. Brubaker (2011: 3).  
 
12
 For instance, Brubaker (2011: 1) classifies this relation onto four categories, as he highlighted 
them in his abstract as follows: 
“Building on recent literature, this paper discusses four ways of studying the relation 
between religion and nationalism. The first is to treat religion and nationalism, along 
with ethnicity and race, as analogous phenomena. The second is to specify ways in 
which religion helps explain things about nationalism - its origin, its power, or its 
distinctive character in particular cases. The third is to treat religion as part of 
nationalism, and to specify modes of interpenetration and intertwining. The fourth is to 
posit a distinctively religious form of nationalism”. 
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A yearning to recover and realize the spirit of one or more golden 
ages, epochs of communal heroism and creativity; 
A belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual sacrifice 
to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of 
commemorating and celebrating the community and its heroes”. 
Normally, the notion of “the chosen people” is heard in reference to the so-
called “people of the book,” especially Jewish people. This has even been 
described in the Qur‟an (2: 47) “O Children of Israel! Remember My Favour 
which I bestowed upon you and that I preferred you to the „Alamin[mankind and 
jinn (of your time period, in the past)]”. Similarly, another rank has been 
mentioned regarding the Muslims in the Qur'an (3: 110) “Ye are the best 
community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and 
forbid indecency; and believe in Allah”. With no mention of the rationale behind 
being good and proud as followers of a certain religion are, might lead to 
arrogance and racism, and has no humane message that many religions call 
for. Further, whenever the followers of any religion or nation had this feeling and 
dealt with others in such a manner, it sparked hatred and isolation.   
The idea of sacred land is also one of the used parts of the Abrahamic religions 
by nationalists. For instance, in Islam, human life is the most sacred and more 
important than anything else. In a well-known, Hadith, the prophet stated that, 
“Destroying Kaaba13 stone by stone, is less evil than killing a single Muslim”. 
This means that whatever is sacred, even as much as Kaaba, to Allah, a 
                                                          
13
Muslims believe the Kaaba was originally built by Abraham and Ishmael, but the site was re-
dedicated by Muhammad and has been reconstructed since. When Muslims pray, wherever 
they are, they turn toward the Kaaba, and during the hajj, pilgrims walk counterclockwise 
around it seven times.  




human‟s life is greater than it. Otherwise, the credibility of the religion should be 
called into questioned. The idea of sacred land seems to be the most 
problematic, because if a nation cannot argue the idea of descending from a 
chosen people, having a golden era or glorious historical heroes, then they 
surely must have a land to stick to, a sacred land to be proud of among the 
other nations. This is actually one of the most controversial and dangerous 
ideas that might create conflicts between the nations anywhere and anytime. As 
far as the other three elements14: (a chosen people, a golden era or glorious 
historical heroes) are concerned, they are only related to oneself, and are not of 
much provocation to others. However, the idea of a one nation being entitled to 
sacred land could lead to intrusion of other lands. The worst case scenario is 
this intrusion, which leads to on-going apprehension, and the inhabitants of that 
particular land would continuously feel insecure. Again, even with the ability to 
regain or occupy the land, the new inhabitants will have the same insecurity, 
simply because anytime whenever the other nation has the ability to regain the 
„sacred land‟, it would almost definitely do so. This cycle could possibly go on 
forever. The example of the sacred land of Palestine and the historical claims to 
it shared by Jews, Christians and Muslims can well represent this argument. 
However, the idea of a sacred homeland is not necessarily inherited from the 
divine religions. Smith (2003:256) stated: 
“Alongside the even more widespread attachments to loyalty and region, 
the idea of a sacred ethnic homeland became prominent among certain 
ancient peoples, and was transferred, particularly in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, to other lands in much later periods of history. In both cases, 
                                                          
14Smith (2003: 255-256). 
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modern nationalists were able to draw on popular traditions and 
sentiments of chosen peoples and sacred homelands, and integrate 
them into the nationalist salvation drama, redirecting their primary focus 
into the political realm”.  
In the early stages of Islam, such sacred ethnic homelands were regarded as 
„Jahiliah‟ (ignorance), and Islam abolished all kinds of ideas. Despite what was 
established in Islamic history, this issue remained unresolved until the 
introduction of nationalism15 at the end of Ottoman Empire. Banko (2011) 
remarked: 
“In 1869, the Ottoman government issued the Ottoman Law of 
Nationality, which defined Ottoman citizenship (tabi‟iyet) without 
reference to religion. Without distinction, all Ottoman subjects were 
defined as Ottoman nationals. Around this same time, Egyptian 
intellectuals began to spread ideas of territorial nationalisms distinct from 
an Ottoman identity (osmanlilik). According to the work of historian 
UssamaMakdisi, Syrian Butros al-Bustani in the 1860s distributed 
pamphlets throughout Syria addressed to his countrymen; these 
advocated that a secular citizenship be developed, taught and actively 
practiced. These Ottoman Arabs were influenced by the French concepts 
of patrie, or fatherland, and used watanto mean the same - the homeland 
as the focus of identity, belonging, and duty”.   
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 “The relationship between Islam and nationalism is a very modern one. Historically, all 
members of the Muslim faith were conceived of as being united into one community of 
believers, the Ummah Wahida. In this ummah, one‟s particular ethnicity and place of residence 
were irrelevant, for the common faith in the teachings of Muhammad was what united Muslims 





Thus, for the Islamic world too, this idea has been derived from a non-religious 
standpoint16. As Smith mentioned earlier, it has been transferred from ancient 
peoples to Judaeo-Christian tradition, then into Islam. Later, in both cases, 
religion has been used to philosophize and moralise the idea of chosen people 
and sacred land. This is despite the Islamic texts clarify the message of Islam in 
this regard, which is liberation from all kinds of similar sentiments that are called 
the Jahiliah. Also, the Qur‟an (49: 13) has stated: 
“O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the 
most honourable of you with Allah are those (believers) who have At-
Taqwa [i.e. they are one of the Muttaqun (the pious. See V. 2:2)]. Verily, 
Allah is All-Knowing and Well-Acquainted (with all things)”.  
So, the only scale for being the best is piety, not one's nation or tribe. Hence, 
there is no one sacred nation, tribe, object, or land, but instead there is only one 
thing most sacred on earth: human life. When nationalism introduces a chosen 
people or a sacred land for certain people, then other nations could raise similar 
ideologies. Then, the next nation would follow in this ideology, and so on.   
Thus, none of the [Abrahamic] religions have initially preferred their followers 
over the others. For example, if the early generations of Muslims considered 
themselves superior to others, how could they possibly approach them and 
                                                          
16
“With the development of separate states in which Muslims predominated, separate national 
identities began to emerge alongside the existing Muslim identity, leading to a hybrid religio-
national identity, for example, Egyptian Muslims. Libyan Muslims, and Saudi Muslim”. Ibid: 




convince them to accept Islam, with having such a barrier in between? Over 
time, the cultures and attitudes of religious people have changed. Thus, of self-
sacredness have been created and used for political purposes. For instance, 
the aforementioned four sacred foundations have been used by no religious 
nationalists. Smith (2003: 255- 256) once more highlights: 
“Each of these four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundations 
has a long history; none of them have been „invented‟ by nationalists. Of 
course, the terms in which they have been put clearly differ from those to 
be found in a pre-nationalist world”.  
Sometimes, people subconsciously practice religion in non-religious contexts, 
as with nationalism. In some cases, nationalism becomes a religion17, especially 
to people such as fundamentalists, who look at themselves as the best people, 
or the chosen ones, or their land as the holy one; this implies it is better than 
other lands.     
A logical question therefore arises whether any religion could claim that it is the 
best and its followers are the chosen people. Within any religion, the issue of a 
chosen group, sect, or school of thought has occurred. For example, in Islam, 
misinterpretation of Quranic verses and other religious texts by nationalists 
resulted in mass confusion. For instance, when we look from a nationalist 
perspective at the history of Islam, each Muslim ethnic group by referring to 
their own glorious martyrs or heroic Muslim leaders could claim that they are the 
best Muslims according to their role in the Islamic history. Even, sometimes 
nowadays, some of the secular nationalists blame those Muslim leaders from 
their own nationalistic point of view, insofar as the historical leaders did not work 
                                                          
17
Brubaker (2011: 3) on Hayes. See footnote 11 above.  
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for their ethnic group, rather they only dedicated themselves to Islam. However, 
in that Islamic era, that sort of ideology would hold no meaning or value. The 
reason is simply because nationalism is relatively a new ideology, and the 
historical Muslim leaders and scholars did not look at today‟s issues from a 
nationalist standpoint. Nationalists might accuse Muslim leaders of having no 
special attention to their own people, ignoring the different context in which they 
lived. This is an anachronism, and unbalanced judgment, as nationalists try to 
weigh these religious values with the nationalist ideology. Smith (2003: 258-
259) adds: 
“Maintaining a sacred communion of the people requires that its 
members strive to ensure that their nation continues to be „authentic‟ or 
„true to itself,‟ and this can be achieved only by assiduously cultivating 
the four kinds of cultural resources that act as „foundations‟ or „pillars‟ of 
national identity, and by continuing to regard them as canonical and holy. 
Hence, the repeated calls by secular as well as religious nationalists 
leaders to the members of their nations to be true to their unique national 
vocation, to love their homelands, to remember their ancestors and their 
glorious past(s), and to imitate the heroic dead and be prepared to make 
sacrifices for the happy and glorious destiny of their nation”.  
There wouldn‟t be a problem to do so, as long as other nations or ethnic groups 
are not affected in the process. However, in the process of trying to prove these 
grand notions of nationalism, there is almost always direct influence on 
surrounding nations, which is why nationalists and their ideals of chosen lands 
never can be ended. The main problem with these “sacred” ideas is that they 




Secondly, Kedourie (1971: 76) talks about the relationship between nationalism 
and religion: 
“In Zionism, Judaism ceases to be the raison d‟etre of the Jew, and 
becomes, instead, a product of Jewish national consciousness. In the 
doctrine of Pakistan, Islam is transformed into a political ideology and 
used in order to mobilize Muslims against Hindus; however, this it cannot 
do, since an Islamic state on classical lines today would be an impossible 
anachronism”. 
Despite all this, it is important to bear in mind that not all Jews are Zionists. 
When we look at Zionism, Kedourie‟s assertion can be valid in regards to the 
relationship of religion to nationalism18. To some extent, the Pakistani example 
cannot fit into the same category of nationalism. He said it must be “in order to 
mobilize Muslims against Hindus.” Otherwise, assuming that there were no 
Hindus in India at all, would Pakistan still emerge? Also, for a religion like 
Christianity or Islam with followers of all races and ethnicity, how and to what 
nationalism would the religious followers turn to? Of course, last century 
witnessed the emergence of many religious nationalist states, but nationalism 
wasn‟t the replacement of the religions. Both examples of Pakistan and Israel 
support this argument, insofar as in these two countries, the religion helped the 
creation of the nation state. It was therefore not the people turning to 
nationalism whilst leaving the religion behind. So, in some cases, in order to 
protect a certain people, religion was used, and religious nationalism was the 
                                                          
18
The Israeli government's own statistics show that 15% of Israelis are religious. This doesn't 
stop 90% of them claiming that this land has been given to them by God... in whom they don't 
believe. (http://www.biblebelievers.org.au/zionmyth6.htm).  
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product. However, this wasn‟t the case with all the types of nationalism that 
emerged, especially when more than one nation have the same official religion.  
Hence, even in the examples given by Kedourie, such as Israel or Pakistan, 
nationalism was not the replacement of religion. Conversely, in both cases 
religion was the key that legitimised the distinction and stepped towards a 
nation state. However, such religious nationalist states did not necessarily lead 
to theocracy. Democracy, to a large extent, is practised especially in Israel, and 
in Pakistan, too. It is practised much more than in Arab secular states such as 
Syria,for example, or Iraq under Saddam. In all instances of nationalism in the 
Middle East, whether in secular states or religious nationalist states, religion is 
still one of the strong mobilisers. Iran under the secular regime of the Shah did 
not prevent the strong growth of religious mobilisation that brought Khomeini to 
power. Similarly, the strong nationalism of the Kemalists and their hyper-
secularism did not stop Islamism in Turkey. 
 
1.6.4 National Identity: 
National identity differs from one nation to another, even if they all officially 
celebrate one religion. Smith (2003: 24-25) writes, “As the maintenance and 
continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, systems, memories, myths, 
and traditions that from the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the 
identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern”. National identity 
can be shaped by elements that vary from nation, religion, sect, ethnicity, or 
geographical area. So, the diversity within one community, nation, or a religion 
could highlight the national identity. Within this identity is an example of how 
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diversity is respected and protected. For instance, in Islam, as it has been cited 
from Ibn Al-Aqyyim19 on Fatwa: Islamic rulings and judgments may change by 
time, place, and condition. This variation has always existed; otherwise, the 
gates of dictatorship would have opened. As a part of national identity, culture 
holds great importance. It is culture that highlights the differences between one 
nation and another. The differences in culture may be due to religion, ethnicity, 
territoriality, tribes, sects, and other factors. Smith (2003: 25) comments, “Two 
of the nation‟s most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted 
by „ethnicity‟ and „religion‟”.  In many cases, within one religion, an ethnic group 
differs from the others; not all the followers are uniform. Religions clearly have 
their differences as well. So within one religion, some other aspects may hold 
greater importance than in the others. Zubaida (2011: 185-186) elaborates “Ben 
Badis (d. 1940), a prominent reformist, like other Algerian ulama20 in the first 
half of the twentieth century, resisted the colonial thrust to make Algeria French 
with the slogan, „Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my 
fatherland”. 
Here, a multi-dimensional view of national identity can be observed. For 
instance, there might be an American, Muslim Arab from an Egyptian ethnic 
minority. For each of these identities, there is a distinct culture that ultimately 
creates an identity different from a non-American, Muslim Egyptian. 
Understanding cultural differences is quite important to realize and to create a 
distinction between the practices of people of one religion from different cultural 
perspectives. Akyol (2011) talks about the way that some local cultural practices 
have been linked to the articles of faith of Islam. He gives an example on his 
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 Elias, Abu Amina, 2014, Ibn Al-Qayyim on Fatwa.  
20
Ulama is the plural of  Aalim, which is a scholar. 
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visit to Mecca. He says that he went to visit the holy Kabaa, and while he was 
doing his Tawaf, the spiritual circle walk around Kabaa, he noticed that men and 
women were walking shoulder to shoulder, with no separation between them. 
However, when he left Kabaa to have his lunch downtown, he went into a 
Burger King and noticed that there were two designated areas that physically 
separated men from women. Then, he remarks, “That is culture.” Otherwise, if 
the issue of separation of men and women was a religious issue in Islam, then 
from the time of the prophet, they would practice separation in the holiest place, 
the Kabaa.  Akyol concludes that there are various Muslim cultures that have 
different practices, but if one person was to look at any one of them, they might 
conclude that one society is representative of Islamic society as a whole. 
Hence, in Muslim nations, each culture comes from different traditions that 
constitute their unique national identities, which are more often different from 
one another. There is no contradiction between holding more than an identity. 
So, religious nationalism can be the crossroads of religion and nationalism 
within different ethnicities of a religion.  
 
1.6.5 Religious Nationalism: 
When it comes to ideologies and religious rhetoric, neo-religious nationalism 
has a different stance than that of a secular one. This is clearly different than a 
pure, religious vision with no political integration. Rather, this stance has given 
nationalists anew political vision, which can be considered as political toleration 
and pluralism. On the other hand, even with the same ideology of Religious 
Nationalism (RN) and sharing of Islamic principles, once it comes to political 
differences, there would be a pure political vision which disregards the religious 
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or ideological principles. In a sense that the religious nationalists are 
disregarding the notion of Islamic nation (Ummah), and dealing with the 
situation on the bases of the current de-facto nation states. Thus, the whole 
idea of sanctity, either from a nationalist or religious point of view, can be 
argued. Even in religion, the idea of sanctity of many things, like the holy land or 
a holy person has been created by the people. Otherwise, humanity must be 
the focus of the religions21 or, the idea of sanctity, in both cases, will 
undoubtedly lead to hatred and ultimately end in war over which people believe 
in the “true” sacred entity.        
We looked at nationalism and its sacred elements that were derived from divine 
religions into Judaeo-Christian tradition, and recently, into Islam, too. In some 
cases, Smith remarks, “Ethnos would appear to be more suited to cultural rather 
than biological or kinship differences; it is the similarity of cultural attributes in a 
group that attracts the term „ethnos‟ (1987:21).” For long periods of time, the 
Ottoman Empire was able to rule many different ethnic groups on the basis of 
the general Islamic culture that brought Muslims and non-Muslims together. 
Zubaida (2011: 24) states: 
“The thinkers Abdulkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar in Iran, and Ali 
Bulac and his associates in Turkey, as well as Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt, 
have argued that Islam is not essentially about the state, but about the 
community (Umma). They proceed to identify the community with a “civil 
society” of actively participating citizens. Some Islamists in exile, such as 
Tunisian writer Rashid Ghanoushi, echo this theme”.  
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This was seen in different places over various periods of time in many religions 
and cultures. For instance, as Smith (1987: 23) mentions: 
"In Yugoslavia, where the Muslims of Bosnia have decided to adopt the 
name „Muslim‟ as an ethnic designation in the Yugoslavian census, 
which requires everyone to name their nationality. This, in spite of the 
fact that many such Bosnian Muslims no longer adhere to the beliefs and 
practices of Islam. Yet they identified themselves, and were identified by 
others, by reference to their religious origins (the fact that they had been 
Muslims) in a society where nationality and religious affiliation were 
closely intertwined, preferring this identity as their emblem than the name 
of the province they had so long inhabited”. 
This is a well-defined example of religious nationalism. When a   religion is 
subject to oppression, then the sense of affiliation to the religion grows, by both 
religious and non-religious individuals. However, when the oppression is 
towards nationality or ethnicity, then almost all people will agree on the basis of 
nationalism. A good example if that of Kurdish nationalism, where we can see 
that the oppressors are other Muslim ethnicities; it is quite obvious that the 
nationalist movement will appeal to both secular and religious people alike.  
Juergensmeyer‟s (1993: 40) definition for religious nationalism is a “means to 
attempt to link religion and the nation-state”. However, neo-religious nationalism 
in the Middle East does not look to establish or run a state on the basis of this 
definition.  It is not like the last century‟s examples of religious nationalist states, 
such as Pakistan, Israel, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, which were 
founded on the basis of a particular religion to have a state for that given people 




From the last century‟s perspective on religious nationalism, we come across 
the following kinds that Juergensmeyer (1996: 1-2) classifies as:  
A. Ethnic Religious Nationalism: “This kind of nationalism is linked to 
people and land. I use the term “ethnic” in this context to refer to 
communities bound by race, history or culture, who feel opposed or 
limited within an old social order and who wish to establish a political 
identity of their own, usually in a geographical region of their own 
(1996: 1-2).” The previously mentioned examples of religious 
nationalisms (Pakistan, Israel, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) fall in this category - national identity connected to 
religion, and state formation based on it”.  
 
B. Ideological Religious Nationalism: “This second kind of nationalism 
is attached to ideas and beliefs.” In a multi-ethnic state like Iran, after 
the Revolution of 1979, [First name here] Khumaini established the 
Islamic government on the basis of the notion in Shiasm of “Wilaiat al-
faqih.”This disregarded the different ethnicities that were living in Iran. 
Thus, the strength of Khumaini‟s success came not from a particular 
ethnicity, but from the majority of Shia Muslims that comprised the 
Iranian nation and believed in his ideology. This kind of religious 
nationalism, whether it is in the framework of a state, like the Iranian 
one, or is spread over many states, like the Muslim Brotherhood, has 
the same kind of ideology vis-a-vis western secular nationalism. 
Juergensmeyer declared, “Religious nationalists are now rejecting the 
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ideological underpinnings of western secular nationalism, the faith in 
reason and the social contract expressed by the ideologues and by 
theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, and 
replacing it with a new ideological framework of their own, one that 
combines traditional religious beliefs in divine law and religious 
authority with the modern notion of the nation-state”. 
 
C. Ethno-ideological Religious Nationalism: “A third form of religious 
nationalism, which one might call "ethno-ideological” combines the 
other two and is both ethnic and ideological in character.” Hamas in 
Palestine and the KIU in Kurdistan could be considered examples of 
this kind of religious nationalism”. 
 
The examples of religious nationalism vary from a place to place or from one 
time to another. The aforementioned example of the former Yugoslavia, where 
people wanted to be called Muslim rather than any ethnic name comes from 
people feeling that their religious identity is in danger. . However, when a 
nationality is in danger, people will emphasize their nationality, but this doesn‟t 
necessarily mean forgetting their religion (and vice versa). This is well-
understood as protection of oneself and the identity that one belongs to. 
Sometimes, people prioritize and protect both their religion and nationalism. 
This is not a contradiction. (Smith, 2003: 9) notes: 
“It is usual to see in nationalism a modern, secular ideology that replaces 
the religious systems found in pre-modern, traditional societies. In this 
view „religion‟ and „nationalism‟ figure as two terms in the conventional 
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distinction between tradition and modernity, and in an evolutionary 
framework that sees an inevitable movement whether liberating or 
destructive-from the one to the other”. 
In truth, one can argue that in many cases, such as in Israel, Pakistan, the 
former Soviet Muslim-populated client states, and Bosnia, nationalism protected 
religion. However, for other examples, such as the Arab countries, as well as 
Kurdistan, Islamism has appeared as a reaction to secular nationalism.  
 
1.6.6 Neo-Religious Nationalism: 
There is a new, growing wave of religious nationalism (RN) in the Middle East. 
This is a result of having political parties within the framework of the territorial 
nation states of the ME that were initially rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which, according to their political strategy, they were ultimately aiming to have 
an Islamic caliphate. Therefore, they looked at those many emerged territorial 
nation states from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire as non-Islamic states. 
However, since the 1990s, they have changed their behavior in this regard; they 
have actively gone into these other nation states with complete recognition for 
their statehood. Since then, the motivation for work within this framework, 
according to them, is religious, despite the point that the context is a nation 
state. In other words, for them, their political participations are in the sake of 
religion and to serve the nation. Thus, to keep their nation state prosperous and 
safe, it's their religious duty to defend it from any external danger. They would 
do so even if that danger was coming from a nation with the same official 
religion and they got help for that protection from a state of a different religion. 
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An example of this is that of Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion in 1990 and the 
stance of Kuwaiti MBs on the invasion, as well as the liberation by the US and 
the western alliance. This phenomenon is one of the more highlighted events in 
the shadow of the Arab spring. The participation is through a democratic 
election, where the political demand and fulfilling the political promises is the 
means of this participation. Thus, the strife and the political participation are 
within the nation states and for the sake of the people of that particular state 
and the demands of its people. 
Generally, there are political and religious thought transformations among these 
Islamic political parties. From their perspective on our study of the KIU, there 
are two circles. The first one contains creeds and worshiping, and the second 
one contains everything else. The first circle is not negotiable; everything 
regarding the creed and worship has to be according to Islamic resources. 
However, for the second circle, which contains everything else, including 
politics, it is the open circle, unless there it contains something that reflects 
badly on the first circle. For instance, according to Islamic political parties, how 
the country should be run is by justice, which is the ultimate Islamic goal of 
governing. With this, it doesn't matter where the idea of this second circle 















These new and growing ideas of the Islamist movements, especially the MB-
inspired political parties, are supported by Islamic proofs. This can open a new 
political era towards the ME, as well as to the Islamic world. In this new 
interpretation, what is important for them is how justice and a better way of life 
are implemented. That is the shared circled between all the citizens of a state, 
which is the open circle. For the first circle, again, it is special only to the 
believers of that circle (Muslims). Surprisingly, this closed circle of creed and 
worship is understood and interpreted differently by Muslim scholars. In other 
words, Islam demands its followers to stick to the first circle for themselves, and 
to be as conservative as possible in this circle. In regards to giving freedom to 
anyone who is outside that circle, the Quran states, "To you be your religion, 
and to me my religion (109: 6)." Hence, for those who are inside or outside this 
circle, there is a private sphere; no one can force others to come into this 
private sphere. Quranic verse also states: “There is no compulsion in religion (2: 
256).” Thus, the second circle is a circle shared between everyone, and it is 
open and left to be as progressive as possible. This circle includes all other 
aspects of life, including politics, instead of the personal sphere. 
Understanding religion and nationalism, or any other political affairs in secular 
and Islamist perspectives, comes from this point, which is looking at politics and 
religion differently. On one hand, for many Islamists, all of life has to be in one 
circle, and the circle is dealt with as creed and worship. They interpret 
everything according to their religious perspectives. On the other hand, there is 
a new kind of transformation among the Islamists, which is classifying the 
personal and public sphere as closed and open circles. This new understanding 
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of religion and politics, and placing politics outside the circle of religion, for the 
sake of religion, is what I call a new wave of religious nationalism. Testing this 
in Kurdistan by looking at the case of the KIU makes us look at two narratives. 
Are these two narratives compatible, or are they different? The narrative of 
ethnic nationalism, which paints a particular picture of Kurdistan, and the 
counter-narrative of political Islam, which places the Kurds within the Umma 
and longing for the Caliphate who is no longer there. What does that mean? 
How does it work? How do these two narratives of identity interact in modern 
Kurdish political life?  Studying this new wave of religious nationalism in 
Kurdistan, by looking at the role of nationalism and Islamism in the case of KIU, 
is the purpose of this research.  
 
1.7 Islam and Nationalism: 
Continuing on the relationship between religion and nationalism and focusing on 
Islam as a religion, there is a whole range of views on this kind of relationship 
which varies according to time, location and understanding of both Islam and 
nationalism. Within Islam, there are two main views, represented by Sunnis and 
Shias. Iran is used as the majority Shia dominant area, and its point of view on 
this issue is highlighted in point three below. Further, point four below covers 
two main beliefs within the Sunnis. 
Thirdly, religious distrust leads to the evolution of nationalism. The Iranian case 
clearly explains this kind of relation between religion and nationalism. Ferdows 
(1967: 90) concluded, in her thesis, that “Iranian nationalism contained a thread 
of distrust”. Despite the fact that Iran is a multi-ethnic country, it is Shiism that 
50 
 
engenders the unity of the majority of the Iranians. Therefore, being Iranian has 
become the nationalism for the wider Iranians, rather than a particular ethnic 
group, including Persians. Yarshater (1989) highlighted that "In 1935 the 
Persian government requested countries with which it had diplomatic relations 
to call Persia Iran". Thus, on the basis of Shiism a nation from amalgamated 
ethnic groups was created. Since then, the idea of Iranianism has been 
introduced in order to embrace other non-Shi'a and non-Persian alliances. 
According to Quora "The Ancient texts of Iran claim that they are Aryans, the 
word 'Iran' itself means, 'Land of the Aryans'".Consequently, assimilating the 
many non-Persian Aryans in Iran was due to the Iranian dimension. Yet, the 
prime identity of the country is Shiism.  
Prior to the Safavid era, today‟s Iran was a Sunni majority, then forcefully, over 
time, it was turned into Shiism. Countrystudies.us (n. d.) records that: 
"Although Shias have lived in Iran since the earliest days of Islam, and 
there was one Shia dynasty in part of Iran during the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, it is believed that most Iranians were Sunnis until the 
seventeenth century. The Safavid dynasty made Shia Islam the official 
state religion in the sixteenth century and aggressively proselytized on its 
behalf. It is also believed that by the mid-seventeenth century most 
people in what is now Iran had become Shias, an affiliation that has 
continued". 
Similarly, Global Security (N. D.b) records that "the Safavids declared Shia 
Islam the state religion and used proselytizing and force to convert the large 
majority of Muslims in Iran to the Shia sect. Under the early Safavids, Iran was 




Thereafter, and on the basis of Shiism the masses were mobilised. In Iran, 
where the nation is based on the Shi‟a sect, it does not mean that the vast 
majority of the people are religious in terms of practising the daily religious rites. 
Nevertheless, the total allegiance is for the sect. Thus, political reactions are 
against any external threat coming from non-Shi‟a and/or non-Muslims, and it is 
equally religious nationalistic whether the reaction is coming from a practising or 
non-practising individuals. This has been the case since the foundation of the 
Islamic republic. Ferdows (1967: 15) noticed “Afghani as well as Malkam Khan22 
had observed rightly that the only means of mobilizing mass support for any 
national movement in Iran would be through religious feeling against foreigners 
and infidels”. 
This mistrust developed within the Shiite Persians in both nationalist and 
religious senses alike. Ferdows (1967: 90) highlighted that: 
“This distrust was perhaps due to the deep, almost fierce, pride which 
characterizes the attitude of most Iranians towards their country. They 
look back upon the past when Iran was the Persian Empire and see their 
culture as the fountainhead of civilization. Their invaders, whether Turks, 
Mongols, or Arabs, have all been referred to as barbarians in Iranian 
history books”. 
From a religious perspective,ever since Shiism was adopted by the Safavids as 
the state‟s religion, the religious mistrust deepenedIranian nationalism. 
Accordingly, starting with the prolonged conflicts with the Ottomans until the 
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Islamic republic, Iran has been mobilising people against the foreign Sunni 
Ottomans, the grand Satan (America), Israel and the Wahhabis. 
In this context, whenever religious institutions in Iran wanted to mobilise the 
masses against the rulers, they simply accused and labelled them as being anti-
religion, betrayers or even hypocrites. Ferdows (1967:90) explains that: 
“Although Iran had never been directly subjected to the indignity of 
colonial rule, modern nationalism in Iran emerged as a reaction to foreign 
intervention and its immediate target was the autocratic regime of the 
Shah and the officials of the government who were supposedly foreign 
tools and traitors to the national interests of the Iranian people”. 
Actually, this is the case, even when the reformists are all religious Shias within 
the Islamic republic system. Yazdani (2016) comments on the reaction of the 
Iranian government towards the reformists as such: 
"This reform movement took a blow in 2009. The crackdown saw dozens 
killed and disappeared, hundreds arrested, many of whom continue to be 
held indefinitely in the notorious Evin Prison. Authorities placed the de-
facto leaders of the Green Movement, Mousavi and the other reformist 
presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi under house arrest, where they 
continue to be held".  
Not only political reform, but also educational reform, in the name of 
safeguarding education from westernizing influences, is subject to such a 
policy. The Washington Post (2011) observed “Iran‟s education reform takes 
anti-Western tack”. A detail of this safeguard, represented by the Iranian 
education ministry, was reported by Erdbrink (2011) “The Education Ministry's 
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plan, titled „The Program for Fundamental Evolution in Education and Training,‟ 
envisages schools becoming „neighborhood cultural bases‟ where teachers will 
provide „life‟ guidance, assisted by selected clerics and members of the 
paramilitary Basij23 force”.   
Thus, even before the Islamic revolution, the phobia of the foreign influence on 
the interests of Iran gave the religious institution and religious trends the chance 
to interfere in politics. Ferdows (1967: 95) claimed that “The oil question was 
perhaps the most important reason for the Fadayan‟s24 thrusting itself into 
politics. Had it not been for this crisis, the movement would probably have 
remained a purely religious one”. Basically, the impact of the religious 
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The Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is an auxiliary force with many duties, 
especially internal security, law enforcement, special religious or political events and 
morals policing. The Basij have branches in virtually every city and town in Iran. 
 The Basij have become more important since the disputed 2009 election. Facing domestic 
demands for reform and anticipating economic hardships from international sanctions, 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has mobilized the Basij to counter perceived 
threats to the regime. 
 For more information about Basij, see: Alfoneh, (n. d.), Online Available at: 
<http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>. 
 
24 Fada'iyan-e Islam was an Iranian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist secret society founded in 
1946 by a 21 year-old theology student Navvab Safavi, who sought to purify Islam in Iran by 
ridding it of 'corrupting individuals' by means of carefully planned assassinations of certain 
leading intellectual and political figures. The group survived as supporters of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution of Iran. During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
Fadayan members served as foot soldiers for Khomeini and formed part of the fundamentalist 
wing of the revolutionary base, pressuring Khomeini to implement rule of Islam immediately. 
They called for a "wholesale introduction of Islamic legal and social codes including a ban on 
music, alcohol, the cinema, usury, women working outside the home and compulsory veiling." 
Many of its members went on to serve in the Islamic Republic regime. See: Terrorism Research 




institutionin mobilising the grassroots has come from its influence over the 
bazzaris25, which constitutes the majority of the people in Iran.    
Therefore, the Iranian nationalism is a unique case of its kind within religious 
nationalism, which demonstrates a special relation between religion and 
nationalism on the basis of mistrust, starting within Islam and relying on the 
Shi‟a sect. Ferdows (1967: 92) stated that “over ninety percent of the Iranians 
are Shiites, and once Shiism has been the state religion in Iran for over 
centuries, it has been, and remains, a bulwark of Iranian nationalism”. 
Furthermore, within the Shia sect, the current Islamic republic has adopted the 
Shi‟a Imaamiyyah26, and within the Imaamiyyahhas adopted 
IthnaaAshariyyah(Twelvers). Even within these elements it has adopted and 
relied on the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih27, and functions upon it. Thus, Iranian 
nationalism is encircled by so much religious mistrust that the nation works by, 
and only trusts, the Imam‟s teachings; no more.  
Fourthly, there is another visionwithin the Sunnis, which claims that there is no 
relation whatsoever between religion and nationalism. Accordingly, in late 
Ottoman era, nationalism as a political meanscame into being. With regard to 
this point, Muslim scholars have dealt with a wide range of explanations. 
Mohammad Ammarah, for instance, looks at this from different angles. He 
states that “when the talk is about Islam and its position from „Arabism‟ and „the 
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Arab nationalism‟…and its position from „the Arab Unity‟ … we have to draw 
attentions to the fact that we are dealing with more than „an Islam‟!..”. Ammarah 
(1988: 5). Furthermore, Ammarah (1988: 5-8) classifies Islam into four 
categories: “Islam: the religion, Islam: the Civilisation, Islam: the history and 
finally Islam: the contemporary.According to him, Islam: the religion, has nothing 
to do with nationalism; any nationalism. However, this does not mean it denies 
nationalism;because, Islam is a global religion, and being a global religion does 
not deny the conditions in which the people live. Nationalism is one of the 
situations where human groups live, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims 
(1988: 10). Thus, according to this explanation, although the religion ultimately 
accepts the reality, and the situation that the people are living in, initially it has 
nothing to do with any political context, including nationalism.  
Ammarah‟s moderate vision on this issue would lead one to look at the more 
extreme vision that is represented by the Salafis in regard to the relation of 
religion and nationalism. Shaykh Abdul-Azeez Bin Baz28 (n. d.b) issued a fatwa 
concerning this relationship as follows:  
“This call is ignorance and it is not to ascribe oneself to it, nor to 
encourage those who call to it. Indeed, it is obligatory to destroy it, 
because Islamic law orders us to combat it and drive it out, to refute their 
analogies and claims with answers which make the truth clear to those 
who seek it. For it is Islam alone that keeps alive the Arab character, 
language, culture and morality. To snub this religion is, in reality, to 
destroy the Arab character in its language, culture and morality. 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the (Muslim) preachers to strive hard to 
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“ABDUL AZIZ bin Baz was the Grand Mufti and head of the Council of Ulema (Islamic 
scholars) in Saudi Arabia from 1962”. Darwish (1999). 
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spread the call of Islam, in order to defeat those who attempt to suppress 
it. It is well known that Islam necessitates the view that calling to Arab 
nationalism or any other kind of nationalism is a false message and a 
great error, and it is a clear abomination, loathsome ignorance, and a 
plot against Islam and its people”.  
For Bin Baz, nationalism is not only unacceptable to Islam, being a call for 
ignorance, but it is also a plot against Islam and its people. Nevertheless, 
nationalism is understood in the Arab world, and it is still widely practised within 
the Arab Sunni states. Despite any denial of nationalism, even in Saudi Arabia, 
Arab nationalism is practised –the name of the state itself includes the word 
Arab (Saudi Arabia). However, when talking about the relationship between 
Islam and nationalism, the denial comes in, and especially when the issue of 
non-Arab nationalism is raised, such denial is given more emphasis.  
Concluding my argument, the relationship of religion and nationalism makes us 
highlight the main two arguments by Smith and Kedourie as the most relevant 
to this study. On the one hand, for Smith, there are four sacred foundations for 
nationalism that came from earlier belief-systems. However, he states that the 
idea of sacredness came first from ancient peoples into Judaeo-Christainity. 
Then, it became a political ideology in the form of secular nationalism. For 
Smith (2003: 26) “In this new political ideology, a worship of the secular nation 
replaces that of the deity, while the nationalist movement takes the place of the 
church, and posterity becomes the new version of immorality in place of the 
afterlife”. On the other hand, Kedourie argues that religion itself turns into 
nationalism, as he highlights the example of Zionism and Pakistan rooted in 
religion and grew into a nationalistic movement, and later, a nation state. For 
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Kedourie (1971: 76) "This transformation of religion into nationalist ideology is 
all the more convenient in those nationalists can thereby utilize the powerful and 
tenacious loyalties which a faith held in common for centuries create”. I 
disagreewith Kedourie‟s evidencewith regard to his assertion of transforming 
religion into nationalism. Since there are multi-ethnic religions, such as Islam 
and Christianity, no one can assume that all followers from different places 
around would turn to a single nationalist state. The reality nationalism in those 
multi-ethnic religions does not prove his assertion. Yet inside one of the 
nationalist states - take any Arab country for the sake of argument - throughout 
the twentieth century, there was always space for both Islamists and seculars. 
Furthermore, now in the shadow of the Arab spring, in some cases, the 
Islamists have the upper hand, not the nationalists. As for Smith, I agree with 
his argument; by looking at the nationalist movements in the Middle East (ME), 
we see at least one sacred element is focused on. For example; as mentioned 
above the sacred land of Israel or Palestine and its on-going conflicts represent 
an empirical supporting point of the pertinent argument.  This is the case for 
seculars and for the newly-emerged religious nationalists, too. However, for the 
seculars, they wouldn't cite religion as their influence, but still they rely on the 
idea of the sacredness for their purposes. In some other extreme secular cases, 
the assertion of Smith has been implemented exactly in regards to worshiping 
the secular nation, the “sacred” leader, and his “holy” speeches.  
Furthermore, looking at the relationship beteween religion and nationalism from 
a different perspective conveys a sense of understanding of the eagerness that 
comes from the sacred dimensions that nationalism has taken from religions. In 
particular, for this study, the works of Smith and Kedourie arethe most relevant. 
For Smith, the sacred dimension of nationalism provides a base and 
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explanation for the growing sense of nationalism among the Islamists. More 
importantly, this sense of growing feelings for nationalism is not only legitimised 
by religion, but also for the Islamist, and as will be seen in the coming chapters, 
it is the demand of the religion. Thus, the argument of Smith is the core that 
constitutes the basis of this study. As for Kedourie, the idea of replacement of 
religion by nationalism is what this study disproves. Kedourie‟s thought is 
profoundly important to my study, not least as a counter argument that 
challenges any nationalist motivations by religion. For him nationalism 
growswith the demise of religions. Hence, in order to fully examine this kind of 
relationship, both works are extremely important, and are more relevant to this 
research than any others. 
 
1.8 Kurds and Nationalism: 
Like other nations in the Middle East, nationalism is relatively new to the Kurds. 
However, there are other indications that show the Kurdish awakening to 
nationalism goes back further, and emerged long before the western 
introduction of nationalism to the region. Nebez (2002: 28-29) records that:  
“The idea of establishing a nationalistic Kurdish state, which unites the 
whole Kurdish nation in an independent Kurdistan, with the leadership of a 
Kurdish King has emerged in Kurdistan itself, and was not received from the 
foreigners. This idea, at least goes back to the beginning of the sixteenth 
century. This is in contrary to the Persian, Arab and Turkish nations which 
were similar to the European nations in the Middle Ages as they were trying 
to establish territorial states, not nation states. Then all those empires or 
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states that they established were called after their leaders‟ families, such as 
the Abbasid state, Qaramani state, Ottoman state, Safavid state and Qajari 
state, not Arabic, Turkish or Persian states”.  
This is in relation to the awakening of nationalism. However, in reality, attempts 
to establish a Kurdish nation state started in the eighteenth century, and in the 
first half of the nineteenth century they had reached a state of organised military 
struggle. When the princes of Kurdistan, such as the princes of Botan, Baban, 
Soran, Badinan and Ardalan were starting their revolutions and clashed with the 
Ottoman and the Qajar states, they were all thinking about establishing a 
nation, not a territorial, state (Nebez, 2002: 29).  
It is commonly believed by the Kurds that the word Kurdayeti,i.e. Kurdism, is 
mainly used for nationalism. However, Ghani (2011: x) refers to the beginning of 
Kurdish nationalism as a reaction to the centralisation policy of the Ottomans, 
stating: 
“They resisted the Ottoman policy of centralisation and the notion of 
Kurdism flourished. This can be regarded as a key turning point for the 
development of Kurdish nationalism, reinvigorating a Kurdish 
consciousness in respect of politics, language and literature. Kurdish 
Meals (Islamic scholars), popular poets and Kurdish folkloric poets 
played a major role in the creation of Kurdism in the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Soran, Botan and Baban emirates”. 
Apart from resisting the growing nationalism among the Ottoman and Qajar 
elites, there was another crucial element that helped the growth and emergence 
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of Kurdayeti from a religious point of view. Abdulaziz (2016b: 75-76) concludes 
the demands of the Kurds from Ubaidulla‟s conference in 1880 as follows:  
“1- Liberating Kurdistan from the tyranny and oppression of Qajar and 
Ottomans. 
2- Forming a united, free Kurdistani state from both controlled Kurdish 
territories by the Qajar and Ottomans. 
3- Trying to execute the Islamic Shari‟ah, especially in terms of justice, 
which had been long forgotten under both Persian and Ottoman rulings”.  
The above three points indicate the early religious nationalism among the 
Kurds. The Kurdish realisation of being different from the non-Kurdish entities, 
especially the Ottomans and Qajars,had been going on for a while29.    
Unlike the other nations in the region, the Kurds, during the growth of 
nationalism, always had an extra burden and more challenges. Prior to the 
existence of nationalism and following the treaty of Zuhab [Zahaw] in 1639 
between the Ottomanand PersianEmpires, they formally established their 
border that had been unofficially marked after the Ottoman victory at the Battle 
of Chaldiran in 1514. The importance for the Kurds is that this border separated 
them from these two great Middle Eastern empires and, in effect, it still largely 
exists today as the border between Turkey and Iran. (Gunter, 2011: 313).At the 
beginning, the Kurds supported the Ottomans because they shared the same 
Sunni sect and preferred them to the Safavids. However, as Nebez (2002: 27-
28) highlights, it appears that after uniting with the Ottomans, the Kurds soon 
realised that they no longer had the same independence which they had 
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 For more details, see Snnw (1998: 123) in Chapter three.  
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enjoyed in their own emirates. Then, they started thinking about independence 
and strengthening themselves through uniting their emirates. Furthermore, after 
World War 1, and according to the Sykes-Picot treaty, the rest of the Kurdistan 
territories which had been under the Ottomans were further divided between the 
newly emerged Turkey, Iraq and Syria.This made the Kurdish aspiration for 
independence more difficult. On different occasions over the twentieth century, 
whenever the four countries that have a Kurdish population (Turkey, Iraq, Iran 
and Syria) felt the danger of the growth of Kurdish politics in any of their four 
countries, they collaborated against them. However, these barriers never 
stopped the aspiration of the Kurds in acquiringtheir nationalistic rights in any 
parts of Kurdistan under those four states. In conclusion, with the rise of 
nationalism in the region, the Kurds, as one of the biggest nations in the Middle 
East, became the victims, while other nations such as Arabs, Turks and 


















In order to choose the right methodology, I had to dedicate a significant amount 
of time and effort to reading and consulting my supervisor. Eventually, I 
determined that the qualitative, single-case study, semi-structured interview was 
the best option for my case. I list the details of my methodology in this chapter, 
which is organized as follows: describing the participants, the samples, and 
discussing each technique I used. In the section titled “Methods,” I have given 
further details on how I followed the method in the fieldwork. The rationale of 
the research method is discussed here. I also have included an additional 
section for the research question and hypothesis. Additionally, I highlighted the 
pilot study, materials, and challenges that I faced. The first part of this chapter 
deals with the literature review,which includes the main authored booksrelated 
to the subject matter, but no inclusively addressing my thesis.  
 
2.2 Literature Review: 
 
Presently, there is no direct literature on the subject of religious nationalism in 
Kurdistan, or on the KIU. However, there are a few marginal subjects that touch 
on this issue within other subjects, such as Kurdish nationalism, with no direct 
commentary on new religious nationalism in Kurdistan. Therefore, I studied a 
few works with similar, but indirect subjects. It is crucial to highlight here, that 
despite the huge literature in regardto nationalism, Kurdish nationalism, 
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religious nationalism, Islamism and the relation of nationalism and religion that I 
came across during this study,none focused on what would be the core of my 
research, with the exception of the works of Smith and Kedourie. This is 
because they all centre on a subject such as the theory or history of 
nationalism, the rights of nations, the national liberation movements, the 
Islamist movements, and so on. However, since my study covers the growing 
sentiments of nationalism within a religious group, it is therefore my claim that 
Smith‟s and Kedourie‟s works are the most relevant:simply, because one of 
them explains the developed sentiments of nationalism and relates them back 
to religions, and the other represents a counter-argument by claiming religion 
transforms into nationalism. Hence, their works best fit within the theoretical 
framework of the relationship between religion and nationalism, and are more 
relevant to my work other than any of the other works. 
One work I came across was (Nasiwnalizm w Nasiwnalizmi Kurdi: Deedeki 
Islami Hawcharx) Nationalism and the Kurdish Nationalism: a Contemporary 
Islamic Perspective by Karwani30 (2008), which consists of two volumes. The 
first volume contains four chapters, and the second volume contains eight 
chapters. While this book does not precisely fit into the framework of my project, 
it is a good contribution to the field of the contemporary Islamic vision towards 
nationalism - Kurdish nationalism, in particular.  
Chapter four of the first volume has been devoted to Kurdish nationalism and 
the KIU‟s vision. In this chapter, Karwani presents his reading in regards to the 
KIU's rhetoric towards Kurdish nationalism. His commentary on the KIU‟s 
rhetoric uses the framework of Kurdish nationalism and the KIU‟s contribution to 
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The actual name of the author is Abubakir Ali, however he is known as Karwani as his nom de 
plume.   
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this newfound nationalism. Thus, the author tries to direct Kurdish nationalists, 
whether they are secular or religious, towards the goals of the Kurdish nation. In 
other words, he advises both Kurdish nationalist movements to set aside 
differences and internal controversy in the name of Islam or nationalism. In 
Karwan‟s opinion, no one has the right to be the spokesperson for either 
movement since Islam and the Kurdish nation are two sides of Kurdish identity.  
While it does not relate to the entire theme, this particular chapter of Karwani‟s 
book is beneficial for my work. However, it does also include statements and 
political stances of the KIU in regards to Kurdish nationalism. Ali (2008: 11) 
states, "Publishing these volumes in regards to Kurdish nationalism is 
containing all my writings about the subject until this moment.” Thus, it is 
somewhat of a combination of many articles written by Karwani over the last 
few years. The book is written in Kurdish.   
(Mustaqbal Al-Haraka Al-Islamia fee Kurdistan Al-Iraq) The Future of the Islamic 
Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. By Muhammad Saeed Noori Al-Baziani (2006) is a 
master degree dissertation. Although its title refers to the Islamic Movement in 
Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), it generally talks about the Iraqi Islamic movements as a 
whole. Hence, on the surface, the book does not fall into the subject of my 
project. It does not even marginally cover the topic of my project (religious 
nationalism); on the contrary, it deals with the Islamic movements in Iraq as a 
whole in a traditional way. Although the book is entitled “Islamic Movement in 
Iraqi Kurdistan,” the book classifies the Islamic movements into two parts. The 
first part covers the Shia trend, which is split into two periods: before and after 
the revolution of 1958 in Iraq. The second part deals with the Sunni trend. 
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Again, it divides this trend into two periods: before and after the revolution of 
1958.  
Chapter one of The Future of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, as it is 
stated in its English abstract (Al-Baziani, 2006: 309-314), covers the historical 
development of the Islamic movement in Iraq. This chapter has been divided 
into a preface and two sections. The first section is a historical briefing of the 
establishment and development of British influence in Iraq, along with the 
stance of both Iraqi Shia and Sunni Islamic trends. The second section focuses 
on the geopolitics of the different Islamic trends since their establishment 
starting from the first half of the twentieth century until 2003. Chapter two has 
been devoted to the visions of the IMIK towards various aspects of life. Chapter 
three deals with the IMIK and international policies. This includes various 
issues, such as the IMIK and the new world order, the IMIK and terrorism, and 
the IMIK and the Iraq Liberation Act of 199831 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed 
Both House and Senate] of the USA. Chapter four, which discusses the future 
of the IMIK, is divided into two sections. The first covers the major obstacles 
that the IMIK faces. The second section of this chapter proposes solutions to 
evade the aforementioned obstacles. In the final chapter, the conclusion is 
drawn. This book is written in Arabic. I found The Future of the Islamic 
Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan to be beneficial for my study in the historical 
background of major Islamists in Kurdistan, especially since the writer used to 
be a leading member of the IMIK.   
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An outline of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq by David Romano 2007 is based on 
fieldwork and personal interviews conducted in Iraq in 2003 and 2004; this 
study presents a significant amount of never-before published data concerning 
Islamist movements.  While it does not relate entirely to the main theme of my 
study, this work is vital for understanding the historical background of these 
movements in Kurdistan. Another importance of this work in regards to my 
project is what Romano highlighted himself: “Particular attention is paid to the 
links between various groups, their transformation or splintering into new 
organizations, and the role of the non-Kurdish Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood in 
spawning these movements”. Finally, this work, as is obvious from its title, is 
only an outline of Kurdish Islamists as a whole in less than 15 pages. 
Otherwise, it is not an in-depth analysis that should be read alone when 
studying such a broad area of Islamism in Kurdistan.  
Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity by Anthony D. Smith 
(2003) introduces a great work on interactions between religion and 
nationalism. The title draws attention to the idea of being chosen by God; this 
refers to the high self-ranking that some nations have chosen for themselves 
with reference to their religion, such as the Judeo-Christian example of claiming 
to be the chosen people. Furthermore, the book presents a wide range of 
examples from historic landscapes in Ireland, Switzerland and Egypt, myths of 
Arthurian Britain, Holy Russia, and Byzantium. The book consists of nine 
chapters, which all highlight the idea of sacredness. The chapters examine 
nationalism and religion, the nation as a sacred communion, election and 
covenant, peoples of the covenant, missionary peoples, sacred homelands, 
ethno-history and the golden age, nationalism and golden ages, and the 
glorious dead. Smith (2003: 255) concludes by stating, “Four kinds of cultural 
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resources and sacred foundation32 drawn from earlier religious belief-systems 
have been of particular importance in this regard” Most nationalists refer to at 
least one of the four sacred foundations to sustain their nationalism, despite 
whether they are secular or religious. Although this book does not completely 
relate to my project, it is useful in considering the relationship between religion 
and nationalism, which I use extensively throughout my theoretical framework.    
 
How to Win a Cosmic War: Confronting Radical Religions by Reza Aslan 2010 
emphasizes the ongoing war between good and evil. Aslan (2010) states that, 
“Cosmic wars are fought not over land or politics, but over identity.” He believes 
that placing value on religious identity is becoming an increasingly popular 
practice throughout global society. Aslan (2010) in presenting this book argues 
that “Indeed, in many parts of the world, including the United States, religion is 
quickly becoming the supreme identity, encompassing and even superseding 
ethnicity, culture, and nationality”. In his opinion, provocation by one side of the 
war initiator would lead to a reaction of the other side, then to the danger of fire 
of a cosmic war. That danger comes from the same base that Smith (2003: 255-
256) articulated - in the name of chosen people and/or a sacred land. In his 
novel, Aslan (2010: 81) states, “The religious Zionists argued that the war of 
1967 had been God‟s design; God had compelled the Arabs to attack Israel in 
order to force the Jews to fight back and thus liberate all of the Promised Land.” 
With this logic, at one point the whole world would be pit against itself in the 
name of what Aslan argues is "good versus evil" and "us versus them.” He 
clearly articulates that US president George W. Bush and Osama Bin Ladin 
played this game of cosmic war, simply by implementing the politics of „us 
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versus them‟, in a sense of one religion against the other. Thus for Aslan, 
religious nationalism is not a threat to global security. However, Aslan (2010: 
24) believes that, “The real threat to global security comes from the rise of 
religious trans-nationalist movements, such as Jihadism, which cannot be 
contained within any territorial boundaries”. 
Although How to Win a Cosmic War is not directly related to my case study,  it 
helps supporting the theoretical framework of my argument, as well as helps 
support many practical experiments throughout the chapters. For instance, 
Aslan‟s argument proves that religious nationalism is not only not posing a 
threat to global security, but also in many cases is a necessity, as it contains a 
nation with its characteristics, in a sense that every nation has to its special 
characteristics, whereby religion included has a unique entity. Hence, religious 
nationalism could be a solution for people of a certain nation, rather than 
imposing any kind of values through transnationalism, which is more likely to be 
subject to rejection, and negative public reaction, and ultimately wars.  
Mark Juergensmeyer is the author of a work unlikely to be directly related to my 
project, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State 
(1993). While it is slightly unrelated, it is one of the most profound works on 
religious nationalism. The book consists of three parts, which include seven 
chapters. He ends his work with a conclusion entitled as follows: “Can We Live 
with Religious Nationalism?” Juergensmeyer (1993: 193) immediately begins 
the chapter with an answer, “Than depends, in part, on how religious 
nationalism behaves, and in part, on how it is perceived. What once appeared 
to many Westerners as an anomaly and an annoyance is now often seen as a 
global foe”. Furthermore, Juergensmeyer (1993: 248) elaborates that, 
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“Religious nationalism raised new hopes, and it also came along in time to 
rescue the idea of the nation-state.” An importance of this work for my project is 
that it includes various examples throughout the world. Therefore, it makes me 
aware of other experiences and practices of religious nationalism, which I must 
be aware of for my well-versed analysis.  
Aram Ali Saeed, (Dozi Kurd: La NewanBeeree Natawayee W Ayeeneeda), 
which can be translated into English as, “The Kurdish Case Between 
Nationalism and Religious Thoughts” (2009). This work is an edited book which 
contains interviews of five Kurdish academics and writers. It is an attempt to 
clarify the role of Islam in helping the Kurds to advocate their nationalistic rights. 
It is also an attempt to criticize the Kurdish secular nationalists in their 
accusations of Islam, which often for them Islam had a negative role in the 
process of achieving the goals of nationalism of the Kurds. It also subtly 
defends the Kurdish Islamists as religious nationalists striving for the rights of 
the Kurdish nation.  
In order to focus on these issues, the editor highlighted a statement from each 
of the interviewees as an indication for his stance on the subject of the book. 
For instance, for Masoud Abdulkhaliq (2009: 10), he highlighted the following:  
“In Kurdistan, in the way that the seculars want socialism, communism, and 
liberalism means to establish a state for the Kurds, in the same way the 
Islamists also want by the religion means to establish a Kurdish state.” For 
Hakeem Ahmad (2009: 54) he highlighted the following: “Throughout historical 
eras, it has been proved that the spirit of the religion of Islam has always been 
an encouraging factor for motivating thought, not dormancy, and to be at the 




Generally, this work does not directly fall into the category of my work. The first 
reason for this is because it is about the Kurdish Case between nationalism and 
religious thoughts. Then, it is only about the literature of both nationalism and 
religious thoughts. It is only a one-sided argument that mainly defends religion 
in favour of Kurdish national rights.  
Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2011) (La KiltooriJama‟atawaBarawHizbekiPashxan 
Islami Hawcharx) “From the Culture of Jama‟a (Group) Towards a Modern Party 
with Reference to Islam”, as it is Karwani (2011: 3) by the author in the 
introduction what this book consists of “is basically some interviews, which later 
on were edited in the form of a book. It expresses some of the perspectives of 
the author on the history of evolving contemporary issues and functions of the 
Islamic current”.  
Overall, it is a good work on the theory of Islamism, and touches on the steps 
that the Islamic parties generally should take in order to become solid political 
parties. For instance, Karwani (2001: 132) recommends that, “The Islamists of 
today must - through holding the slogans of reform and justice - look for a 
strong political justification”. It is mainly about the inner reforms of the Islamic 
parties from being mostly religious groups that prioritized justifying their politics 
from historical texts, to becoming contemporary demands of the people. For the 
author, these kinds of policies are among the ultimate Islamic objectives that 
lead to justice. Therefore, in Karwani‟s belief, this must be the policy that the 
Islamists must adopt instead of merely holding the title of “Islamic” and evolving 




Although this book does not directly correlate with the field of my work, it 
represents a great contribution to the theory of political Islam, and directly 
benefits the Kurdish Islamists in working on their popularity, which according to 
the author, is achieved by not following the Arabic examples, but instead, 
through following the Turkish AK party or by Malaysian examples. Karwani 
himself is a leading member of the KIU. He used to be a politburo of the party 
when this work was published.      
Edris Siwaili, (2009b) (Rawtee Islami La Bashoori Kurdistan 1946-1991: 
TwejeenawaiakyMejwee La Kar w Chalaki Part w Komala Islamiakan) “The 
Islamic Current in Southern Kurdistan 1946-1991: a Historical Research for the 
Activities of the Islamic Parties and Groups” is a pretty self-explanatory title. 
Siwaili‟s work is a thorough historical background for the Kurdish Islamists in 
southern Kurdistan. Although it is the most direct book so far on the history of 
Islamism in southern Kurdistan, it does not fall under the theme of my project. 
However, this work is quite helpful and important for my thesis, especially in 
writing chapter six, where I use it thoroughly and mainly rely on it for the 
historical background. This is the second edition, which the author has spent a 
great time revising, further documented the events, and included his interview 
with Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin, the former Secretary General of the 
KIU. More importantly, as the author mentions in the introduction, three years 
after the first addition, the book was reviewed many times, and he used many 
other sources, theses, and feedback that, according to him filled many gaps and 
created corrections for mistakes in the first edition.   
Another importance of this book is the fact that it was written in 2009, where 
apart from the KIU, the IMIK and KIK were also practicing civil political strife. 
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For instance, if it was written a decade earlier (probably under the influence of 
jihadism of the two latter parties, which at that time both were IMIK), could have 
had a different outcome due to majority interviewees who mainly were formerly 
IMIK leaders, and whose vision at that time were different to the events and the 
circumstances. However, by 2009, they all were calling for similar civil and 
political reforms in the region. Even as mentioned earlier, the KIU, KIK, and two 
other secular parties formed the Reform and Services List for the general 
elections of 25/07/2009.  
Omar Ali Ghafour‟s novel (2013), (16 Sal La New Yakgrtwi Islami) “16 Years 
within the Islamic Union” chronicles the author‟s experience in the Islamic Union 
of Kurdistan. The book also includes detailed critiques of the KIU based on 
Ghafour‟s experience in the party over the mentioned years. Although this book 
can be helpful in some of aspects for my project, it is, however, not directly tied 
to my thesis. Mostly, this work details the operation of the party, and the 
experience and feelings of the author as a former member of the party from a 
dissident point of view. The author, in this regard, on the back cover of the book 
Ghafour (2013) stated that, “Those years, bating of being the history of 
development of my thoughts experience, are also a perspective for studying the 
Islamic Union‟s past operations too. Therefore, it was important for me to 
document the summary of my own experience.” Hence, it reflects an angle of 
self-criticism from a former member of the KIU, which highlights some of the 
cons without discussing the main point of my thesis.  
Omar Abdulaziz (2011) wrote (Yakgrtui Islami Kurdistan w PrsiChaksazi La 
Harem: Bochoon w Gutar, Halwest, Yadasht w Proja) “Kurdistan Islamic Union 
and the Question of Reform in Kurdistan Region: Opinions and Rhetoric, 
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Position, Memoirs and Projects” This book consists of three main parts. Part 
one contains a general analysis to rhetoric and stance memoirs of the KIU from 
1994-2011 in regards to reform in the region. Part two contains the texts of the 
memoirs of the KIU from 1994-2011, whether that was with the cooperation of 
other Kurdish political parties, or by the KIU alone. Part three is an appendix for 
the images and photocopies of those documents which were covered in the 
book.  
This book was authored in the summer of 2011, after two the months of 
continued demonstrations that took place in Sulaimani in the spring of that year. 
The demonstrators were calling for reform, which coincided with the so-called 
package reform, which was presented on behalf of the demonstrators by the 
three opposing parties (Change movement, the KIU, and KIK) to the region‟s 
president, parliament, and the cabinet on March 3, 2011. The importance of this 
book stems from the fact that the author was a politburo member of the KIU and 
the head of the party‟s parliament block in the region‟s parliament. Thus, he 
personally was involved in most of the reform attempts that were referred to in 
the book. Although this book is partially an important one for my research, 
however, it is not the main subject of my thesis. 
In her Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the Fadayan-I Islam, 
Ferdows (1967) stated: 
 “a study of the Fadayan Islam (Devotees of Islam), the politico religious 
group which played a significant role during the nationalist movement 
1951-53 in Iran. It is hoped that it will shed some light on the subject of 
the role of religion in nationalism as a political phenomenon in that 
country”. (1967: 1).  
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Since the focus of the study is on Shi‟a Iran, it is obvious that it does not directly 
cover the subject of my project. Nonetheless, it will shed light on the importance 
of religion in portraying Iranian nationalism as a religious nationalism:therefore, 
it falls into the category of the relationship between religion and nationalism. 
This helped me when I conceived my idea of looking at thissortof relationship 
when I covered religion and nationalism in Chapter One.  
Overall, Ferdows‟ work has provided and covered a few key issues in studying 
nationalism in the Muslim World. Ferdows (1967: 4) argues that “the problem of 
the present day nationalism in the Muslim countries of the Near East in general, 
and Iran in particular, is that it differs from the western nationalism in several 
important ways”.Her justifications alert me, and any other researchers in the 
field of nationalism in the Muslim World, to important issues to be aware of in 
studying nationalism. 
Generally, her study highlights the example of Iran among all the Muslim cases, 
on the basis of what she describes on page 90, as “a thread of distrust”. 
Referring to the general trend of Iranian politics, in pre- and post-Islamic 
revolution, where politics always reflects the mistrust of the Iranian governments 
to any potential threats to the identity of Iranian state, represented byShi‟sm, 
whether those threats have come from Muslim or non-Muslim entities. The 
thesis is divided on four chapters, as follows: Chapter one is covering the 
background, which is a historical review. Chapter two is covering Fadayan 
Islam. Chapter three is about kashani33.Chapter four is the conclusion. Then, 
she has the appendix at the end of the thesis. 
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Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2016) (Islami Boon La QonaghiPashIslamida) “Being 
Islamist in the Post Islamic Age.”Hiswork consists of two parts: part one, 
contains his previous work, which was published in 2012, entitled 
(BinamawChwarchewaGishtiakaniHizbekiPashxan Islami Hawcharx: 
Xwendnawaiak La Adabiati Parti Dad w GashapedaniTurkia w Azadi w 
DadparwariMisr) “The General Principles and the Frame of A Contemporary 
Islamic Party: A Study of the political literature of Turkey's Justice and 
Development Party, and Egypt's Freedom and Justice”. Part two contains the 
reprint of his book (covered above) (La 
KiltooriJama‟atawaBarawHizbekiPashxan Islami Hawcharx) “From the Culture 
of Jama‟a (Group) Towards a Modern Party with Reference to Islam”, which 
was initiallyprinted in 2011.  
This workdoes not cover the subject of my project; it is, simply,theorising for the 
Islamists of Kurdistan to change their political framework,in the sense that they 
follow the offices of Justice and Development of Turkey and Freedom and 
Justice of Egypt so that they can be publically accepted by the masses, instead 
of relying only on the Islamistvoters. Karwani (2016: 288) sums up by stating 
that: 
"Now the Islamists are ina self-redefining stage. Accordingly, they are 
required to redefine their rhetoric, slogans, and their role in the society. If, 
they are aiming at a further influential political role, and want stronger 
masses support, they must understand the mechanisms, requirements 
and the contemporary political logic. They must also, logically restudy 
their patriotic situation, and the society's needs, especially those of the 
growing generation".  
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Thus, karwani‟s work, and all his previous works in similar vein,is theorising for 
a kind of liberal and secular Islamist.Karwani‟s rendering of Islamists is different 
from my work, which focuses on the growing sense of nationalism among the 
Islamists. 
Jamal Nebez (2002) BeeriNeteweyi Kurd: Ne BeeriQawmyiatiRojhalati w Ne 
BeeriNasyionalizmiRijawaie(The Kurdish NeteweyiPhilisophy Is Neither Oriental 
Nor Occidental Nationalism). This work highlights the nature of Kurdish 
nationalism, in which it tries to present it as a distinct kind of nationalism. As is 
obvious from the title, for Nebez, Kurdish nationalism is neither similar to those 
in the Middle East, in particular the Arab nationalism, nor to those in the West. 
For that reason Nebez even did not want to call it nationalism, rather he 
preferred the Kurdish word Neteweyi. This is a fine condtribution to the nature of 
Kurdish nationalism; however, it does not shed light on the religious side of the 
issue. Therefore, it does not cover the subject matter of this project.    
Omar Abdulaziz (2016b) Xabati Kurd w Rahandi Islami: Karigari Islam 
LasarShorsh w Rapareen w RekxrawaSiasiaKurdiakan 1850-1950 (The Kurdish 
Strife and the Islamic Dimension: the Influence of Islam on the Kurdish 
Revolutions, Uprisings and Political Organisations 1850 - 1950). This work is 
particularly important, since it covers two significant elements: the influence of 
Islam on the Kurdish nationalist movement and the peak of nationalism „1850 – 
1950‟, where it touches the subject of my thesis. Indeed, it is a contemporary 
work that highlights some of the resources that I have already covered, such as 
the role of Ubaidullah in his early attempts at Kurdish religious nationalism in 
late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, it does not precisely fall into the subject of 
my thesis. It is highlighting the influence of Islam as a religion on Kurdish 
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nationalism, not religious nationalism, as a new phenomenon that shifts 




I conducted my interviews by using the selective snowball34 technique through a 
leading member of the party, who then arranged the meetings for me; the 
majority of my interviewees were in Sulaimani and Erbil. Initially, she arranged 
for the Sulaimani leaders to be interviewed first; then, she contacted me with 
the assistant Secretary General in Erbil to facilitate the rest of the interviews 
with my chosen samples in Erbil35. I completed twelve interviews with the 
leaders and policy makers of the KIU during my first visit to the Kurdistan 
Region. Then, as a necessity and for further data collection for the project, I 
approached some other potential interviewees, one of whom had no time to 
meet or write to me, while others agreed as shown in the definition below 
(interviewees 13 to 20). Thus, the total number of interviewees was 23, and 
another two (22 and 23) promised to write to me, however due to their own 
                                                          
34“A snowball sample is one in which the researcher collects data on the few members of the 
target population he or she can locate, then asks those individuals to provide information 
needed to locate other members of that population whom they know”.(Crossman, A., n., d., 
Snowball Sample, Online Available at: <http://sociology.about.com/od/Types-of-
Samples/a/Snowball-Sample.htm>). 
 
35Selective Snowball, also known as: “Exponential discriminative snowball sampling. 
Subjects give multiple referrals, however, only one new subject is recruited among them. The 
choice of a new subject is guided by the aim and objectives of the study”. (Dudovskiy, J., n. d., 




workloads, they apologisedthat were unable to participate in the data collection. 
The reasonbehind selecting these people (except interviewees 13, 14, 15, 16 
and 17) was to get the information directly from the policy makers and 
implementers, since they are responsible for the policies of the party, and the 
highest-ranking members of the party. Interviewees 10, 13, 18 and 20 agreed to 
answer my questions in writing, by emailing me. Interviewee 19 agreed to have 
a Skype session, during which I had a chance to ask my questions. 
Interviewees 14 and 15 answered my questions over the phone. The purpose of 
interviews 14, 15, 16 and 17 was to verify information, where except for 
interview 14, they were asked specifically for certain information. I had an 
opportunity to meetinterviewee 20 in Sulaimani in June 2016, where he agreed 
to answer my questions by emailing the answers to me.Samples 16 and 17 are 
representatives of other Kurdish political parties in London, whereas interviewee 
15 is based in Newcastle. Thus,samples 15, 16 and 17 are British Kurds living 
in the UK. As a result of my second visit to the Kurdistan region in late May and 
early June 2016, apart from my participation in the seventh congress of the 
party, I had a chance to make appointmentsto interviewparticipants 18, 19, 20 
and 21. Interviewees 24 and 25 provided me with extra data including union, 
local and general election results. Finally, interviewee 26 gave me access to the 
archives of the official website of the party. For the subjects involved see the list 
of the interviewees in the appendix.  
 
2.3.2 Methods: 
I adopted qualitative, single-case study, semi-structured interviews with the 
political leaders of the KIU. I conducted these interviews by using the selective 
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snowball technique through a member, who arranged the meetings for me with 
the majority of my interviewees in Sulaimani and Erbil. I asked her to get in 
touch with the participants and ask for their permission to interview them. First, 
she contacted two of the leaders in Sulaimani and got their permission to be 
interviewed. Then, when I visited their office, I introduced myself to two more of 
the leaders. Since it was Ramadhan, one of the interviewees invited me to his 
office in Kalar for a Ramadhan breakfast gathering in Garmian, where I had an 
opportunity to obtain permission of the head of Garmian's centre of the party. 
Thus, I already had four participants in Sulaimani, one in Kalar, and my contact 
person, who is among the party‟s leaders herself.  
As for the Erbil interviewees, my contact person had already reached out to the 
assistant Secretary General of the KIU. However, he preferred the interview to 
take place after Eid. Accordingly, after the holiday of Eid, I went to Erbil, to the 
headquarters of the party. Since, most of the leaders are not originally from 
Erbil, and they had gone back to their relatives during the Eid celebration, when 
I visited the Secretary General, the leaders were coming to the office of the 
Secretary General to congratulate him on the occasion of Eid. This was a great 
opportunity for me to reel in as many participants as I wanted. On the same 
morning, I had a chance to interview one of them. Later that afternoon, I 
interviewed another one. The next day, from half past eight until noon, was 
spent interviewing another three participants. Finally, on the evening of the 
same day I visited the former Secretary General with a member of KIU‟s 
parliament at his home, where I could interview him too. I found myself with 
another six interviews in Erbil. The total number of interviews became 12. 
However, two of them were written interviews, while the other ten participants 




Furthermore, in May 2016 the KIU held its seventh congress, which I 
attendedfor the whole two days (28th and 29th May) in Erbil. This was a chance 
for me to secure three more interview promises, and after the congress (in July 
and August) all three answered my questions.I also had the opportunity to 
witness the congress in person, the content ofwhich was documented by Speda 
TV channel.Later, I obtained a copy of the congress videos by contacting Mr. 
Abdul-Kareem Ahmad, the director of the channel. During the conference, I met 
most of the interviewees, as well as some of those who provided me with data 
and information from their offices, archives or publications. I was also able to 
visit the archive of the KIU‟s official website (Kurdiu.org) in Sulaimani after the 
congress, where I spent a whole day scanning previously published documents 
about the KIU.  
For further clarification, I also examined KIU statements, manifestoes, media 
broadcasts and bylaws. For the interviews, I initially had fourteen questions 
prepared. Then, during the fieldwork, I realised that I needed more questions to 
elaborate, and some other questions were crucial for the success of the project. 
Questions one to 14 are the pre-fieldwork questions. Questions that come after 
the initial question were followed by a dot, such as (3. 1, 3. 2) are the set of 
questions needed to further clarify the research question. Also, during the 
fieldwork, I realized that I needed many other questions that either were crucial 
for my project, or were potential questions I may have needed while writing the 




2.3.3 Rationale of the Research Method: 
The rationale behind the selective snowball methodology comes from the nature 
of the study,i.e. dealing with a political party.In such situations, accessing senior 
officials was not possiblethrough other methodologies as they are not easily 
approachable for interview. Hence, through snowball methodology, I was able 
to contact other available officials at the time, when I attended the headquarters 
in Sulaimani and Erbil, where I could select from those who had time, were 
ready to be interviewed by me, and were important for me to interview. When I 
was given more than one option to choose from, I used my prior knowledge 
about each member, and went for the best available participant in order to ask 
him/her the right question frommy pre-planned list of questions. The rationale of 
numbering my samples from the first group during my fieldwork in summer 2012 
(from 1 to 12) is to indicatetheirpolitical hierarchyin the KIU.Samplenumber one 
was the Secretary General at the time. Sample number two, was the head of 
the leader‟s council of the party. Sample number three was the assistant 
Secretary General of the party, and so on. Thus, the numbering did not come 
from the subject who was interviewed first and gave me access to other 
samples, but it came from the importance of their position and their importance 
in the sequence of my interviews – who was important to come next, and why. 
Therefore, I am going to highlight the key importance in selecting my samples, 
whichsimultaneously explains the selective technique that I adopted within the 
snowball methodology. First, for further clarification and positioning of my 
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To the right hand side of the diagram the arrow shows the Sulaimani region, 
whereI chose six of my interviewees from a total of twelve initial interviews. To 
the left hand side of the diagram,the arrow shows the Erbil region, where I 
selected my other six samples. Starting from Sulaimani, the rationale for 
selecting interviewee number 8 was that he is the most influential leader, thinker 
and theorist among the party that calls for reform, and even known by many as 
the secular leader of the KIU. Almost all his recent books concentrate on 
changing the party into a conservative nationalist democratic party such as the 
AK party of Turkey. In the last (seventh) congress, in May 2016, he nominated 
himself as the Secretary General of the party, and according to ekurd.net got 
25% of the votes. This came after publically publishing his manifesto, which 
informed the members of the congress as well as the whole party. Even during 
the congress, the NRT channel asked him in a live broadcastabouthis 
nomination, during which he reiterated as follows:  
“I want the KIU to step into a transitional phase that it separates the 
preaching and religious affairs, and establishes a party on new bases of 
citizenship… a nationalist Islamic democrat party that can embrace all 
the people, with patriotic and political projects. It is necessary that all 
these Islamic political parties to be dismantled, they are all expired and 
regressive political forms. Then, it is necessary to form a new democratic 
party with Islamic reference from the substance of all of them”. 
Thus, the rationale behind choosing sample number 8 was to examine the 
party‟s intra-discussionswithregard to the separation of preaching and politics, 
reform and other issues concerning the nationalistic dimensions by the KIU. 
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Choosing samples 9 and 10 was due to their differences from sample number 
8. Interviewee number 9 is an academic with a Shari‟ah study background, and 
was the head of the KIU's cleric scholar office at the time. Interviewee number 
10 is a cleric and was the head of the pursuance high council of the KIU. At the 
outset of his interview, interviewee 9 asked me whether I deliberately chose him 
after interviewee 8, since it was the afternoon of the same day that I had 
conducted my interview with interviewee 8 in the morning. I asked him why? He 
replied: “you might know I have different thoughts than him in certain issues, 
especially in regard to the issue of preaching and politics”.Similarly, I 
intentionally wanted to interview sample number 10. This was on account of my 
desire to question a cleric within the KIU‟s officials for the purpose of diversity in 
their educational and political views towards the importance of nationalism.  
Likewise, in Erbil it was extremely important for me to ask the selected subjects 
from among the other possible samples. My key contact was interviewee 3, the 
assistant of the secretary general, who had access to all the political bureau 
members and the members of the leadership council, as well as other heads of 
offices of the party. From the available options, I preferred to go for interviewee 
2, who was the head of the leadership council and was a former minister in the 
KRG. The role of the KIU in preparing members for the government, and what 
statesmanship meant to them, was an important question to ask a former 
minister of the party. Through interviewee 2, I had the opportunity to interview 
the number one man of the party at the time. This was the best option to ask 
questions related to holiness, being above the law, and any kind of immunity; if 
there was any. 
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Overall, each of the selected samples held an important position, and was 
selected intentionally  fromamong the other options. Although, the snowball 
technique might give an impression that each sample leads to another, whether 
it is a good sample or not, in my case, I was able to make it a selective 
snowball, with many options to choose from. The advantage of the snowball 
technique for me was that, when a suggestion came from an existing sample, I 
had a chance to choose those whom I thought would be a good option. Of 
course my prior knowledge about characteristics and suitability of the samples 
helped me hugely in the selective process. 
 
2.3.4 Research Question and Hypothesis: 
2.3.4.1 Research Question: 
For more than two years, I thought about the research question. I wrote many 
questions; sometimes I had four research questions at the same time. However, 
after many readings, reviews, supervision, consultations, and more importantly, 
gathering my data, I reached the conclusion that the most concise research 
question for my project was the following: Is Islamism Defined by Nationalism in 
Kurdistan? This question answers any questions I may have about the title 
(Religious Nationalism in the Middle East: Islamism and Kurdistan Region of 







After much thought, I hypothesized that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the 
politics of Nationalism. This is due to the point that there were many semis 
organised underground by Muslim Brothers among the Kurds since the 1970s. 
Their priority was to preach Islamic values, and hoping for a margin of freedom 
to widen the circle of the „dawa,‟ calling for Islam. The opportunity presented 
itself after the uprising of 1991, and consequently the safe haven and provided 
comfort by the USA, Britain and France that was provided in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
which opened their eyes to the opportunity in front them, which was greater 
than what they expected. Thus, the goal changed from wanting a free, 
organized missionary was taken to the level of political parties, which from that 
time onward became an additional missionary advantage.   
Having a political party demanded a political vision. From the political situation 
of that time, where Kurdistan was suffering from ideological tensions, economic 
sanctions, and civil war, KIU's raison d'etre was proven because of its moderate 
Islamic vision, its charitable organizations, and its efforts for mediating between 
the fighter parties. Then, it became one of the main political parties, accepted 
internally, regionally and internationally. Furthermore, they recently announced 
their part in mediating between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the 
Turkish government for their current peace negotiation. More importantly, it is 
the first political party among the main political parties of the Kurdistan Region 
to call for a nation state of Kurdistan. All these factors highlight the rapid growth 




2.3.5 Pilot Study: 
After almost seven months of starting my study, I realized that the only feasible 
case for my project was the KIU. This was due to many factors, such as the 
focus of the thesis, the accessibility to data, and its relevance. Conducting 
interviews as the most appropriate method of research for this study made me 
ponder what questions would help me create my hypothesis. I wrote the 
questions in English, and then asked a researcher in London to read them and 
give me her understanding of each question. This was to assure whether each 
question was clear enough to include and help assert my thesis. Then, I had to 
translate them into Kurdish. Shortly after arriving in Kurdistan, I showed them to 
a few volunteers and asked them if they understood each of them. This was l 
crucial to validate; my Kurdish had to make sense to native speakers of the 
language who lived in the society of the study. None of the volunteers were 
participants. However, I made sure to read the questions to one low-ranking 
member of the KIU to see how the questions might be understood by their 
leaders. Overall, there were no major issues, aside from a few areas that 
needed minor improvements. I believe the reason behind this was my native 
Kurdish, and my own translations into Kurdish. After collecting my data and 
using quotations, I once again looked at the English version of the questions to 






Before beginning the fieldwork, I prepared a digital camcorder with an internal 
hard disc; this made sure that I was keeping the data by easily saving them on 
my external hard drive for security purposes. I also carried my digital 
Dictaphone with me, along with paper and pens as well. I was simultaneously 
recording the interviews, writing down keynotes in between, and preparing the 
right question to ask, especially when the interviewee's answer was going in a 
different direction. At other times, I had to politely redirect him or her to my 
question. In total, the initial interviews conducted in 2012yielded 571 minutes of 
recording from ten interviewees; that equated to an average of 57.1 minutes for 
each of them. The other two participants, as mentioned earlier (10 and 22), 
preferred to answer their questions in writing. Prof. Aladdin (13)also emailed me 
his answers. Here, a comment regarding ethics should be mentioned 
considering the length of the interviews. For each interview, I allotted 40 
minutes maximum, which I asked of my interviewees beforehand. However, the 
majority of them continued talking and gave lengthy answers. After beginning 
and outlining the interview to one of the participants, he replied with, “Let me 
give you a general introduction first, and then ask your questions.” His 
introduction was more than one hour and a half. Consequently, he left me with a 
huge load of data to deal with. Overall, the length of the interviews was between 
25 minutes and 145 minutes varying from one interviewee to another. Out of 
that collected data, I have transcriptions totalling 40,420 words. I have every 
video, audio recording, and electronic transcripts saved. Also, some of the 
participants gave me some of their books which they thought were related and 
beneficial to the study. Additionally, one participant ordered two CDs from the 
archive of the official newsletter of the KIU, which contained the majority of their 
89 
 
newspapers from 1994 until the summer of 2012. Interview 19, which was 
conducted by Skype,lasted 29 minutes. As for interviews 18 and 20, I received 
the answers by emails. 
 
2.3.7 Challenges: 
One of the major challenges was the fact that I began the fieldwork on the 19th 
of July 2012, and Ramadhan (the fasting month) began on the 21st of July and 
continued until 18th August. Hence, it was very difficult to interview my 
participants during the day, considering they were all fasting. Also, during 
daytime in July and August in Kurdistan, the heat was no less than 45 degrees 
C, making comfort and convenience scarce. Furthermore, at night, the 
participants all went to tarawih prayer, which makes them busy until late. Since 
they had to wake up before dawn to have breakfast in order to prepare for the 
next day‟s fast, they would not stay too late after tarawih. Therefore, during the 
whole month of Ramadhan, I could only conduct four out of twelve of my 
interviews. That was one third of the interviews which took three quarters of my 
time doing fieldwork. My return ticket was for the 31st of August, which meant I 
could only work until the 30th. One of my participants agreed to answer my 
questions in writing, so he took my questions during Ramadhan and sent the 
answers back after Ramadhan. Five participants were from Sulaimani. 
However, two out of the four interviews were conducted in Garmian, in the city 
of Kalar. The remaining seven interviews had to be conducted after Ramadhan, 
six of which had to be conducted in Erbil, and the seventh preferred to answer 
me in writing. However, after nearly three months he emailed me apologising for 




Another challenge was that even in the final quarter of my time in fieldwork, 
there was Eid (feast) break, which is a four day, formal public holiday that starts 
directly after the last day of fasting. Therefore, I had to do the remaining seven 
interviews in only six days. Also, since all those seven participants were not 
originally from the capital Erbil, they all returned to their hometowns to visit their 
families and friends for Eid celebrations. When they came back to the capital, 
there were more Eid celebrations for them, since their fellow cadres from 
different apparatus of the party were visiting them to congratulate them for Eid. 
Luckily, I managed to conduct six of the interviews during that time, which as 
mentioned earlier, took place over only a couple of days. The seventh 
participant requested the questions and preferred to answer me in writing in 
addition to the other two; he was a member of parliament. However, I was 
waiting for his answers until January 2013, but he sadly emailed me to 
apologise for not being able to answer my questions due to his very busy 
schedule. For this, I had to backtrack, but with only few questions to the first 
person that I contacted in Sulaimani and whom helped me with facilitating my 
interviews. Thus she as a member of the leadership committee answered my 
questions and emailed them back.   
Another challenge was dealing with the lengthy answers given by most of the 
participants. This forced me to ask many other questions to redirect them back 
to the point that I wanted them to touch on. However, sometimes their diverted 
answers raised some other issues that made me feel were important for my 






From Embracing Islam to the Dawn of Religious Nationalism 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
This chapter is dedicated to the general affairs of the Kurds, from first 
embracing Islam to the dawn of religious nationalism. It will cover the 
introduction of Islam into Kurdistan and the reaction of the Kurds to the new 
religion (taking into account the general occupation), and the threats to their 
existence during that time, under the occupation of the Sassanid Empire. 
Another subject of this chapter is the role of the Kurds during the Islamic eras, 
with a focus on the rise of nationalism; theories with regard to religious 
nationalism will also be touched on. Another section of this chapter is devoted 
to the period following the reign of the Ottomans, in which the Kurds faced the 
second major division in their history. Covered will be religious nationalism and 
the dichotomous relationship between religion and nationalism, or secularism 
and Islamism. It will also shed light on the period which spans the embrace of 
the Muslim Brotherhood until the establishment of Kurdish owned Islamic 
groups and movements. This part of the chapter will attempt to examine the 
way that Kurdish nationalism has evolved from religious nationalism into both 
secular and Islamist nationalisms, and to understand the reasons behind the 
chasm between the two. Furthermore, it will attempt to understand the politics of 
nationalism in both of its aforementioned forms, secular and Islamic, in the 
Middle East, by making use of the Kurdish case as an example. Finally, the 
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dangers of radicalisation among the Kurds, and the threat it poses to the 
progress of uniqueness of the Kurds within the Middle East, will be outlined. 
 
3.2 Islam in Kurdistan: 
The majority of Kurds were from the First Nations, outside Arabia, which 
accepted Islam with ease right at the beginning of the Islamic conquests. This, 
according to Hama Kareem (2006: 15), was due to the fact that: 
"When the Islamic troops knocked the door of the borders of the Mount 
region [Kurdistan], who came to the door were not the Kurds. Although 
Kurds were at home, those who opened the door were the Persian 
troops that forcefully without the permission of the Kurds were occupying 
their home".  
Shourush (n.d: 114), citing Muhammad Amin Zaki, has spoken about the Muslim 
conquerors arriving Kurdistan in the year 18 AH36; it is obvious that until this 
date, the Kurds were under Persian rule since the latter overcame the Medes 
Empire. The Kurds, then, were hoping that, under the long occupation of Persia, 
some kind of rescue would arrive; there are, however, counter-arguments that 
claim that the Kurds, similarly to the Persians, were against the Islamic 
conquests. The stronger argument, arguably, is that which is in favor of the true 
acceptance of the majority of the Kurds to Islam; despite claims that some of the 
Kurds fought the Muslim conquerors alongside the Persians, this does not 
                                                          
36
 The Hijri calendar is the Islamic dating system deriving its name from the Hijra, the Arabic 
word for migration, referring to the migration of the prophet Muhammad (SWT) from Mecca to 
Yathrib (Medina) in the Arabian Peninsula in 622 A.D. thus marking the first year in the Islamic 
calendar. The first day of the Islamic calendar, 1 Muharram, 1 A.H. (Anno Hijrae) is Friday July 




change that fact that those Kurds were under the command of the Persian 
troop‟s leaders. This is similar to any other era in which they were under the 
control of the invaders with little alternative, such as those who served forcefully 
under Saddam‟s regime in Iraq during its war against Iran, or invading Kuwait in 
1980s and 1990, or even, in some cases, against their own people; it is clear 
that these regimes were commanding the recruited followers to fight. This does 
not necessarily means that those followers were committed to such kinds of 
combat, especially when they were not representing their people or, on the 
contrary, working for foreigners. The main support for this argument comes from 
the long standing allegiance of the Kurds to Islam, the up-to-date religiosity of 
the Kurdish people, and the upholding to the mainstream of Islam.  
Furthermore, Mar‟i (2006a: 27) added that: 
“The embracing of the Kurds to Islam, made them feel their existing as a 
distinct entity with their language and heritage within the Islamic entity. 
On the other hand, the loss of the Medes state and shrinking their 
civilisation role under the series of foreign states, such as the 
Achaemenids, the Greeks, the Parthians and Sassanids made the Kurds 
unsurprisingly welcoming Islam, and considering it as a transition into a 
better situation. Rather, it would get the Kurds out of the injustice of the 
Persia and complication of the Zoroastrian clerics (Magians) who had 
been imposing unbearable rituals and traditions on them”.  
Also, Ahmad (2006: 107) in answering Aljazeera Net‟s question: “however, 
some of the Kurdish nationalists consider the Arabic Islamic conquests to be 





“With complete objectivity, without any emotions and with due respect to 
my Kurdish people, I say that the Kurds embraced Islam with absolute 
satisfaction. Similar to the Arabs, the Kurds were consisting of a group of 
people, and their origin goes back to the Gutians, one of the branches of 
the people of Zagros, who ruled Babylon for a whole century, and had a 
strong state. However, their state disappeared since the Persians came 
to the region after the Kurds by three centuries.  
“Thus, the Kurds shifted from rulers to the ruled and from oppressors to 
the oppressed, and then they were like that until the Islamic conquest. It 
was natural for them to welcome the new religion which rescued them 
from oppression which lasted for many centuries. Therefore, there was 
no resistance to the Islamic conquest, but marginally. Then the Kurds 
were unlimitedly sincere to Islam”.           
Understanding the vision of the Kurds with regard to Islam as a religion, and 
their stance towards it as a political entity right from the beginning, is crucial. 
Since that juncture, the Kurdish people have had many opportunities to 
demonstrate their true feelings towards Islam in the shadow of the many 
weaknesses that the Islamic empires have had over this time. Hama Kareem 
(2006: 39-40) has recorded that the following steps had been taken by the 
Kurds towards Islam and its troops, including the Arabs of early Islam: 
"1- yet, the Islamic preaching were in Mecca, when the Kurds sent Jaban 
as a representative to Mecca and Meddinah, passing the news of Kurds 
to Islam, and bringing back the news of the prophet and Islam to the 
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Kurds. This is barring the representatives of Jazira region and the 
merchants of Bajin tribe. 
2- When the Islamic troops reached Jalawla37, before the start of war; a 
Kurdish delegation from Sharazoor arrived to the Islamic troops. Before 
stepping into Kurdistan territory, they secretly came to an agreement on 
few things away from the Persians.  
3- The mentioned agreement resulted in a revolt in Sharazoor, which 
was turned a blind eye to by many of the historians. By approaching the 
troops of Islam to Kurdistan, according to the agreement, the Kurds in 
Sharazoor, Hawraman and Sharbajerstarted a popular uprising against 
the Persian troops and state apparatus. Hence, the region was cleared 
up [from the Persians]".  
This is how Islam came to be introduced into Kurdistan. Contrary to the 
Persians, the Islamic army for the Kurds was a Salvation force; since pre-Islam, 
the Sassanid and the Byzantine empires were mainly occupying the whole land 
of Kurdistan. Thus, the Kurds were neither politically nor religiously independent 
and were looking for an opportunity that fulfilled time-to-time political 
independence and continued religious freedom. Nawxosh (2012: 26) states, in 
regard to this point, "if Islam had not been arrived to Kurdistan, in between the 
Sassanid and Byzantine, a nation in the name of Kurds would not exist 
anymore. As a result, they would disappear like the Assyrians and Babylonians". 
At the time, the Kurds had nothing to fear by trying this new growing force; Islam 
was not a mere belief separate from the injustice that the Kurds were suffering 
                                                          
37
 It is alleged by the contemporary Kurdish intellectuals in Kurdistan Region that Jalawla has being 
mistakenly pronounced by the non-Kurdish Muslims; otherwise its true Kurdish name is Gulala. 
Therefore, and accordingly, it is currently called Gulala.    
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under. The Kurds simply wanted to escape their oppression; by welcoming the 
newly growing force of the time, the Kurds hoped to get rid of the occupiers.  
However, the denial of this favouring of Islam by some of the 
Kurdishintelectualshas emerged from the zeal of nationalism that grew among 
the Kurds after the remapping of the Islamic world based on ethnic nationalism, 
and depriving the Kurds as the result of a similar right. Though during the early 
Islamic eras there was no nationalism in today's sense, the Kurds were one of 
the nations that benefited from Islam in order to regrow their entity. According to 
Nawxosh (2012: 7), at that time: 
"Since the history of the Kurds and Persia were so close, and the 
absolute power was in the hand of Persian, with no power for the Kurds. 
This kind of shared life continued till the era of the Sassanid. This in all 
political, cultural and religious aspects, were in the service of the Persia. 
This made the Kurd, to look for an opportunity to get their freedom".  
Consequently, since the collapse of Mede Empire, the Kurds once again had a 
chance to work on three important elements of independence. Nawxosh (2012: 
8) elaborates that "Nation, language and faith were strong causes for secession 
of Kurds from Persian! And the Kurdish language grew in the mosques. Then 
they restored their independent nationhood identity from the Persian. The 
language, gained its own morphology, syntax and semantics, and separated 
from Persia".  
In fact, the denial of the positive influence of Islam doesn't change the reality. 
The Kurds could reject Islam once it had no political power over them, at least 
since the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. However, this doesn't mean that 
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the Kurds, as with other Muslim ethnicities over the years, had not suffered 
political oppression at the hands of Kurdish and non-Kurdish Muslim leaders. 
Overall, the majority of the Kurdish people have convincingly chosen Islam as 
their religion, and today they practice its rituals more than any time in the past. 
Simply by looking at the mosques in Kurdistan region during the Jum‟aprayers, it 
becomes apparent that the number of praying people has hugely increased. 
Also, according to the PUKonline.net quoting regional officials from the Ministry 
of Endowments and Religious Affairs, even in the atmosphere of austerity in the 
current year of 2015, the amount of money spent by Kurds going to Saudi 
Arabia for visiting the holy places reached 7.5 billion38 US dollars. This amount 
does not including other expenses with respect to 3656 pilgrimages that 
according to the same source have gone for the pilgrimage to Mecca this year. 
Moreover, had it not been for the restrictions and quotas that limit the number of 
people allowed to visit Mecca each year from every country, it is assumed that 
the number of Kurds going to Saudi Arabia would have been significantly higher. 
 
3.3 Role of the Kurds during the Islamic Eras: 
Throughout the reigns of Islam, there has always existed a semi-Kurdish self-
government in different parts of Kurdistan. On many occasions, there has been 
more than one Kurdish rule at a time due to the fact that there were no nation 
states in today's sense; in addition, the tribal non-agreements between the 
entities led to rivalries between them, subsequently weakening them. According 
to the mentioned sources, most of the former Kurdish dynasties are as follows:  
                                                          
38
 Even, if this amount is not accurate, and only assuming it is 7.5 million, still it is a substantial 
amount of money during the current economical austerity that the region suffers from.   
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"Saffarid dynasty from the mid third century [864] to 288 AH [901] (Al-Alawi, 
2010: 206), [However, Bosworth (2010) records the period as (861-1003)]. 
Salarids (300-420 AH) [912-1029] (Al-Alawi, 2010: 206). Ardalan Emirate (1169-
1867). Bashnawi emirate (888-889) (Tawfiq 2010: 65).Hassanpour (1992: 50) 
mentions the followings dynasties in the mentioned regions: 
"Shaddadids (951-1174, Transcaucasia).Hasanwayhids (959-1095, 
Dinawar).Marwanids (990-1096, Diyarbakir).Annazids (991-1117, 
Hulwan) had established their power in various parts of Kurdistan. These 
dynasties were, however, wiped out between the 11th and 15th centuries 
by the invasion of the Seljuq Turks (11-12th c.), the Mangols (13th 
century) and their successors".  
Furthermore, there are other emirates39 that are mentioned by the following 
sources:Hakkari emirate was a prominent Kurdish emirate for more than 500 
years until its last mir [prince, leader] was deposed in the mid-19th century. Al-
Alawi, (2010: 209-262) also mentions other Fayli Kurdish dynasties, such as 
"the FayliAtabegs, the minor Luriatabeg state during the Safavids, and other 
Fayli governments, like Nakhawis, Deeris, the Fayli Kurds of Iraq". Overall, 
there were many, many states, emirates and sultanates throughout the 
                                                          
39(Tawfiq 2010: 44) Bokhti emirate (380-420 AH/990-1029). (Shar'ati: 2013) Shwankara (1168-
1200). (Metropolitan Museum of Art, n.d.)Ayyubid Dynasty (1171-1260) in Egypt, Syria, and 
parts of Hijaz(Saudi Arabia) and Yemen. (Chaliand 1993: 17-18) Emirate of Baban (1649-1851). 
(Sykes 1930: 277) the reign of Karim khan [Zand] (1750-1779) in Iran. (Gunter 2004b: 199) "the 
ruler of the semi-independent Kurdish emirate of Botan, surrendered to the Ottomans in 1847".  
(Tawfiq 2010: 83) Jawani emirate (1006-1012). (Tawfiq 2010: 107) Jolamerg emirate.(Tawfiq 
2010: 117) Chopy emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 125) Hamidian emirate. (Tawfiq 2010: 177) Qaimari 





Islamicera. Batlisi40, (2006) classified them into four parts, more detail of which 
can be found in the footnotes.  
Over the twentieth century, since the collapse of the Ottomans, there were 
attempts in different parts of Kurdistan to establish themselves as a nation 
state, a move which faced brutal opposition by the occupiers of Kurdistan. 
                                                          
40
 "Part one, is covering the rulers of Kurdistan who regarded them as kings and sultans, in five 
chapters. Chapter one, mentioning the rulers of Diyarbakir, jazira [Bokhtis] (Marwanids).Chapter 
two, mentioning the rulers of Dinawarand Sharazwr, whom were known as 
Hasanwayhids.Chapter three, mentioning the rulers of Fadhilwayhid, whom were known as 
great Lur.Chapter four, mentioning the rulers of the minor Lur.Chapter five, mentioning the 
Sultans of Egypt and Syria, whom were famous as Ayyobiddynasty. 
Part two, is dedicated in mentioning the great rulers of Kurdistan, whom, albeit did not reach 
independence level and proclaiming their sultanates, yet, they achieved currency making and 
being mentioned in Friday prayers. This part too, consists of five chapters: chapter one, 
mentioning the rulers of Ardalan. Chapter two, mentioning the rulers of Hakkari, whom were 
known as Shnbo.Chaperthree, mentioning the rulers of Amadiya, whom were known as 
Badinan.Chapter four, mentioning the rulers of Jazeeera, whom were known as Bokhti. This 
chapter is subdivided into three sections. First mentioning the rulers of Jazira.Second 
mentioning the rulers of Gurgil.Third mentioning princes of Fanak.Chapter five, mentioning the 
rulers of HasanKifa, whom were known as Malkan. 
Part three, is covering the other rulers and mirs of Kurdistan, this consists of three main 
branches: first, contains nine chapters: chapter one, mentioning the rulers of Jmshkzk, which 
talks about the rulers of Mjnkurd, Prtk and Sqman. Chapter two, mentioning the rulers of 
Murdasi, this contains the rulers of Akeel, Palw and Charmok. Chapter three, mentioning the 
rulers of Sason (Qapljuz) whom eventually were known as the rulers of (Hazo).Chapter four, 
mentioning the rulers of Khezan, which covers the rulers of Khezan, Mks and Asbaeerd. 
Chapter five, mentioning the rulers of Kls. Chapter six, mentioning the rulers of Sherwan, this 
covers three branches, the rulers of Kifri, Irun or Iruhand (Kirni=Kirti=Kurti). Chapter seven, 
mentioning the rulers of (Zrqi=Zrki) which contains four branches: the rulers of Drzeni, 
(Krdkan=Kardkan), (Itaq=Htakh) and Tarjeel. Chapter eight, mentioning the rulers of 
Suidi.Chapter nine, mentioning the rulers of (Sulaimani=Sulivani) this consists of two branches: 
first, mentioning the rulers of Qalb and Batman. The second, is mentioning the rulers of 
Miafarqeen. The second branch is covered in twelve chapters: the first covers the rulers of 
Soran. The second covers the rulers of Baban. The third covers the rulers of Mukri. The fourth 
covers the rulers of Bradost, which consists of two branches: one, mentioning the rulers of 
(Washni=Ashnw=Ashna), and two, mentioning the rulers of Somai. Chapter five covers the 
rulers of Mahmoodi. Chapter six covers the rulers of Danbli. Chapter seven covers the rulers of 
Zrza. Chapter eight covers the rulers of Astooni. Chapter nine covers the rulers of 
(Tasni=Dasniah). Chapter ten, covers the rulers of Kalhur, this consists of three branches. The 
first, mentioning the rulers of Plnkan, the second, Drtank, and the third is on Mahidasht. Chapter 
eleven covers the rulers of Bana. Chapter twelve covers the rulers of Trza. Finally, the third 
branch is covered in four sub-branches: First, mentioning the rulers of Siamansoor. Second, 
mentioning the rulers of Chnki. Third, mentioning the rulers of Zangana. Fourth, mentioning the 
rulers of Pazooki.  
Part four, is covering the rulers and mirs of Badlis.   
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Some examples of this opposition are as follows: Hawar (1990: 544) writes that 
"the first kingdom of Kurdistan under Shaikh Mahmoud Hafeed, in Southern 
Kurdistan was from 1918 to 1919", Kurdsat (2011) highlights that "the [second] 
kingdom of Kurdistan [under Shaikh Mahmoud, again] lasted from 1922 to1924" 
and White (2000: 77) states that the Republic of Ararat lasted from 1927-1930. 
In addition, Ervand (1982: 217-18) states that the Republic of Kurdistan in 
Mahabad remained only eleven months (1946-47), while De Waal, (2003: 183) 
writes of Lachin Kurdish Republic in 1992. 
Despite the fact that there were a number of self-governances at different levels 
by the Kurdish rulers throughout the reigns of Islamic, notably the Ardalan 
dynasty, lasted for 700 years. However, this has been rare due to certain 
factors, such as disagreements between the rulers of different regions (and, in 
some case, those within the same region), as well as their links and allegiance 
to different greater powers, like the Ottomans and Safavids, and religious 
differences, being divided between Sunni and Shiias. Plus, due to the non-
existence of the notion of race-based nationalism, the Kurds did not benefit from 
uniting all the Kurds under a single self-ruling state; there were no nationalistic 
feelings under the banner of Islam. For the same reason, for hundreds of years 
different nations had accepted the ruling of a single dynasty, such as the 
Umayyads, the Abbasids or the Ottomans. On the same basis, other nations 
also came to accept the ruling of Ayyubid in Egypt, Syria, Hijaz and Yemen.  
Snnw (1998: 113-14) has commented on the situation of the Kurdish 
principalities in terms of their internal relations, as follows: 
"Since the eighteenth century, the Baban principality became the most 
powerful Kurdish principality. However, due to the internal family conflicts 
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between the princes, the principality weakened in the following century. 
This gave the opportunity to the Soran principality to appear as the most 
powerful among the Kurdish principalities. As for the Badinan Principality, 
it was in conflict with both Baban and Soran principalities". 
The situation with the other none Kurdish regions was similar to this during this 
period of the Ottoman Empire. Snnw (1998: 114-15) adds that:  
"Up-till the early nineteenth century, the Kurdish principalities in the 
Ottoman state had kept their internal independence. However, this 
situation had not last long, especially during the reign of Sultan 
Mahmoud the second (1808-1839) when the Ottomans were 
strengthening and widening their central power. He defeated Ali Pasha 
(Tabln) in Albania in 1822, and controlled Tripoli (Libya), Baghdad and 
Mosul between 1831 and 1835. During this new policy, the Ottomans 
tried to defeat all the [semi-independent] Kurdish tribes and Principalities, 
which led to many revolutions by the Kurds to defend their rights. This 
continued over the nineteenth century".  
In terms of the nationalist critics to these entities, there is an arguably, unfair 
critical judgment towards Salahaddin and his Ayyubid dynasty among the 
Kurds, with regard to failing to achieve nation statehood for the Kurds by 
exercising their power widely over time. This, one could argue, is not a realistic 
criticism; the Ayyubids were ruling outside the land of Kurds. If there was a 
racial sentiment among those people, they would never have accepted the 
Ayyubids to rule over their people and land; if such a criticism is legitimate, it 
would also have to be leveled at the other Kurdish dynasties that were ruling 
over the land of Kurdistan and the Kurdish people. Nonetheless, this is still an 
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unrealistic judgment, as it concerns a different situation and different sense of 
allegiances, which cannot be aligned with nationalism in today's sense. The 
nationalist sentiment came to the Islamic world as late as the second part of the 
nineteenth century.  
It can be argued, therefore, there was no clear-cut nationalism among the Kurds 
during that time, which was also the case with the other Muslim nations. By 
looking at the Kurdish nationalist movements and their revolutions since the 
second part of the nineteenth century, one clearly notices a call by the Kurds for 
nation statehood over Kurdistan, on the part of Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri. Snnw 
(1998: 123) remarks: 
"In the 1880 revolution, we notice that a fundamental modification had 
occurred to the thought of Shaikh Ubaidullah and to his plan. Before that 
revolution, the Kurds used to revolt for [some tactical demands], or to 
obtain further self-ruling and strengthening themselves in their lands, not 
to establish an independent entity to contain [all] the Kurds of the 
Sultanate [Ottomans] and Persia together. With the second revolution of 
Shaikh Ubaidullah in 1880, the situation changed. For the first time in the 
history of the Kurdish movements in the nineteenth century, a Kurdish 
leader lonely comes to arise within the Kurdish tribal and feudal society, 
the Kurdish issue in a unique nationalistic rhetoric to call for uniting all 
the Kurds in a single independent entity, using terms such as „nation‟ and 





Noticeably, Shaikh Ubaidullah was theorising a complete religious nationalism, 
and nation building, on the land of Kurdistan. Furthermore, Snnw (1998: 123) 
highlights that "when Shaikh Ubaidullah started his revolution in September and 
October of 1880, he sent two letters to Joseph Cochran, the American physician 
and Presbyterian missionary in Kurdistan, and to Iqbal al-dawla, the Persian 
ruler of Urmia".Snnw (1998: 123) quoted the first letter, which states "the 
Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. 
Their religion is different (to that of others), and their laws and customs are 
distinct...". This is what makes Shaikh Ubaidullah distinct among all the Kurdish 
leaders; his idea was that of complete nation building on the basis of race, 
religion and law. As for race, the Kurds are an independent people. The 
differences in religion and law originate from the fact that the Kurds are 
Shafi'isMazhab(jurisprudence), which differs from the Shia Jafaris of Iran (that 
which that the Safavids created their nation state of Iran on) and the Hanafi of 
Turkey. Yet, despite the divided nature of Kurdistan, this is the strongest 
dimension of the Kurdish nation; Kurds being primarily Sunni Shafi‟is makes 
them different than all other surrounding Muslim nations of Turkey, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria.  
 
3.4 Post Ottomans Empire: 
3.4.1 Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Kurd: 
After the Ottomans, and especially after the Great War, the Middle East 
witnessed enormous changes in its political environment; a new map shadowed 
over the region, many new nation states emerged, and new political tensions 
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came to exist. All of this came into effect in a world that was described by 
Lazarif (2007: 15) as follow "In early twentieth [of the 20th century] the world 
was relatively stable. That came after many years of bloody wars and 
devastations, which was followed by political and economic turmoil. Then, 
generally, the situation became more stable in the Middle East too, except one 
region: Kurdistan”.  
This new era for the Kurds brought with it much grief; regionally, and 
internationally, the situation had turned against them. As Lazarif (2007: 15) 
witnessed “indeed, the land of Kurds was boiling, since the people neither 
wanted appeasement with their situation under the repression, nor with the 
many promises regarding their self-determination41, which all the promises 
remained just a piece of paper".    
Not only did the Kurds not get the right to self-determination, but the new epoch 
also further fragmented them in between the newly emerged states, such as 
Turkey, Iraq and Syria, who all gained sovereign statehood in lieu of Kurdistan. 
In this regard, Lazarif (2007: 15) underlines the following: 
"Nothing changed in regards of Kurdistan‟s boundaries, but its inner 
boundaries, that separate the Northern Kurdistan and North Western 
(Turkey's Kurdistan) from Southern Kurdistan and South Western (Iraq 
and Syria), that formed the international borders between Turkey, Iraq 
and Syria. The borders between Turkey's Kurdistan [northern Kurdistan] 
                                                          
41
 Self-determination: National self-determination was the principle applied to the break-up of 
Austria, German, and Ottoman Empires by President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’after 
the First World War. It is also embodied in the charter of the United Nations, in the 1960 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples, and in the 
1970 Declaration of the Principles of International Law. (McLean. I., & McMillan, A., 2003: 483). 
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and Iraqi Kurdistan [Southern Kurdistan], and between Iranian Kurdistan 
[Eastern Kurdistan]42 with Iraqi Kurdistan remained stable".  
If the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire remained under one of the newly formed 
states, this would have, in the long run, been much easier in terms of their 
struggle towards self-determination and the establishment of a united Kurdistan.  
The international community after the Great War also dealt with the issue of the 
Kurds from the point of view of the British; the British mandate that was ruling 
over Southern Kurdistan was viewing the issue of the Kurds‟ right to nationhood 
in terms of its own political interests. However, some Kurdish intellectuals claim 
that this decision was ideological. This is unlikely, as the promises laid out in 
Severs43 treaty for the Kurds were under the supervision of the allies, Great 
Britain among them; if there were any hidden agendas against the Kurds, they 
would not mention the Kurds and their rights at all. However, when, a conflict of 
interest between the British and the Kurds wish for nation statehood occurred, 
the treaty of Lausanne44 was proposed. In this treaty, the British wanted to 
                                                          
42
 The Treaty of Zuhab [Zahaw] in 1639 between the Ottoman and Persian Empires formally 
established their border that had been unofficially marked after the Ottoman victory at the Battle 
of Chaldiran in 1514. The importance for the Kurds is that this border separated them between 
these two great Middle Eastern empires and in effect still largely exists today in the border 
between Turkey and Iran.  (Gunter, 2011: 313). 
43
 The stillborn Treaty of Sevres signed in August 1920 provided for “local autonomy for the 
predominantly Kurdish area”(Article 62) and in Article 64 even looked forward to the possibility 
that “the Kurdish peoples”might be granted “independence from Turkey.”  (Gunter, 2011: 6). 
44
 Although the Treaty of Sevres (1920) held out the possibility of Kurdish independence, as 
mentioned above, the definitive Treaty of Lausanne (1923) made no mention of the Kurds. What 
is more, the British already had decided to attach the largely Kurdish vilayet of Mosul to Iraq 
because of its vast oil resources. The British felt that this was the only way Iraq could be made 




compromise Turkey, but were not ready to give up their oil reserves for Turkey 
or France.       
 
This policy was an ongoing cause of unrest for the Kurdish issue, as well as for 
the people of Kurdistan and the surrounding states on which Kurdistan was 
divided, despite the fact that the British were aware of the consequences of 
such a decision. Lazarif (2007: 51) gives a brief outline of the history of Kurdish 
national demands and the main players in this process before the division of 
Kurdistan:  
“It is well known that the turmoil that started in Kurdistan, initiated in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, and spread to a wide area 
throughout the century, and in the early of the following century. At that 
time, it used to be an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire and Iran. This 
was a concern for two major colonial states: Czarist Russia and the 
Great Britain. Then the circle of the concern by the major countries to the 
Kurdish issue widened in the period that followed after the peace 
reconciliation in the Middle East (1918-1923). This concern grew after 
the war, and at the price of France and the United States of America. 
However, as far as the Kurds concerned, the problem had not been 
resolved, neither for the Middle Easterners nor for the major western 
countries that had connection to it”.    
Although the Kurds became the victims of imperialist interests, according to 
Lazarif (2007: 52) “the very wide trend by the writers, journalists, politicians and 
historians in the West as well as in the East, those who study the situation in 
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Kurdistan, are to look at it from the non-Kurdish perspective”. This is primarily 
due to their orientalist point of view, which tried to label the Kurdish nationalist 
movements, and their leadership, „reactionaries‟. This was an attempt to prove 
that the Turks, Arabs and Persians were far more civilized than the Kurds, and 
that they should be punished accordingly. Lazarif (2007: 52-53) highlights some 
writers of this kind of propaganda, who described the Kurds as „backwarders‟ in 
all aspects, both as social and cultural. They also labeled Kurdish society as 
being dominated by the tribal and feudal system, with no intellectual class. 
 
3.4.2 From Kurdish Religious Nationalism to Dichotomy into Religious or 
Nationalists: 
Basically in the Kurdish case, religious Shaikhs led the nationalist movements 
which appeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, most notably 
Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, who was struggling to establish a nation state within 
Kurdistan on the basis of Islam. Dashti (2014) argues “Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri 
is considered to be the first Kurdish leader, who was calling for the 
establishment of the independent state of Kurdistan”. Since there was no clear-
cut distinction between the religion and nationalism in that period, religious 
nationalism continued until the revolts of Shaikh Mahmud Hafeed in southern 
Kurdistan and Shaikh Sa‟id Piran in northern Kurdistan in 1925. Karwani (2008: 
15) notes that “from the great Shaikh Ubaidullah, till Shaikh (Abdulsalam) 
Barzani, Shaikh Mamhood, Shaikh Sa‟id Piran, Qazi Muhammad, and their 




However, this kind of combination, with both Kurds and non-Kurds, did not last; 
according to Karwani (2008: 15):  
“with the appearance and spreading around the modern ideologies, such 
as secularism, Islamism, especially Marxism and the new Islamic 
ideology, also the new era of the military Coup d'états, and the 
backwardness authoritarian nationalist regimes in the region, the issue of 
Islam and nationalism, widely were presented as problematic, and as two 
contradictory polar. Then, both were presented as alternative to each 
other”.     
A raw model for nationalists in the Middle East was the Kemalists; from the 
Reza Shah of Iran to the later nationalists in the Arab world, all followed the 
extremism of the Kemalists, in the sense that they all undermined the religious 
extent of their nationalism. Despite the prominence of religion in all Kurdish 
nationalist movements, the later Kurdish nationalists also followed suit with 
regard to Kemalism. Over the entire region, as Karwani (2008: 14) observed: 
“the Collide of nationalism and the region‟s value system, had led to 
different kinds of reactions. At the outset, nationalism more was 
appearing in a sense of nation and land loving, with sympathy to the 
fellow citizens. Though, at this level too, nationalism and the traditional 
Islamic culture had a shared resistance movement against the occupiers 
and the colonialists”.    
As a result, religious and secular figures began to diverge and the whole issue 




“…, nationalism in the east, similar to many other notions and trends, 
couldn‟t maintain its natural progress and reach its natural results. In the 
west, nationalism, due to its good extent that filled the spiritual vacuum, 
that the radical critique, and the enlightenment had against Christianity in 
the form of the church. While, here [Islamic World], religion has occupied 
a wide area of the human‟s spiritual and material life. Contrary to the 
west, nationalism here didn‟t become a framework for cultivation of 
political liberalism and democracy”.    
In fact, the hyper secularism that varies from a region to another, starting with 
Turkey, day after another widened the gap between nationalists and non-
secular nationalists. Those non-secular nationalists later were called Islamists. 
With reference to Kurdistan, although the notion of Islamism and Islamists did 
not clearly appear till 1980s, this was due to the fact that Kurdistan was not an 
independent state like Turkey, Iran or the Arab states. However, the same 
factors that led to the appearance of Islamism in the region were also present 
here; Siwayli (2009b: 20); Erwani (2004: 62); Ali (1999: 26); explain that: 
"if we need to talk about the beginning and historical roots of the Islamic 
trend in Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to determine its beginning. In 
order to know its beginning, we need to note two main important reasons 
that affected all the Islamic trends over the Islamic world. The first effect, 
that affected the start of the contemporary Islamic trend, was the 
religious reform movement that was led by Jamaladin Al-Afghani (1839-




A religious reform, demanded by a small stratum of the religious elites, took 
place over the Ottoman Empire; for them, all of the political, economic and 
military declines were down to the influence of the old regime and non-religious 
reforms. This attitude was also present among the Kurdish scholars too. 
According to Siwaili (2009b: 20): 
"The influence of the above scholars had reached Kurdistan in the early 
twentieth century. The grand Mulla of Koya was influenced by those new 
ideas. Accordingly, he was propagating for religious reforms. He was 
even hopping to meet them and to write the Islamic teachings for the 
Muslim people".  
Arguably the greatest factor that led to this dichotomy, and concentrated the 
religious dimension, is highlighted by Siwaili (2009b: 21) here: "the second 
effect was the abolishment of the Islamic caliphate in 1924. Although, the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate was debated, however, its abolishment was 
considered as a deadly hit. Since, the caliphate was a spiritual symbol for the 
Muslims". This was the catalyst for the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt by Hassan Al-Bana in 1928. As for southern Kurdistan, a clear Islamic 
political movement appeared quite early on, even before the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Siwaili (2009b: 22) records that: 
"after the battle of Darbandi Bazian [in 1919], and capturing Shaikh 
Mahmoud by the British, two political parties were established in 
Sulaimani, which later they united in a front. Those two parties were 
(Parti Nishtmani Kurd, Parti Islami Kurdi) (the Kurdish Patriotic Party, and 
the Kurdish Islamic Party). The Kurdish Islamic party was against the 
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British, they willed to agree with the Turks, if they would acknowledge the 
independence of Kurdistan".  
Similarly, another attempt was recorded by Siwaili (2009b: 23) as "in 1934 
Abdullah Beg, the son of Ahmad Beg, Shaho; the poet, along with other figures 
in Halabja established an Islamic party, in the name of (Hizbi Islami Kurd45) (the 
Kurdish Islamic Party)”. During this time there was not a dichotomous 
relationship between secularism and Islam in Kurdistan, like that of other 
neighboring countries; this indicates the depth of such political thought among 
the Kurds.Abdulaziz (2016b: 100) claims that:  
“This Kurdish Islamic Party had influence on a huge number of later 
intellectuals, whether in southern Kurdistan, such as the prime cadres of 
Brotherhood party and Darkaw party, then Hiwa party. Or in Mukrian and 
eastern Kurdistan generally, which started few organisations, such as 
(IthadiMohammadi) the party of Mohammadian Union, (Hizbi Azadixwazi 
Kurdistan) the Liberal Party of Kurdistan, and the later (JK)”. 
For Siwaili (2009b: 24-25): 
"The establishment of (Parti Islami Kurdi, the Kurdish Islamic Party) and 
(Hizbi Islami Kurd, the Kurdish Islamic Party) at that period of time raises 
few questions. It is my belief that the establishment of those two parties 
away from any external influences; they were the outcome of the political 
and social situation of the time in Southern Kurdistan. The founders of 
those political parties wanted to benefit from Islam to serve their nation, 
and lift up its sufferings. For us, we can say that the establishment of 
                                                          
45
 Abdulaziz, O., 2016 traces the date of the establishment of this party to 1933. 
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those two Islamic parties becomes a beginning for the Islamic trend of 
Kurdistan".  
 
As previously mentioned, the mosques had an important role in Kurdistan after 
the Kurdish people embraced Islam; under the prolonged occupation by Persia 
of the Kurdish identity, their language was under the threat of disappearance, 
as with other nations under similar circumstances. Similarly, after the 
appearance of nationalism and the division of Kurdistan, the mosques assumed 
the same role, that of protecting the national identity of the Kurds. This kind of 
role was noticed even in the Christian world by Juergensmeyer (1993: 135-6), 
who noted the churches resistance to forceful change: 
"The polish church was one of the primary purveyors of the spirit of 
polish nationalism. Its central role was especially evident during the 
czars' attempts to Russify the areas of Poland they controlled by forcing 
the churches to embrace the Orthodox faith. These unsuccessful 
attempts reinforced the image of the polish Church as a bulwark of Polish 
nationalist culture".  
We can compare the Kurdish case to the Polish one, in terms of the role of the 
church in sustaining and preserving Polish nationalism against attempts of 
Russification, and changing their nationality by converting their church to an 
Orthodox denomination. There are two useful examples here; the first is the 
process of the Safavid, which succeeded in converting some of the Kurds to 
Shi‟ias and ultimately led to the controversy of identifying as Kurds, and the 
second is the majority who resisted the change and maintained their pure 
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nationality, primarily due to them maintaining Sunnism against the new imposed 
Shi‟asm. This comparison brings to light the failure of the Kurdish religious 
figures to create a religious nationalism that would distinguish them as their own 
nation, alongside the Safavid and the Ottomans. For the late Ottomans and the 
era of nationalism, as was discussed above, disagreement among the religious 
orders and the tribes were the primary obstacles facing the dissident Shaikhs 
and their nationalist attempts. Above all, the Shafi‟i jurisprudence was 
fundamental in the uniqueness of the Kurds, if used for that purpose. However, 
it was the mosque, far before the appearance of secularism in Kurdistan, which 
defended the concept of Kurdish identity and presented all the leaders of the 
Kurdish nationalist movements until the establishment of the Republic of 
Kurdistan in Mahabad, Eastern Kurdistan, in 1946. Abdulaziz (2016b: 17) 
argues that “the mosques and its graduates in Kurdistan had significant roles in 
the revolutions, revolts and organisations of Kurdistan. Even, in many occasions 
the pioneers and the leaders were from the educated elites of the mosques, the 
Shaikh order Khanaqas46, and the scholars, Mulas, their students, and the 
judges”.    
 
3.4.3 Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic awakening in Kurdistan: 
Although the political situation in Kurdistan was different than that of the Arab 
states, due to the unique situation of the Kurds lack of nation statehood, among 
the Kurdish Muslim scholars there was a yearning similar to that of Islamic 
                                                          
46
 A khanaqa or tekiye is a religious meeting place for a sufi or dervish ritual gathering (majlis). The 
inside looks like a simple mosque with a mihrab (prayer niche) but no minbar (pulpit where Friday 
prayers are said). Portraits of sheikhs, flags, and the silsila, the spiritual pedigree or chain of transmission 
that links a sufi master with the founder of his particular tariqa (mystical path), as well as sharp objects 
used during ceremonies distinguish a khanaqa from a regular mosque.  
Gunter (2011b :160). 
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revivalism in Arab countries; this situation was no different to that of the rest of 
Iraq in this respect. Siwaili (2009b: 25) records that "after the establishment of 
the Iraqi state, few Islamic associations had been established in Iraq. Most of 
those associations had opened their branches in the cities of Kurdistan, and 
had activities. Mostly, they had activities in Islamic preaching, charity, education 
and cultivation of Islamic culture".  
Examples of those associations were, as Siwaili (2009b: 25-28) mentions, "the 
Islamic Youth Association and the Islamic Guidance Association"; for all of the 
Islamic associations in Iraq, there were branches in the main Kurdish cities 
based upon the network of scholars between the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and 
the Kurdish cities. This was the dawn of a new kind of apolitical activity among 
the religious Kurdish elites, as well as the Arabs of Iraq. According to Siwaili 
(2009b: 28) "the various activities of those associations had become a 
beginning for many other associations, especially after the Second World War. 
The Muslim Brotherhood had benefited from the experience of those 
associations and followed them". 
All the above Islamic activities paved the way for the Muslim Brotherhood to 
cross its way into Iraq. Abdulhamid (2009: 17) highlights that: 
"the first contact between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iraq was when Dr. 
Hussain Kamaladin came to Baghdad, and was appointed as a professor 
at the Engineering College. His students found him to be an Islamic 
Da‟iah [caller or missioner]. He attracted them with his deep Islamic 
modern knowledge, his humbleness, decentness and his ability in 
teaching his subject".  
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Siwaili (2009b: 31) adds that: 
"the beginning of arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to Iraq was through 
Egyptian scholars, who, with the intention of spreading the Brotherhood, 
came to Iraq. In the beginning of 1940 a group of Egyptian scholars 
came to Iraq, among them were Shaikh Al-Ahmar, who in Basra and 
Zubair started calling for the Muslim Brotherhood thought. Also in 1942, 
on the demand of the leadership of the Brotherhood, (Hussain Kamaladin 
and Muhammad Abdulhamid Ahmad) came to Iraq to spread the Muslim 
Brotherhood thought".  
Indeed, when we look at the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt, 
we can see three patterns of expansion. First were those importing it through 
scholars who used to be studying in Egypt and had since returned to their own 
countries, most notably Syria and neighboring countries. Second were those 
exporting the idea by sending missionaries via the Muslim Brotherhood, as in 
the case of Sudan. The third consisted of migration on the part of the Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders after their crises with the Egyptian regime, for example that 
of Libya and the Arab Gulf States; in case of Iraq, first and second patterns 
were the most prominent. 
Gradually, a number of students at the University of Baghdad embraced the 
thought of the Muslim Brotherhood. Siwaili (2009b: 32) observed that "the first 
organisational cell in Baghdad was in the engineering college"; he mentions 
some of the names, a few of which were Kurds. Abdulhamid (2009: 22) adds 
that "[Abdulhamid‟s] brother Nidhamadin was from the first individuals whom 
were cultivated on the hand of Dr. Hussain Kamaladin in Baghdad. Then 
between 1955 and 1960 was the head of the branch of the Brotherhood in 
116 
 
Erbil". This was the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, which began 
gaining followers among university students which then, with the return of 
Muhammad Mahmood Al-Sawaf from Egypt, spread among the scholars. 
Abdulhamid (2009: 20) states that "When Muhammad Mahmood Al-Sawaf 
returned to Iraq in 1946, he found a solid ground to work on. This was due to 
the existence of many youth who were cultivated by Dr. Hussain Kamaladin".  
When Al-Sawaf returned to Iraq, he began with the Islamic associations; 
according to Abdulhamid (2009: 21) "he became a member of both the Islamic 
Guidance Association that was led by Shaikh Qasim Al-Qaisi, the national Mufti 
of Iraq, and the Islamic Moral association, which was led by Shaikh Amjad Al-
Zahawi". Shaikh Amjad Al-Zahawi was a Kurd and thus with those Islamic 
associations and the well-known Shaikh‟s among them, this became a 
springboard for Al-Sawaf and the Muslim Brotherhood. Abdulhamid (2009: 21) 
elaborates: 
"then Al-Sawaf with cooperation of Shaikh Al-Zahawi, and some other 
prominent Shaikhs established the Islamic Brotherhood Association. 
Indeed, this association was (the Muslim Brotherhood). They wouldn't 
name it so, because the law would not allow any association with the 
same name of another association in other countries".  
Over time, the Islamic Brotherhood disseminated into in various cities of Iraq, 
such as Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Basra, Sulaimani and Rumadi (Abdulhamid, 2009: 
27-31).  
Abdulaziz (2016b: 245) highlights another Islamic local movement stating that:  
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“it has been mentioned in some other resources that a political 
organisation called (YaketiQutabianiAyni” the Religious Student Union, 
allegedly in 1954 secretly was established in Sulaimani. Its objective was 
social reforms. They had a publication was called (DangiFaqe47) the 
voice of Faqe, this was distributed secretly in Sulaimani, Kirkuk, Hawler 
and Diala”.   
The evidence suggests that the acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq 
was in a missionary capacity; despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was, 
at that time, working at a political level, in Iraq the motive was on more of an 
individual level. In other words, in a multi-ethnic society like that of Iraq, Arabic 
and Kurdish nationalism did not yet exist among the Islamists. This was the 
case even in 1960, when the Iraqi Islamic Party was established on the same 
Islamic principles that combined Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. Abdulhamid 
(2009: 53) records that, at the first conference of the party in 1960, Shaikh 
Osman Abdulaziz gave a speech on behalf of the scholars of Kurdistan. 
However, the establishment of the party demanded a political vision on certain 
issues. Abdulhamid (2009: 55) quotes Ch. 6, Article 37 of the party‟s charter 
(1960), as follows: 
"The party believes in the necessity of the unity of Iraq between all the 
citizens on the basis of their Iraqi nationalities. It considers Iraq as a part 
of the Arab nation, which must unite in a strong state on the basis of 
Islam, not any other principle. So, this single state becomes the core for 
the universal Islamic unity between all the Islamic nations. Thus, there 
                                                          
47
Faqe: is a term called to a student who studies Islamic Fiqh (Jurisprudent). Normally, they are studying 
in mosques and taught by religious scholars. 
118 
 
must be one Islamic state that combines all the Muslims in the whole 
world”.  
This particular article articulates two important issues. Firstly, it emphasises the 
strategic road-map of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, whose official aim was, 
initially, to unite the Islamic lands and create an Islamic caliphate. Secondly, 
when the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood became a political party, the political 
situation of the time demanded a stance on the Kurdish issue in particular. This 
was a way to deny the national rights of the Kurds, in a sense of a failure to 
recognize an independent nation state for the Kurds; however, the article was 
also recognizing the equal rights of the Kurds side by side with the Arabs, on 
the basis of Iraqi nationality. This was exactly the terms the Kurdish national 
movement was demanding, as this was later adopted by the Kurdish revolution 
in 1961 to gain their rights within the Iraqi state.    
Throughout 1960s, until the ban on the Iraqi Islamic party (IIP) in 1971, Kurdish 
Islamists remained working within the party rather than joining the Kurdish 
revolution. This was due to two reasons outlined above, as well as the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as the leading party of the revolution, being 
similar to all the nationalist parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, which was, ideologically, 
not an ideal model for Islamic figures to follow. Proclaimed in its bylaw since its 
third congress in 1953, this was highlighted by Ahmad (2012) as follow “[the 
members of the third congress of the KDP] wrote a new bylaw for the party, with 
the most dangerous article that recognised Marxism-Leninism to be utilised as a 
programme for the party”. Furthermore, during the revolution of 1976, led by the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the leftist ideology deepened further; 
Stansfield (2003: 85) traces the origins of the PUK to “several interrelated 
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factors, the origin division within the KDP between the Barzani-wing and the 
Ahmad-Talabani faction”. According to him, this division led to the basis of a 
new organisation. Stansfield (2003: 85) elaborates “The growth of left-wing 
political idea, culminating in the establishment of Komala is a further important 
factor. It is from the structure of the PUK was dependent upon the organisation 
of Komala as it was the only political grouping operating on a reasonably large 
scale within Iraqi Kurdistan”.   
After banning the IIP, alongside other political parties such as the Al-Ba'ath 
Party, the Kurdish Muslim Brotherhood stayed deactivated until the late 
1970s/early 1980s. At this time, particularly during the Iraq-Iran war, many of 
them fled the military to the Iraqi refugee camps in Iran, where they began their 
activities. Also, due to the loose control of the Iraqi regime over some Kurdish 
cities and towns, such as Halabja, another group of them became active on a 
local level. At this time, apart from the later Salafism trend, almost all Islamic 
activity among the Sunni Iraqis in both Arabic and Kurdish societies had, in one 
way or another, a historical link to the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. Nonetheless, 
among the Kurds, this activity remained at an individual level due to the 
stronghold of Sufi and Darwish orders, and the political aftermath of the Kurdish 
revolution. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, and proclamation of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Islamic activities increased worldwide, including in Iraq and 
Kurdistan. During the same period, Afghani Jihad and Salafism preaching had a 
significant role in attracting the youth to the mosques. Overall, the so called 




3.4.4 Kurdish Nationalism and rise of Marxism and Socialism: 
Initially, all the Kurdish nationalist movements were led by religious figures in all 
parts of Kurdistan. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, under the 
influence of secular nationalists throughout the Middle East, Kurdish 
nationalists, too, started holding a secular banner. Although the issue of 
secularism remained an issue for the political elites, as the masses had no idea 
of such ideologies, for religious figures the situation was very different; the 
clearer secularism became, the more those religious figures distanced 
themselves from seculars and their movement. The masses, and even the 
overwhelming majority of supporters of Kurdish nationalist movements, had 
neither the interest nor understanding regarding secularism. They all 
nonetheless agreed about advocating the Kurdish issue, with no knowledge of 
the ideology that the political elites were calling for. I remember in 1984, during 
a demonstration led by the affiliate members of the PUK in my home town Kalar 
in Southern Kurdistan, one of the slogans was "we are the sons of Marx, with no 
fear of the death", which was loudly repeated by the demonstrators, with little 
attention being paid to the actual meaning of the slogan. Personally, till few 
years later I had no idea who or what was Marx. Later on, when I started 
thinking and remembered that particular slogan I asked few friends who also 
participated in the demonstration about their realisation of that slogan and its 
meaning. I couldn't find a single person of that range of age knowing what was 
going on. The only thing that made all of us to take part in the demonstration 
was our enthusiasm and courage, not Marx or Marxism.  
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By 1946, the majority of Kurdish politicians who were inspired by the idea of a 
republic of Kurdistan came to an agreement in order to establish a political party 
which combined them all. Ahmad (2012) remarks:  
"When the Democratic Party for the Iranian Kurdistan was established on 
16th February 1945 it was led by Qazi Muhammad, and its struggle was 
specified for the Iranian Kurdistan. This made Barzani think about a 
similar step, especially, after the arrival of Hamza Abdullah to Mahabad 
to tell Barzani about the desire of the Kurdish political parties for 
establishing a Kurdish political party from all the Kurdish parties in Iraq. 
On this basis, Barzan with Hamza Abdullah and the Iraqi Kurdish military 
officers formed a party and named it the Kurd Democratic Party-Iraq; 
they also wrote its bylaws. Thus, territorial and regional Kurdish political 
parties came to exist, whereas before, the political parties and 
organisations were established for the whole of Kurdistan".  
It can be discerned from this that, during that time, there were already a number 
of Kurdish political parties, with different ideologies and objectives. However, 
the proclamation of a Kurdistan Republic in Mahabad enhanced their political 
motive and unified them around a nationalist objective; they wanted a nationalist 
figure that had cross-party appeal, such as Barzani. However, Stansfield (2003: 
64) argues that "it is likely that Hiwa [Party] saw Barzani as a vehicle for the 
nationalist cause, and intended to discard him once the objective of the 
autonomy was obtained". To a large extent, this was similar to the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, as well as the revolutionist and opposition political parties of 
Iran at the time of Khumaini. Desired was a figure who represented multicultural 
Iran, but who the majority Shi‟as could support; for the secular political elite, 
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Khumaini was merely a bridge for the period of the revolution. Nevertheless, in 
both cases, Barzani and Khumaini both later controlled the situation though, 
unlike Khumaini, the secular elite among the Kurdish politicians had, once 
Barzani came back from the Soviet Union after the coup d‟état of 1958 by Abdul 
Kareem Qasim, adopted socialism as the pathway of the party. Indeed, this was 
the real dichotomy present in traditional Kurdish nationalism, from being 
religiously led to being governed by secularism.      
 
Barzani had his own ideas, and didn't become the vehicle that Hiwa or the 
leftists might have hoped; right from the formation of the party, this became 
obvious. Stansfield (2003: 66) refers to the first congress of the party, and 
Barzani‟s agenda, as follow: 
"The new KDP held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946. 
The thirty-two delegates elected a central committee with Hamza 
Abdullah as secretary-general, Barzani as president-in-exile, and Sheikh 
Latif and Ziyad Agha as vice-president. The balance in the leadership 
Barzani supported saw the position of secretary-general going to a leftist, 
and two tribal elders in the positions of vice-President".   
Also, Ahmad (2012) comments on this moment in the party‟s history as 
follows"…furthermore, the leadership of the new party became under the control 
of the communists of Shorh, and the Marxists of Rzgari. The central committee 
was comprised of four members from the right nationalist Hiwa party, three 




Hence, from the moment the party was formed, there was a new kind of 
nationalism that differentiated itself from previous nationalistic movements; the 
party, from the perspective of the religious figures, was not in line with its 
nationalist movement predecessors, especially with Barzani leading the party, 
who was known as a Mulla who was not in the country. The party at this time 
was not adhering to any particular ideology, though the majority of its leaders 
were known as anti-religion. This led to the conclusion of the third congress of 
the party, highlighted here by Ahmad (2012): 
"the third congress of the party that was held in Kirkuk in January 1953 
was a dangerous indication in the history of the party, where Ibrahim 
Ahmad changed the name of the party to 'Kurdistan Democratic Party'. 
That was an important progress in political thought of the party, because 
it achieved a shift from the idea of a people to the idea of the homeland. 
Also, they wrote a new bylaw for the party, with the most dangerous 
article that recognised Marxism-Leninism to be utilised as a programme 
for the party. By doing so, they made away with the communists 
accusations and swept across its masses in Kurdistan".  
Yet, Abdulaziz (2016b: 117) considers the formation of the Hiwa party in 1939as 
the ideological dichotomy of the Kurdish organisation. Also, he records  
thatwhen the KDP was formed in 1946, the Kurdish communist members of the 
Iraqi communist party joined it. Abdulaziz (2016b: 118).   
For reasons outlined previously, the party was not ideal from the point of view of 
Kurdish religious figures; throughout the Middle East during this period, due to 
western colonialism and to avoid being labeled reactionists or pro-imperialism, 
almost all of the nationalist parties aligned themselves with Marxism and 
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socialism. However, there was a crucial element missing with regard to the 
ideology of these nationalist movements and this was the issue of the myth, 
memories and symbols of those nationalist movements (including the Kurdish 
one). For the religious elites, this was a fundamental element of any kind of 
movement, particularly as, during the same period of time, there was an 
alternative, the Muslim Brotherhood, who provided pure Islamic myth, memories 
and objectives. For the Kurdish religious figures, this was especially important 
as, contrary to other nation groups, the Kurds were on the road towards nation 
building.  
For the religious figures, Kurdish myths, memories and symbols were drawn 
from their history, in which they are purely Islamic, something which all previous 
movements had already proved. Furthermore, linking Kurdish nationalism to 
communism and socialism was an alien concept to Muslim societies, including 
the Kurds. As with the other nationalisms in the region, the Kurdish one faced a 
kind of dichotomy due to the deprivation of the Kurds from their nation state 
right, which made the strengthened the Kurdish seculars at the cost of the 
Islamists. As Githens-Mazer (2006: 8) elaborates: 
"Myths, in the context of ethnic groups and nations, serve to 'establish 
and determine' a nation's foundation and system of values, creating a set 
of beliefs put forward as a narrative about the group itself. The value of 
national myths, memories and symbols comes from their being 'founded 
on living traditions of the people (or segments thereof) which serve both 
to unite and to differentiate them from their neighbours".  
As for the religious figures during this period, the Kurdish people never objected 
to their values, despite suffering a political inequality. Over time, especially after 
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the 1990s by which time the Islamists had increased within the Kurdish society, 
the non-Islamist nationalists argued that the Kurds did not have a religious 
problem, but were suffering from political inequality. The extreme seculars 
began to blame Islam for the poor political situation of the Kurds, which led to 
the creation of unique myths, memories and symbols separate from historical 
concept; for the Islamists, all memories, symbols and myths of the Kurds come 
from its Islamic history, and so too, they argue, should Kurdish values. 
Another concept normally referred to by the nationalists in the stage of nation 
building is that of a mythical leader; of the nationalists in the region, apart from 
the Islamic leaders and figures, none can be counted as a mythical leader. In 
order to fill this vacuum, the nationalists tried to appoint contemporary secular 
leaders, such as Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, Jamal Abdulnassir of Egypt and 
Abdullah Ojalan of PKK in Northern Kurdistan. However, in Southern and 
Eastern Kurdistan, the consideration of mythical leaders circles religious figures, 
such as Qazi Muhammad and Mulla Mustafa Barzani; some have looked 
historically in order to exemplify nationalist mythical leaders of pre-Islamic eras. 
This effect is far from being followed by new generations. In some cases, there 
were attempts to nationalise even the Islamic symbols and figures, starting with 
the prophet Muhammad himself; although Michel Aflaq (the founder of Alba‟th 
party) was himself a Christian, he was theorising his Arab nationalism from the 
life of the prophet of Islam. Aflaq (1943) "In the past, one person‟s life 
summarized the life of a nation. Today the life of the whole nation in its new 
revival should become a detailed exposition of the life of its great man. 




3.4.5 Kurds: Political Parties and Social Rebellion: 
During this period political parties were new in Kurdistan, and transforming 
Kurdish nationalism in terms of political entities with political ideologies was not 
accepted by many, among them the religious figures. A stereotype had 
emerged regarding political parties and politicians as a group of opportunistic 
liars whose personal ambitions came at the cost of the people. Furthermore, it 
became common among not only the religious figures and their followers, but 
also by the chieftains and their tribesmen, to keep away from political parties. 
This phenomenon remained among the Shaikhs and their order followers. 
However, many of the clergies preferring to support the Islamic movement, 
which was not considered a political party with similar objectives to other non-
Islamic parties. The Islamic movement, for those clergies, even after the 
formation of the Islamic party, was 'Da‟wa' (a religious mission). Yet, later, for 
other Islamists such as the Salafis and other non-Islamists, affiliation of clergies 
and religious figures in any kind of political parties became unacceptable. On 
the other hand, many other clergies and religious figures have already joined 
and are supporting secular political parties, thus opposing the Islamists.   
 
3.4.6 Other Islamic movements and groups: 
According to Siwaili (2009a: 9), the Muslim Brotherhood, by way of Subhi 
Dawdi, arrived Halabja in 1960. This came from Kirkuk, where the MB existed 
even before the formation of the Iraqi Islamic party. Before the official arrival of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to the Kurdish cities, Siwaili (2009a: 22), quoting 
Dawdi, states that Sawaf used to have tours to Sulaimani, Halabja and Hawler. 
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However, his tours were aimed at the scholars, not the youths. This does not 
necessarily mean that those scholars had embarrassed the Muslim 
Brotherhood, however, his tours had an impact on enhancing the Islamist 
culture; this becomes obvious as, in the words of Dawdi: 
"For the first time, when the communism gained popularity in 1958-1959, 
I noticed in a newspaper that the scholars of the South and North issued 
a Fatwa, equating communism with blasphemy. From the south; Muhsin 
Al-Hakim [the grand Shi‟a Marja'], and from Kurdistan Shaikh Osman and 
some other scholars were among those who issued the Fatwa" (Siwaili, 
2009a: 22) 
For reasons previously mentioned, the Kurdish Islamists couldn‟t integrate into 
the Kurdish revolution. This is actually one of the criticisms faced by the 
nationalists. After the closure of the Iraqi Islamic party, only few months after its 
formation, they didn‟t appear formally anywhere in Iraq again. Though the party 
was officially terminated by its leaders in 1971, and the Kurdish MB, too, was 
obliged by this decision, nevertheless, since the late 1970s, both individually 
and at the level of propagating Islamic teachings in different parts of Kurdistan, 
the MB way of Islamism had started again.   
In fact, the Islamic revolution of Iran enhanced the morale of the Kurdish 
Islamists; Leezenberg (2001: 218) states "Be this as it may, in Iraq, as 
elsewhere, Islamist ideas and movements received a great boost with the 
successful Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979". During this period in Kurdistan, 
namely the 1970s and early 1980s, the term „Islamism‟ did not exist publicly 
among the Kurds, though the Iran-Iraq war also was another reason for those 
individuals to flee the Iraqi military and settle down in Iranian camps, where they 
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made plans to organise themselves. Salahaddin Muhammad Bahaddin, who 
later became the Secretary General of Kurdistan Islamic Union (1994-2012), 
and was reelected in the seventh congress of the party on 28th May 2016, was 
among those individuals. With regard to the Afghani jihad and the media focus 
on their victories against the Russian troops, this was yet another contribution to 
the rise of those individuals, and groups. Above all, the so-called „Islamic 
awakening‟, and practicing youths, started peaking within Kurdish society; 
Halabja, for its many scholars, their history with the MB, and its many Madrasas 
and Islamic schools, had a pioneering role in cultivating those youths.  
The Iraqi regime, due to the war with Iran and its intention to deepen the 
sectarianism politics among the Kurds, turned a blind eye to some of their 
activities. At the same time, this policy of marginal freedom provided the chance 
for the regime to monitor Islamic activities closely; this led to the arrest of some 
of its activists in 1987.  Shourush (n. d.:179) highlights that: 
“in the first half of the 1980s and during the years of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Iraqi government had in various ways encouraged the emergence of a 
Sunni religious movement in order to act, as that government had hoped, 
as a barrier against the penetration into Kurdistan of the religious and 
political influence of Iran and its Shi‟i forces. The government had viewed 
the Islamic movement as a useful counterweight to its adversary, the 
armed Kurdish movement, which it accused of cooperating with Iran. 
However, things did not work out as planned for [by] the Iraqi 
government. The Islamists soon turned to violence in their struggle 
against the „infidel regime‟“.  
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Allegedly, the Iraqi regime had tried to involve the Kurdish Islamists into their 
politics through Saddam's father-in-law, Khairullah Tlfah, and his contacts with 
some of the Kurdish Scholars in Halabja. However, the regime's policy didn't 
work as the nature of the view of the MB towards the Shi‟ias, who used to be 
seen as an Islamic sect, is not as other Islamists view them, not unlike none 
Muslims such as the Salafis; this was the view of Kurdish scholars too. The 
Kurds believe that whoever collaborated with the regime would be seen as a 
betrayer, and branded a Jash (babe donkey). Therefore, even if the regime had 
succeeded in convincing the scholars, the number actually following them was 
minute. On the contrary, the policy of the regime against the Kurdish people led 
the Islamists to consider action that would support their nation. 
 
3.4.6.1 The Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan: 
By the time the Iraqi policy towards the Kurds intensified and the result of this 
was described by Leezenberg (2001: 219) as: 
"The turning point, at least as far as the emerging Islamic Movement was 
concerned, seems to have in 1987. In May of that year, it appears, 
mullah Othman called for a jihad or holy war against the Iraqi regime, in 
reaction to the destructions and chemical attacks on Kurdish villages in 
the region".  
Shourush (n. d.:178-179), while quoting Al-Nafeer newspaper, no. 3, 1989, 
which used to be the official press of the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
stated the following: 
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"The Kurdish Muslim cadres were strengthened in their determination to 
form their own organisation to and declare armed struggle against the 
regime of Saddam Hussayn after the intensification of Iraqi policies 
against the Kurds, such as the chemical weapons against Kurdish 
civilians, especially against the town of Halabja, which had itself been an 
important centre of those Islamic cadres. These conditions led to the 
creation of the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and the decision to 
focus on armed struggle. It began that struggle (jihad) in the Kurdistan 
Mountains, through an armed organisation composed mainly of Islamic 
Kurdish fighters. The basic objective of that organisation is to rid Iraq and 
Kurdistan of 'Saddam's infidel regime'".   
Until the uprising of 1991, the Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) had 
no significant tensions with other Kurdish political parties. However, there was 
a, mainly political, rivalry between the nationalist political parties, most notably 
the PUK (the ruling party in Sulaimani Provence), particularly when the IMIK 
was rapidly gaining followers at the expense of other parties. The first general 
parliamentary election in 1992 saw the rise of the IMIK and other Islamists, 
especially the Kurdish MB, who in 1994 formed a Kurdistan Islamic Union, but 
couldn't pass the 7% margin required to enter parliament.  Shourush (n. d.:179) 
explains that:  
"The Islamic movement has been a newcomer to political organisation in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and it has to contend with a deep-rooted nationalist 
movement which deprived it of possibilities of rapid growth and 
expansion in the area. Nevertheless, the organised Islamic movement 
was able to achieve perceptible advances, as in the recent elections 
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[1992] in Iraqi Kurdistan where it polled 47,000 votes, and ranked in third 
position, albeit a long way behind the large Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan".  
Until the formation of the KIU in 1994, the IMIK was the biggest Islamic party in 
Kurdistan; however, because of their involvement in the civil war with the PUK, 
their member numbers were rapidly decreasing. Leezenberg (2001: 223) 
highlights that: 
"Since the early 1990s, IMIK appears to have lost some of its urban 
constituency, in part because of its violent methods. In March 2000 
municipal elections in the PUK area, it was the Islamic Union Party 
[Kurdistan Islamic Union] (Yekgirtuyislami) rather than IMIK that gained a 
significant percentage of the votes; in all, Islamic groups received some 
30 per cent of the votes in the Sulaimaniya area; the Halabja area 
remained strictly IMIK territory".  
Currently, the IMIK is suffering from a decrease in popularity, due to many 
internal disagreements and the split that led to the creation of the Islamic Group 
in 2001. Proof of this unpopularity are the results from the latest general 
parliamentary election of the Kurdistan, which took place in September 2013; 
the IMIK barely gained a seat whereas the KIU, for instance, gained ten seats, 
and the Islamic Group also gained six seats out of the 100 seats of the 
Kurdistan regions parliament. There are also another 11 quota seats for the 
other ethnic and religious minorities in Kurdistan region, distributed as follows: 
five seats for the Turkmen, five seats for the Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, 





Throughout the 1980s, a few Islamic groups and political parties came to the 
surface. One of those parties was Hizbullah. On the topic of Kurdistan Hizbullah 
(Party of God), Shourush (n. d.: 180/181) remarks as follow: 
"This organisation is composed primarily of the Barzanis, who took 
refuge in Iran after the collapse of the armed Kurdish movement in 1975. 
It is led by Shaykh Muhammad Khalid al-Barzani, the spiritual guide of 
the Naqshabandi order among the Barzanis. The party was formed after 
the beginning of Iran-Iraq war, and it is supported by Iran. It appears to 
have taken this name for itself in order to be identified with similarly-
named Iranian-backed Shi'i parties. However, the movement has 
distinguished itself from other Pro-Iranian Hizbullah by avoiding the 
practice associated with those parties, except for its armed struggle 
against the Iraqi government".  
The name and their closeness to the Iranians made the Kurdish people 
reluctant to associate with the party; for some others, it was considered a 
branch of the KDP. This became clear later, when the second leader of the 
party, Adham Barzani, became one of the leaders of the KDP. According to 
Shourush (n., d.: 181): 
"The parties influence among the Kurds appears to be very limited. 
Moreover, it seems unable to expand its membership outside the circle of 
Barzani supporters of Shaykh Muhammad Khalid. A notable 
development in this party is the sudden split which took place a few 
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years ago when Shaykh Adham al-Barzani broke away from the party of 
his uncle Shaykh Muhammad Khalid, and established a separate Islamic 
party known as the Islamic revolutionary party".  
Shaikh Adham eventually jointed the KDP, and recently, after the general 
election of the regions parliament on 21st September 2013, resigned from the 
KDP. Again, in 2016 he rejoined the KDP and currently is leading the party‟s 
leadership council in Sulaimani.  
 
3.4.6.3 Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement: 
With regards to the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement, Siwaili (2009b: 
141) argues that there are different opinions regarding its formation; according 
to some sources, the movement originates in the period 1975-1976. However, 
all other resources consider 1978 the official establishment of this party. 
According to Siwaili (2009b: 142): 
"other opinions in this regard refer to the early activities of this party to 
the late 1970s. The motivator of this movement was Abdulrahman 
Nawracy, who used to be the secretary of the directory of Sulaimani 
Awqaf. He had a good and a wide connection to many Islamic scholars 
and figures, in which he could influence a number of them to have a very 
basic organisation”.  
During this period, the Ba'th party was at the peak of its strength, and controlled 
all the cities in Iraq, including Kurdistan; however, the motivation for enhancing 
Islamic teaching was growing within a small circle of religious scholars. On the 
other hand, the expansion of extreme secularism and atheism among wide 
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range of intellectuals, created much discussion regarding the defense of Islam 
as a creed first. Consequently, during the late 1970s and throughout 1980s, a 
wave of Islamic writing was becoming popular; the scholars, as well as the 
individuals within Islamism, created a network of communication. Also 
significant was the appearance of religious cassettes throughout the cities, 
towns and the villages of Kurdistan; most of these cassettes were produced 
using the Friday prayer speeches, made by prominent preachers such as Mulla 
Ahmad Khanaqa in Sulaimani. Many of these youths were going from different 
districts, travelling as far as two hours in order to attend prayers and speeches. 
The more that anti-Islamism was growing, the more determined those who were 
Islamist-minded became. Consequently, there was a surge during this period of 
Islamic groups in Kurdistan, in which they became pillars of the later Islamic 
parties in Kurdistan.  
Siwaili (2009b: 143) remarked:  
"The majority of the cadres of this party were religious scholars. This, to 
a large extent, had an impact on the movement, and came to be known 
as an Islamic religious scholar‟s movement. On the other hand, this 
organisation was a basic one, with no central organisational body that 
would unite all the members in a single view, with a central vision and 
organisational method. However, what combined all views an Islamic 
culture and the Baa'th oppression".  
In this organisation, as with others, the younger followers were influenced and 
attracted by personal contacts, no one imagining that what their gatherings 
might lead to. This party, along with similar armed Islamic parties and groups 
during that period, were aided by Iran. Their armed struggle against the Iraqi 
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regime and demand for continuation not only created the perception that these 
groups were under the control of Iran, but also that all the secular Kurdish 
parties were under the same influence.  
For Siwaili (2009b: 143): 
 
"this party after its formation in 1978 remained secretly till 14th 
September 1984 when a number of its members left to the mountains 
[out of the control of the Iraqi regime] and formally proclaimed the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement. Shaikh Muhammad Barznji [the late 
and last guide of Islamic Group, who passed away in July 2014] was 
nominated as the guide of the movement. This was considered the 
beginning of the overt work of this party, and continued until the 
formation of the Islamic Movement in 1987".  
Once again, Siwaili (2009b: 150) highlights that:  
"…this party had a good relationship with Iran, and Iran was supporting 
them. This relationship some other times had become complicated. 
Since 1982, Iran had started a project to gather the Iraqi Islamic 
opposition. For that, it formed the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI]. This council brought together all the Iraqi Shia 
Islamic oppositions. When the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Liaison Movement 
was proclaimed, it became the only Sunni member in the council".  
Since the entry of this party into the Iranian made coalition, Shaikh Muhammad 





3.4.6.4 Kurdish Islamic Military: 
In regards of this group, (Siwaili, 2009b: 151) remarks as follows:  
 
"Kurdish Islamic Military is the first Kurdish Islamic militant party in 
Southern Kurdistan. There are two opinions in regards of the year of the 
formation of this party; some of the researches consider 1980 as the year 
of the formation of it. However, the other opinion refers to the early 
February 1981 as the date of its formation". 
Furthermore, (Siwaili, 2009b: 151) refers to Nawsheerwan Mustafa Amin (the 
current Change Movement leader, while stating that "this organisation with the 
help and plan of Iran was proclaimed in Tehran". As for Mas‟ud Abdulkhaliq "the 
Islamic Military firstly was influenced by Libya" (Siwaili, 2009b: 151). As with 
most Kurdish armed movements during the era, this organisation, as well as 
other later Islamist armed movements, was seeking help from Iran and other 
anti-Iraqi regime countries.  
Siwaili (2009b: 152) remarks that "Libya was providing them arms, and Iran 
despite its cash support, was also politically supporting them". Siwaili (2009b: 
152) goes on to say that "this party was comprised of disproportionate 
members. At the beginning, on the basis of interests came to exist with the 
encouragement of Iran. It had no ideological or organisational base. Therefore, 
it had become an example of an undisciplined party [and did not last long]".  
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3.4.6.5 Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan: 
With regards to the Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan, Shourush (n. 
d.: 181) states that: 
"This association had been founded in a conference in Canada in early 
1988. It declared itself a professional non-party association of Muslims in 
Kurdistan, simultaneously, its aims were defined as the Islamisation of 
the Kurdish issue through the establishment of an Islamic alternative for 
the Kurdish people's struggle to win its just rights; training of Islamic 
cadres to operate in Kurdistan; cooperation with other Islamic 
organisations in order to combine their efforts for the establishment of an 
Islamic state".  
This association later mainly focused on getting scholarship for the cadres and 
members of the Islamic groups, most notably from the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia, at which one of the founders of the association was a 
lecturer; they were also publishing an Islamic magazine.    
 
3.4.6.6 The Islamic Jihad Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan: 
Overall, the Jihadist movements in Kurdistan, to some extent, neglected to 
consider the nature of the Kurdish society, such as the tribal dimension, socio 
religious issues, the Shafi‟i school of thought, and political issues. However, 
since being Salafi jihadist, this group had disregarded all of these issues, 
instead behaving radically. Any other group which had displayed a similar 
mentality would have had troubles with the society and faced political 
opposition. According to Siwaili (2009b: 158) "the beginning of the Islamic Jihad 
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Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan goes back to a secret organisation in the early 1980s, 
when the founder of this clique Mulla Amin Pirdawud Khoshnaw first started it". 
As for their geographical origin, Siwaili (2009b: 158) states that "this group had 
started their activities in Hawler, and then they became the strongest Islamic 
trend in Hawler in 1980s. Also, to some extent they had activities in Mosul and 
Sulaimani too".  
For the aforementioned reasons with regard to their extremism nature, Siwaili 
(2009b: 159) goes on to say: 
"right from the beginning of the formation of the Islamic Liaison 
Movement, and IMIK, Mulla Amin few times [secretly] visited Iran to 
contact those two movements, in order to proclaim Jihad. He met the 
leaders of those both movements, and after a series of conversations, he 
disappointedly returned".  
Unlike the other jihadist subgroups which came together and created IMIK, 
Mulla Amin and his collective remained separate. The final attempt was what 
Siwaili (2009b: 159) describes thusly: "during the uprising of March 1991, the 
Jihad Clique joined the IMIK. However, shortly in June 1991 the disagreements 
started, consequently they left the IMIK".  
However, it could be argued that their extremism always directly or indirectly 
influenced other Islamists; on the one hand, individuals within the IMIK with a 
similar mentality were leading the movement towards tension and ongoing 
battles with other Kurdish political parties (the PUK especially), whilst on the 
other hand, when the Kurdistan Islamic Union first announced the establishment 
of the party, they assassinated one of its leaders in Hawler, and started 
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attacking their charitable medical clinics in Akre and elsewhere. The main 
reason for this hatred on the party of the KIU was from their standpoint of 
refusing extremist behaviour and publicly denouncing all kinds of extremism and 
violence.  
 
3.4.6.7 Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan: 
The history of this movement goes back to the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
Halabja, where it started its activities. Al-Baziani (2006: 81-82) remarks that, 
according to Islamic resources and the literature of Al-Nahdha Islamic 
Movement (NIM or the Islamic Renaissance Movement), it started organising in 
1979 under the leadership of Shaikh Siddiq Abdulaziz; Siddiq was the youngest 
brother of Shaikh Osman Abdulaziz, who were secretly in different cities and 
districts of Kurdistan. This secret work continued until November 1994, at which 
point the organisation, under its new name, was publicly announced. This 
movement was known, before this announcement, as the second line of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Kurdistan, the first line led by Salahaddin Mohammad 
Bahaddin, supported by the international MB. The NIM and IMIK united in 
August 1999 and comprised a new movement named the Islamic Unity 
Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Shaikh Ali Abdulaziz became the general 
Murshid [guide], with [his brother] Shaikh Siddiq Abdulaziz as his deputy. 
However, after the election of 2000, the majority of the NIM cadres joined with 
the conglomeration of Shaikh Ali Bapeer, forming a new collective: Islamic 
Group in the Iraqi Kurdistan (Komali Islami). Other cadres of NIM, in addition to 
Shaikh Siddiq, remained with Shaikh Ali Abdulaziz during the announcement a 
new group named the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, which was also the 
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name of the previous IMIK. A combination of NIM cadres and former IMIK 
cadres helped them with the later de-radicalisation accepting civil struggle 
rather than sticking to jihadism as the only political method. When the USA and 
the allies liberated Iraq in 2003, Komali Islami had come under the attack of the 
allies. Further, in an operation they captured the Amir, Ali Bapeer, who stayed in 
prison for 22 months, and under, the new policy, gave up their militant struggle 
and adopted a political struggle instead. The role model to follow, in this 
respect, was the Kurdistan Islamic Union which, since its establishment in 
February 1994, has adopted a civil political struggle as its political method, 
denouncing all forms of political violence and terrorism; this has been practically 
proved as the best method of political struggle.  
 
3.4.6.8 Kurdistan Islamic Group: 
As previously discussed, the Islamic group, Komali Islami, split from the IMIK, 
though during this period, they were not the only faction who had defected away 
from the IMIK; as Nazmi (n. d.: 328) observes "during the year 2001, the IMIK 
split up into four factions in contention with each other, Islamic Group, 
Unification movement, Soran Force and Jund Al-Islam". There has been 
ongoing disagreement between the leaders of the IMIK, especially Shaikh Ali 
Abdulaziz, and Shaikh Ali Bapeer, the long-standing current Amir of the Islamic 
Group. However, their union with NIM provided an opportunity for the latter to 
adopt the majority of the movement‟s members to his side. Due to its militia, the 
Islamic Group suffered a lot after the liberation of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies 
in 2003; however, after adopting a civil political method and abandoning their 
armed struggle, they became first among all the factions that gone out of the 
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former IMIK in terms of popularity. In the recent Parliamentary General election 
in Kurdistan, they gained 6 seats out of the 100, whereas the current IMIK 
hardly gained a single seat. Furthermore, if these two factions, namely the 
Islamic Group and the current IMIK, had not agreed and adopted a non-militant 
struggle, they would have been remembered as terrorists, much like their sister 
factions.  
 
3.4.6.9 The Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic Clique: 
Shortly after the formation of the IMIK, many disagreements took place within 
the movement. Siwaili (2009b: 160/161) highlights that Fatih Krekar later left the 
IMIK and on the 5th November 1990 formed a party called the „Iraqi Kurdistan 
Islamic Clique‟. After the uprising of 1991, the party terminated its activities, its 
members then joining the IMIK. Krekar himself joint the IMIK and became the 
head of the military office of the movement. As the IMIK was, in general, a 
group of hodgepodge individual and subgroups comprised of the Salafi 
Jihadists, other Salafis, and mainly 
led by Shafi‟i former Muslim Brotherhood like Shaikhs, disagreements were 
common. For the same reasons, as well as a lack of political experience by the 
newly joined cadres, tensions were high within the secular Kurdish political 
parties, the PUK particularly, which up until that time was labeled a socialist 
party with background in Marxist ideology.  
This lack of a unified ideology and a political methodology within the IMIK at this 
time was widening the rift between its cadres. The defeat of the movement by 
the PUK in December 1993, and the later agreements between the two parties 
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mentored by Iran, was not accepted by a wide range of the movement's cadres. 
Many of the extreme cadres considered the movement and its leadership as 
being in a weak position, not at the required level of jihadism that they had 
come to expect. For those cadres Iran, as a Shi‟a government, and the PUK as 
a secular party, were not regarded highly; these cadres and members had little 
in the way of political or national objectives. All that united them was jihadism, 
mainly inspired by the jihad of Afghanistan; in other words, they were mere 
global jihadists, rather than Islamist Kurdish freedom fighters. The basic 
problem in this stretches back to the establishment of the IMIK, when the group 
it was more a reactionary effort, rather than a preplanned organisation with 
clear defined political objectives. For these reasons, many jihadist groups had 
separated from the IMIK, such as Hamas, Jundul Islam and Ansarul Islam.  
 
3.4.6.10 Radical Jihadism and Terror in Kurdistan: 
Formally, the first group that had left the IMIK and announced their aims of jihad 
were Hamas, whose policy allowed no compromises towards the Kurdish 
political parties, as well as the regional states, notably Iran, who had always 
support them. The name „Hamas‟ originates from the Hamas of Palestine, which 
is an acronym of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiah, an Islamic Resistance 
Movement; and the word Hamas in Arabic means enthusiasm. The catalyst for 
this, as recorded by Romano (2007: 9), was that: 
"in 1997 and 1998, when the IMK decided to cooperate with the secular 
PUK and join the Kurdistan Regional Government, that important splinter 
movements opposed such cooperation with secularists and broke off 
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from the group. These dissidents were also upset that the IMK had 
refrained from imposing Sharia law in the areas it controlled. Some of the 
Afghan veterans (Hassan Sofi, Omar Barziani, and Mullah Krekar) broke 
off to form Hamas in 1997. Hamas based itself in the town of Khormal 
and promoted a literalist, Salafi interpretation of the Quran". 
After almost a year, the more cracks appeared when the Second Soran Force, 
also led by Aso Hawleri in 1998, left the IMIK and started its own jihadi 
organisation.  Romano (2007: 10) remarks that: 
"The IMK‟s largest military unit (350-400 fighters), the Second Soran 
Force, broke off from the organization in 1998 as well and took control of 
Biyara (the village where they were based) as an independent force. The 
Second Soran Force was led by Aso Hawleri and included many Arab 
veterans of Afghanistan (including Hawleri himself). It too espoused a 
puritanical Wahabi interpretation of Islam". 
In discussing the IMIK, it can be observed from its leadership, cadres and 
members that it was a distinctly Kurdish movement, in the sense that they were 
all Kurds and had a shared struggle against the regime of Saddam, which 
aligned with the Kurdish nationalist movements. From the appearance of these 
newly emerged jihadists, one could no longer identify any Kurdish or Iraqi 
political aims and objectives; however, it did demonstrate the global jihadism 
that Bin Ladin and Al-Dhawahiri had adopted during the same period. In 
addition, the methods employed in their struggle were indistinguishable from 
those of Al-Qaeda, which involved attacking and killing the non-Muslim 
politicians, usually westerners and their allies. In a YouTube video clip, Mulla 
(Krekar, n. d.) states the following: 
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"No Fatwa necessarily for those who openly oppose Islam is needed, 
and if a Muslim comes across him in a street, let use an axe to behead 
him or fire a bullet through his brain. No need for Fatwa, don't worry 
about the security forces. If it is possible for me to kill him, I will do it 
myself. Then let the authorities come and kill me too".   
In 1999, as mentioned earlier, both the IMIK and NIM united and created the 
Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan; Hamas was also invited to join the 
new union, an invitation they eventually accepted. Romano (2007: 10) 
highlights: 
"In 1999, the two Aziz brothers (Ali and Siddiq) united al-Nahdha and the 
IMK, and formed the Islamic Federation of Kurdistan (also known as the 
Islamic Unity Movement of Kurdistan). The Islamic Federation of 
Kurdistan also reconciled with Omar Barziani‟s Hamas and brought it into 
the federation". 
During this time, there was a hope that all of the Islamists would be gathered 
under this aim, including Kurdistan Islamic Union. There were accusations by 
the Islamic Unity towards the KIU for not joining their united front and creating 
one Islamic movement of Kurdistan. The reasoning given by the KIU for not 
joining was based on its rejection of their armed movement. Nevertheless, 
instructions were given to wait further and judge the success of this new unity; 
as the KIU predicted, this unity soon to come to an end. The majority of the 
cadres and members of the former NIM supported Ali Bapeer and broke away, 
establishing the Islamic Group in June 2001. Following this, the former Hamas 
members broke away in July 2001; the remaining cadres and members 
reformed the IMIK in September of the same year. During this time, Mulla 
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Krekar announced what he called "the Reformist Group", in the sense that he 
was endeavoring to mediate between all the splinters and unite them; despite 
prolonged efforts, this attempt failed.  
Also in July 2001, the former members of Hamas broke away from the Islamic 
Unity Movement and United with Tawheed, created in May 2000 and led by 
Abdul Ghani Bazazi; together they formed the so called "Islamic Unity Front", 
led by Abu Baker Hawleri. Just a few months later, this front and the Second 
Soran Force joined to form Jund Al-Islam, led by Abdullah Shafi‟i. Finally, in 
December 2001, Jund al-Islam and the Reformist Group of Mulla Krekar came 
together and formed Ansar Al-Islam under the leadership of Mulla Krekar. Ansar 
Al-Islam continued its activities until 2003, where upon the USA and the allies 
invaded Iraq, dismantling them from their powerful position in Kurdistan. During 
the same year, their members joined both Ansar Al-Sunnah and Jaysh 
Muhammad, and finally, in 2004, joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Al-Zrqawi. 
The remaining terrorist groups among the Kurdish Jihadists later joined the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Levant), ISIS or ISIL. A new group of jihadists 
have more recently joined them, among them a Salafi Shaikh known as 
MulaShwan, who had been focused on in Kurdish media as a notorious figure of 
Kurdish terrorism. According to Rudaw (2015b), the number of Kurdish terrorists 
among ISIS numbers around 500; despite the geographical closeness between 
the ISIS territories and the Kurdistan region, when compared to the number of 
terrorists from Tunisia, for instance, 500 is a relatively small number. According 
to Altaqreer (2014), the number of the terrorists joint ISIS from the following 
countries, is as follows:  
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Country No. of Terrorists joint ISIS 
Tunisia 3200 




This relatively low number can be attributed to a few factors, most notably: 
1. The nature of the Kurdish political context, which is still struggle for the 
national rights and self-determination.  
2. The KIU‟s pioneer as a civil non-violent actor, which became a role 
model for the young Islamists. 
3. Following the steps of the KIU by the KIK and IMIK. 
However, the alleged violation of human rights by anti-terror squads and the 
security forces in Kurdistan region against Islamist detainees and their family 
members has increased the number of those terrorists willing to commit terrorist 
acts, especially with ISIS. Otherwise, the number may have been smaller.   
 
3.4.6.11 De-radicalisation: 
There are two groups among the Islamists in Kurdistan region who de-
radicalised their methods of political struggle; the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) 
and the current Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMIK). Considering this de-
radicalisation from the point of view of Ashour (2009: 7), it has been defined as 
such: "De-radicalisation is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of 
armed Islamist movements towards violence, rather than towards democracy. 
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Many de-radicalised groups still uphold misogynist, homophobic, Xenophobic, 
and anti-democratic views". Over the period of the de-radicalisation of KIG and 
IMIK since 2003, they have been under the influence of the USA troops in Iraq, 
who have imprisoned both leaders of the two groups, altering the public 
perception of these two de-radicalisation. The core question in this regard is 
whether both of these organisations would give up their armed struggle without 
the existence of the USA and their allied troops in Iraq. It also draws attention to 
questions regarding what both organisations were doing with their arms, 
especially at a time then both of their organisations and leaderships were 
coming under the pressure of the allies influence, going as far as attacking the 
KIG's armed men using rockets. Finally, even under the pressure of the U.S. 
troops, the extent to which the de-radicalisation over the time became of the 
behaviour of the cadres and members of both organisations? All the questions 
in this regard are valid, unless otherwise proven by practice of both 
organisations.  
Since 2003, both of these organisations have gone through different 
experiences; from the beginning, this was not at all an easy task for their 
leaders, who were, for many years, mobilising their followers on the basis of 
struggle (jihad) against the invaders and non-believers, only to completely de-
radicalise. For their followers, the invaders and non-Muslims were all over the 
land of Iraq, including Kurdistan region and, therefore, despite the behavioural 
de-radicalisation, many doubted the ideological de-radicalisation aspect. In 
reality, some of their leaders had stated that the question of armed struggle 
depended on the need for it, in the sense that there may be a return to it if it is 
necessary and feasible. Overall, de-radicalisation is a practice of different 
phenomena, Ashour (2009: 7) observing that: "Separate from the ideological 
148 
 
level, de-radicalisation can occur only on the behavioural level. On that level, 
de-radicalisation means practically abandoning the use of violence to achieve 
political goals without a concurrent process of ideological de-legitimisation of 
violence. De-radicalisation can occur in only one of the two levels". 
However, for both KIG and IMIK, whichever levels of de-radicalisation came 
first, over time they both adapted to cope with the new political atmosphere, 
following the example of the KIU; to a large extent, they have both integrated 
into the political situations of the region. One could argue that they have already 
passed the danger of what Ashour (2009: 7) refers to, stating: 
"...there is also a third level of de-radicalisation. Following the declaration 
of ideological and/or behavioural de-radicalisation by the leadership of an 
armed group(s), there is usually the challenge of organisational de-
radicalisation: the dismantlement of the armed units of the organisation, 
which includes discharging / demobilising their members without splits, 
muting or internal violence". 
Nonetheless, as for the historical background, they both need continuous 
deeper de-radicalisation, especially with the lack of American troops on the 
ground, and particularly with the mess in the region that led to the upsurge of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and its challenges. Otherwise, the de-
radicalisation has worked effectively, and the religious disproving by both 
parties as to ISIS's claims proving the deep rooted de-radicalisation, followed by 
a wider political and social struggle; this is the wider sense of jihad that the 




Salafism, in the form put forward by Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab in Najd (in 
today's Saudi Arabia), was a violent extremism that examined all aspects of 
Islam, from creed to worshiping. Theoretically, they radicalised Islamic creeds 
starting with the Muslim individuals and societies by declaring them disbelievers 
or apostates and then practicing the verdict of apostasy, by which the apostates 
must to be killed; the group would later be called the Wahabees, and the 
ideology Wahabism, named after its founder Muhammad Ibn Abul Al-Wahab. 
For the first time in the history of the Islamic World, Khawrijtes were the first to 
carry out such radical ideology and behaviour. Their first conflict was with the 
fourth Caliph of Islam Ali bin Abitalib, the son in law and a cousin of the prophet 
Muhammad. According to Aal Mansi (2014) "Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab 
was accused by the scholars of its time, including his brother Sulaiman, who 
used to be a judge by being and practicing the thought of Khawarijtes".  
The Wahabees  took this way of life very seriously and put excessive worth on 
practicing Islam; this led to their marginalisation throughout Muslim societies, 
with the exception of Saudi Arabia, as there it is the official version of Islam 
supported by the government. Nevertheless, the nature of the non-Saudi 
societies made the Muslims reluctant to accept such an ideology and extremism 
in the name of Islam. Therefore, Wahabism suffered from isolation within those 
Muslim societies as the more liberal the society was, the more Wahabism was 
isolated.  Wahabees become violent easily, terrorising the society, normally, 
after accusing the society of being non-Muslim in an attempt to legitimise the 
use of violence against them. Aal Mansi (2014) has said that "the Wahabism 
thought is the origin source of the modern Takfiris [calling the Muslim individuals 
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and societies as non-believers or apostates]”. He elaborates that “Muhammad 
Ibn Abd Al-Wahab himself practiced this ideology, that which is now adopted by 
terrorist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, sometimes distributing his books 
among their followers”.  
The most dangerous ideology among the Kurdish Islamist is Salafism, which is 
another name for Wahabism. At the most fundamental level, they are breaking 
down the uniqueness of the Kurdish religious nationalism, the Shafi‟ism that 
makes the Kurds unique among the surrounding Muslim communities. For 
instance, the Shi‟as of Iraq (and the majority in Iran) follows Ja‟fary (Shi‟asm), 
while the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, the majority of Syrians and Turks are following 
Hanafi school of thought. This means that between the main four countries that 
the Kurds are divided between; the Kurds remain unique by following their own 
school of jurisprudence. The breaking down of this uniqueness by the Salafis is, 
however, endangering a dimension of Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, the 
ongoing radicalisation among the Kurdish armed movements, such as the IMIK, 
has its roots in the thought and behaviour of the Salafis. The more that Salafism 
was expanding among them, the more they radicalised and lost control of their 
leadership. All the aforementioned terrorist groups which splintered from the 
IMIK in the 1990‟s and early 2000‟s were influenced by Salafism. Similarly, the 
current Salafis in Kurdistan are a potential danger and Larva of the future 
terrorism. Nonetheless, the rivalry policy between the main two Kurdish parties, 
the KDP and PUK, and the Islamic parties in the region granted the Salafis and 
Salafism overwhelming freedom within the mosques, in which they preach hate 
and radicalise the youth. This comes about by not recognising any kind of 
school of thought or jurisprudence among the Muslims, particularly as they only 
consider those who are following their way as true Muslims. In the long run, this 
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ideology is a potential source of terrorism, which might at any time trigger a 
societal catastrophe; their thinking and their vision towards Muslim societies is 
an ongoing threat.  
 
3.4.5 Concluding Remarks: 
At the time of the introduction of Islam to the land of Kurdistan, the Kurds were 
under the occupation of the Persians; their land, language, culture and religion 
were under threat of disappearing. The Kurds were expected to seek salvation 
and, accordingly, they adopted Islam. Their new occupier gave them the 
opportunity to free their land, culture and language by cultivating their literature 
and promoting their political power. As a result, they built numerous emirates, 
states and Sultanates. However, as the general political model was not a nation 
state in today‟s sense, the Kurds were similar to the other Muslim ethnicities in 
that neither thought of nation building; nor was possible for them to have such 
an entity under the pan-Islamic caliphates. 
Nonetheless, the absence of any internal collaboration between the Kurdish 
entities led to their fragmentation and, consequently, weakened their non-united 
bodies. Though the majority of the Kurds identify as SuniShafiis, for the above 
reasons they did not apply this in achieving a united strong entity like that of the 
Safavid Iran. Furthermore, the many disagreements between the Kurdish tribes 
were yet more obstacles in the path of Kurdish unity.  
Upon the arrival of nationalism to the region, a nationalist revolution occurred in 
Kurdistan against the centralised Ottoman ruling. Among the revolution leaders, 
Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri was a distinct religious nationalist figure which, for the 
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first time, put forward an idea of Kurdish religious nationalism, focusing on a 
single united nation-state for the whole of Kurdistan; this was to be based on 
being Kurdish and SuniShafii, two characteristics that distinguish the Kurds from 
those who surround them. 
After the First World War, the mere political interest of the imperial powers and 
the new emerged nation states of the region caused Kurdistan to be divided into 
newly emerged non-Kurdish states. Since the new map of the region was drawn 
on the basis of nationalism, the Kurds were faced with a new era of politics, 
wanted or otherwise. Therefore, it was possible for the Kurds to work on their 
political reality, most notably nationalism. Although the Kurds became victims of 
this new political environment, a solution had to be addressed from the 
situation, namely stepping out from the reality. Right from the beginning, and 
under the influence of a long Islamic history, two clear attempts of proclaiming 
two Islamic parties in southern Kurdistan, in 1919 and 1934, indicate that 
Kurdistan witnessed some of the very earliest attempts, even earlier than that of 
Egypt with Islamism. However, the term Islamism was not in today‟s sense 
neither in Kurdistan nor elsewhere. Establishing an Islamic party in Kurdistan at 
that moment was very different to the one that was started in Egypt by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, but as Siwaili (2009b: 24-25) highlighted, this was 
an attempt to “benefit from Islam to serve their nation”. Obviously, these came 
after the attempts of Shaikh Mahmood, which were aimed towards establishing 
a self-determined Kurdish entity in southern Kurdistan. 
Mosques, from the first appearance of Islam in Kurdistan until recent years, 
have played a crucial role in the revival and preservation of the Kurdish 
language and culture. Politically, all of the early nationalist movements were led 
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by grand Muslim figures among the Shaikhs and the clerics. However, as was 
the case of Safavid and Shi‟asm, the Kurdish religious figures had no chance to 
have a distinct Kurdish religious nation. This was due to two major factors, the 
first, during the Ottoman reign; with the attempt of Shaikh Ubaidullah Nahri, the 
Ottomans consisted a Sunni ruling and the fragmentation of the religious 
leadership of the Kurdish society was between many disagreeing Shaikhs and 
Sufi orders. Secondly, under the influence of a secular nationalist, Kurdish 
nationalism shifted to secularism by the mid-20th century, which led to horrific 
genocides by the Ba‟th party, branding the Kurds and their nationalist 
movement as apostates and implementing a false ruling of ethnic cleansing in 
the name of Islam. It was obvious that the Ba‟th was not an Islamic ruling, and 
that the Kurds were not apostates or non-believers in Islam, however the 
justification was present, and the secular nationalism of the Kurdish movement 
could not rely on Islam to preserve the Kurdish nationalist rights48. This also 
paved the way for the genocide of the Kurds, which was met with silence in the 
rest of the Islamic world, strengthening the Ba‟th regime in their chauvinistic 
policies against the Kurds. Although this is not a justification for entire Muslim 
societies, especially those of the Arab land, two major factors had worked on 
the side of the Ba‟th in their policy towards the Kurds. Firstly, the image of the 
Ba‟th as defenders against the Shi‟a regime of Iran to the majority Sunnis of the 
Islamic world was maintained. Secondly, the Arab chauvinistic sentiment among 
the Arabs preserved their silence. Even now, when the balance of Islamism and 
nationalism comes to the surface in the Arab world with regard to the Kurds, the 
vast majority of Arabs keep silent. The recent offenses of the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Sham (ISIS) against the Kurds in Iraq and Syria are proving fuel to this 
                                                          
48
 For blaming Islam for the political situation of the Kurds, see Baxawan's (2016) article (Is Islam 
Responsible for Backwardness of the Kurd?) published in Kurdish in Rudaw.  
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argument, as there exists no single Arab stance condemning ISIS regarding 
their actions towards the Kurds. 
Shortly after WW1, the politics of nationalism gradually deepened at the cost of 
the politics of the Islamist vision of having a united Islamic land. In other words, 
although the newly emerged nation states were created on the coattails of 
imperialism, they have become a reality; Islamists have become one of its first 
line defenders. This phenomenon was crystalised by time, particularly in the 
case of the Kurds, and the main reason for this is due to non-independent 
nation state that non-Kurdish Islamist could realise. We can see right from the 
birth of the Kurdish Islamic parties that the political demands were for the Kurds 
and for the sake of Kurdistan; both Kurdish Islamic parties of 1919 and 1934 
clearly illustrate this argument. Also, in the last quarter of the century, Islamic 
parties such as the IMIK, KIU and KIG proved this argument. Similarly to 
elsewhere in the Middle East in the mid-twentieth century, a dichotomy between 
the seculars and the Islamist nationalists occurred. Nonetheless, the political 
framework for both sides remains nationalistic and is focused on the nation 
state, explicitly or otherwise. For the Kurdish political parties too, the political 
platform is nationalism, and the more they advance in their politics, the more 










Kurdistan Region De-Facto and the Rise of Religious Nationalism 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
This chapter will focus on the conclusion of political strife and revolution in 
southern Kurdistan, and its de-facto self-ruling, which came to exist after the 
1991 uprising. The rise of religious nationalism will also be discussed, from 
preaching to politics, as will religious nationalism and the phases that this 
phenomenon witnessed. The chapter is divided into seven titles, and finishing 
with some concluding remarks; highlighted will be the development of the 
Kurdish movement, from revolution to self-governing, as well as the Kurdistan 
Front, in its role as a cooperation framework for the political parties of Kurdistan; 
the role of the front in preparing for the 1992 elections will also be covered. Self-
ruling and the challenges involved, most notably the struggle for power and civil 
war, will be covered, as will the emergence of the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(KIU); important factors include the raison d‟etre and role of KIU, the KIU and 
political outcome, participating in elections, ethno-politics and KIU‟s second 
political phase. Finally, the issue of self-determination and independence in 
Kurdistan will be covered, specifically the stance of the main political parties 
that comprise the parliament and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with 
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regard to the issue of self-determination and proclaiming the nation state of 
Kurdistan.  
 
4.2 From Revolution to Governing: 
From the inception of the British mandate, as explained by The History Guy 
(n.d.), “Rebellion by Iraqi Kurds against the British Mandate, Kurdish tribesmen, 
led by Sheikh Mahmud, a powerful Kurdish leader, attempted to establish an 
independent Kurdish nation”. In fact, Sheikh Mahmud announced his kingdom 
the superior one and himself the King of Kurdistan. He was, however, shortly 
hereafter defeated by the British. This was followed by subsequent revolts 
throughout the twentieth century, chronicled by Hawar (1990), Tripp (2007), 
Ihsan (2000), Barzani (2002) and the History Guy (n.d., BBC, 2011) as follows:  
Revolt of Ibrahim Khan Dalo 1920 
Uprising of Barzan 1932 
Kurdish Revolt 1943 
Kurdish Revolt 1945 
Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970 
Kurdish Revolt March 1974 





These revolts demonstrate that the Kurds continuously refused to be ruled by 
the Iraqi governments, as was the case across all regions of Kurdistan; 
however, in part due to the circumstances of the Kurds, the outcome across 
these states varied.   
Each of these revolts faced brutal opposition by the British Mandate and the 
Iraqi governments. Arguably the most ruthless military operations were the last 
ones carried out by Saddam's regime, termed the Anfal campaigns49; these 
took place in the final year of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988, using Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), primarily chemical weapons, which swept across almost all 
liberated areas of Kurdistan which were under the control of the Peshmarga 
(Kurdish Liberating Fighters). The word Anfal was chosen in order to justify the 
genocide operations, as the Kurds were not Muslims and were to be 
accordingly punished; this is, of course, false, both contextually and in terms of 
the Kurds being non-Muslims. The Ba‟th party was not the implementers of this 
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Anfal--"the Spoils"--is the name of the eighth Sura of the Koran. It is also the name given by 
the Iraqis to a series of military actions which lasted from February 23 until September 6, 1988. 
While it is impossible to understand the Anfal campaign without reference to the final phase of 
the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that war. Rather, the winding-
up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance that gave Baghdad 
the opportunity to end its longstanding efforts to bring the Kurds to heel. The Iraqi regime's anti-
Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the outbreak of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq. 
 
Anfal was also the most vivid expression of the "special powers" granted to Ali Hassan al-Majid, 
a cousin of President Saddam Hussein and secretary general of the Northern Bureau of Iraq's 
Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party. From March 29, 1987 until April 23, 1989, al-Majid was granted 
power that was equivalent, in Northern Iraq, to that of the President himself, with authority over 
all agencies of the state. Al-Majid, who is known to this day to Kurds as "Ali Anfal" or "Ali 
Chemical," was the overlord of the Kurdish genocide. Under his command, the central actors in 
Anfal were the First and Fifth Corps of the regular Iraqi Army, the General Security Directorate 
(Mudiriyat al-Amn al-Ameh) and Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat). The pro-government Kurdish 
militia known as the National Defense Battalions, or jahsh, assisted in important auxiliary tasks. 
The first was the integrated resources of the entire defense Battalions; the word jahsh means 
"donkey foals. The second was "Saboteurs", the term commonly applied by the Iraqi regime to 
the Kurdish peshmerga guerrillas and their civilian sympathizers. Military, security and civilian 
apparatus of the Iraqi state were deployed, in al-Majid's words, "to solve the Kurdish problem 
and slaughter the saboteurs”. 
 
Human Rights Watch, n.d., Anfal Campaigns, online available at 
<http://m.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALINT.htm> [Seen 16 April 2015]. 
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policy, which had nothing to do with Islam; the only rationale behind it was using 
the name as a means to legitimise the brutal massacres and to abuse the 
reputation of Islam. The Iraqi regime, in order to finalise any further revolts, 
committed genocide against the village dwellers of liberated areas, bringing the 
Kurdish revolution to an end.  
However, when the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait50 on the 2nd August 1990, and 
then consequently to liberate Kuwait, the International alliance, under the 
leadership of the United States of America, attacked Iraq; the Shi'as in southern 
Iraq and the Kurds in Kurdistan (northern Iraq) began an uprising in March 
1991. The uprising went on to control the entirety of Kurdistan and other 
Kurdish cities, including Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. However, this control did not 
last long, and soon the regime had a counter-attack. As the people had already 
experienced chemical attacks and mass murder during the Anfal campaigns, 
they feared a similar reaction from the regime; they chose to evacuate the cities 
and migrated in great numbers towards Iran and Turkey. This led to a 
humanitarian crisis, and consequently the UN Security Council issued 
Resolution 688 on 5th April 1991. This was followed by the No Fly Zone51, 
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Background - The Gulf War:  
A. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting the UN Security Council to pass 
Resolution 660 the same day demanding 'that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all 
its forces‟.  
B. Iraq's failure to comply led to Resolution 661, adopted on 6 August 1990, which called for the 
restoration of the 'sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait' and imposed 
wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq.  
C. The US and the UK began deployments of troops to the region soon afterwards (Op 
DESERT SHIELD), with the initial aim of deterring further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia 
which was threatened by large numbers of Iraqi forces on its border.  
D. On 29 November 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 which authorised 
Member States “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)…” 
unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait on or before 15 January 1991.  
E. Iraq‟s failure to meet the UN deadline led to the coalition war against Iraq, Operation 
DESERT STORM, which began on 16 January 1991 and continued until Iraqi forces were 
driven from Kuwait on 28 February, when hostilities were suspended. 
(http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/38010/mod-no-fly-zone-r1.pdf). 
51
 The Iraqi no-fly-zones were established in April 1991 (north) and August 1992 (south) as a 
coalition (US, UK and France) initiative in support of UNSCR 688 demanding an immediate end 
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proposed by the USA, the UK and France (also was known as Safe Havens in 
Iraq): these proposals providing some promise of safety. Although the Iraqi 
regime regained control in the major cities during this time, the Kurdish people 
had their second uprising in late 1991; this caused the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
regime from the main three governorates of Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok, all of 
which lay under the no fly zone.    
 
4.3 Kurdistan Front and 1992 Election: 
Political disagreement amongst Kurdish politicians began from 1961, during the 
beginning of the revolution, and intensified by 1964. This prolonged internal 
disagreements after the setback of 1975, leading to the existence of many other 
political parties alongside the KDP. Although this brought with it a new era of 
pluralism, it was the trigger for internal civil war between Kurdish political 
parties; it was many years before most of them agreed to work together under 
the promise of cooperation. According to Osman (2001a) “in May 1988 the 
Kurdistan Front was formed. The front comprised the PUK, KDP, KSP, 
Kurdistan People‟s Party, Kurdistan Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist 
Party-Kurdistan Branch”. This front, however, came too late, as the Iraqi 
genocide operations had already started and the Iraq-Iran war was in its final 
stages, the war ending in the summer of 1988. Nevertheless, it did provide 
some help to the Kurdish parties during their struggles. Osman (2001a) adds: 
“Its existence also played an important role in avoiding a bigger political 
setback when the Iraq-Iran war had ended because the Kurdish Political 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to Saddam's brutal repression of Kurds in north and Shias in south. 10. Iraqi aircraft were 




will was, to a certain extent, united when the Kurdistan Front decided that 
the struggle should continue by all possible means. It was also important 
for rallying resistance against the Iraqi government in Kurdistan and 
gaining understanding and support for the Kurdish issue abroad”.  
The end of the Iraq-Iran war cost the Kurds and their political parties dearly. On 
the ground, the Iraqi troops controlled almost all the liberated territories that 
were previously under the control of Kurdish political parties. The villages and 
towns of those territories were destroyed by the Iraqi government, and most of 
their inhabitants were captured and/or killed in the so called „Anfal campaigns‟. 
Nonetheless, the existence of the Kurdish political parties and their front, with 
their affiliates inside the cities of Kurdistan, helped them prepare to take the 
opportunity of the weaknesses in the Iraqi regime, its troops defeated during the 
liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Within days, they had successfully controlled all 
cities and towns in Kurdistan, including Kirkuk and Khanaqeen. After the second 
uprising of the people in Kurdistan, which took place in October of 1991, the 
complete withdrawal of Iraqi administrations left a vacuum for Kurdish political 
parties to fill; this led to the general election of 1992.   
There were many criticisms among the smaller parties, Osman (2001a) 
remarking upon the election as follows:  
“The election was held on 19th May 1992, with many irregularities and 
rigging by the two main contenders [PUK and KDP]. As a result, none of 
the participating parties, including us [Kurdish Socialist Party], accepted 
the results and an agreement between the two parties was reached on to 
the way the assembly was to be divided. The results were very close with 
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a slight majority for the KDP, though the PUK insisted on splitting the 
assembly by 50-50 and the KDP accepted”. 
This election was very important for the Kurds in southern Kurdistan, as well as 
in all the other parts of Kurdistan and diasporic Kurds. This was considered the 
right step towards self-ruling, the desired result of the many years of struggle by 
the Kurds. There were, however, many challenges, particularly the internal 
disagreements in an era of new self-ruling when these disagreements became 
more serious. Stansfield (2003: 121) highlights:  
“The subsequent 50:50 system was a workable but extremely 
fragile shared type of governmental organization, dependent upon the pr
eservation of a balance of power between the KDP and 
PUK.  When  this  balance  was altered, 
the  system  became  unworkable  and  provided  yet  another  catalyst 
for the decline  into confrontation  and  conflict”.  
Disagreements were present even during the initial stages of the uprising in 
1991 with regard to control over the cities and towns of Kurdistan; the historical 
disagreements between both the KDP and PUK disappeared for a while under 
the threat of genocide by the strong Iraqi regime, only to reappear when the 
threat was starting to fade out. When they came back into the cities, all of them 
had a desire to organise the maximum number of followers into their 
organisations; this worsened when the race for power began. The more the 
region had hoped to survive, the tougher the struggle for power against each 
other became. Furthermore, there were other issues, such as those highlighted 
by Osman (2001a):  
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“the differences over the failed negotiations [of 1991] with the 
government and the government‟s withdrawal from the aforementioned 
areas heralded a new era of dispute between the two parties. They had 
different approaches to the future of relations with the Iraqi Government 
and with the outside. Talabani and PUK favoured seeking a solution with 
the international community and Barzani and KDP were more for trying 
seriously to reach a settlement with Baghdad. Furthermore, the 
remarkable increase of the areas under their control and the resources 
available to them increased competition that escalated the dispute”.  
 
4.4 Self-ruling and challenges: 
The intention of the Iraqi government in withdrawing its administrations from 
Kurdistan cities and towns was to cause the failure of the Kurdish political 
parties, hoping that the people of Kurdistan would organise an uprising in 
response to this failure. Another significant pressure was that of the central 
government of Iraq; despite the economic sanction placed on Iraq, they then 
imposed internal sanctions on the region by not allowing any kind of fuel, 
electricity and other basic needs to pass the Iraqi check points into the region. 
The justification for this was, claimed Saddam Hussain52, to stop an area 
uncontrolled by the authorities turning into a sabotage point in the destruction of 
the rest of Iraq. He clarified the nature of the sabotage to be smuggling 
government aids across the border into Iran to the people in Kurdistan, acted 
out by the controlling political parties. The people of Kurdistan, therefore, 
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suffered two sanctions: one by the international community and another by the 
Iraqi regime.              
Another challenge was the lack of experience in administration and ruling by the 
political parties; especially when they adopted the policy of reward and 
privileges to their cadres by appointing them in civil posts, where they only had 
previous experience in partisan organisations. This lack of experience and 
favouritism led to maladministration and corruption. The 50:50 policies between 
the PUK and KDP deepened this corruption, as in cases where the minister was 
from one side; his deputy had to be from the other; the director from one party, 
his deputy from the opposite party. Consequently, with a competition over 
power raging, all administrative life became a political race and hindered the 
daily routine of administration for the people. It became standard practice that 
posts were only gained by getting a recommendation (Tazkia) from one of the 
two parties (the KDP or PUK) and proving his or her loyalty to them; this was 
the case even for the smallest governmental posts. Consequently, this excluded 
any none PUK-KDP expertise, reflecting further on the maladministration.     
 
4.5Struggle for Power and Civil War: 
Disregarding the quality of those who were appointed in governmental posts 
reflected poorly on the quality of governance and led to a deeper level of 
nepotism, favouritism and recommendation systems. In other words, the best 
possibility for gaining a post became political loyalties rather than expertise. 
When this situation reached the point that which each of the two rival parties 
wanted more than 50% of the posts, they had to go to extreme lengths to win 
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the struggle for power and gain the majority share of the people; to achieve this, 
each of them had to out-recruit the other party in such a tense political situation 
on the verge of civil war. For both parties, as the government of the region, they 
had to generate revenue to fuel the government; this primarily came from 
customs, imposing customs not only on the goods that were imported or 
exported out of the region, but also between the cities of the region too. This 
worsened the economic situation as the poor had a heavier burden die to the 
two other sanctions from the international community on Iraq and the Iraqi 
regime in the region. 
By escalating the tensions between the KDP and PUK, the main revenue from 
customs from Turkey on one side and Iran on the other side came under the 
control of the two parties. The Iranian border customs came under control of the 
PUK, the custom of Ibrahim Khalil between the region and Turkey came under 
the control of the KDP. The lack of transparency among them affected the 
economic revenues, especially when, under the sanction, the central 
government in Baghdad had to rely on the region to smuggle oil out of the 
country and establish a business for its elites, in particular for the sons of 
Saddam. The differences deepened between the PUK and KDP mainly over the 
revenues of Ibrahim Khalil‟s custom. The civil war, or as it is known in Kurdish, 
the „War of Brothers‟ broke out in 1994, and continued until 1998; fuelling the 
war and its aftermath deepened the rentier economy53 in the region. Despite the 
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 The rentier economy has, basically, been used to explain the politics of Iran, under the Shah, 
and the Arab oil states in terms of the fact that they have not undertaken democratic 
transformation or political reforms. “In the wealthy Arab oil-exporting countries, which have been 
referred to as rentier states because they live off „rents‟-income from oil-there are other 
problems (on rentier states, see Beblawi and Luciani, The Rentier State, 1987). These 
states have sought to buy the loyalties of rentier populations by distributing a vast array of 
goods and services. They too have been unwillingly to permit widespread political participation” 
 
(
Bill, and Springborg, 2000, p. 59). Nevertheless, the rentier economy did not stop the Iranian 
revolution, at the first stance. In the cases of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, there are many 
types of growing politics that the rentier state could not stop; for instance, the politics of 
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fact that in the new Iraq, the share of the region from the wealth of Iraq (17%) 
deepened the rentier policy of the two ruling parties in the region, due to many 
factors, this did not cease the growth of a strong political opposition to the ruling 
system of the region.  
 
4.6 The Emergence of Kurdistan Islamic Union: 
As the result shared power in 1992 between the KDP and PUK, and for the 
aforementioned reasons, a kind of resentment started to grow among the 
people in the region. Leezenberg (2001: 163) argues “With the collapse of the 
strong Ba‟ath state in 1991 and the ensuing economic crisis, the lower strata of 
the urban population became ever more dependent on patronage as a mean for 
survival”. Apart from the two leading parties, there were many other smaller 
parties in the region; either because those political parties were following one of 
the two parties, or because they were followed by those people who were 
discontent with the political situation, since then there has always been a 
vacuum to be filled. However, due to lack of democracy, the militia‟s presence 
in the region and the soon-to-be civil war between the KDP and PUK, it was not 
an easy job for any kind of political party to attempt this. The masses hoped for 
an escape from this chaos; whichever political party displayed even the most 
minimal disagreement towards the situation had a chance to present itself as 
the middle-ground.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
resentment, even amongst the families of Aal-Saud, in Saudi Arabia, and, Aal-Sabah, in Kuwait, 
as well as the politics of the Islamist in both states. Therefore, the theory of the rentier economy, 
itself, is rather thin, analytically. Furthermore, the history of Kurdistan points away from this 
theory: in spite of the fact that, for many years, the Iraqi regime provided welfare, money, and 
authority  to the Kurdish collaborators (Jash)
 (
josh (jash), or little donkeys, Kurds who fight on 
the side of the Iraqi government. 
Gunter, 2004 (PP 165-166), suddenly, in 1991, almost all of them, with their tribal chiefs, turned 




On 6th February 1994, after a series of battles between the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) and the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) came to exist. As mentioned in chapter three, the 
KIU grew out of such chaos; during that time, however, the main motive was not 
merely a political one. Kurdistan, as a part of the Middle East, had already 
witnessed the Islamic awakening, and had already identified the IMIK as a 
jihadist movement, which had already had a series of battles with the PUK. Two 
important events paved the way for the KIU‟s acceptance by the people of 
Kurdistan and by other political parties. The first was its reputation which, 
through its benevolent association with the Islamic Kurdish League54 (IKL) since 
1992, had already provided many services. The second was its announcement 
as the first non-militia party after the resentment of the people towards the 
armed clashes and battles of the PUK and IMIK, and the imminent inevitable 
civil war between the PUK and KDP.     
 
4.6.1 the Raison d’etre and role of the KIU: 
The main two factors mentioned above paved the way for the KIU, though in 
terms of strategy and longevity, the KIU had to prove itself politically. During 
that time, there was little difficulty for political or social actors to exist due to the 
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Islamic Kurdish League (Kurdish: Yakgrtwi Islami Kurd) is an Islamic charitable development 
foundation, it was established 1n 1988 on the hand of a number of Kurdish intelligentsia among 
them Shaikh Dr. Ali MuheideenQaradaghi, and it adopted a number of objectives to serve the 
region by its varies domains. The IKL entered Iraq in 1992 and opened branches in Duhok, 
Erbil, Sulaimani and Darbandikhan, and after 2003 it widened its services and opened branches 
in Kirkuk, Musil and Baghdad.  




circumstances that the region was witnessing. Leezenberg (2001: 223) 
remarks: 
"Following the 1991 uprising, several factors created room for Islamist 
Organizations like IMIK, Rabita [IKL] and Yakgirtu [KIU] to gain social 
and political influence: the collapse of the hitherto strong state apparatus; 
the ensuing social, political and economic chaos; and the gradual erosion 
of Kurdish nationalism as a mobilizing force".  
The KIU in its first manifesto, published on 6th February 1994, highlighted its 
strategy as follows: 
“…therefore, in today‟s circumstances our strategy for serving our 
Kurdish people is: 1- Striving to rebuild Kurdistan, and deletion of the 
trace of all kinds of expulsion, Arabisation, genocide, and all the 
coercions that our people suffered from. 2- Insisting on obtaining all our 
just rights on our territories, thus we can defend our existence and rights. 
3- We consider the parliament and government of the region as two 
privileges, therefore respecting, preserving, and developing them are of 
our duties. 4- Preserving the internal securities and avoiding all kinds of 
social, tribal or political fighting. Hence, this leads to the rule of law, and 
our people will be accordingly respected. 5- In order for our people to get 
out of the economic crisis that suffers from, we must try to increase and 
establish the charitable relief organisations, and by helping and 
preserving them we attract the vision of the charitable people so they can 
help our people.” (KIU Media office, 1998: 11-12)       
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From the announcement55 of the party, the KIU thought of its raison d‟etre, and 
conveyed the massage that they were a necessity for the people of Kurdistan 
and to the situation, to participate in rebuilding Kurdistan and try to delete any 
trace of expulsion, Arabisation and genocide by helping the people that suffered 
from the regime; the people of Kurdistan had already experienced at least one 
of these three during the regime and had already, through their benevolent 
association, proved that they could help in this regard. As for the second point, 
striving for obtaining the just rights of the people of Kurdistan meant federalism, 
which was adopted by the region‟s parliament in 1992. This idea was, for an 
Islamic political party, a new one and was in line with all of the other political 
parties, passing the message that the KIU strategically had no disagreements 
over this crucial issue for the people and the political parties in the region. The 
clarification of a strategic political aim by an Islamic party was so important, as 
the people wanted to know what kind of policy a newly established Islamic party 
would adopt for the future of the region. 
Furthermore, during that time, many of the other Islamists (among them some 
of the leaders of the IMIK) were not respecting the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). In some cases, their militias were challenging the 
apparatus of the KRG, such as the fighting trigged in the district of 
Darbandikhan in 1993, during which some of the security forces were killed by 
some of the peshmargas of the IMIK; this led to fighting between the PUK and 
the IMIK. As for not admitting the KRG, they were mocking the KIU for seeking 
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Due to the fact that before declaring a political party on 6
th
 February 1994, the cadres and 
preachers who were from the founders of the KIU were considering themselves to be of the 
Muslim Brotherhoods in Iraq, they did not consider that day as the beginning of the 
establishment of the party, but they claim to have a kind of organisational way of life before that 
which they trace back to 1950s, referring to the first entrance of the MB into the cities of 
Kurdistan. Therefore, they consider the 6
th
 February 1994 the announcement day of the party, 
not the establishment day.  
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permission from the KRG for establishing the party. Some of the leaders of the 
IMIK considered the parliament counter-Islamic, to the extent that one of their 
prominent leaders published a book titled „Parliament between the Belief and 
Infidelity‟. During this time, the KIU came to exist and announced in its first 
manifesto that it considers the parliament and the KRG as two privileges of the 
people of Kurdistan that it respects, preserves and helps to develop; this 
declaration was well respected by all the parties and by the people of Kurdistan. 
Through this, the KIU presented a moderate kind of Islamism that strived for the 
political demands of the people in Kurdistan, and left no room for non-Islamic 
parties to claim that all Islamists are against the political will of the people of 
Kurdistan.     
By respecting both the parliament and the KRG, this automatically led to the 
implementation of the fourth strategic point of the manifesto of the KIU: 
„preserving the internal securities and avoiding all kinds of social, tribal or 
political fighting‟ (the KIU, contrary to all other political parties, guaranteed this 
by not having militias). From this action, the KIU demonstrated that it was not 
only distinct from the other Islamists, such as the IMIK, but also from all other 
political parties, by not having its own militias; they were considered defenders 
of Kurdistan, and so their policing must be by the government, not the political 
parties. Under such circumstances, with all the political parties holding arms 
with no respect with regard to the law, chaos ensued, people reporting internal 
fighting between families, tribes and political parties, especially in the newly re-
inhabited villages across of Kurdistan. People were generally in fear that 
internal fighting between the groups would trigger at any moment. Calling for, 
and practicing, a zero-militia policy in such a chaotic situation was widely 




With regards to the fifth strategic point of the first manifesto of the KIU, the new 
party once again emphasised its strength and presented itself as a solution 
regarding the economic crisis of the region. Highlighting the importance of 
helping and preserving those organisations, via the authorities of the KRG, 
would attract the largest number of them, in order to help the people of the 
region through the crisis; this would guarantee the activities of the KIU and its 
charitable organisations. Calling for the establishment of local charitable relief 
organisations was of the utmost importance for the KIU to stay in the region 
under all circumstances. Despite the existence of a number of international 
appeal organisations in the region, after the 31st August 1996 and the 
interference of the Iraqi army into the region by the invitation of the KDP to 
defeat the PUK, the majority left the region and did not return to resume their 
activities. However, the KIU and similar organisations remained, especially the 
IKL, which actively continues its charitable activities to the present day. In 
recent years, other local similar organisations were established by the media 
and the leading political parties, such as the Ibrahim Ahmad Foundation (funded 
by the PUK), and Barzani Foundation (funded by the KDP). All followed the KIU 
in this, as they were the pioneers in such charitable work.  
Though the KIU was mainly concerned with uniting and centralising its 
organisations in different cities, and setting up legal cover for its centralised 
preaching, its leadership from 1991 to 1993 had progressed sufficiently, 
politically, to justify announcing a political party. The main two political additions, 
a moderate Islamism which recognised the national institutions of Kurdistan 
(such as parliament and the KRG), and its non-militia means, distinguished it 
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from the other Islamists; in addition to its well respected charitable 
organisations, this proved its necessity for the society during that era. Its raison 
d‟etre in terms of containing the growing youth of the Islamic awakening of 
Kurdistan into a moderate political entity, which would otherwise be potentially 
subjected to radicalisation, was also extremely important. The KIU approach of 
Islamism and politics became a model to be followed during the de-
radicalisation process of other Islamists, as well as a model of political party for 
other non-Islamists too.   
One of the most important raison d‟etre of the KIU as a political party in the 
region was its peaceful approach, internally and in terms of its role as a 
mediator between the warring parties during the civil war in the region. 
Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) summarises56 the KIU‟s attempts in mediating between 
the fighting parties; the KIU‟s peaceful approach was not only important in 
proving itself as a new party to the people of Kurdistan, but also with regards to 
educating its members and followers on such behaviour. This became the 
hallmark of the KIU, and it was soon known as a peaceful political party. As 
previously mentioned, the assassination of its founding member by the jihadists 
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“ 1- The KIU‟s mediation between the KDP and PUK as follows: 
KIU politburo delegation‟s visit on 2/3/1994 to the PUK‟s politburo attempting to cease fire. 
Visit of the same delegation on 4/3/1994 to the KDP‟s second branch for the same purpose. 
▪ On 2/5/1994 the KIU‟s leadership committee sent an official letter to PUKand KDP asking calling for cease fire. 
▪ On the same day [2/5/1994] the KIU leadership committee‟s delegation visited the 
PUK‟s politburo attempting to pacify the tensions between the two parties.    
▪ In the same first week of May upon the KIU‟s suggestion the idea of (peace and 
brotherhood committee) was presented, which later on had many activities in regards of 
mediating and peace. 
▪ On 14/9/1996 the KIU politburo issued a statement to its organisations, emphasised its 
condemnation of the civil war.    
▪ Furthermore, we must refer to the important statement of the General Secretary ofthe KIU on 26/9/1996 in the parliament, which he reminded the  KDP‟s MPs as well as the public opinion of the legitimacy of the PUK‟s   seats in the Kurdistan‟s parliament. This statement was stated by him in the presence of 
Mas‟ud Barzani and the political leadership of the Kurdish parties. 
 
2- The war between KDP and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 
3- The second war between the PUK and IMIK. 
4- The mediation of the KIU and KIG”. 




did not spur feelings for retaliation unlike other parties; rather, KIU referred its 
grievances to the courts and believed in the rule of law. Its political life began 
with no equipment for retaliation that other parties owned in the form of their 
militias. This made the KIU subject to attacks mockery from some of its 
competitors. However, the more stable the region became, the more the other 
parties followed the KIU in this regard.           
 
4.6.2 The KIU and Political Outcome: 
Due to the above factors, the KIU grew rapidly in the first few years of its 
announcement. Unlike the other political parties, one of its characteristics was 
its presence in all the cities of the region. The PUK, for example, was mainly 
controlling Sulaimani, the KDP the Duhok, and the IMIK were controlling 
Halabja. However, as Leezenberg (2001: 222) highlights:  
"Bahdinan [Duhok governorate] is a traditional KDP stronghold, and tribal 
structures and Sufi orders have remained relatively strong. 
Subsequently, it was the Rabita [IKL]57 rather than the Islamic Movement 
that made inroads in this area, but once again, and significantly, primarily 
in urban areas like Duhok".  
Due to the nationalistic party‟s dominance in the villages during the revolutions, 
their ideologies were spreading and prevented those areas from receiving any 
new ideas. However, in 1988, the Iraqi regime committed a mass genocide and 
destroyed these villages, either killed the habitants or gathering them into 
                                                          
57
Rabita: is the Arabic word for Islamic Kurdish League (IKL). However, here is referring to KIU 
since it was for many known by it, due to its charitable activities and its prior existence. Hence 
for many people for many years the KIU was referred to by its charitable organisation Rabita.  
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camps near the cities, away from the control and ideology of those parties; 
slowly, the new ideology of Islamism was growing in those camps. Nonetheless, 
due to the uprising of 1991 and the return of many of those people to their 
villages, they once again became strongholds of those parties‟ ideologies. 
Although the IKL had many of its projects in the villages, the KIU could not 
expand in the rural areas as much as they could in urban areas. Consequently, 
although the KIU saw huge expansion in the cities, especially among the 
educated (such as students, teachers, doctors, etc.), its influence remained 
limited in the rural areas.  
 
4.6.3 Elections: 
In its first few years, the KIU was mainly working on the following factors:  
It‟s preaching (Quran 2:107) (We have not sent you except as a mercy for all 
mankind) this included its benevolent works. Its soft reform (Quran 11: 88) (I 
want nothing but to set things right as far as I can). This politically presented in 
its mediation attempts. Both above points required the KIU to avoid political 
rivalry. However, both above points enhanced and widened the circle of its 
organisations and increased the number of members. This caused the main 
political parties to be wary, stating that this widening of the circle of the KIU is at 
our cost, due to the benefits gained through the civil war.  
One of the strategies that the student organisations and syndicates of the KIU 
employed in 1998 and 2000 was participations in the elections during these 
academic years. This participation was important as under the control of both 
the KDP and PUK, which divided the region into two controlled areas, such a 
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democratic step was crucial for the region, especially as no election had taken 
place since the 1992 general election. Conversely, it was important for the KIU 
itself to weigh up its existence over the four years. Generally, the results 
indicated that its organisations had significantly expanded to a degree that it 
became the number two party in each canton of the KDP and PUK. This later 
led to harsh political contestation by both parties towards the KIU in the 
territories that they ruled.  
Taking the student organisation elections as an example, starting from 1998 the 
results of the elections in the secondary schools between the main two rivals 
(Kurdistan Students Union-KSU led by the KDP and Islamic Students Union of 
Kurdistan-ISUK led by the KIU) in the governorate of Erbil for the academic year 




Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
For the all universities, institutions and the secondary schools in both 
governorates of Erbil and Duhok, which were under the rule of the KDP, the 
results were as follows:  
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Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Of the above results, the results of Salahaddin University-Erbil and University of 
Duhok were as follows:  
University KSU ISUK 
Salahaddin 71.5% 27.5% 
Duhok 58.15% 36.34% 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Allegedly, a high percentage of ratio of votes for the KIU in the areas under the 
control of the KDP in Erbil and Duhok were coming from the supports of the 
PUK, as they had no candidates of their own to vote for, preferring to vote for 
the KIU in order to embarrass the KDP by supporting the newly emerged KIU. 
This allegation is doubtful, for various reasons:  
In the same way that the KIU was growing in those areas, they were growing 
similarly in the areas under the PUK too. Thus, it was not in the interest of the 
PUK to support the KIU whatsoever. 
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 Union of the Islamic Students (UIS) was the students of Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  
60
Association of Muslim Students in Kurdistan (AMSK). See chapter three.   
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The above table shows that the ratio of the ISUK in University of Duhok was 
36.34%, while its result in Salahaddin University in Erbil was only 27.5%. The 
PUK had never had much popularity in Duhok compared to its popularity in 
Erbil. For instance, the following table shows the PUK‟s results in the 1992‟s 
general election in comparison to the KDP in both governorates: 
 KDP PUK & Toilers‟ 
Duhok 168683 15184 
Erbil 152143 148352 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Thus, according to the 1992‟s elections, the PUK‟s presence in Duhok was only 
9% of the KDP‟s popularity in the same governorate. According to the same 
election, its presence was 97.5% of the KDP‟s popularity in Erbil governorate. 
This disproves the allegation, as, if this was the case, the ISUK would get more 
votes in Erbil rather than Duhok through the support of the PUK students; the 
results indicate the opposite effect, receiving 36.34% in the University of Duhok 
and only 27.5% in Salahaddin University in Erbil.       
If the PUK wanted to support any other organisations against the KDP, it would 
rather support the other smaller organisations. This due to the following: 
Not to highlight the growth of the KIU, as it was the number one growing party in 
its own controlled areas too. They would support organisations with a similar 
ideological mindset, not an Islamic party such as the KIU.  
If this allegation was correct for Erbil and Duhok under the KDP, it is still unclear 
how the ISUK could possibly achieve similar results in Sulaimani, which was 
controlled by the PUK, unless with the possibility of the same allegation for 
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supporting the KDP followers to them against the PUK; the above reasons 
disprove this possibility also. 
In the University of Sulaimani and the institutions of Sulaimani governorate 
(under the control of the PUK), the main rivals were Kurdistan Students 
Association (KSA) led by the PUK and ISUK; and the results of the elections in 
the academic year of 1998/1999 were as follows: 
KAS ISUK UIS 
63.6% 27% 2.6% 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Generally, by looking at the results of Erbil and Duhok, it can be noticed that the 
KIU grew equally in the universities in Erbil at this stage, with the Sulaimani 
results coming in similarly, by 27.5% and 27% respectively. However, this grew 
by 36.34% in the University of Duhok. If we look back again at the results of the 
general elections of 1992, in the governorates of Sulaimani and Kirkuk61, the 
results were as follows: 
 PUK KDP 
Sulaimani 207168 92449 
Kirkuk 53129 24606 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
This indicates that the KDP‟s presence in the governorate of Sulaimani was 
44.64% of the size of the PUK, and its presence in Kirkuk governorate was 
46.30% of the PUK‟s size. Hence, the presence of the KDP in these two 
governorates was quite close to that of the PUK, while, according to the same 
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Note: till 2003 Kirkuk city was under the control of the Iraqi regime. However, in the KRG there was 
Kirkuk governorate containing the districts of Darbandikhan, Kalar and Chamchamal, and the 
governorate was run from Darbandikhan. 
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general elections of 1992, the PUK‟s presence in Duhok governorate was only 
9% of the presence of the KDP. In this first general election, both the KDP and 
the PUK had almost the same size in the capital Erbil, whereas the PUK 
received what is equal to 97.50% of the votes that the KDP received. Although 
this shows that, generally and overall, the KDP were more popular in the region 
than the PUK in 1992‟s general elections, and with the later overall expansion of 
the KIU in all the governorates, according to the latest general election for the 
Iraqi parliament in 2014, out of the four received seats of the KIU, two of them 
were received in Duhok governorate. As for the Provincial Councils Elections in 
the region, which took place simultaneously with the Iraqi general elections in 
2014, the KIU, out of the six seats received in the three governorates of the 
region, three of them were from Duhok: 
Duhok Sulaimani Erbil 
3 2 1 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Despite their strategic agreement and coalition with the KDP over the last ten 
years, the PUK are still limited in their governorate. Similarly, the KDP, in 
comparison to its presence in the 1992 general elections in the Sulaimani and 
Kirkuk, did not, according to the election results, perform well.                                                                                                                                     
Due to the many acts that the region witnessed during the circumstances by 
which the KIU came to exist, and the strong Islamic awakening, the KIU 
experienced unexpected growth, especially among young people. This growth 
can be attributed to its Islamic background, not necessarily its politics. However, 
the more the situation settled, the more became a realistic size. In the elections 
of the student organisations of the academic year 2000/2001, the average size 
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in all the universities, institutions and secondary schools under the control of the 
KDP, in both governorates of Erbil and Duhok, was as follow:  
KSU ISUK IUMIK62 
81% 10.41% 0.01% 
Source: the personal archive of Amjad Mohamad, the former ISUK‟s secretary. 
Due to the single party ruling and the monopoly of the ruling party, there were 
always complains about the results of the elections and their credibility. 
However, over time and with the power of the rentier economy operation, the 
KDP also grew; as the winner in the last general election of the region in 2013, 
they received 38 seats out of the 100 seats available to Kurdish entities in the 
region‟s parliament. In the same election the KIU received only 10 seats. As for 
the period after the civil war, between 1994 and 1998, both fighting parties (the 
KDP and PUK) were primarily concerned with the conflict; they cared little about 
the growth of an unarmed political party such as the KIU. With their peace 
agreement, they both concentrated on expanding their organisations, and relied 
heavily on the rentier economy for this; despite their peace agreement, they 
pursued each other‟s followers in their controlled areas. This is the main reason 
for the substantial differences in the votes from 2000 onward as, from this date, 
both the KIU and the PUK in Erbil and Duhok, and the KDP in Sulaimani and 
Kirkuk, did not receive the amount of seats near that of the 1992‟s general 
election. The power shift that took place under the reform demands also cost 
the PUK more than any of the other parties.     
Now to compare the Islamists, who were new in the political arena of Kurdistan, 
to the Communists, who had existed in Iraq as a political party since 1934, in 
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 For (Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan -IUMIK) see Al-Nahdha Islamic Movement in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, where IMIK and Al-Nahdha united for around a year and called it IUMIK.   
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terms of the general elections in the region. The following statistics clearly 
demonstrate the extent of the influence of religion among the Kurdish society:  
1992 Islamists Communists 
 5.05% 2.5% 
 
In 2005, the KIU, IMIK and the Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP) were in the 
Kurdistani coalition. However, KIK alone received 4.86%.  
2009 Reform & Services63 IMIK KCP 
 12.83% 1,45% 0.8% 
 
2013 KIU KIK IMIK KCP 
 10 seats 6 seats 1 seat 1 seat 
 
The above data strongly suggests that Kurdish society is in line with Islam and 
does not accept anti-Islamic ideologies. On the other hand, the society does not 
approve of radicalisation and extremism. For instance, all of the Islamist parties 
in the 1992 general elections had only 5.05%, which did not pass the 7% 
margin, and therefore did not gain any seats. Whereas, in the 2013 general 
elections, they received 17 seats in total, out of the 100 seats allowed for 
Kurdish entities in the Parliament, while the PUK only received 18 seats. In 
addition, the reasons for the size of the votes of the Islamists in 1992 general 
elections can be summarised as the following: 
                                                          
63As mentioned above, the Reform and Services consisted from the KIU, KIK, KSDP and Toilers‟.  
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The Kurdish society was new to Islamists, and the opponent parties could easily 
mobilise the masses against them. Although, the civil Islamists were also in 
coalition with the IMIK, the IMIK was the banner for the coalition. Thus, the main 
reaction towards them was one against an armed Islamist movement. Overall, 
at that time, the nationalist politics of the Islamists was not very clear, neither for 
themselves nor for the voters. In other words, according to the above 
comparison between the communists and the Islamists, over the course of four 
general elections, religion served a significant role in mobilising the people of 
Kurdistan. The Islamic awakening, in particular, had its own role in this 
mobilisation, and would have been even more significant, if not for clashes 
between the armed Islamists and other Kurdish nationalists in the past. 
Although the main three Islamist parties are currently at different levels of 
participation in the Kurdish nationalism, for the above reasons, they have not 
yet realized their own ambitions. Allegedly, the prominent candidates among the 
Islamists are still the clerics, not their politicians. Taking the 2010 Iraqi general 
elections, for instance, there is strong support for this allegation. In this election, 
in the Sulaimani governorate, from the 103188 votes that the KIU received, Aziz 
Hafiz (or MallaAuzair), a prominent cleric in Kurdistan, alone received 46314 
votes. From the same list of the KIU‟s candidates, the top individual, Bakr Hama 
Siddiq, a well-known lawyer, author and politician, received 12332 votes. For 
the KIK, this effect can be seen most clearly, as in the same elections in Erbil, 
of the 62706 votes that the KIK received in that governorate, Ali Bapeer, the 
leader of the party, who is a well-known cleric, received 50116 votes. This 
means that two clerics from the KIU and KIK alone received nearly 45% of 
votes in the case of KIU, and 80% in the case of KIK in those two governorates 
during the 2010 Iraqi general elections.      
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In the region‟s general election in 2013, of the 186721 total votes that the KIU 
received, the head of its candidates list, the politburo and its prominent politician 
figure Mawlood Bawamurad according to Rudaw (2013) only received 6600 
votes. The preacher Haji Karwan, who had never been known as a politician, 
but was well known as an Islamic preacher, received 76943 votes; Omar 
Kochar, another preacher, received 40000 votes. Hence, out of the 186721 
votes that the KIU received, two of the party‟s preachers alone received 116943 
votes. This made their proportion 62.50% of the total votes in the 2013 general 
elections. However, Mawlood Bawamurad “referred the reasoning and 
explanation for such a result back to the failure of the political rhetoric of all the 
political parties in Kurdistan, which made the voters to trust neither the political 
parties nor their political figures” (Rudaw, 2013). For Bawamurad, this kind of 
results is not necessarily due to the Islamic background of the KIU and its 
voters, but instead to the mistrust by Kurdistan‟s voters towards the politicians 
and the political parties. To a large extent, this argument is valid, as most of the 
candidates who received a large number of votes, from all the non-Islamic 
parties too, were not prominent politicians in their parties. For instance, of the 
476736 votes that the Change movement received, Ali Hama Salih, a TV 
presenter, received 139767 votes.    
 
4.6.4 Ethno-Politics and the KIU: 
Ethno-politics gradually developed among the KIU alongside the political 
enhancement going on in the region generally, which Iraq in particular 
experienced from 2003 onward. For this reason, the Turkmen members of the 
party left, and established their own party on the basis of their own ethno-
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politics; the gradual shift from religious politics to further ethno-politics took 
place within the party. During every election, in order to attract the maximum 
number of the voters, the parties had to prepare ever more nationalistic 
manifestos. During this period, the voter numbers varied and the statistics did 
not behave in the same way as was seen during the student organisation 
elections, for instance. The new politics of the party lost thousands of the 
Islamist voters, voting instead for Islamists who had not yet reached this stage 
of politics, the KIK particularly; the KIU did not gain much from more nationalist 
voters, who would logically prefer exclusively nationalist parties such as the 
PUK and KDP. Yet, among its candidates for both the Iraqi and Kurdistan 
general elections, the clerics had a better chance, and it was they who gathered 
most of the votes for the KIU; to a large extent, and as mentioned above, this 
was the same for KIK. 
After the civil war, when the new era of political rivalry demanded that the KIU 
concentrate its nationalistic politics to attract the maximum amount of voters, 
instead of targeting only students and professional syndicates. Focusing on 
nationalism cost the KIU something else which none of the non-Islamist Kurdish 
parties had: a large number of Turkmen members and supporters, especially in 
the city of Erbil.Ghafur (2013: 51) remarks:  
“…in the first years of the announcement of the KIU, which until that 
moment the party had not indulged into political emulation, and had not 
faced with the nationalistic demands of the Kurds, it had a religious trans-
nationalism rhetoric, and they all [Kurds and non-Kurd members such as 
Turkmen] confidently were under its flag continued their Islamic struggle. 
However, day after day and year after another under the pressure of the 
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Kurdish nationalism of Kurdistan, that non-nationalist Islamism of the KIU 
withdrew in favour of the Kurdish nationalist rhetoric to the lowest level. 
That, for the Turkmen members, was a trigger of concern and stance”. 
Thus, slowly the volume of nationalism increased within the politics of the KIU, 
this behaviour considered a normal attitude for any political party in the position 
of the KIU. Otherwise, the question is raised as to its political demands would 
be within such a nationalistic atmosphere, such as that of Kurdistan, especially 
when the Kurds had suffered a lot, even ethnic cleansing, in the process of 
defending their right to existence as a nation. However, due to three factors, this 
kind of nationalistic behaviour by other non-Kurdish Islamists is not well 
documented: Those non-Kurdish Islamists are not representing a revolutionist 
nation within their states, like that of the Kurds which, over a century, suffered 
from their regimes. They have no such circumstances, and even in a multi-
ethnic society, like those of Egypt and Syria, they are from the nation that rules 
the state, and similarly to all their Arab nationalist parties, they never wanted to 
recognise the nationalist rights of the other ethnicities.  
They are not in a position, like that of the KIU, which demands them to struggle 
for equal national rights among the nations of the region. Rather, they blame the 
KIU for this political decision and expect them to keep quiet for the sake of the 
so-called Islamic unity.  
They all practice nationalist politics within their own states, however, due to the 
above two factors, they either don‟t realise their nationalism, and still desire an 
Islamic caliphate, or are simply denying the rights of the Kurds, instead blaming 
their nationalist movement: this is especially true in the cases of Iraq, Syria and 
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Turkey, as the Kurds are struggling against two Arab nations and the Sunni 
state of Turkey.  
As for the KIU as a political party in Kurdistan, its advancement in politics 
brought the party closer to its nationalistic demands, otherwise it had no raison 
d‟etre as a political party in the first place; it had to remain a benevolent 
preaching group and not interfere into politics. This was not in line with Islamic 
principles and the understanding of the KIU, as they consider politics a 
dimension of the good deeds that Islam requires from Muslims. In the case of 
the KIU, the more they practiced politics the more nationalistic they became, 
until the aftermath of the Iraq and the increase in political demands by the 
Kurds, leading to the establishment of the KIU as one of the first Kurdish 
players within Iraq to accept the reality that Turkmen members have their right 
to have another political party, with their own political ambitions. 
 
4.7 KIU’s Second Political Phase: 
The KIU rapidly grew in the region, from its establishment until the invasion of 
2003, however, as with other Kurdish political powers, the policy that was 
followed took into account the ongoing threat of the Iraqi regime on the region, 
the danger of another phase of civil war between the main ruling parties, the 
carrying out of serious kind political manoeuvres, due to its Islamic background, 
especially when the Islamic militias were involved in the civil war. Therefore, its 
politics mainly focused on mediating and self-maintaining, with few attempts at 
political manoeuvres. However, after 2003, when all the three mentioned 
circumstances disappeared; the regime changed and the danger of civil war 
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disappeared, as coalition forces existed in Iraq. Furthermore, no more Kurdish 
Islamic militias remained, and, more importantly, the KIU became well known by 
America and had been classified as a legitimate Kurdish nationalistic entity by 
them. Under the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Iraqi 
governing council was established, and the SG of the KIU was a member of the 
council.  
The new political era witnessed by Iraq, Kurdistan and the rest of the region 
demanded many political steps from the Kurds, in order to gain the utmost 
benefit from the situation. The aftermath of the civil war brought changes in the 
way that the region was run, the social political life under the rentier economy 
and the two controlled cantons run by the KDP and PUK. Above all, the newly 
liberated disputed areas between Iraq and the region required a total political 
reform and transparency in the region. All of these factors provided the KIU with 
an opportunity to call for reform. Its political position as the third Kurdish entity 
at that time gave it a louder voice.                  
During this phase, the KIU was part of the coalition government, while also 
acting as an opposing party. In a sense, it was trying to use its position within 
the government to call for reform, which made it impossible for the party to 
adopt its policy as an opposition party outside the government. Abdulaziz (2011: 
82) remarks: 
“…the KIU was utilising its existence in the government for reform. Even, 
this point was raising a question about it: how could [the KIU] be in the 
government and at the same time consider yourselves as opposition and 
criticise the authorities? Obviously the answer of the KIU‟s leadership 
was the following: due to the special political circumstances of the region, 
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and instability of the [region‟s] political experience, we have chosen this 
form of politics, for this phase. With changes in the political atmosphere, 
we could review our political stance”.       
Although this policy was not an effective one as an opposition, it was a starting 
point for opposition experience in an atmosphere in which, under the effect of 
the civil war, any political objection could be viewed as a counter to the political 
experience of Kurdistan. Nonetheless, this led to bigger voices calling for 
political reform, and eventually political opposition too. This was not the only 
experience of its kind, but many other political parties were trying the same kind 
of policy. Even, at the level of the ministers, there were such attempts, such as 
the reforms that Professor Dlawar Alladdin (the minister of Higher education 
and Scientific Research) called for; Alladin was a minister of the PUK, when 
they were in coalition with the KDP. He was trying to adopt reforms within his 
ministry, which facilitated reforms and overall development of the ministry, 
where his policies were opposed by their partner KDP, and he could not 
complete his four year term; his service lasted only two years. Furthermore, 
when the former opposition parties of the Change movement, the KIU and the 
KIK decided to participate in the coalition government after the 2013 elections, 
they all stated that they wanted to reform and implement their reform package 
within the government. Reforms were difficult to implement by an opposition 
party, so attempts had to be made within the government to implement reform 
policy together with their allies.        
The second term of the general elections for the Kurdistan Parliament took 
place on January 30th, 2005, after the first election that took place in 1992. The 
KIU ran for the general election within the Kurdistan Democratic Patriotic list in 
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the second term, which contained all the main parties of the region, including 
the Christians and the Turkmen entities. The list out of the 111 seats received 
104 seats, the KIK received 6 seats and Kurdistan Toilers‟ Party and the 
independents one seat. The KIU, from the 104 seats, received 9 seats.  




Kurdistan Democratic Patriotic 1570663 89.00% 104 
Islamic Komal of Iraqi Kurdistan 85237 4.86% 6 
Kurdistan Toilers‟ Party and the 
independents 
20585 1.17% 1 
Kurdistan Democratic Labour Party 11748 0.67% 0 
Kurdistan‟s People Democratic 
Movement  
10952 0.62% 0 
Independents List 10262 0.59% 0 
Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party 9081 0.52% 0 
Iraqi Republican Gathering 9499 0.54% 0 
Iraqi Unity Patriotic Front 8255 0.47% 0 
Kurdistan Democrats Movement 6690 0.38% 0 
Kurdistan Conservative Party 5506 0.31% 0 
Iraqi Patriotic Brotherhood Party 3422 0.20% 0 
Kurdistan Patriotic Trend  2018 0.12% 0 
Total of the Votes 1753919 10% 111 




The results of the second term of the general elections of the Kurdistan region, 
January 30th 2005.  
Source: the personal archive of the Elections office of the KIU. 
 
Prior to 2003, and working with the Iraqi opposition, the KIU always classified 
itself as a Kurdish party rather than an Islamist opposition. On more than one 
occasion, it was suggested that the Iraqi Islamists should be classified together, 
as they have the same ideological bases. However, the KIU never wanted to be 
classified under the banner of the Islamists, but preferred to be classified as a 
Kurdish party instead. Therefore, when the Iraqi Interim Governing Council 
(IIGC) was appointed in 2003 over a year, from the 25 members, 5 members 
were assigned to the Kurds, and one of those five Kurdish members was the 
Secretary General of the KIU. Therefore, when Kurdistan‟s general election took 
place in January 2005, the KIU entered the coalition with almost all the Kurdish 
entities, but not KIK, which until that moment were experiencing the aftereffects 
of the prior civil war with the PUK. Also, their leader at that time, Ali Bapir, was 
jailed by the Americans from July 2003 until April 200564, and did not become a 
part of the coalition.    
                                                          













The main reason for having such a big coalition was to keep all the region‟s 
entities united, so that they all have the same policy towards the central 
government in Baghdad (in negotiation over the disputed areas) and the 
constitutional rights of the people of Kurdistan. However, in the same year on 
15 December 2005, the Iraqi Parliamentary election was taking place. The KIU 
alone decided to run for that election outside the Kurdish coalition; for the first 
time, the KIU called publicly for reform, its manifesto based on reform and anti-
corruption. This was a shock for the main two ruling parties of the region, 
mobilising their masses against the KIU, stating that they had gone out of 
consensus with the people of Kurdistan. Furthermore, they accused them of 
being anti-Kurds, pro-Arabs and the agent of the foreigners (referring to the 
Muslim Brotherhood). This led to a general attack on all the offices of the KIU 
over the Badinan area under the KDP on 6th December, perpetrated by the 
youth organisations of the KDP, an act which included setting all of their offices 
on fire. According to EKurd Daily (2005) “four KIU members were killed, 
including a high ranking official of the party”. Despite the accusations and the 
attack, the KIU‟s five members in the Iraqi parliament, with the 53 members of 
the Kurdish Alliance in Baghdad, worked for Kurdish politics. The KIU‟s 
explanation and rationale for running alone for the Iraqi parliament was based in 
its resentment and the non-reform policies of the two parties, an act which was 
later criticised by many political analysts. Indeed, the KIU should have gone 
independent for the earlier elections of January 2005 rather than the central 
government, as the reform of the region should emerge within itself, rather than 
the other way around.  
The concepts transparency, corruption, nepotism and reform became the daily 
subjects of the Kurdish media. Some had gone further, referencing the call for 
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reform within the PUK; this was one of the ruling parties of the region, started 
on the hand of Nawsheerwan Mustafa (the deputy SG of the party) which 
eventually led to the formation of the Change Movement in 2009.  
Within the wider call for political reform, the third term of Kurdistan‟s 
parliamentary general election took place on 25th July 2009. For this term the 
KIU, Kurdistan Islamic Komal (Group) (KIK), Kurdistan Socialist Democratic 
Party (KSDP) and Kurdistan Toilers‟ Party (KTP) had a coalition parliamentary 
list and called it „Services and Reform‟. The list gained 13 seats out of the 100 
seats allocated to the Kurds. There are other 11 seats allocated to religious and 
ethnic minorities, as follow: 5 seats to Turkmen, 5 seats to Chaldean and 
Assyrian Christians, and 1 seat to the Armenian Christians; the total number of 
the Kurdistan Parliament‟s seats becomes 111 seats. According to the prior 
agreement of the four parties of the parliamentary list of Services and Reform, 
the KIU received 6 seats, the KIK 4 seats, the KSDP 2 seats and the KTP 1 
seat out of the 13 seats that the coalition received. 
A list of the voting results for the political parties and coalitions in the election 




























Sulaimani 288980 303103 127020 19564 6026     
Hawler 420627 122205 68029 6916 7839     
Duhok 333574 14443 42124 666 1160     
Others 33189 5273 3669 1 3     
Total 1076370 445024 240842 27147 15028 29845 27644 14296 1876196 
Percentage 57.37% 23.72% 12.83% 1.45% 0.8% 1.59% 1.47% 0.76%  
Source: the personal archive of the Elections office of the KIU. 
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The KIU‟s political participation, disregarding the specificities of its existence 
and objectives, was positive in creating a political culture. This political culture 
was democratically orientated in many respects; civil life; with no militia, positive 
women participation, non-tribalism, political reform and political opposition were 
among the major issues that the KIU worked on. Currently, these are among the 
top political topics affecting the region, all worked on by the major political 
parties. Although the KIU had suffered a lot when it started and called for this 
kind of policy, even when it was mocked for expecting such a policy in a region 
full of militia, civil war and violation of the human rights. However, the success 
of this kind of policy in the region, and having this political culture, is the 
success of the political philosophy of the KIU, whether it had itself directly 
gained from it or not. In contrast, some of the political parties were mobilising 
and maintaining their organisations by creating civil war and trying to defeat the 
other political parties. On the contrary, recently, in a peaceful contestation, they 
cannot mobilise or even maintain their existence, but the more the democratic 
successes, the more they are losing.   
Officially, after the general elections of 2009, there were political oppositions in 
the region, which consisted of the Change movement with 25 parliamentary 
seats, with the KIU on 6 seats and KIK 4 seats. Throughout that parliamentary 
term, those three opposition parties had more than one third of the seats of the 















reforms. Abdulaziz (2011: 117-151) classifies the KIU‟s efforts, by itself or with 
the other political parties, into two phases. The first one occurred prior to the 
2009 elections, which summarises them in nine points, and the second phase, 
which started after that general election, continued until the 2013‟s general 
elections, and summarises it in ten points. Until the fourth term of the general 
elections in Kurdistan, the opposition parties, despite the promises of the 
government for reforms, did not witness any kind of reform. All parties decided 
to take part in the government that would emerge from the fourth general 
elections, which took place on 21 September 2013, hoping to start reforms 
within the government.  
The results of the elections for the Kurdish parties in the fourth term that took 
place on 21st September 2013 were as follows: 
KDP Change PUK KIU KIK IMIK KSDP KCP Third 
Direction 
38 24 18 10 6 1 1 1 1 















4.7 Independence of Kurdistan: 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Kurdish political parties in southern 
Kurdistan never happened to see any political party to call for an independent 
nation state for the Kurds after the revolts of Shaikh Mahmood, who clearly 
called for a kingdom of Kurdistan. According to those political parties, this was 
due to the regional and international circumstances, which would not allow the 
Kurds such a step. The attempts of Shaikh Mahmood, in the first half of the 
century in Iraq, and of Qazi Muhammad in Iran, both failed to achieve this. First 
striving for autonomous rights for the Kurds in Iraq, and ending with the 
federalism of Parliament of Kurdistan on 4th October 1992, enhanced the 
political ambitions of the Kurds in this part of Kurdistan. After 2003, in light of 
the changes in Iraq and the wider region, many of the political interests of the 
major political players in the region changed. In particular, when the political 
parties and the people of the region were disappointed by the Iraqi central 
government with respect to its reluctance to implement the Iraqi constitution, 
thus guaranteeing the right of the Kurds in Iraq. 
Since 1991, the Kurds in Iraq have had two opportunities towards the 
independency in this part of Kurdistan; however, for the same reasons stated 
above, the political parties did not even mention the issue of independence 
seriously during those two occasions. The first occasion was after the uprising 
of 1991 and the no-fly-zone that was provided by the USA, UK and France. The 
second occasion was after the 2003 regime change in Iraq. Although the 
referendum movement, alongside the Iraqi general elections on 30th January 
2005, ran a referendum pole, according to the Kurdistan Referendum 
Movement International Committee (2005), in all the Kurdish areas, including 
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the so-called disputed areas; “the total number of Kurdistani voters participating 
in the referendum was 1,998,061 people”. According to the same source, 
98.88% of them voted „yes‟ in favour of independence of Kurdistan, and the 
results were as follow:  
Governorate Voted for  
Independence 












Kirkuk 131,274 181 131,582 99.88% 0.12% 
Nineveh 165,780 111 165,891 99.93% 0.07% 
Diyala 35,786 627 36,413 98.28% 1.72% 
Sulaimani 650,000 5,796 656,496 99.12% 0.88% 
Hawler (Erbil) 622,409 11,289 636,898 98.23% 1.77% 
Duhok  368,163 2,247 370,781 99.39% 0.61% 
Total 1,973,412 20,251 1,998,061 98.88% 1.12% 
Source: Kurdistan Referendum Movement – International Committee, 2005. 
For the same reasons, the political parties hoped to guarantee the Kurdish 
rights within the Iraqi constitution by rebuilding Iraq and staying within it, rather 
than acting on the wishes of the 98.88% of the voters. As they disappointed the 
Kurds via the Iraqi governments, and did not implement the constitution, 
gradually the position of the Kurdish political parties changed. The position of 
the major political parties in the parliament and government of Kurdistan can be 
classified into two groups, with regards to the independence and establishment 
of a nation state for the people of Kurdistan. The first group which publicly 
advocated this idea and thought about this step timely with respect to the future 
of Kurdistan Region, comprise of the KIU, KDP and KIK. The KIU officially 
adopted self-determination and the establishment of a nation state as its 
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strategy in its congress in May, 201265. According to Rudaw (2014) prior to the 
last Iraqi general election in April 2014, the KIK announced the same idea for 
Kurdistan‟s nation statehood, arguing that was the right time for this step. As for 
the KDP, especially when tensions between the region and the central 
government in Baghdad arise over budget and power sharing, the head of the 
party, Mr. Masoud Barzani (also the current president of the region), stated that 
they would fight for independence. Directly after the control of Mosul by the 
terrorist Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant) (ISIS), as Khalaf (2014) 
highlights, Barzani declared that “he was no longer bound by the Iraqi 
constitution and called on the Kurdish parliament to prepare for an 
independence referendum”.    
The second group consists of the PUK and the Change movement. As Abdulla 
(2014) comments “PUKleaders are reluctant to speak out publicly in favour of 
Independence”. The change movement, in this regard, followed the same policy 
of the PUK, stating that it is not the right time for an independent nation state. 
Rather, they state that change and reform should be prioritised over an 
independent Kurdistan. Chomani (2014) quoted “KNN, a TV network close to 
Gorran, reported on July 6 that [Nawsheerwan]66 “Mustafa believes Kurdish 
claims of independence should not only be based in rhetoric, but also on 
democratic, accountable and transparent rule”. It is true that democracy, reform 
and anti-corruption are all necessary for an independent nation; however, once 
the chance is gone, it might never come back. Thus, striving for democracy, 
human rights and positive governing demands should not stop the Kurds from 
utilising the available chance of having their own nation state. All parties 
                                                          
65Also, in the last congress in May 2016, the KIU reiterated the self-determination right for the 
people of Kurdistan in an independent national state of Kurdistan. 
66
Nawsheerwan Mustafa: the late leader of Change Movement (Gorran) died on 19
th
 May 2017.  
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nonetheless laude the ambition of the people of Kurdistan towards this goal. 
They all also believe in achieving this goal in peace, The Economist (2015) 
remarking: 
“If the landlocked Iraqi Kurds are to win statehood by peaceful means, 
plainly they must reach an accommodation with their neighbours. Their 
biggest new hope on this score is the transformation of their once 
scratchy relations with Turkey. Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister, 
emphasises friendship with Turkey and Masoud Barzani, the president, 
gets on well with RecepTayyipErdogan, Turkey‟s president. Annual 
bilateral trade now exceeds $8 billion and 100,000 Turks are reckoned to 
be working in Iraqi Kurdistan. They built the snazzy new airport in Erbil, 
where Americans and Europeans, among others, can enter without a 
visa. Turkey is easily the region‟s leading investor”. 
Convincing Iraq and Iran is the challenge faced by the Iraqi Kurds in terms of 
achieving their nation state peacefully. As for Syria, it is already suffering from 
its own troubles, and may not be able to control its own territories, even less 
having a say in the future of the Kurds and that of Kurdistan. It is understood by 
those who are supporting the idea of independency that Turkey will not oppose 
a nation state of the Kurds in northern Iraq; this is the only gateway for 
exporting Kurdistan‟s petrol, and furthering their bilateral business. As 
AkhbarAlaalam, 2014 reports “the oil of North Iraq [Kurdistan Region] suffices 
Turkey for 200 years” Furthermore, as Rudaw Net (2015a) quoted (Turkish I 
TV), Rajab TaibErdugan, the president of Turkey, stated “they will not oppose a 
nation state for the Kurds in Iraq, and scission of the Kurds from Iraq is an 
internal Iraqi affair”. Unlike Iraq and Iran, it is expected that the current Turkish 
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government will accept the situation of the Kurdistan region, as it has already 
accepted itself as a self-ruling region; whereas in the past, none of the Turkish 
governments were ready to accept any kind of development in Kurdistan. 
Nowadays, they want their own peace process to success and getting into any 
negative interference would further its own problem similar to that of the Kurdish 
issue. Stopping its peace process, and entering into new warfare with the 
Kurds, would ruin its economic growth and halt their strategic plans. Above all, 
they would lose potential business with the Kurds, which they are the number 
one beneficiary from.  
When it comes to the sectarian politics of the region, Turkey, again, wants the 
Kurds as majority Sunnis to its side. This political decision is also important in 
the rebalance of power between, Turkey and Iran on the one hand, and 
between Turkey and the Arab states on the other. Under the development of 
these politics in Syria, Iraq and recently Yemen, as well as the role of Iran in this 
politics, caused the Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and 
Saudi Arabia to reconsider their position on the Kurds and Kurdistan. On June 
4th 2015, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington saw talks 
between Maj. Gen. Anwar Eshqi from Saudi Arabia and Ambassador Dore Gold 
from Israel, the Saudi Maj. Gen. Eshqi, (2015) suggested “working toward the 
creation of a greater Kurdistan in peaceful ways as this will weaken Iranian, 
Turkish, and Iraqi ambitions and would split up a third of each of these countries 
in favour of Kurdistan”. It is left to the Kurdish politicians whether they act in a 
way by which they benefit from the situation, or hesitate again and miss the 
opportunity.   
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However, recent political tensions between the political parties in the region led 
to differences over the issue of referendum. When Barzani called the political 
parties for a meeting to assign a date for the referendum, two of the major 
political parties, Change Movement and Islamic Group, boycotted the meeting. 
Their reason for this was to reactivate the Parliament that has been suspended 
by the KDP since 2015, before any talks about a referendum. Nonetheless, all 
other political parties, including the PUK, had consensus on the issue and 
agreed to go for the referendum on 25 September 2017. (Chmaytelli, 2017). 
 
4.8 concluding Remarks: 
The political parties and Kurdish revolutions throughout the twentieth century, 
with the help of the international community and direct help from the USA, UK 
and France via the implementation of the no-fly-zone, became extremely fruitful. 
A free region in major parts of southern Kurdistan in 1991 was taken over by the 
Kurdish political parties. A year later, the Kurdish political entities ran a general 
election, and in the result, Kurdistan parliament and Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) were born. However, due to lack of administration 
experience and the struggle for power between the main two parties, which on 
the basis of a 50:50 shared power in the first decade of their governing 
experience, did not provide a good example of self-ruling.   
As mentioned in Chapter three, Islamism among the Kurds in southern 
Kurdistan goes back to the late 1940s and early 1950s of the last century. Due 
to many factors, among them the orientation of the Kurdish political parties, the 
Kurdish movement and lack of abilities the Kurdish Islamists were not able to 
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integrate into the revolution, in the words of Karwani (2014) “until early 1980s, 
could not expand”. Therefore, during these years, they remained politically 
unproductive. Once again, Karwani (2014) remarks:  
“…the [Islamic] trend during this era, due to a lack of clarity in its identity 
and characteristic as an independent entity, rarely had a written political 
framework. This was because of the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood 
thought and the era, which had given more preaching context to the 
trend. In other words, the Islamist Kurds, had more of identity rhetoric, 
and their thoughts generally revolved around slogans and the general 
concepts of trans-nationalism issues”.          
This was not only the case with the Kurdish Islamists, but also generally, as 
Esposito (2011:17) highlights "Although nationalists since the  1960s have 
called for a separation of national and religious identities, Islamists continue to 
support the notion of membership in the Ummah as the primary identity for all 
Muslims, rather than ethnic, linguistic, or geographic identities". It can be argued 
that since the 1990s, within the Islamic political parties, not yet the preaching 
groups, this notion has slowly become less believable. Noori (2015) states that 
"we want our Kurdish version of Islam". However, at an individual level and that 
of non-political actors, Islamic trans-nationalism is still a strong mobiliser. 
Therefore, when it is needed, it is used to mobilise the grassroots.  
The Kurdish Islamists too, in particular the KIU, had gone through the same 
political cycle; they stayed preaching, with no clear political vision, for decades. 
Eventually they found themselves in a political context, which made it difficult to 
stay at the same level of preaching and distancing themselves from politics. In 
order to protect the preaching, groups of the preachers had to establish a 
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political party, which required a political vision. This political vision, over the first 
few years, evolved into a complete religious nationalism. Religious nationalism 
is a complete nationalism, with a political concentration on the nation state, and 
concern about the religious dimension. This is the case with all the Islamic 
political parties in the Islamic world so that their political mission has evolves 
accordingly; in many cases, however, they deny this case. This denial either 
goes back to lack of political opportunity, i.e. not being in power, or, perhaps 
they are enjoying their nation statehood and do not identify with the feeling that 







Islam and the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter, I will argue that the KIU has evolved from a traditional Islamic 
pattern, caring about Islamic feelings more than anything else, to the level of a 
political party that is concentrating on regional needs, with reference to Islam. 
This argument will be based on the themes presented in the chapter. 
Conventionally, Islamic groups are sympathetic with the notions of Umma, 
Islamic caliphate, Shari‟ah, and so on, mainly looking at these concepts from a 
historical perspective. However, when the group turned into a political party, its 
political demands made it perceive them differently, in the best interests of its 
political demands. Accordingly, the experience of the KIU shows it is offering 
this kind of evolutionwithin the context of the Kurdistan region and its unique 
political needs and status quo.             
 
5.2 Universalised Islam (Umma): 
In order to examine the KIU's understanding of the concept of Islamic Umma, 
and its enthusiasm towards Kurdish nationalism, I asked the following question: 
“As a Kurdish Islamist or an Islamist Kurd if you prefer what do you think of the 
universalised Islam?”. The purpose of this question is to examine again whether 
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there is any preference between nationalism and Islamism by the leaders of the 
party, as well as to see how they look at the universalised Islam by examining 
whether they have a complete loyalty to Islam as an Umma with disregards to 
ethnicity (as is the case with some Islamists in transnational groups such as Al-
Qa'eda). The importance of this question is firstly to reiterate the answers from 
question one and to double-check the balance and loyalty towards the Kurdish 
nationality and Islamic religion by the party. Its importance secondly is to 
examine the policy of the KIU in regards to the theoretical background of the 
MB strategy, the revivalism of Islamic glory through restructuring the Muslim 
individual, the Muslim family, the Muslim society, the Muslim government, and 
the Islamic caliphate. Through obtaining the answer to this question, we will 
have the basis to testing the research question. This allows us to have a 
window into looking at the political thought and behaviour of the KIU and 
understanding their visions towards all other affairs, both religion and 
nationalism alike. It also helps to test other similar contemporary MB-inspired 
political parties' behaviours throughout the ME. Finally, it is important in order to 
see the differences between the KIU and other MB groups and political parties, 
since the Kurds are a nation without a state, whereas other MB groups and 
political parties have their own states and govern citizens with a state. 
Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answers the question as follows: 
“As far as I understood, Islam has few dimensions, such as the   
Universal dimension. Islam hasn't come to melt down  
the nations into a universal body. It has come to make   
partnership between the nations on the basis of being human beings. 
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 Also, it forms partnership between Muslims as followers of a religion,  
as they have shared worship in which they are partners.  
           Similarly, there is another circle which is the circle of the    
nations, another creation of God. Hence, it is God's 
decision to have all these different nations, as it has referred 
to by the following Quranic verse (49:13) “O mankind! We 
have created you from a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, 
the most honourable of you with Allah is that (believers) who 
has At-Taqwa [i.e. he is one of the Muttaqun (the pious. See V. 
            2: 2)]. Verily, Allah is All-Knowing, Well-Acquainted (with all things)”. 
            Thus, to know each other, then Quran asks us to cooperate with 
each other, where it says (5: 2) "....Help you one another in Al-Birr 
and  Al-Taqwa (virtue, righteousness and piety); but do not help  
one another in sin and transgression". 
Concentrating on various circles such as nationalism, universality of Islam and 
humankind as a whole is a new interpretation among Islamists. This links their 
world view to places beyond the traditional boundaries of the Islamic world 
which they used to define including the western world as former colonial 
powers. The importation of nationalism at the end of the Ottoman Empire by the 
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nationalists alone came from beyond traditional Islamic boundaries. As a result, 
the nationalism that came during the era of colonialism to the ME states was 
seen by the Islamists as a non-Islamic nationalism.  
However, this new vision of nationalism as explored by certain Islamists leads 
them to look differently at non-Islamist nationalists and the west. Therefore, 
looking at nationalism as a political product, which is for them is a realistic 
solution for living in peace with neighbouring Muslim nations as well as living in 
the international community with harmony and not as rivals, is a significant 
progress in Islamic political thought and behaviour. Furthermore, this is also a 
kind of liberalism which brings some progress for secularists and Islamists, as 
not being anymore under the influence of the conspiracy theory that the whole 
region, seculars and Islamists alike, was suffering from. It also highlights the 
rights of the nations among the Islamic Umma, bringing to it a new interpretation 
on the basis of partnership and cooperation and widening this cooperation 
beyond the Islamic Umma. This is a form of normalisation that has emerged 
over a century of experience.  
As the KIU is representing a nation that has been divided across other Muslim 
nation states, the example of the KIU is a chance to elaborate the details of 
connection between nationalism and Islam. Without the example of the KIU 
leading the way, other similar groups appear unlikely at this moment to state so 
clearly the connection between nationalism and Islam in the case of Kurdistan. 
This partnership comes with the equal rights for the affected nations, with the 
nationless state of Kurdistan surrounded by fully developed nation states - in 
the case of the Arabs, even more than a nation state. This leads to a lack of 
connection and equality between Kurds and their fellow Muslim nations, both in 
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the region and with other Muslim and non-Muslim countries through the world. 
This feeling, in certain extreme secular nationalist cases, has led to polar 
reactions, with some rejecting Islam as a suitable identity for Kurds, and others 
rejecting western policies, particularly after the downfall of the revolution in 
1975, when the United States of America left Kurdistan at the mercy of the 
agreement between Iraq and Iran.  
Abubakir Ali (2013) has made comments which have some relevance to this 
phenomenon: 
"Islam as a religion is above nationalism. This means that any attempts 
to subjugate Islam as a universal monotheistic religion to any particular 
nationalist will is a betraying to Islam. To some extent, some nationalists 
among the Arabs and the Persians have practiced this. Does this mean 
that we cannot produce an Islamic understanding of nationalism? No, 
because nationalism is a fact in the contemporary societies, holding 
influence on these societies. This fact has created crisis, aggrieve, and 
demands. Therefore, in the light of Islamic values, we can talk about 
nationalism, but not from the point of view of Islam itself. Islam itself 
holds the beginning of justice, the beginning of the rejection of injustice, 
and the beginning of equality between nations. It doesn't prefer a 
language to another one, or a race to another. All human beings are 
equal before God, with all their nationalist, linguistic and racial 
differences. As a result, we can talk about dealing with nationalism, and 
we can have Islamic movements with nationalist inclination. In the light of 
these Islamic values, Islamic values can to some extent be mingled with 
the nationalist values. Consequentially, Islamic movements with 
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nationalist backgrounds, or nationalist movements with Islamic 
backgrounds, come into existence, the KIU being one of those 
movements”. 
Recently, nationalists among the Arabs and Persians have been accused of 
using Islam for their nationalist purposes, such as the Iranian politics of Shia 
Islam in serving pan-Iranism.  This is similar to the situation facing Kurdish 
Islamists in regards to Islamists and nationalism. This way of thinking has 
enhanced the sense of nationalism in the KIU, helping the KIU to think 
differently about nationalism from an Islamic perspective. As a result, the KIU 
can be seen to be practicing the first working combination of Islam and 
nationalism, which attempts to fully understand the general principles of Islam, 
such as justice and combating injustice, as a core matter in addressing 
nationalism. The KIU elaborates on political issues using this methodology, and 
focuses on stability, justice and equal rights for every single nation, claiming 
that this understanding is based on Islamic principles which do not ask for a 
particular political form. This kind of understanding avoids mixing every single 
political issue into the circle of creed and worship, to the extent that some 
extremist political parties do, and therefore provides a better approach to 
consolidating religion with political modernity and the civil life. 
Salahaddin Babakir's thoughts are particularly interesting in relation to this 
(2012):  
“We believe that none of these concepts are contradicting each other. 
When God has created you in a particular geographical area, that called 
Kurdistan, and we are speaking Kurdish, then we are Kurds. This is the 
nationalism circle. There is another circle which is the circle of faith that, 
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with all other Muslim nations, comprises the Islamic world. Furthermore, 
in the circle of mankind, we are all partners in humanity. These circles 
are not contradicting each other. In Islam, everyone has his duties and 
rights in each of these circles. Therefore, in the circle of nationalism, 
Islam has given all rights to the nations. For the circle of the Islamic 
brotherhood, Islam has designated other duties and rights. Similarly, in 
the circle of the humanity, there are another set of duties for Muslims 
towards their fellow humankind”.  
Normally, Islamists adopt political points of view from their Islamic 
interpretations. Their political behaviours are therefore different according to 
their exact interpretations and religious practice. Therefore, the recognition of 
multiple dimensions of identity is a modern movement from transnational 
Islamic thought which denied national rights, and which classified the whole 
world on the basis of 'us' and 'them' in the manner that Aslan (2010) talks about 
in his book “How to win a Cosmic War”. This transformation of thought, as a 
moderate interpretation of Islam, shifts from the classification of the whole world 
as binary opposites of good and evil towards a multifaceted recognition of the 
nations within Islam, and all other entities worldwide. This is observed 
particularly in how the KIU had a neutral stand in the Islamic secular civil war in 
the 1990s, also with its condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, as well as all the 




5.3 Islamic Caliphate: 
As, previously mentioned, the Islamic caliphate in one form or another existed 
from the death of the prophet Muhammad up until 1924. As a result, for Muslims 
it became part of the fabric of Islam. As a result, after the abolishment of the 
caliphate in 1924 by the Kemalists in Turkey, there was a widespread and 
diverse reaction from the religious figures and clerics. Consequently, in 1928 
Hassan Al-Banna started the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The ultimate 
goal of the MB was to unite the Islamic land and revive the caliphate. However, 
nation states began to emerge over the twentieth century, and the change in the 
political map following the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was accepted by the 
people of the region. Within the Islamist movements, especially those formed 
political parties; they moved to become religious nationalists and accepted the 
new reality. These days, a caliphate for many Muslims is not a religious demand 
or a necessity, but in the past it served as the only form of governance. 
However, even during those eras and through different parts of the Islamic 
Empires, the caliphs had no real political power; they were only prayed for in the 
Friday prayers by the Imam as a symbol of the unity of the Muslim World.  
In order to discuss this issue with the KIU, I first asked the following question: 
“the MB's rhetoric theoretically refers to the strategy of restructuring the Muslim 
individual, family, society, government and the revival of the Islamic caliphate. 
What is your position according to this? Will there be a caliphate?” Amin (2012) 
answered as follows: 
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"We believe that Islam has not determined a specific form of governance, 
and that caliphate was just one form out of many forms. An Islamic 
caliphate attempts to unify the Muslim nations. It can be a unity between 
the Muslim States, with each of them having their own political identity. In 
this sense, they have a strategic union. This can be compared to the 
European Union, or NATO, where no one can call it a dictatorship, or a 
union against humanity and justice. In other words, the European Union 
doesn't mean the terrorisation of non-Europeans. Likewise, any kind of 
unity between Muslim nations does not necessarily mean the 
terrorisation of non-Muslim nations”. 
Amin (2012) continues his argument further: 
"Caliphate does not mean the control of all the Muslim States by a state; 
this never happens. If it were the demand of the people and for the sake 
of the common goods of all nations, such as in the example of the 
European Union, this would be a legitimate demand and would be 
possible. In this case, it should not necessarily be called a caliphate, as a 
caliphate was a historical and political system of ruling, rather than a 
religious form of governance. However, in Islam there is a value placed 
on the unity of the Muslim nation, which could be in any form or 
mechanism. The Islamic caliphate does not necessarily mean a unified 
state, but is rather the unity of the nations of Muslims. In reality, the 
Islamic caliphate never had a centralised state. There were Islamic 
federations, and the caliph was the symbol of the unity of the Muslims. 
Nowadays, we are not obliged to stand by a historical form; many nations 
are trying to collaborate to form different unities. These unities then help 
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to prevent war, as long as they are formed on the basis of justice and 
equality, rather than control and coercion”.  
Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered the above question as follows: 
"We prefer the education of individual, family and society [of the theory of 
the MB]. However, political issues and exercises of power are on-going 
variable issues in Islam. Whereas creed, worship and manners are non-
variables in Islam, statute and politics are all variables which vary 
depending on time and place. As a result, the Islamic caliphate was a 
human experiment, in a political form, which today we are not obliged to 
follow. The Islamic culture is a human experiment; we can take some of 
it, and abandon some of it, because it is not sacred in itself. Therefore, 
we adapt according to the human evolution cycle. We do not strive to 
return to the caliphate, and the states are built on the basis of nations. 
Hence, we have our own nation state on the basis of our nationality. As a 
result, the nation can be formed on the basis of shared interests, who 
can then create an organisation for the states of the region. Other than 
such an arrangement, we do not believe in the concept of a caliphate. 
And no one can install himself as a caliph and imposes his will on other 
nations. Right now in the United Nations, there are Muslim and non-
Muslim states, and there is no problem”. 
It seems from the existing evidence and from the opinions of KIU members that 
no one, save for utopians like the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (Levant) 
(ISIS), is calling for a caliphate. Instead, nationalism has been deepening, with 
each nation state developing itself. Within these nation states, despite the 
Islamic links, the behaviour of the Islamists is no different than that of the non-
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Islamists, insofar as all the religious and secular nationalists alike in each 
Muslim state are working for the good of their own nation state. Bawamurad 
(2012) answered the same question as follows: 
"Generally, the MB's way of thinking was a reflection of the 
circumstances that came to exist at that time. Following the attacks made 
by the colonialist states and the influence these exerted, new values 
came to exist within the Muslim societies. For many of the Muslim 
groups, among them the MB, many of these things which came to exist 
under the influence of those circumstances were alien to Muslim 
societies at the time. Therefore, as a reaction to the abolition of the 
Ottoman caliphate, the MB made the completion of the caliphate their 
objective. Following the division of the Ottoman legacy after the Cykes-
Pikot agreement, the MB knew it would be difficult to unite those 
territories into one entity; however, they proclaimed the formation of the 
caliphate as their objective, as at the time it was not possible for an 
Islamic group to work with no stance on this issue".  
In regards to the KIU and the issue of caliphate, some of the shorter answers 
included Bawamurad (2012): "The caliphate for us is a form of ruling as formed 
by Muslims through history, and it is in no way whatsoever a legitimate Islamic 
form of ruling to be obliged". Abubakir Ali (2012) answered: "There is no issue 
of the caliphate in our dictionary”. From many of these answers, the conclusion 
seems to be a total denial of even thinking about the caliphate among the 
leadership of the KIU. However, to test the understanding of their lower level 
members on this concept, I asked the following question:  “What about your 
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grassroots' vision regarding the caliphate? Do they look at this issue in the 
same way as you?”.Amin (2012) answered as follows: 
"No one in the KIU believes in enacting a caliphate in the modern day in 
the same manner as its historical form. There is not a single Muslim 
Brotherhood in the whole world today that believes in the concept of the 
caliphate in its historical form. In other words, there is no MB that 
believes in following the command of a single caliph, because neither in 
the past this was possible nor in today‟s reality this can be possible. 
Apart from the Tahreerparty, which have a traditional vision in regards to 
the Islamic caliphate, no single MB looks at the caliphate in such a way”. 
Abubakir Ali (2012) answered the same question as follows: 
"In the education of our members, we have always generalised our 
thoughts. In doing so, we know that this issue is not in the literature or 
thoughts of the party at all. There is no existence in our rhetoric of the 
caliphate. We consider this to be a historical form of ruling; instead, we 
now talk about the right of self-determination for the people of Kurdistan. 
We, as the KIU, talk about the self-determination of the people of 
Kurdistan to establish an independent state of Kurdistan. In the future, 
after the creation of the independent state of Kurdistan, if the people of 
the whole region - the Kurds, Arabs, Persians and other nations -  in a 
shared understanding came to the conclusion to create a modern form of 
cooperation, then it would be their rights to participate in this or not. This 
matter is left to the free will of future generations". 
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Therefore, the KIU realises that although the idea of the caliphate is not 
possible, the Kurdish national right has not yet even been granted. The KIU 
therefore supports being realistic in order to gain similar rights to the nations in 
the region as a nation state. For them, the caliphate is a historical and 
unachievable goal for which no nation can currently strive, as no nation has 
even reached the much lower standards of equality required to accept equal 
rights for Kurds as a state and a people alongside the many other nation states 
of the region.  
It is worth noting a limitation of my study in that when I conducted my interviews 
in the summer of 2012, there was no ISIL or ISIS at that time, and it would have 
been useful to gain the KIU's opinion on this. The emergence of ISIL and their 
call for the caliphate demonstrates the political failure of the region. ISIL came 
to exist and proclaim an Islamic caliphate in the shadow of the failure of the 
Arab spring. When the MB in Egypt came to power following an election, a coup 
erupted which ousted their elected president and led to the mass murder of the 
party's members in the streets of Cairo. This offered an opportunity to the 
extremists to claim that this disproved the concepts of democracy, and that it is 
a delusion that Muslims could possibly come to power through peaceful means. 
As a result, Jihadism and terrorism became a forefront tactic; strengthened by 
how many Sunnis in Iraq under the sectarianism gave a blind eye to the ISIL 
controlling their territories in Sunni Iraq. As a result, ISIL formed a radical call for 
the caliphate over the Muslims territories, and called for all Muslims to focus 
their loyalty on their caliph, hoping not to control just Iraq and Levant but to rule 




5.4 Muslim Brotherhood: 
The advantages and disadvantages of having a relationship with the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) is widely argued. Hearing from the KIU in regards to this kind 
of relationship was crucial for my interview. When questioned about the KIU‟s 
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, Burhan Ahmad (2012) answered as follows: 
"We have benefited from the MB as a school of moderatism. We also 
benefit from the experiments of other people, too. We observe 
experiments from all around the world. We even study the European 
political parties, and wherever we find a good example - after taking our 
nation and people's characteristics into account - we can apply those 
techniques to our mission. As an Islamic party, we profess moderatism, 
and the MB is one of those parties that support us in creating this circle 
of moderatism. Also, the MB, as well as  others,  favour us considerably 
on our stances regarding freedom, political participation, practicing 
democracy, the role of women, respecting coexistence, providing justice, 
and more. However, we mainly prioritise the needs of our society. Since 
we have emerged out of our community, and our community is suffering 
from many problems, we strive to resolve its issues and stop its suffering. 
This is one aspect of our party that makes us stand out from the rest. 
However, as social democrats all over the world share similarities in 
some of their beliefs, we generally share similarities with moderate 
Islamists, and particularly with the MB, especially where moderatism is 
concerned. Otherwise, the highest authority in the KIU is the congress, 
the leadership committee follows after, and ranking last is the politburo, 
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which makes crucial decisions. Beneath these positions, we have a 
flexible decentralised system in which the local committees have their 
own roles. Therefore, wherever anything is compatible with our 
strategies, we accept it, just as we are free to reject anything that is 
incompatible with our experiment”.   
Salahaddin Bahaddin, (2012) who is a veteran MB, the first leader and founder 
of the KIU who witnessed all the transformations, remarked on the issue as 
follows: 
"Now, we cannot say that those who were taught the Muslim 
Brotherhood's education are still Brotherhood in the same sense that 
past MB was. Before anything, in the past, the political question did not 
exist. There was only the issue of preaching, and preaching is the same 
anywhere; geography doesn't affect it. However, when a political issue 
comes to the forefront, the political parties, with reference to the MB, 
cannot all have one objective, because the political agenda of any state 
is different than another. There will always be differences. For that, the 
MB political parties, in terms of thought processes and preaching 
methods are similar, but in terms of political projects are different. For 
instance, most MB political parties can agree on moderatism in thoughts 
and practice. Hence, there is only a kind of solidarity in the work style. 
Otherwise, for instance, in regards to an issue like Kirkuk, the Iraqi 
Islamic Party's position is like that of (Allawi)67, whereas our position is 
like the KDP and PUK. Perhaps sometimes these similarities and this 
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 (Iyad Allawi: a secular Iraqi politician and head of the Iraqiya bloc, previously served as Iraq‟s interim 
prime minister following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. His electoral bloc won the largest 




kind of relationship have an influence on party ranking and how different 
parties interact with one another. However, there are unwavering 
nationalists. Hence, each of these Islamic parties is a nationalistic 
political party that stands for the benefit of their people and states, but 
with an Islamic standpoint. They bear similarities with secular parties 
which do the same thing". 
Merging a religious group into politics is triggering a rippling wave of nationalism 
in the Middle East. Simply, because the general trend of the politics in the entire 
region is nationalism. However, this nationalism is not necessarily going to call 
for leaving Islamism. It is more the question of political behaviour and 
evolvement. We saw in chapter one how this evolvement started from the 
1990s onward.  Sometimes, those political leaders had to use their powers in 
critical situations and could not ignore major issues. The MB Kuwaitis during the 
Iraqi invasion and the Kurdish case in Kurdistan region left no room for doubt in 
this regard. Whenever an Islamic group denies their problems, it has either not 
taken politics seriously, especially if the group has stayed away from regional 
conflicts, or they may have no national threats. These parties do not wish to live 
in denial of any issues they face, but it may be because they lack experience in 
such situations of dire problems. 
Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows: 
"Our relationship with the MB is that historically, we were under the 
influence of their thought. Afterward, we reached a point where we 
benefited from all Islamic thought experiences. Now, we benefit from all 
the Islamic and non-Islamic successful political ideologies of the world. 
We can say that, in the same way that social democrats around the 
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globe are a patriotic entity in their own countries, and because they share 
similar ideologies, they are all in an international framework of social 
democrats joined together as one entity.  We have such a relationship. 
We are a Kurdistani entity, we defend the interests of Kurdistan, and in 
our recent congress [sixth congress took place in May 2012], we adopted 
self-determination as our party's strategy".  
Indeed, there is a crucial difference between the social democrats and the MBs. 
Amongst social democrats, there is no issue of nationalism, since the majority 
of them seem to be against the idea of one single, representative nation; this 
may be in hopes of remaining united. However, for the MB, and particularly their 
vision towards the Kurdish case, they haven‟t yet recognised the rights of the 
Kurdish people as an issue of people who must have their own nation state 
equally to all the nation states in the region. This may be a similar thinking to 
that of the Arab nationalists when they consider the possibility of a proclamation 
for a nation state by the Kurds as further fragmentation to the Arab world. In 
some other extreme examples, they even regard that possibility as the 
emergence of another Israel in the region. This is why many of the MBs do not 
speak out often when it comes to the self-determination of Kurdistan and the 
stance of the KIU in that regards; they accuse it of being a nationalist goal, and 
KIU members, as Islamists, shouldn‟t have nationalistic feelings. While they; the 
non-Kurd MB all share the same feelings towards their own nations, the only 
difference is that, they don‟t need to express it, because their nation states 
already securely exist, and so nationalism is not on their political agenda. 
However, the only similar case to the Kurdish is the case of Palestine and 
Hamas, where they are too deprived from an independent nation state, which all 




The more the Islamists step into politics, whether they are Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliated or not, the more politically realistic they become to the modern nation 
states. Therefore, for some, it is confusing to be Islamists and nationalistic at 
the same time, as it has been noted by some observers. Nafi (2016: 10) 
remarks that “in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with the Islamists‟ inability to 
grasp the nature of the modern state, created confusion about the Islamists 
phenomenon and its trajectory”. Hence, this kind of route by all the Muslim 
Brotherhood political parties now becomes clearer, more than at any other time 
in the past. The MBs of Kuwait are good Kuwaitis, and this nationalism path 
came to the forefront when Kuwait, as an entity, was under invasion. Similarly, 
in the Kurdish case, the KIU stands for Kurdish nationalism more than any other 
MB elsewhere, with no problem in Kurdistan. This stand, for some, is a new 
trajectory among the Islamists.  
 
5.5 Sacredness: 
Despite that in Islamic literature it is believed that no human is sacred, many of 
the religious leaders and figures are hailed as holy persons. This is not 
necessarily because those leaders themselves declared themselves to be holy; 
their followers played in role in praising their leaders. Not only the religious 
leaders, but also almost all the Shaikh orders, and many other preachers have 
been labelled as holy persons. This was a major issue in Islamic reform. One of 
the reasons for the leaders to keep quiet and enjoy their new statuses was to 
give no room for any political opponents. This is why whenever we hear about 
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reforms, taking the opposition into consideration is necessary, and checks and 
balances are essential. To shed light onto this issue in the KIU, I questioned 
both the former and the current Secretary General (SG) of the KIU about it. 
More specifically, I asked the current SG the following question: "As the 
Secretary General, how do you deal with criticism? Do you, as the most 
important person of this party, have any kind of religious immunity to protect you 
from criticism?”. Muhammad Faraj, (2012) answered as follows: 
"Since we in the KIU have decided that an election is one of our most 
important mechanisms, it is up to our members to elect people. Elections 
are used both in our party and for the Kurdish people. For instance, when 
the people elect members of parliament, then that is legitimacy, and it is 
so in the party. This does not mean that those who were elected have 
religiously been elected, because we believe that the positions in 
government aren't divine; they have been given by the people. Those 
people who trust in you, they will elect you for a limited period, and when 
the period is finished, then you have no mandate. In the KIU, there is no 
sacredness for the highest ranking person or any other persons”.  
To the former SG, I also asked, "Is there any religion immunity for the Islamist 
leaders, in a sense that they have a sanctity that prevents them from criticism?" 
Bahaddin (2012) answered as follows: 
"Certainly, there is no such a thing, because, before anything, the leader 
is not infallible. Even the prophets were infallible in their prophecy and 
their message. However, in practicing their leadership, they were not 
infallible. In the biography of the prophet, it is clear that he did not know 
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how to fecundate palm68. Hence his command, in that aspect, was not an 
infallible. If this is the case with the prophet, which in few places was 
criticised in Qur'an, how could other people not make mistakes without 
criticism? However, this sacredness that was invented by people for their 
rulers was falsely linked to religion. At the same time, we have to 
differentiate between sanctification and appreciation, or respect".  
Apart from the political and religious leaders, especially when the sentiment of 
nationalism came to exist, the idea of sacred people and sacred land started to 
grow. To assess the KIU in this regard, I asked, "Some of the theorists, among 
them Anthony D. Smith, talk about the sacred dimensions of nationalism. What 
is sacred for you, and what is not?” Faraj (2012) answered:  
"We, as a political party with Islamic reference, feel that these issues are 
clearly identified in the Qur'an. When people had questions about the 
prophet, the Qur'an immediately reminded them, and tells the prophet to 
tell them, that Quran (18:110) "Say I am only a mortal like you, (except 
that) it is (divinely) revealed to me that....". If sometimes, there were 
disputes between two persons, they would say that this is the prophet 
[Muhammad], and he knows who is wrong. He [the prophet] would in 
return say, “No, I am a man like you, don't try to deceive me and make 
me judge for your favour”. Thus, even the prophet himself did not desire 
to be recognised as sacred or to be called „knowing the unseen‟. 
                                                          
68
 After arriving in Medina, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) passed by some people who 
were fecundating some date palms, so he asked them what they were doing. When they told him, he said, 
“I don‟t think that will provide any benefit,” or in another narration, “It would be better if you didn‟t‟t do 
that.”So they refrained from doing it, and that year the crop was not as good. They mentioned it to him 
(peace and blessings be upon him), and he replied:“I am only a human: if I command you to do 
something in your religion, then take it; but if I tell you to do something based on personal opinion, then 
[realize] that I am only human,” and in another narration, “Yet if I inform you of something from Allah, 
then do it, for indeed I will never convey an untruth on behalf of Allah Mighty and Majestic,” and in yet 
another narration, “You know better of your worldly affairs.”  
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However, this does not mean that he was not deserving of the utmost 
respect. Some scholars say that if the prophet  as a judge had 
established a certain decree, but later on [in a time after the death of 
prophet] different judge preferred another decree of the prophet was not 
the best one for that day, he could refute the prophet's decree. However, 
for issues detailed in the prophecy, we cannot do so, especially in 
regards to the issues of creed and worshiping. This also goes for all 
other concerns. Sacredness is only for God, and for those commands 
that were revealed to the prophet. At the cost of the humanity, no place, 
time, or anything else is sacred. However, this does not mean not to 
respect these things. I have to respect and love my nation, and strive for 
its independence. This does not mean I have to prefer any person from 
my nation to good individuals of the other nations".   
This is an important issue, which Islamists are in progress to resolve. 
Otherwise, no reform and no progress are possible. The importance of this 
issue comes from the point that it is religiously theorised for, and it is a step 




Implementing Shari‟ah is one of the ongoing controversial issues among 
Islamist parties. For many Islamists, whoever calls for implementing Shari‟ah 
law is considered a real Islamist, whereas seculars consider these to be 
fundamentalists. However, what the concept of Shari‟ah means to them is the 
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real issue that must be unveiled in order to understand exactly what those 
Islamists want. For example, for many people, when the word Shari‟ah is 
mentioned, the penal codes come to mind. To understand how the KIU 
perceives Shari'ah, I asked the following question: “how do you understand 
Shari'ah and how do you practice it?” Babakir (2012) answered as follows: 
"We generally understand that in Islam, when we talk about legislation, 
state running and politics, Shari'ah is meant to symbolise the objectives 
[of Islam], rather than the implementation of a kind of law or 
jurisprudence. The Qur'an and Sunnah demand from Muslims to 
implement justice when they are ruling. Therefore, implementing justice 
is the objective of Islam. As for how to implement it, these are the details 
left for human minds to solve. What Islam wants is to implement justice in 
ruling. How this justice is done, this is left for the humans themselves. 
This has nothing to do with the system's name, because even in the 
name of Islam, when justice was not implemented, Islam does not accept 
it. However, as long as justice is implemented under any other name, 
that is then an Islamic ruling".  
Bawamurad (2012) commented on this issue as so: 
"We think that every good deed in this life is Shari'ah, and all the good 
deeds of this Universe are from God and are legitimate too. Otherwise, 
we do not think that implementing a kind of jurisprudence is Shari'ah. 
This is a law-making process formed by the representatives of the people 
in the legislative authority”. 
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In a lecture presented by Bawamurad (2012) in the University of Human 
Development in Sulaimani, he stated that “the KIU in no document or a formal 
statement has mentioned that it would implement Shari‟ah”. This was a trigger 
for a wave of media propaganda against Bawamurad and his party by other 
Islamists. This difficulty in understanding the concept of Shari‟ah and Islam itself 
is leading to problematic systems of governance, such as what can be seen in 
Turkey with the AK party, with Syria and ISIL, or with the Taliban form of ruling.  
Ramadan (2013) comments on this point: 
“I do not define Shari'ah as a legal corpus of Islamic law. For me, in the 
Quran, Shari'ah is defined as “the way”. The most important thing for me 
is the objectives of the law such as justice and equality. To be faithful to 
these objectives is to truly be within Shariah”.   
Hence, looking at Shari‟ah from the objective of justice in Islam is different than 
concentrating on implementing an Islamic jurisprudent out of context. From this 
perspective, Islam does not need to forcefully implement any kind of 
jurisprudence if it does not lead to justice. For instance, if non-Muslims are not 
convinced to follow Islam itself, it is contradictory to the Quranic principle (2: 
256) “there is no compulsion in religion” to make him or her forcefully follow 
Islam. Furthermore, the personal choices made by individuals must also allow 
some degree of freedom, such as a Muslim‟s choice on whether she should or 
should not wear Hijab. Here, it must be considered whether it is part of Shari‟ah 
to make her wear it by force. The question of personal choice within religion is 
something I wanted to ask the KIU. In regards to the Hijab, and whether it is to 
be imposed by the KIU if they were a ruling party, similar to that imposed by 
225 
 
Iran and Afghani Taliban, Bayan Ahmad (2012) a female politburo member and 
member of Kurdistan parliament, answered as follows: 
"This kind of thinking is unauthentic, because clothing is a part of 
individual‟s freedom, and no one has the right to interfere in it. Everyone 
is free to wear whatever she wants. This is related to the individuals and 
their belief and freedom, and must not be imposed on anyone. This issue 
is like the religion of Islam itself, which cannot be imposed on anyone. 
The Qur'an says “there is no compulsion in religion”, meaning no belief 
can be imposed on anyone; likewise, no one can impose an item of 
clothing on him/her. Right now, we have many friends with whom we 
have a good relationship, and who respect each other. Even in the 
elections they vote for us. However, they are free to choose their clothing 
and free in the way they dress".  
In the following answer by Pa (n. d) Fiqh is mentioned, which is what many of 
the more extreme Islamists refer to rather than Shari‟ah: 
“Jurists define it as 'the science of the derived legal rules as acquired 
from their particular sources'. Let us take this definition in detail. Fiqh is a 
„science‟. It is true that jurists used the word science to mean 
comprehension or knowledge; they [with] no doubt studied fiqh as [a] 
specific subject with specific principles, so we can conclude that they 
considered it a science in modern sense. However, some legal writers 
are reluctant to denominate it so because it is often coloured with social 




The danger is that a specific fiqh which can be well fitted for a given society 
may not necessarily work with another. Take, for instance, the Wahabi fiqh, 
which is no problem for a tribal society like that of Saudi Arabia. However, it 
would never work in a society like that of Turkey. This is what is referred to as 
the Shari‟ah, in a sense that its objective is justice. The Wahabi fiqh that is 
accepted by the tribal society in Saudi (including the majority of women), but 
which bans women from driving, does not fulfil the justice inherent in Shari‟ah; 
furthermore, it would not work in the liberal society of Turkey. Therefore, when 
we talk about the general practice of Shari‟ah, we actually talk about Islam itself 
in a societal context. This understanding of the nature of the society and the 
implementation of the justice of Islam is the process of fiqh as understood by 
the jurists. In other words, in Islam or Shari‟ah, there is always fiqh in 
accordance with the need and the nature of the society, and the justice comes 
from how that fiqh is fulfilling the need of that particular society. 
 
5.7 Preaching and Politics: 
Any political party evolves over time, and its vision towards various political 
aspects will therefore vary from time to time. In the case of Islamic political 
parties, when they move from being a preaching group into the political arena, 
this change is clearly noticed. A preaching group has only one task; the 
religious mission. In comparison, an Islamic political party's task is to improve all 
the aspects of the nation, including religion, as well as maintaining the regional 




As a result, it was expected that the KIU over the past few years would go 
through tumultuous debate over the performance and functionality of its 
preaching and politics. Traditionally, it is hypothesised by Islamists that in Islam 
politics is a component of the Islamic system. However, in a democratic context 
where there are many political parties coexisting, with each of them claiming to 
be the true or best stream of Islam, then it is necessary to see that politics is 
focused more on variable daily issues than religion. Therefore, the question 
should be who has the better politics, not who has the better version of Islam. In 
such a context, the issue surrounding separating politics and preaching comes 
to the surface. To discuss this issue with the KIU, I asked the following 
question: “How are the debates on separating preaching from politics within the 
KIU?” Abubakir Ali (2012) answered as follows: 
"This question is warmly discussed within the KIU. This question is not 
unique to the KIU, but it is a question related to all the Islamic political 
parties of the Islamic world. This is especially true in the Middle East, 
particularly those countries historically under the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In many states where political parties are established, 
preaching has remained in the framework of the movement. These 
discussions are currently ongoing within the KIU. This is because a 
preaching group considers being Muslim as the base for affiliation, and a 
political party must consider citizenship as the base for the affiliation. A 
political approach must be presented to all the citizens, and those 
citizens who believe in this political approach should have access to be 
affiliated to the political party. In the KIU, there is a group, myself 
included, calling for transforming the party into a democratic 
Conservative party with an Islamic background, rather than a preaching 
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Islamic group. In other words, the mission of this group is that all those in 
Kurdistan who believe in our party, regardless of religion, should be able 
to work towards the shared objective that we all believe in".  
In regards to the political development of the KIU, Bawamurad (2012) 
commented as follows: "If we go back to the beginning of the establishment of 
the KIU, its first manifesto clarified that it had been established as a political 
party:  
To avoid being banned. 
To be an official body for preaching. 
To distinguish this group from other groups”. 
In regards to this question, the Secretary General Bahaddin (2012) added: 
"Firstly, it was for reorganising the preaching body, which at that time was 
fragmented. Secondly, it was to have a political addition to the [political arena of 
Kurdistan] through utilising historical thought".  
Therefore, preserving the act of preaching had a pivotal role right from the 
moment of forming the KIU. The ongoing political demands in the region helped 
to advance the KIU from being a preaching group alone into a both political and 
religious group. The political group was formed in order to preserve its 
preaching whilst avoiding the influence of the Islamic Movement in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (IMIK), which at that time relied on arm struggle and since 1992, had 
occasionally been involved in armed conflict with the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). The preaching elites within the Kurdish MBs took advantage 
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of the political party law69 that was issued by the parliament of the region to 
announce a political party. This was a timely and important decision for the KIU 
to make at this time in order to further its preaching and gain independence. 
Since the KIU grew over the course of the years, with participation and 
influence throughout the region, Iraqi and local elections, its politics gradually 
developed. The political demand of the region hugely expanded, particularly 
from 2003 onwards. As all of the veteran members of the KIU were originally 
preachers, and they all found themselves becoming busy with the day to day 
organisational and political affairs, the party couldn‟t maintain the same level of 
preaching under these new circumstances. Alongside this, the entirety of Iraq 
was opened up, particularly in the newly liberated territories and cities where 
there were similar circumstances to 1991-1992 in the Kurdistan region, meaning 
that demands for preaching highly increased. This meant the KIU had to assess 
its abilities in regards to this, and realise that it was not possible for the party to 
contain the situation in the same way as it did previously in 1991-1992. 
Henceforth, the issue was raised of how best to keep or separate preaching and 
politics. At the same time as this, a number of nationalities and ethnicities came 
to the forefront in Kurdistan's newly liberated cities, which challenged the 
expansion of the KIU. For example, in Kirkuk, Khanaqeen and Baghdad, 
different Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen ethnicities began to form grassroots action. 
During this period, many of the leading members of the KIU according to Amin 
(2012) formed the Turkmen Justice Party. Therefore, the maintenance and 
expansion of the KIU as a Kurdish political party and a preaching group became 
increasingly problematic.        
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This kind of debate and action of separating preaching from politics will be 
faced by all similar political parties in time. For instance, the Tunisian Ennahda 
movement, since its establishment in the 1980s until the Tunisian revolution, 
had no problem in thinking about this partition. However, the revolution and the 
demand for political contest made it think seriously about the separation, and in 
2016 made a decision in this regard. Affan (2016: 1) states that “at its tenth 
national congress, the Ennahda movement declared that they would separate 
„politics‟ from „preaching‟ and to transform itself into a national democratic 
party”. The ratio of votes in favour of the decision was reported by Souli (2016) 
“in an electronic vote, 93.5 percent of delegates voted in favour of separating 
the party's religious and political activities”.     
Another issue that the KIU had to face in the new Iraq after 2003, it had to exist 
alongside two non-militia Kurdish Islamic parties. Under the new circumstances, 
these parties withdrew from armed struggle and adopted a similar form of 
political struggle as adopted by the KIU. These parties are the Kurdistan Islamic 
Group (Komali Islami) (KIK), and the new IMIK. Aladdin (2014) highlights that 
"As a competitive political party, KIU had to keep an eye on its Islamist 
competitors Komall [KIK], and Bizutnawa [IMIK]". Amin (2012) remarks on this 
debate as follows: 
"I can say that the KIU is at a transitional stage in determining its identity. 
At this transitional stage, if the KIU could polarise both poles [preachers 
and politicians], and successfully keep the balance between them and 
satisfy both sides, then it can survive as a party. On the one hand, it 
needs to have a strong educational and preaching performance that 
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could assure the cadres of the Islamic movement [the preachers]. On the 
other hand, it has to assure the Islamist cadres' activists and its voters 
that the KIU could truly represent their political demands. Therefore, both 
sides will accept it, and whatever identity it might have, as long as it 
performs the political demands in a positive way”.  
Alongside these two Islamist political parties, which are the current preaching 
competitors holding the KIU back from concluding the issue of separating 
preaching and politics, the sudden appearance of the Change (Gorran) 
movement in 2009 posed a threat to its political advancement.  
Overall, from 2003 to 2009, due to few attempts for political reform that may 
have positioned the KIU as politically advanced, the internal demand within the 
party for the separation of preaching and politics seems to have never reached 
the required level. If it had, the party's position on this would be much clearer, 
with a far better separation between these two at times disparate and conflicting 
poles. 
 
5.8 Muslim-Muslim Conflicts and Rights: 
In order to test how deep the issue of national rights is within the KIU, 
particularly in the case of conflicts with other Muslim nations on Kurdish land 
such as Kirkuk, I asked the following question: “How do you deal with the 
question of Kirkuk? How would you feel if you, as Muslim Kurds, gave up Kirkuk 
to the Brother Arab Muslims, in order to avoid further bloodshed and tensions?”. 
The purpose of this question was to evaluate the level of nationalism within the 
KIU, especially in terms of the issue of Kirkuk, and the tension between the 
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Kurds on one side and the non-Kurds in Iraq such as Islamists on the other 
side. This question has importance in two different ways. Firstly, it tests the 
extent of nationalism in the KIU and its support of the Kurdish movement. 
Secondly, it tests the loyalty of this nationalism when faced with arising tension 
between non-Islamist Kurds and non-Kurd Islamists. By answering this 
question, we will understand the type of policy that the KIU adopts in regards to 
both nationalism and religion. Consequently this will help to test their political 
project as well as the extent of the support given or hindrance suffered by the 
KIU in regards to Kurdish nationalism. Through this, it is possible to see how the 
KIU approaches the issue of rights, and whether it is for themselves as a nation 
or for others.  
Muthana Amin (2012) answered this question as follows: 
"In our understanding, rights have nothing to do with brotherhood, or 
non-brotherhood. For instance, I refer to the question of nationalism as 
the question of inheritance. I say, when God has divided the inheritance 
between brothers and sisters, God himself has divided the rights of 
everyone, from the brothers, sisters and the mother. Why? This is to 
avoid them from being angered by one another. To avoid mixing their 
rights, that would lead to political and nationalist conflicts, and 
consequently to bloodshed. When a nation occupies another nation, and 
disregards its rights, this is like a big brother who controls the 
inheritance. Then he tells his brothers and sisters, let's keep our 
brotherhood, let's keep this house united, I am your brother, and I will be 
serving you instead of our father. This is deceiving. Then, the brothers 
and sisters must not say that our brother is right, unless they are foolish. 
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We, the Islamists, neither are the oppressor brother, who keeps the keys 
in his pocket and oppresses the brothers and sisters, nor the foolish 
brother. Therefore, when between brothers and sisters from the same 
parents, the rights are divided on them by God. On this earth too, the 
rights must be given back to their owners. Afterwards, they can for the 
sake of brotherhood give their rights to us, which never happens! For 
that, we, the Islamists, are not the foolish brother, to give up our rights, in 
the name of brotherhood".  
From this example and explanation, it is difficult to see any difference between 
a nationalist and the understanding of national rights among the Muslim nations 
by an Islamist. On a number of occasions, the KIU have been accused of being 
loyal to the Muslim Brothers and to the Arabs. In the general election of 2005, 
when the KIU decided to run alone for Iraqi parliament, the nationalist parties 
accused them of being anti-Kurds, Arab loyalists and even of not being Kurds, 
due to them not taking part in the Kurdistan coalition. Consequently, in many 
areas, including the whole governorate of Duhok and the districts of Duhok, 
Zakho, Sumail, Akre, Amedi, and Shaqlawa in the Erbil governorate, all of the 
KIU offices and media stations were burnt down, and five of their members 
were killed, including a politburo member. However, this did not lead to a large 
reaction by the KIU. According to many political statements and stances, the 
KIU continued working side by side of other Kurdish nationalists, defending the 
rights of Kurdistan in the Iraqi parliament. The rhetoric and practice of the KIU 
therefore shows their belief and work for the national rights of Kurdistan.  
The issue of defending Kirkuk, as well as other disputed conflict areas between 
the Kurds and the Iraqi government, has become the symbol of nationalism 
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among the Kurds. For example, the disagreement between the Kurdish 
revolution and the Iraqi government in 1974 was over this issue. Although the 
KIU did not exist at this time, in today's Kurdish politics, being an Islamic party, 
its stance in this regard is very important. This is particularly important because, 
in the rest of Iraq, Islamists predominantly control the political arena. The tie of 
Islam which connects Kurds to Arabs has not influenced Islamists to have a 
different vision to that of the Baathists. The Baathists originally claimed that the 
affected areas were Iraqi lands, which did not belong in any way to the 
fabricated autonomy area. In this new Iraq, the Iraqi Islamists and non-Islamists 
behave in a similar way. This is despite the fact that in the new Iraqi 
constitution, there is a new article, Article 140, which deals with this issue. 
Nonetheless, there is continued pressure to deactivate this article. The question 
of Kirkuk has therefore become a beacon for the Kurds of national rights. 
Examining other political parties against this beacon demonstrates the nature 
and the extent of nationalism within the KIU. 
Despite this on-going situation, the same participant Amin (2012) elaborates on 
the issue of rights as follows: 
"Philosophically, sometimes, values contradict interests. When you have 
an interest for yourself or your nation, sometimes you are in line with 
values, and other times you are not. For instance, when there is a piece 
of land which belongs to another country and your country wants to 
occupy it. At this moment, you are between two options, between the 
value of justice, and the insistence on the interest of your nation to 
occupy the land. Here, if you are only a nationalist, and not taking values 
into account, you would support your nation, even when it is wrong. 
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Therefore, our understanding of the nationalist question has to be in line 
with the concepts of rights and justice. Then, these concepts of rights 
and justice are Islamic values. At the same time, they are international, 
democratic, human rights and modern life values. These values have not 
only been mentioned in religion, but also have been mentioned in 
international laws, democracy and human philosophies too. When a right 
contradicts these values, then you must not be with your nation. 
Otherwise, you are then a chauvinist person." 
When examining many nationalists in the region, as well as across the world, 
we find this assessment an accurate match of them. Furthermore, opportunistic 
approaches by politicians lead to a public impression that politics generally 
operates in this manner; concepts such as rights and justice are not commonly 
discussed, unless they are used by oppressed groups like the Kurds. As Kurds 
continue to suffer from injustice and the denial of their rights, a positive form of 
nationalism is emerging in regards to their rights in Kirkuk. One question 
regarding this is whether the KIU only talks as an Islamic party on these issues 
while their rights as Kurds have been forgotten by Iraqis, or whether they would 
still talk about these issues if they were in the more fortunate position of their 
fellow Islamists in central Iraq. However, for now, this position would question 
the stance of other Islamists in Iraq. It would also heighten eagerness 
surrounding national issues, particularly if they consider themselves right and 
the other side being wrong. As a result, this makes the Kurdish Islamists like the 
KIU to feel how other Islamists are nationalists, even without any kind of 
admitting, even with the oppression policies of their governments towards other 
peoples like Kurds. They consider that they should be proud with their people's 
right, and that it is their religious duty to defend such a right.  
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Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2012) answers this question as follows: 
"We could look at this question from a few perspectives:  
Firstly, from a justice perspective, we could look at justice from the 
framework of the current circumstances, which have been created by the 
new nation states.  
Secondly, from the historical oppression perspective from which the 
Kurds have suffered. 
 Thirdly, from the perspective of the solution of the Kurdish issue in Iraq.    
From the legal, justice perspective, according to much accumulated 
historical and geographical evidence, Kirkuk is a natural part of the 
Kurdistan region's territory. Then as well as now, the criterion of nation 
state building around us is the land, language, nation, national identity, 
and states  are formed on these bases, therefore it is the right of the 
people of Kurdistan to claim back those territories. During the Ottoman 
era, Kirkuk was the capital city of the province of Sharazoor. The 
surrounding area, during the establishment of the Iraqi state, used to be 
called southern Kurdistan. Southern Kurdistan became linked to Iraq due 
to colonial interests in the area and to keep the balance of sectarianism 
in Iraq, which was again in the interest of British to maintain Iraq in the 
way they wanted”.  
The city of Kirkuk symbolises great oppression; thousands of families from 
Kirkuk have been displaced because of their Kurdish nationality, with their 
assets controlled and confiscated. Now, these families must go back to their 
homes and their assets must be returned to them. This then is the removal of 
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the historical oppression, and returning justice. Kurdish revolutions have many 
times collapsed on the question of Kirkuk. People of Kurdistan consider Kirkuk 
as a non-detached part of their land; Kirkuk has become a symbol of removed 
identity and human dignity, as well as Kurdish nationalism. Without resolving 
the question of Kirkuk, the issue of Kurds in Iraq cannot be resolved, and 
therefore the fear of the continuation of historical oppression will continue, 
leading to instability in Kurdistan, Iraq and throughout the ME. 
Through these three perspectives, we concentrate on returning Kirkuk and all 
other detached areas to the Kurdistan region. This is aimed to take place 
through peaceful methods by implementing article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. 
Through a referendum by the people of these areas, it will be determined 
whether they want to return to the Kurdistan region, or if they want to remain as 
a part of Iraq. This answer explains in some detail the three perspectives of 
justice, historical oppression and the importance of a solution for the sake of 
stability in Kurdistan, Iraq and the ME. It demonstrates a clear political vision not 
only for the solution of the Kirkuk issue, but also for the issue of Kurds within 
Iraq as well as in Turkey, Syria and Iran. In the recent negotiations and 
ceasefire between the AK party and the PKK, both sides demonstrated their 
desire for a peaceful solution that helps to end decades of conflicts, and that 
leads to economic, social and political prosperity for their country. As a result, 
the general trend of policy in the region is towards a peaceful manner of politics. 
In my interview with the deputy secretary general of the party, with an interest in 
ensuring the prolongation of the peaceful struggle and the belief in this by the 
party, I asked several times “what if they wouldn't accept these peaceful 
solutions, and started war against you?”. In his responses, it was never once 
mentioned that we should then revert to war. Although looking forward to a time 
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where these geographical areas belonged to the people of Kurdistan, the 
deputy secretary general considered the Kurds to not want war, and therefore it 
would be necessary to patiently rely on discussion and dialogue, despite this 
taking longer. 
With the last century's Muslim-Muslim conflicts over territories, and the 
continuing denied rights of existence for the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and 
Syria, the potential of conflict still exists. In light of this, the KIU leaders continue 
to insist that national right is a matter of justice and that any nation should be 
equal to their fellow Muslim nations. To address this, the KIU believe in 
returning their rights in a peaceful manner, no matter how long that might take, 
as well as believing that policy makers will finally return to a manner and reality 
which welcomes peace and stability as the only way to prosperity of their people 
and country. For example, the KIU publicly announced that they were mediating 
between the AK party and PKK for a peaceful negotiation.  As Abubakir Ali 
(2012) expressed, "if we were in power, we would use our Islamic dimension to 
convince them [the Iraqi government] to settle our conflicts", demonstrating the 
desire to pursue peaceful negotiations in order to further prosperity and stability 
in the region.  
 
5.9 Concluding Remarks: 
This chapter covered Islam and the KIU. Its aim was to test the curve of 
progress of the party from a traditional preaching group to the level of a 
nationalist political party. To reach my conclusion, I looked at seven themes, as 
follows: Universalised Islam (Umma), Islamic caliphate, Muslim Brotherhood, 
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Sacredness, Shari‟ah, Preaching and Politics, and Muslim-Muslim conflicts and 
rights. With no hesitation, the participants from the leadership of the party 
answered my questions. All the answers supported my hypothesis, and 
confirmed the progress of the party in relation to the Islamic dimension. They all 
articulated that the KIU, deeply and convincingly, believes and works for the 
good of the Kurdish nation and its land. Further, from the analogy drawn  byDr. 
Amin, it becomes clear that this nationalistic approach, for them, is a religious 
duty, and divinely the Kurds must have an equal right to anyone else, with no 
compromise on an independent nation state for the Kurds. Also, for them, at 
whatever cost, they must defend this right, which they again consider as 
another religious duty towards their nation. Hence, Islam is not hindering the 












This chapter is dedicated to looking at the influence of democracy and 
modernity on the KIU. In the modern world, politics and political participation are 
judged by democracy and its values. The Islamists, traditionally, are accused of 
being non-democratic. However, in recent years, a few of the Islamist political 
parties are engaging with democracy. In order to judge the KIU by some of the 
measures of democracy, this chapter is highlighting a number of themes which 
are core concerns for any Islamic party that claims to be democratic. These 
themes include: democracy, theocracy or civil sovereignty, Islamism versus 




The Islamist sense of democracy as a philosophical and historical concept can 
be traced back to Abraham Lincoln (1863), where democracy was defined as a 
"government of people, by the people, for the people". Democracy has been 
interpreted differently by each of the Islamic political parties. In order to 
understand the various interpretations of democracy, it is necessary to first 
understand what we refer to when we say 'Islamic political party'; since not 
every Islamist group is a political party, we refer explicitly to those that already 
have a political organisation and that are practising democracy through those 
organisations as well as in the political sphere of their countries. In reality, 
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democracy as a whole has not been practised much in the Middle East (ME) 
region, save from in Turkey. Furthermore, when we talk about democracy in 
such a region, we need to be realistic in both cases when we are talking about 
Islamists or non-Islamists, in understanding their practice of democracy and 
how it is still evolving. The term 'democracy' itself has moved through a cycle of 
evolution and been understood differently at different times. There are various 
reactions to the concept from separate parties, from the simplistic interpretation 
as 'a ruling of people by the people' that was completely rejected by the vast 
majority of Islamists, especially those of non-political parties such as Salafis 
who consider it to be a non-Devine ruling or 'ignorance ruling', up to the 
sophisticated practice of democracy as practiced by Islamists such as the AK 
Party of Turkey. 
When we examine the historical way of ruling in Medina by the prophet 
Muhammad himself, this seemed to arise as a kind of consensus formed by the 
majority of the dwellers, both Muslims as well as non-Muslims such as the Jews 
of Medina who disregarded Islam. This was presented in the so-called 
'constitution of Medina'. Therefore, regarding the current political parties, for the 
sake of argument as different religions, it is the consensus that they organise 
themselves accordingly and agree on certain ways of ruling. Such consensus 
then represents a concept of democracy. However, it is important to note that 
the modern contemporary states of the Middle East differ from the historical 
state of governance in Medina at this time. At the time that Medina was ruled by 
the prophet Muhammad, there was no better ruling either in the Arab peninsula 
or by the super powers of the time, such as the Persian and Byzantine Empires. 
More importantly, when political differences among the Muslim society emerged 
even from the first generation of Islam, such as the disagreement of the fourth 
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caliph Ali bin AbiTalib and the governor of Sham (Levant) Mu'awia Bin 
AbiSufian, it was a disagreement and political difference between two of the 
companions of the Prophet and their followers, and not a disagreement 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between the ruling of Islam against non-
Islamic ruling. Hence, accepting or rejecting democracy as it is practiced today 
and has been defined in literature, such as of the (online Oxford Dictionary, 
n.d.) as "a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible 
members of a state, typically through elected representatives", is not the issue 
on which Muslims or Islamists should disagree. But, as demonstrated by the 
history of Islam, the issue should instead be about the fact of whether the 
consequences of democracy and democratic ruling lead to justice or not. As 
long as democratic governance leads to justice across the country, and 
preserves the rights of all of society, including their religious rights, Islam has no 
rejection to it.    
 
The early ruling of Medina by Muhammad demonstrates an early form of 
democracy which sought justice for all, and can be used to demonstrate a solid 
example to be used as a basis for democracy in Muslim countries in the modern 
day. If we look at the prophet Muhammad and his companions, who suffered 
from the persecution and the siege of the tribe of Quraish, we can see how he 
sought a safe haven for his religion and its followers. To do this, he first headed 
towards Ta‟if in order to find a place away from Quraish to preserve his religion 
and its followers. This was the same reason that led them to migrate to Yathrib, 
which they later called MadinatArrasul (the city or the town of the messenger). 
This was following the embrace of the two main tribes of Aws and Kazraj, 
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meaning they could migrate there and established a ruling in the city. In doing 
this, they had taken into account the current dwellers of Medina and the 
diversity between Muslims and non-Muslims when they wrote the constitution 
and the way of ruling. This means that neither the prophet nor the immediate 
rulers that followed him wanted or tried to establish a ruling system meant only 
for Muslims, which disregarded other religions or non-believers. This was the 
system of justice which the Muslim community wanted for themselves and for 
their fellow non-Muslims. As a result of this, if there was a tyrant Muslim ruler 
who did not protect the justice of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, then Muslims 
had the duty to oppose him, rather than obeying him simply for his religion. 
Therefore, the essence of ruling in Islam is to be left to the community, as long 
as it leads to justice for all, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. In terms of what 
Sharia refers to in regards to this, this theme was explored in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
 
In order to find out about the KIU leadership and their understanding and 
perspectives towards democracy, I asked some of them a number of questions, 
including what they would define as democracy. Burhan Ahmad (2012) defines 
democracy as: "… a mechanism of organising the authorities, and an alternative 
to dictatorship”. He further commented as follows:     
"We in the Middle East have suffered from dictatorship more than 
elsewhere; look at the examples of Saddam Hussain, Bashar Al-Assad, 
Mubarak, Zain Al- Abdeen Bin Ali, Ali Abdullah Salih and the rest of 
them. Therefore, in this region, we long for democracy. Since the people 
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are the source of power and authority, democracy is a good mechanism 
for organising and classifying them”.  
In answering my question: "if the KIU had a chance to win the majority in the 
general election, then after four years‟ time couldn't get the majority again, will 
you peacefully hand the power over to the winner?”, Burhan Ahmad (2012) 
answered as such: 
"Certainly, we believe in a peaceful hand-over of power, and this is 
another principle of democracy. Plurality, human rights and law abiding 
are all principles of democracy, and we believe in all of them. These are 
from the bylaw of the KIU, and we call for them to be enacted. How could 
we possibly not act these out ourselves!”. 
 
Practising democracy internally and within their own political party is one of the 
issues of which many of the KIU members are proud. For example, in their 
latest congress, the KIU limited the term in office for the Secretary General to a 
maximum of two terms, with four years for each term. In regards to this, I 
directly wanted to hear from the former Secretary General, and asked him: “As 
the first Secretary General, since the establishment of the KIU in 1994 till the 
sixth congress which took place in May 2012, you continued in the post. 
However, in the latest congress, you did not candidate yourself for the post. 
What was behind this?”. (Bahaddin, 2012) answered as follows: 
"This is one of the practices of democracy that we believe in. We believe 
that nowadays democracy is an active part of today's world. Moreover, 
democracy is not in contradiction to Islam, nor to our Islamic 
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understanding. Before anything else, the people are the source of the 
power in democracy. Since the second congress, we have recognised 
this, and it has become one of our by-laws, helping us to avoid all kinds 
of violence and adopt dialogue and discussion into our mechanisms. In 
regards to handing power over to others, we came to the conclusion that 
we should limit the time of persons in power, and the Secretary General 
should not stay in his post forever. This is an innovation among the 
Kurdish political parties, and initiated by the KIU. It is not only an 
innovation among the Islamists, but also among all the secular political 
parties too in the Middle East. Furthermore, another innovation was that 
for the first time we live broadcast the entirety of the sixth congress70".  
 
I was interested in testing whether this is a political manoeuvre by the KIU, 
especially as it contradicts much with the historical Islamic leadership as far 
back as the caliphs, or whether they are genuinely convinced of it being a good 
idea and on what basis. Therefore I asked him the following question too: “If we 
look at the Islamic history, including the Rashideen caliphs, we notice that 
whenever anyone had been elected, he had stayed in power till his death. 
When you limit the term of the Secretary General of the KIU to a maximum of 
two terms only, do you think your approach is more Islamic than those historical 
examples?”.Bahaddin's answer was as follows (2012): 
"This [approach] is more authentic and more Islamic, because the 
authentic way is Shura (consultation) which is clearly prescribed in Quran 
(42: 38) “and who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation”. When 
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Abubakir [the first caliph after the prophet] was elected, he said that “I 
was appointed to be your leader, and I am not the best among you; if I 
did well, then help me, and if I did wrong, straighten me”. He did not 
pretend to be nominated or delegated by God. These days, democracy 
exists as a very good product of human beings' intelligence; we therefore 
choose to practice it”.  
 
I asked the newly elected deputy of the Secretary General (SG) the same 
question Babakir (2012), and he answered as follows: 
"This is a better approach than the historical approach, because I believe 
that a ruler, if he wants to rule seriously, should do so for only a term or 
maximum two terms. More than that, they are conventionally ruling, and 
the ruler would not have any connection to the people, meaning that 
everything lags behind. Thus, limiting the time they have to rule is a very 
important issue, and it is in the benefit of the people".  
 
Mohammad Ahmad (2012), a politburo member and the board of council chief 
of the Slaimani region answered the initial question of “How do you understand 
democracy, and how do you practice it?”, as follows:  
“Democracy is based on principles; it is a collection of mechanisms. Its 
principles vary from one region to another according to what democracy 
means to them in each region. However, generally, it is a collection of 
principles, mechanisms and concepts, which promote freedom, elections, 
freedom of expression, transition of power, and separation between 
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authorities. This means it is a collection of concepts that guarantee 
justice and freedom among human beings. We consider it as wisdom, 
and whenever we find wisdom, it is ours. Therefore, we believe in the 
concept of democracy, as long as it guarantees “freedom, brotherhood 
and justice”; the framework contained by our slogan is democracy's 
mechanism. Through the mechanism of democracy, we can advance the 
mechanism of politics. Democracy is a successful man-made 
experience; there is no obstacle preventing us from accepting it. With all 
of the concepts that Islam demands from us, and our desire as a nation 
to achieve them, democracy's mechanisms can help us achieve these.” 
 
In response to the following question: “If you democratically came to power, and 
then in the next election a secular political party won the election, would you 
peacefully hand the power over to them?”, Mohammad Ahmad (2012) 
answered as follows: 
"We strongly believe that no authority has the legitimacy to retain 
ultimate power and remain ruling indefinitely when people have not voted 
for them, even if it was an Islamic party. In Islam, forceful leadership has 
no legitimacy, and in order to rule, you need to have the trust of the 
people through the means of the voting system. Hence, when people 
give their trust to someone or something else, even a secular party, you 
must hand the power to him. If you do not hand it, then it is coercion, and 




Using democracy as a one way ticket to power is one of the accusations that 
Islamist parties often face. However, there are many examples of how Islamists 
have been suppressed by secular parties. The Islamists in Turkey were one of 
the victims of misuse of power against them and against democracy as a 
system. In other words, in many examples the Islamists were the victims of a 
lack of democracy and not the other way round. Durmus (2015), in regards to 
Erbakan, comments on this: “His political goals quashed by three military coups, 
Erbakan fought against all odds to raise the voice of the conservatives who 
were long neglected by governments and repressed by secular policies, through 
policies such as blacklisting and banning head scarves”. The latest coup was in 
1997. Similarly to this, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt came to power through 
means of a free and fair election, then after one year the military toppled them 
with a coup and ousted the president Murcy by force in 2013. What happened in 
Algeria in the 1990s shows that this allegation of the use of democracy as a 
ticket to power seems to be in fact backwards; the seculars in these examples 
have misused democracy and banned the Islamists from using it. In Turkey the 
failed coup d‟état attempt of 15th July 2016 was the last in a series of the military 
coups, some of which were against the Islamists. For more details in regard to 




Source: Omer Aslan, (2016: 8). 
 
Furthermore, the political and democratic thoughts of many Islamist parties 
have advanced in such a sense that even when they receive the majority of the 
votes, they look to share the power with other political parties. Muhammad 
Ra‟uf (2012) comments on this: “if we now get 51% of the votes, we would not 
form the government alone. Generally, democracy is new in the region; any kind 
of political party advocating democracy cannot currently form government alone 
and successfully run the country”. Therefore, right from the beginning the KIU 
proclaimed the slogan that „we are a participant, not an alternative‟. For further 
clarification, I asked a few of the leaders of the KIU, among them Muhammad 
Ra‟uf (2012) for the rationale behind this slogan. He, in addition to the above 
statement, added: “… if the society developed similarly to the British or the 
America political system, for instance, then if we alone form the government, 
then lose the election after the four years term, we are again democratically 
participating, and not just as an alternative”.  
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So, according to him, in either case they want to participate as a party, and not 
just use democracy in order to come to power then monopolise the power. For 
example, in 2011 when the Tunisian Al-Nahdha party came to power, and lost 
the election in 2014, they peacefully handed the power over to the new winner. 
What precisely the term alternative refers to is to participate in governing either 
in a coalition government or governing as a winner, and smooth and fair 
execution of post-election transformation. Thus, they are participating in 
governing but not as an alternative, in the sense that they control the power for 
them, like what happens after a coup.  
A further question I asked to Muhammad Ra‟uf (2012) about practising 
democracy within the KIU, especially as he was one of the nominees for the 
post of the SG in the last congress71, was as follows:  
“When we look at the Islamic history and legacy, right from the beginning 
we see a Shura (advisory) council that consisted of a number of people. 
During the reign of the first caliphs, there were ten. This meant people 
had the choice to only elect one of them”.  
 
His answer made me ask a question in clarification as follows: 
„Do you have such a nomination process within the KIU, or do all the members 
have the right to candidate themselves for that post?‟. Muhammad Ra‟uf (2012) 
answered: 
"We have gone through many phases, our organisation, and have many 
various stages; all members, from the bottom to the leadership 
committee and politburo, have the right to elect all leaderships on each 
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level, according to the rights that are given by our bylaw. This is the case 
in all the political parties around the world. This time, in the [sixth] 
congress, through the initiative of the former SG, this post too was 
opened for election, and the former SG did not nominate himself for the 
post. From now on, all upcoming congresses will follow the same pattern. 
Those who have the right to nominate themselves are obliged to act by 
the bylaw of the KIU. For instance, for this post, every nominee must 
have been a politburo member for at least two terms. For this last 
congress, sixteen members were qualified to nominate themselves. 
However, only four of them did." 
 
Another issue particular to democracy is the participation of women in the public 
life and in politics. To clarify the vision of the KIU in this regard, I asked Bayan 
Ahmad the following question: 
“Generally, among the Islamic parties and groups, the exclusion of 
women from the general leadership (in a sense of only allowing men into 
the top posts such as president, prime minister and judge) still exist. In 
the KIU, you have had similar posts held by women, such as head at 
some of your offices and at some occasions; organisation branches such 
as the Swedish branch. How do you view this issue? Can a woman be a 
president, even if some Islamists deny this and claim that it is restricted 





Bayan Ahmad (2012) answered: 
"Of course, there are many new theories in this regard. If we look at the 
Holy Quran, we have a stringent Quranic argument which mentions 
'Balqees', the queen of Sheba. The story of her in the Quran as a 
successful women leader and a queen is to confirm that this woman is an 
example to be followed by all women throughout history. Therefore, we in 
the KIU have no issue with women becoming even the leader of our 
party. In the recent congress, there were talks about sister [female 
members of the KIU] nominees for the SG post. In the KIU, we believe 
that when a sister can obtain the trust of her brothers and sisters, we 
have no objection of her holding any post. Therefore, we have no 
objection against a woman becoming the president of the Republic and 
the president of our region, and there are no legitimate obstacles existing 
within the structure of the party”.  
 
Another phenomenon relevant to an Islamic democracy is the modernity of 
democracy and in what way it can continue to respect the universal values. To 
highlight this issue, I asked the following question: “In the KIU's bylaw, article 
four, the general principles says that the source of our politics is, firstly, the 
unchangeable Islamic values and principles, and secondly, the unchangeable 
human values. What exactly are the unchangeable are human values?”. Amin 
(2012) answered as follows: 
"This means that the KIU not only utilises the rich Islamic heritage, but 
also utilises humanity's heritage too. There are many values of humanity 
outside of the Islamic context that are all important and widely practiced. 
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Often these are standardised, with nations built upon them. These 
human values include general freedoms, democracy, human and political 
rights, and anti-corruption. All of these are concepts and values that are 
not exclusive to Islam but belong to the wider set of core values within 
humanity, and around which all nations form a consensus. Therefore, our 
thoughts are not closed in onto just the Islamic heritage, but are open to 
any reasonable and good principle from any nation. This is not in counter 
with Islam; in contrary, it is the re-practicing of the open mind that Islam 
wants Muslims to have".  
 
Another issue in democracy on which KIU and other political parties have 
recently focused is the concept of good governance. To further my knowledge 
on this subject, I asked the following question: “Clause twelve of article four of 
the KIU's bylaw says that good governance and justice are Islamic objectives as 
well as necessities of life. What is good governance to you?”. Amin (2012) 
answered as follows: 
"Good governance is a concept much used within international 
documents. It is governance which focuses around effective democratic, 
justice and human rights measures. Good governance in our literature 
refers to the governance demanded by Islam, because Islam demands 
good governance. Therefore, Islamic history is full of examples of good 
governance. Of course, certain parts of Islamic history are examples of 
not so good governance too. This was a deviation from the kind of 
governance that Islam demands, which respects people's dignity and 
rights whilst remaining as an earthly and humble power”.  
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To understand this better alongside Islam's original essence of democracy, 
particularly in terms of ruling and sovereignty, I asked the following question: 
“The sovereignty of the Umma (nation) before implementing Sharia is a concept 
that has been discussed a lot nowadays, especially by the Islamists. How do 
you understand this concept?”. Babakir (2012) answered as follows: 
"It is better to say 'the sovereignty of the people72', because in today's 
world and in accordance with the United Nations, apart from us as the 
Kurds, each person and group of people has its own sovereignty. This is 
formed on the basis of separate borders, and no one can breach those 
borders. Thus, the sovereignty of the people in the constitutions has to 
be at least the second article after the first article of the definition of the 
state. This is an important issue that considers the people as the source 
of authorities. This is so in Islam, and the people - according to a contract 
- give the authority to a subset of people to lead and rule them on behalf 
of the millions of them, who cannot all rule. Therefore, in today's sense 
this is democracy. The sovereignty is the people's sovereignty; no one 
can rule in the name of God. This is exactly what the homage is. People, 
exactly like any other business in the market, can give power to whoever 
they want, and in accordance with whatever conditions they agree on. 
This is an agreement between the people and the rulers”. 
 
The concept of democracy and the practice of it are similar across many 
societies. However, when it is new and hasn‟t become normalised within a 
                                                          
72
 This is an early indication of the depth of nationalism by the KIU, which is going to be covered in 
chapter seven. It is reiterating the party‟s treatment to the concept of the Umma; which was covered in 
chapter five, with no attention to or even including in the party‟s literature or their political agenda.   
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society, it may be rejected for no apparent or discernible reason. This is the 
case with some of the newly emerged social and political entities, including the 
Islamists who are new to politics and react differently to the emergence of 
democracy. However, when they become a part of the political system, then 
their vision towards it will change. For instance, Ali Bapeer the Amir (leader) of 
the Islamic Group in 1990s wrote a book entitled Parliament between Belief and 
Infidelity. However, in 2010 he nominated himself to the Iraqi Parliament and 
became an MP, and his party is now one of the main parties running for 
parliament in the Kurdistan Region, and in this term they are in the coalition 
government that rules the region. In describing the de-radicalising of the 
Egyptians, Jihadists Ashour (2011) refers to one of their leaders who recently 
described their desire to make change in society without the use of combat:  
"'We were not in love with combat...if there was a way to hold a 
government accountable, Sadat would probably be alive today... we 
didn't know another way to change things.' This is how the Jihadist icon 
Abbud Al-Zumur, former leader of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's Al-Jihad 
organization, recently explained the most famous assassination in 
modern Egyptian history. Zumur is now currently an elected member of 
the Consultative Council of the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG). Until last 
March, he was also the most famous political prisoner in Egypt”. 
 
All of the above discussions indicate something important in regards of the 
Islamists, which is the evolution of societies and their political thoughts in the 
Middle East. Democracy within the nation states of the Middle East is a 
relatively new phenomenon, especially the practice of it, as well as the concept 
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of the nation state as the framework for practising it. This is particularly new for 
Kurdish society and for the Islamists such as the KIU, where both the nation 
state and the practice of democracy within it are very new. The situation within 
Kurdistan is still very complex; on the one hand they have not yet reached the 
stage of a nation state, and on the other hand the experience of democracy 
within such a region of the Middle East hasn't yet become a good political 
model. Therefore, the political strife of the KIU towards both a nation state and 
democracy is a model which all similar religious nationalists strive for in the 
whole region. They are the political framework for it, whether they realise and 
admit it or not. 
 
6.3 Theocracy or Civil Sovereignty? 
 
It has been a long period under the shadow of partial Islamic participation in 
ruling, which only served to clarify that Islam does not need a theocracy. 
Theoretically, it is clear that for the Sunni branch of Islam, the ruler after the 
prophet is up to the people to choose according to a social pack. The problem 
in many regions of the Islamic World is of the unbalanced, monopolistic 
competition between seculars and Islamists, which in some cases, leads to 
hyper-extremism on both sides. Utilising democracy helps both sides to set 
aside differences and realise that Islam itself can bring them together, and allow 
them to work together for the good of the nation. Thus, the possibility of any 
kind of theocracy will disappear, and all the theories of civil sovereignty that 





Abubakir Ali, (2014) commented on this subject: 
"I believe that we are in an era that has passed the ideological States. 
Forty or fifty years ago, the region was witnessing a stage of 
contemporary, ideological Islamism and secularism that was forced to 
turn into ideological movements; both of those two ideologies failed, and 
they couldn't live with democracy. Now, we are in a stage in which 
democracy means a civil constitution. In the past, a political party would 
make a coup d'état, and would write a constitution. Now, people write 
constitutions, despite their different political affiliations. Ergo, there is a 
desire for a constitution that the seculars, Islamists, Muslims, and non-
Muslims are taking part in. This constitution is Islamic and it is not. It is 
secular, and it is not. It preserves Islamic identity, and democracy 
becomes the shared point amongst all the entities. In the framework of 
this constitution that we have agreed on, a social pack for running the 
state and practicing our differences comes to exist. Then, the possibility 
of staying in power by a political entity would not exist, because we 
would not have an Ideological army or security forces, and we would not 
have a predominant ideology. All these apparatus will become patriotic 
and professional. Thus, democracy is a pathway to power, and at the 
same time, it is a mechanism to take them [the political entities] down 
from power when they lose the trust of the people in the election. Yes, 
we in the framework of this constitution agree with the seculars to 
administrate our society, and whenever we lose the trust of the people, 
then it is our moral, religious, and patriotic duty to hand the power [back 
to the people]. Then, we once again try to gain that trust through civil 
striving".        
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Theocracy73 as a sacred ruling was already practiced during the 
aforementioned period (the coup d'état‟s era of 20th century). Calling and 
practicing the rule of the leading party and the necessity leader was a kind of 
sacred ruling, whether it was in the name of secularism, socialism, or 
nationalism. However, allowing anyone to rule is the gateway that opens politics 
to the public and nixes any kind of theocracy, which ultimately leads to civil 
sovereignty. After the Arab spring, on the one hand, people throughout the Arab 
world was demanding and calling for political participation, and would no longer 
keep quiet –unless they were oppressed as has happened in Syria and Egypt. 
On the other hand, the major Islamic political parties, such as the Tunisian 
Nahda movement, are already calling for the sovereignty of the people. Nafi 
(2016: 5) refers to the main themes of Nahda‟s recent conference as the three 
pillars of the party‟s new version, which are as follows: “1- the nationalist values 
of the Tunisian republic, as stated in the (new, post-revolution) constitution; 2- 
An Islamic framework; and 3- The value of human achievement”. Prior to this, 
under the democracy theme, I went through the KIU‟s position towards 
democracy values and constitutional right for all the people, disregarding 
religious affiliation. Here again, the civil sovereignty was reiterated.              
 
 
                                                          
73Theocracy means literally „the rule of God‟ and the term was invented by Josephus (AD 38-c.100) to 
describe the ancient Hebrew constitution and the role of Mosaic Law. However, if you do not literally 
believe that the law has been handed down by God on tables of stone, it may be difficult to accept 
theocracies on their own terms. A more secular version of the meaning of theocracy is that it is priestly 
rule. Arguably, however, the more important distinction is between regimes that have religiously revealed 
laws or policies unchallengeable even by a popular majority or by an inherited monarch, and regimes that 
do not. (It should be noted that even such regimes which claim that their laws are divinely ordained and 
thus immutable do not make this claim in respect of all laws. For example, the Islamic Shari‟a recognizes 
a category of positive law, the mubah, covering such matters as driving on the right, which are religiously 
neutral.  
Mclean and Mcmillan (2003: 536).   
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6.4 Islamism versus Secularism: 
 
Right from the beginning, what made the KIU distinct from the other Islamists 
was its vision on this issue, not wanting to label the society or divide it onto 
seculars and Islamists. When the civil war occurred between the Islamic 
Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the 
IMIK wanted to give the war an Islamic and Secular dimension. However, 
despite the severe critiques by the IMIK to the KIU, yet the KIU was outspoken 
when it described it as a conflict of interest and a struggle for power, not one of 
religion. This caused some of the hyper Islamists to direct extreme criticism 
towards the KIU; some of them even doubted the Islamic identity of the KIU for 
the aforementioned stance; in some cases, these hyper-Islamists described it 
as a secular party. Over time, as an internal issue to the KIU (and similar to the 
issue of preaching and politics), the Islamic banner of the KIU was oftentimes 
discussed at different levels of the party. To assess this issue with the 
leadership of the KIU, it was necessary to understand their vision on the issue. 
Bawamurad (2012) in regard to the concept of Islamism and Secularism 
commented as follows: 
"Our Islamism identity has been occurred in counter to secularism. 
Basically, Islamic political parties have been established on the basis of 
opposing colonialism and the alien values to our societies. For that, this 
has continued up-till the current time. Then, from 1920s onward, the 
Marxist and Secular orientations came to exist. Because these 
orientations fundamentally were anti religion movements, the Islamist 
movements had to continue to defend the religious values. So, the 
Islamic movements are generally reactions to protect the Islamic values 
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and preaching. Otherwise, I have already my own opinion in this regard. 
Which is the Islamic Suffix is not necessary for the Islamic parties to 
have in their titles. However, because there are communist, socialist and 
liberal parties in the society, these Islamic parties have existed in counter 
to them. Furthermore, because nowadays the jurists have issued a 
number of fatwas, which prohibit entering such parties, consequently, 
this has become a necessity. Otherwise, in the political context, now in 
the Kurdistan region similar to the other political parties, we have the 
political requirements, as well as our political strife is for this land and 
people. Similarly, we have all organisational, media, grassroots organs 
and we candidate our members for the political posts too. More 
importantly, we actively participate in all the political issues".  
Thus, if we take the concepts of both secularism and Islamism, they are both 
new and have come to exist in the region as reactions to each other. Basically, 
the term „secularism‟, similarly to the term „nationalism‟, was looked at as a 
hope towards prosperity and development. However, the secular elites had no 
secular stance towards religious values, in the sense that they had an anti-
religion stance, thus leading to the growth of the concept of Islamism, in terms 
of defending religious values against the attacks of secularism. Otherwise, the 
term „Islamism‟ never existed throughout the history of Islam; even when we 
refer to the „Islamic eras‟, this term has come to exist during this controversial 
discourse of Islamism and Secularism. To elaborate further, the researcher 
asked the following question: "is the Islamic suffix74 of the KIU, you as the party 
                                                          
74
 As in the Kurdish version it is (Yakgrtui Islami Kurdistan) and well known as (Yakgrtui Islami), it can 
be said suffix. However, for the English translation, as it is (Kurdistan Islamic Union), and known as 
Islamic Union, it can be said prefix.   
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want it, or the reality has given it to you?". Bawamurad (2012) answered as 
follows: 
"In reality, it is a part of the identity that we have. As long as in our 
country there are political parties called socialists, communists and 
nationalists, it is then normal to have an Islamic political party too. This 
suffix is an indication to distinguishing this group of people who work in 
this party as being caring about the religious rites and manners, and their 
political work has emerged from the Shari'ah thoughts and principles. 
However, this has not created a political identity for us. This only 
distinguished us from the others by compliance to the Islam as our 
religion. Whether this suffix is exist or not, it does not change anything 
from the reality, because what is important is the message not the title. 
Now in the Arab spring, we see all the Islamic parties choose their 
names to be justice, freedom and development without an Islamic suffix. 
However, we couldn't yet, mobilise our grassroots on the basis of political 
project”. 
 
If we take both terms, especially when they counter one another, we see that 
both have no philosophical base. In all the secular parties in the Kurdistan 
Region, we see many practicing religious members. Actually, in many cases, 
apart from the few atheists among the leaders of some of those secular parties, 
who wish to use the secular title for their anti-religion stances, there are no 
philosophical ideologies at all. Even some other times, they use the religious 
means for political ends. The picture below shows a veiled woman was 
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nominated by the communist party for the region‟s parliament during the 
campaign of 2013. 
 
As for the Islamic parties, such as the KIU, when for them the Islamic ruling is 
not a particular Islamic jurisprudence; and, as long as justice is achieved, that is 
then the objective of Islam. When the Iraqi constitution75 and the draft 
constitution of the Kurdistan Region76 (approved by Kurdistan Parliament on 
                                                          
75
Iraqi Constitution in section one, fundamental principles, article 2, states that: 
“First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation:  
 A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.  
 B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.  
 C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated 
  in this Constitution.  
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and 
guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals 
such as Christians, Yazidis, and MandeanSabeans”. 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html). 
76
 Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region, “Article 6: 
This Constitution confirms and respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
It considers the principles of Islamic Sharia as one of the main sources of legislation. Likewise, this 
Constitution upholds and respects all the religious rights of Christians, Yazidis, and others, and it guarantees 
to every individual in the Region freedom of belief and the freedom to practice their religious rites and 
rituals. It is not allowed: 
First: Enact a law inconsistent with the provisions of the fundamentals of Islam. 
Second: Enact a law inconsistent with democracy principals. 
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24th June 2009) both guarantee respect to the Islamic identity, and no law may 
be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam, the question 
arises as to what Secularists and Islamists, respectively, might want to achieve. 
Essentially, the best guarantee for such societies is the society itself; any 
political party that wants to be accepted by the society must adopt and respect 
the principles and values of the society in order to avoid rejection and 
marginalisation. In looking at both extreme Marxists, such as the Worker-
communist Party of Kurdistan, and the extreme Islamists, such as the 
disappeared groups of Jundul Islam and Ansarul Islam, they will never be 
accepted by the Kurdish society, and will not become popular; this is due to the 
fact that the Kurds have political demands regarding national rights in lieu of 
ideological issues. Also, it is, by nature, a moderate religious society and will 
neither accept religious nor anti-religious extremism.  
 
Hence, in light of the historical background and context, many of those political 
parties have revised their aims and objective; to highlight, this kind of change in 
the KIU, the researcher asked the following question: "if you were now 
establishing the party, would you choose the Islamic suffix?", to which  
Bawamurad (2012) remarked: 
"No, indeed, right from the beginning we wanted to name the party KIU, 
because it was similar to Kurdish Islamic League (KIL), which was our 
charitable social service organisation. Otherwise, even that time, we 
might have named it (Justice and Benefaction). If, we had established it 
                                                                                                                                                                          





now, certainly, we would name it something like (Justice and 
Development)”. 
 
Since the KIL was the springboard for the KIU and their subsequent reputation, 
they wanted to use a similar name, the Kurdistan Islamic Union, which is not 
dissimilar to the Kurdish Islamic League; in Kurdish KIL is (Yakgrtui Islami Kurd) 
and KIU is (Yakgrtui Islami Kurdistan). They are, in essence, the same name, 
but the word „Kurd‟, which refers to the Kurdish people in the case of the KIL, 
has been changed to the word „Kurdistan‟, which refers to the land of the Kurds 
in the case of the KIU. This has actually led to a prolonged confusion by many 
people, among them some politicians; according to the above statement by 
Bawamurad, this was a deliberate mixture and usage of the name of the charity 
organisation and they soon realised that the Islamic suffix was not of much help 
in the long run. The issue of having it or not having it is due to the same 
discussion and factors discussed in the section „Preaching and Politics‟.  
 
Otherwise, having the adjective “Islamic” or not, would not change the reality of 
the political platform of the party. Actually, in the second draft77 of the 
constitution and bylaws of the KIU for the seventh congress, drafted by the KIU 
leadership council (2016a: 4), in article one, under name and definition, there 
were two options with regard to the name of the party: “1- Kurdistan Islamic 
Union; and 2- Kurdistan Patriotic Union”. Thereafter, in the subsequent drafts, 
only the KIU option remained. Personally, I believe that at this historical 
juncture, with fighting ISIS and the nation building ambition of the region, it is 
                                                          
77
 The second of the four drafts that I am aware of. 
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important to have the adjective “Islamic” by a Kurdish political party such as 
KIU. Put simply, with any further steps towards independence, the anti-
Kurdistan Arabs would mobilise their extremists against the Kurds, and similar 
to the Ba‟th regime, would commit genocide against them in the name of Islam. 
Therefore, the Kurds too, at this stage, must benefit from the Islamic identity, in 
order to avoid any misuse of terrorism against them by those who do not want a 




Looking back to 1992-1994, we can observe many tensions between the 
Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) as the major Islamic militia, and 
several other secular political parties, particularly the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). As a result, after the fatal battles between the IMIK and PUK 
at the end of 1993, it was not an easy task for the KIU to announce the 
introduction of an Islamic civil political party on 6th February 1994. Not only was 
this a non-militia Islamic party, but at that time this was also the only non-militia 
political party in the whole region of Kurdistan. Therefore, the purpose of the 
question “How do you survive as an Islamic political party among many other 
secular Kurdish political parties?” is to explore the confidence, tolerance, and 
coexistence of the KIU within the other surrounding political parties, many of 
them secular. The importance of this question is not only because of their ability 
to coexist in such an atmosphere, but also due to them being the only civil 
political party and only single unique example promoting a civil political culture, 
therefore becoming an example to be followed by other Islamic and secular 
groups, such as the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and the Change movement. 
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Through answering this question, this is possible to identify the political thought 
that led the KIU to such an unlikely coexistence that has been exemplified by 
many other political parties as a moderate Islamic party. In order to best 
examine the KIU's belief in coexistence, I also attempted to ask my interviewees 
about their opinion of other Islamists, particularly the Salafis, as they are not 
supportive of Islamic political parties as well as other religious minorities. 
 
Muhammad Raauf (2012) answered the question as follows:  
"Very briefly, firstly, we from very early on had no support for the battles 
between secular and Islamic. Secondly, we, in the same way that we 
don't believe in an extreme radical salifism, we neither believe in an 
extreme radical secularism. In the same way that you see the takfiris78 
among the Islamists, there are takfiris among the seculars too. The 
takfiris of the seculars are those who do not accept any Islamists, or 
even any religion. These kinds of seculars do not only believe in the 
separation of religion from the state, but also in the separation of religion 
from life. They don't believe in any kind of Islamic thinking. Apart from 
these seculars, we can coexist with any kind of seculars. We can even 
rule together. My personal belief is that, this century in the ME, the power 
is going to be in the hands of the moderate Islamists and the moderate 
seculars. The moderate Islamists are those who do not establish 
religious states in a sense of theocracy. In other words, in any aspect of 
the life, they do not interpret it in a religious way, in the same way they 
would interpret a creed matter. The moderate seculars are those who 
                                                          
78
Takfiriis an Arabic word refers to a blasphemer, who labels the others as non-believers or who 
committed blaspheme.   
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believe in the basic principle of Islam, and believe in the moderate 
Islamic movements. The moderates from both sides are those who 
believe in leading their countries towards stability, prosperity, social 
justice and the rule of law. Therefore, it is not important if the presidents 
of those states are Islamists or seculars, as long as they are moderates".   
 
The whole concept of being a 'moderate', as stated by Raauf, is centred 
aroundthe notion of accepting others with tolerance and coexistence. As a 
result, the introduction of moderate Islamists and seculars has been seen as a 
challenge to traditional Islamism and secularism, who have always been much 
opposed to each other. In this conflicting environment, at the beginning, being a 
moderate political force, with no militia to protect the party has been treated as 
laughable. This is particularly in comparison to the surrounding parties, with the 
seculars, communists and Islamists all having their own militias. There are two 
main reasons why the KIU had a chance to survive:  
Firstly, it began with its own charitable organisation called Islamic Kurdish 
League (IKL) which has been active since 1992 in the region. At the time, 
Kurdistan was under two sanctions: the international sanction on Iraq, and an 
internal sanction by Saddam's regime on the Kurdistan region. Therefore, the 
KIU's movements to sponsor thousands of orphans, provide food to the needy, 
and build mosques, schools, hospitals, and mobile clinics, made them different 
from any other political party. At this time, many parties were busy fighting each 
other on controlling territories, customs revenue, and ideological issues.  
A second reason why the KIU had a chance to survive was that, when the KIU 
was originally announced, the major Islamic group IMIK had just been defeated 
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by the PUK. As a result, there was a prevailing hope that a peaceful non-militia 
Islamic party would come and replace the tensions between the Islamists and 
non-Islamists. Consequently, the KIU greatly benefited from this, coupled with 
their charitable activities, and in a short time became a prominent political party. 
This can be particularly seen in the liberation of 2003; when the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) was founded on July 13, 2003, there were five members 
representing the Kurds out of the twenty five members of the council, with one 
of those five being the Secretary General of the KIU. The KIU managed to not 
only survive but to in fact prosper, due partially to their moderate approach and 
tolerance towards seculars, Islamists, communists, Muslims and non-Muslims 
right from the start.  
 
Amin (2012) has expressed himself on this issue as follows: 
"Because we believe in freedom, everyone - whether he is a liberal, a 
communist or anything else - is free. As we believe in freedom, we 
believe in rights too. First of all, everyone is free how he wants to be. 
Secondly, he has the right of justice. That must be guaranteed for him. 
The justice gives him his rights and his freedom. Therefore, the KIU has 
chosen “Freedom, Justice and Brotherhood” as their slogan".  
The claim to be a tolerant moderate, if it is not supported by a strong belief and 
commitment, cannot last for long on its own. Holding the slogan of “Freedom, 
Justice and Brotherhood” right from the start has helped the KIU to train its 
members and followers to practice coexistence. Through this slogan, they found 
their strength and raison d'etre in this concentrated belief and practice.  
Hassan Shamerani (2012) added further to this topic: 
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"We have understood from Islam that it gives freedom to every individual, 
group and entity, in their beliefs, ideology, religion and sects. Islam never 
agrees for its beliefs to be imposed by force. Quran (2: 256) says "There 
is no compulsion in religion". Therefore, coexistence across all the 
secular parties is easy. We believe that we all can freely practice our 
religion, beliefs, ideas and sects without any problem".   
 
The KIU's originality in terms of its ideas of tolerance and coexistence, as 
originating from Islamic thought, made them unique pioneers among the 
Islamists in this regard. Although this is the same for non-Islamists, such as the 
Change movement, this was unique within Islamic parties. The most important 
point in this regard is the fact that the radical Islamists support their ideas by 
Islamic texts; the KIU, too, supports its ideas with Islamic texts. This made the 
KIU's policies viable and dominant in the region, and even made them an 
example to be followed in the era of de-radicalisation.  
 
In regards to the KIU's coexistence with other Islamists in Kurdistan, Abubakir 
Ali (2012) answered as follows:  
"In the past, because there was a militant movement, our visions were 
too different. However, since they too have no arms now, and they have 
adopted a civil struggle, I can say every day we come closer to each 
other. However, the different historical developments still has its 
intellectual and political influence on each of us. For instance, the idea of 
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the Caliphate may be more thought about by them, but we have left it 
behind".     
 
Condemning any kind of terror in thought and practice from anyone, including 
from the Islamists, was the first thing that the KIU announced in its first 
manifesto at its proclamation in 1994. However, working alongside non-violent 
Islamists, the KIU is able to share the same policy of coexistence. In many 
ways, this is a bonus, due to the unique form of Islamic cooperation involved in 
this. This has helped both of the other main Islamic parties, the KIG and IMIK, 
to accept each other after their dissidence in 2001, and to follow suite of the KIU 
in its approach to politics. 
 
In regards to the Salafis, Amin (2012) commented on the participation of the 
Salafis of Egypt in political life and their establishment of the Noor party:  
"For Salafis, or any other Islamic movements, when they come into 
political life their thinking will be more moderate. Therefore, they 
understand the issues better, as well as the necessity for cooperation 
and growing together".  
 
The KIU's expectations of the Salafis of Kurdistan to participate in political life in 
the future have grown in the light of the Egyptians' example. The importance of 
the Salafis' participation derives from the fact that they are likely to be politically 
more realistic in their vision towards society, politics, minorities and political 
parties, whether they are seculars or Islamist. The first and closest example to 
271 
 
them as Islamists is the KIU. Therefore, with there being a chance of political 
participation by all types of Islamists, there are two advantages that can be 
gained: one for the Islamists themselves, and one for wider society. Firstly, no 
one would remain to claim and talk alone in the name of Islam, as all Islamic 
parties would be representing only their political parties. Secondly, having a 
political party means the party is liable before law, and is responsible for their 
behaviours in front of and towards wider society.  
 
In reference to the KIU‟s position on religious minorities, Babakir (2012) 
answered as follows: 
"In the KIU, from our understanding of Islam and how it respects every 
language, nation and religion, we believe that it doesn't matter whether 
those religions and nations are majority or minority: they have the same 
rights. The rights of these religions have been clearly mentioned in the 
Quran and through the traditions of the Prophet.  Even an atheist person, 
on the basis of Quran (2: 256) "There is no compulsion in religion", has 
his own freedom. In terms of justice, and implementing the rule of law, 
the judicial system is for protecting the rights of every citizen, 
disregarding their religion and beliefs. The Islamic history, too, is full of 
examples of how to respect beliefs, worship, and the way of life of 
people".  
 
There are two significant points that can be made from this answer. Firstly, 
having insight from an Islamic perspective in regards to the rights of other non-
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Muslims - whether they are from other religions or non-believers - helps to close 
the gate of hatred and ideological war. Secondly, the mention of the judicial 
system and equality before law demonstrates the growing importance of the 
concept of citizenship, whilst diminishing rights based purely on affiliation to 
religion. Therefore, this answer shows the gradual rejection of theocracy and 
the movement towards civil governance, both which the KIU supports. 
Muhammad Faraj (2012) adds further: 
"When we believe in freedom, then we should accept its results. From 
this perspective, we must respect the existence of all of society. 
Respecting and protecting citizens' rights has to be recognised by the 
constitution. The constitution must be implemented. The rights of 
citizenship will protect equality between all existences of society, with 
protection and respect for all of them. Rights, freedom and many other 
concepts are important, and they must be protected for the citizens. 
Respecting the existence of society shouldn't contradict these concepts 
and freedom, because these concepts and freedoms are unchangeable. 
These existences are the entities of this society, and this society is ruled 
by law. No one must be above the law. So, everything must be in the 
framework of constitution, and all the citizens must be highly valued".  
 
Talking about the rule of law and the practical steps of coexistence highlights 
the history of the KIU across a number of different occasions in regards to both 
their belief in rule of law as well as their belief in coexistence. For example, in 
the two attacks in 2005 and 2011 on their offices in Duhok and further afield, 
they had no reaction but to return to the rule of law. In regards to coexistence 
and working with others, in 1996 they cooperated to some extent with the 
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Conservative Party of Kurdistan, which is a non-Islamic party. Furthermore, in 
the general election of 2009, they ran for parliament in partnership with the 
Social Democrat Party of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Toilers' Party, and KIG. Working 
together with seculars and Islamists, without any ideological clashes, validates 
and demonstrates the KIU's beliefs in rule of law and coexistence. 
 
6.6 Role of Women: 
 
One of the most unsavoury characteristics of Middle Eastern societies is the 
poor treatment of women; the more tribal the society is, the worse the treatment 
towards women is viewed. The danger in this comes from the fact that despite 
that it arises from tribalism; sometimes there are attempts to give it a religious 
dimension. Take, for instance, the issue of women driving cars in Saudi Arabia; 
one could argue that it has nothing to do with religion, while many think it is a 
religious ban. In a conservative society, like that of the Kurdish one, it is not 
easy for women to participate in politics, especially during the 1990s. Still, for 
many Islamists, the only role fit for women is to be in the home as a housewife. 
It is important to understand the KIU‟s vision in this regard, and the extent of 
roles for women in their political and organisational day to day. In answering the 
following question, (what is the role of women in the KIU?), Bayan Ahmad 
(2012) a female politburo member, answered as follows: 
"Right from discussing the idea of forming the political party, the KIU has 
consulted the sister's [the female members of the KIU] opinion. Which at 
that time, the other political parties might not count for women that much. 
This from the point that a preaching group, right from the idea of 
establishing a political party, the sisters thought and vision was important 
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for them, and they counted for. Then, when the list of the founder 
members were presented to the region's government to form the party, 
the list included sister members. This is another indication for this 
important participation".  
In answering: "what is the role of the sisters in decision making in the KIU?", 
Bayan Ahmad (2012) answered as follows: 
“As I mentioned, the role of the sisters started right from the formation of 
the KIU.  Then in the second congress of the party in 1996, only after two 
years of its formation, the sisters without any kind of quota had a 
member in the leadership committee of the KIU. In the congress of 1999, 
among the 30 members of the leadership committee, three sisters were 
elected. As for the congress of 2005, the number of the sisters reached 
five in the total number of the committee that was 35, and a sister of 
them was elected to be a politburo member. This is how the sisters 
participated in decision making till the recent congress, which took place 
in May 2012. In this congress, in the total number of 35 of the committee 
members, nine sisters were elected for the committee, and three of them 
were elected for the politburo. This time was according to the quota 
system that was adopted by the party. This is due to the rise of the 
female sisters within the party, which is amounted to be half of the total 
members of the whole KIU. Although, personally I disagree with the 
quota system, as it might give a chance to some people who are not 
quite prepared for a certain post. However, in this society, as well as the 
entire societies of the region, which they do not believe in women's 
abilities, it might for the time being, be a good idea".  
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If we look at the ratio of women in the leadership committee of the KIU in 
comparison to the other main four political parties; Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Change movement, and Kurdistan 
Islamic Group (KIG) (according to Welate Me (2010) for the KDP, (PUKPD.org) 
for the PUK, Salam (2015) for the Change movement and Rabati (2015) for 
KIG, we see the following figures:  
Political Party No. of Leadership 
Committee (LC)  
No. of Women 
members in the LC 
KDP 53 5 
PUK 50 9 
Change Movement 54 6 
KIK 30 1 
KIU 35 9 
 
 
The percentages, according to the above statistics, are as follows: KIU: 25.71%, 
PUK: 18%, Change movement: 11.11%, KDP: 9.43% and KIG: 3.33%. It is 
obvious that the ratio of the women in leadership roles among the KIU is bigger 
than that of any other party. This is despite the grievances that were expressed 
by Xaraman Jaf (2013), the secretary of Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League 
(KISL), the women‟s organisation of the KIU, about the misusing of power by 
those parties in favour of their own similar organisations, and their attempts to 








Bringing women back to public life is extremely important in any Muslim society. 
The importance of this for a party like the KIU comes from two angles; the first, 
is the correction of the idea that the Muslim women cannot integrate into the 
public life, and that any woman that wants to be publicly free needs to 
compromise her Islamic values. This kind of perception is traditionally used by 
the secular political parties due to that idea that the more women that were 
liberalised, the more those secular parties‟ popularities were expanding. 
Secondly, the KIU benefited practically from women‟s reintegration into the 
public life, and gained huge popularity among women. More importantly, the 
more popularity it had among the women, the more potential members it was 
gaining, simply due to the important role of women within the family sphere as 
mothers, wives, sisters and daughters.  
 
6.7 Concluding Remarks: 
 
Judging any political party with reference to its religious background, and by 
measures of democracy, has to be according to democratic principles. For 
instance, when looking at a political party such as the ruling party  of Germany, 
the Christian Democrat Union, it is necessary to judge it by its political 
behaviour according to democratic measures, not labelling it as a non-
democrat, due to its Christian identity. The same is true with the KIU, from the 
perspective of the themes covered in this chapter. It is notable that within the 
democratic margin of the region, the KIU has made relatively good democratic 
progress. Remarkably, women's participation in the leadership and organisation 
of the party stands out in comparison with other major political parties of the 
region. Continuous internal democratic changes through elections are another 
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aspect of the advancement of the KIU. Working on civil sovereignty and the 
abolition of all types of theocracy has left no room for non-democratic dogma 
that could be used in politics by a religious group. Overall, within the context of 
the region, a noticeable democratic progress has been observed in regard to 






Nationalism and the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
 
7.1 Introduction: 
This chapter looks at the role of the KIU in Kurdish nationalism. Nationalism, for 
many Islamists, especially those in non-political parties, is a non-Islamic 
ideology, and it is labelled as the product of western imperialists attempting to 
cause fragmentation and differences in the Islamic Umma. However, by looking 
at the realpolitik of the Islamist political parties,  the politics of nationalismcan be 
seen clearly, in the sense that they are practising nationalism in their day-to-day 
politics. The data show to what extent the KIU has contributed to Kurdish 
nationalism. First, by looking at the theoretical aspects through several themes, 
then by looking at some aspects of realpolitik in the KIU over the last few years, 
this chapter examines the KIU‟s nationalistic politics through the highlighted 
themes of Kurdish or Muslim, Nationalism, Nation State, Reform, 
Realpolitik.With reference to Kurdistan, the following subjects are highlighted: 
mediating and peace-making, maintaining the unity of the region, combatting all 
kinds of terror in the name of Islam and pioneering a non-militia political model, 
and introducing good character cadres and statesmen in Baghdad, then finally 




7.2 Kurdish or Muslim? 
One direct semi-structured question which was asked to interviewees identified 
a core theme for this project, questioning their feelings of being Muslim and 
Kurdish. The question “What is your feeling as a Kurd and an Islamist? What 
does either of these mean to you?” was directly asked to 6 out of 12 
interviewees. In one way or another, it has been implicitly asked to the other 
interviewees too. Of these, almost every interviewee expressed clearly and 
directly his feeling towards each of the above identities, demonstrating that this 
is an important prevailing theme in this study.  
The purpose of this question was to find out the feelings of the leaders of the 
KIU towards both nationalism and Islamism, and to see whether there is any 
preference of one over the other. This question is important to this study as it 
demonstrates the extent of the development of the sense of nationalism within 
the KIU leaders from moving from an Islamist group into a religious nationalist 
political party. It is also important in order to see the balance between 
maintaining one's religion and utilising it for the purpose of promoting the 
causes and purposes of Kurdish nationalism. This is particularly important to 
question within the context of Kurdistan, where Kurds as a nation without a 
state are divided between the three Muslim nationalities of Arabs, Turks and 
Persians. The importance of this question is seen through the extent that the 
other neighbouring nations, especially those on which the Kurdish land is 
divided on such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, have contradictory feelings to 
the Kurds, accusing the Kurdish Nationalists as separatists or even in some 
extreme cases as non-Islamic nationalist rebels. What I was aiming for in asking 
this question was to see how, despite the accusations by Arabs, Turks and 
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Muslims against the Kurdish Nationalist movements, the KIU has participated 
within the Kurdish National movement, and has used its Islamic background to 
further the rights of the Kurdish nation.  
Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered the question as follows: 
“The Kurdish identity and the religion identity are not contradictory to 
each other. I am in nationality a Kurd, and as religion a Muslim. They are 
both complementary to each other, and they are not alternative to each 
other, neither contradicting each other. Therefore, they are both 
important, and each nation has its own religion and its national identity”.   
This indicates the balancing act involved in supporting both nationalism and 
religion on the same level. This also shows that there is no question of 
comparison between them in terms of preference of one over the other; they 
can in fact complement each other. The expression of this by an Islamic party 
validates and demonstrates nationalism in a political context. This not only 
demonstrates the KIU's stance as an Islamic political party, but also in some 
ways questions and tests other similar political parties in the Middle East (ME). 
However, the feelings of the KIU, as representing Kurds as a nation without a 
state, is naturally separate from the case of other Arab or Turkish Islamists. 
Although many parties and states are practicing somewhat similar approaches 
to religion and nationalism on the ground, their situations do not stand out in the 
same way that the case of Kurdistan does. The example of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) of Kuwait during the Iraqi regime's invasion in 1990 works 
well to demonstrate this, since Kuwait has  exerted every effort to liberate their 
land from the neighbouring Arab nation of Iraq, with the help of the non-Muslim 
western coalition forces led by the United States of America (USA).  
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Burhan Ahmad (2012) has also expresses his feelings in regards to this 
question:  
 “We as Kurds, from the beginning of the appearance of Islam, willingly      
entered Islam. Today, as hundreds of other nations on this earth, weare 
proud of being Muslim. We do not see any obstacles to being a Kurd and 
a Muslim. It is obvious that being a Kurd, Arab, Turk, or any other 
nationality is out of the hands of the humans. God has created us inthat 
particular nation. There must be wisdom in this God's will. Therefore, we 
are proud with God's wisdom. God wants me to have a role as a Kurd, 
and he wants me to cooperate and coordinate with the other nations in 
the matters that are shared between us”. 
Through recognising the hundreds of nations believing in and practicing Islam it 
is easier to understand the KIU's belief in its nationalist duties to its nation. By 
having no nation state, Kurdish people are made to feel they are deprived of the 
same rights granted to all other Islamic nations. Therefore, if the KIU do not 
appropriately strive to meet its nationalist demands, as a political party it may 
find its role invalidated. Since all those countries on which the Kurdish people 
are divided (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey) do not deny the Islamic identity of the 
Kurds, but are practicing the denial of the national rights of Kurds, the entire 
political demand in the Kurdish arena must circle around their national rights. 
The realisation of the KIU's role in this national political demand, and working 
towards this, makes its role pivotal amongst other nationalist political parties. In 
knowing this, it is necessary to understand how the KIU's Islamic dimension 
further clarifies its identity as a Kurdish Islamic political party. In other words, 
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what does an Islamic dimension mean in the context of a Kurdish political 
party?    
Abubakir Ali (Karwani) (2012) has expressed himself regarding this question as 
follows:  
“For me, being a Muslim and a Kurd are two sides of my personal 
patriotic identity. We have multi-dimensional identity. I am at the same 
time a Muslim and a Kurd, Oriental and cosmopolitan...etc.”. 
This statement explicitly highlights the importance of nationalism and religion for 
the KIU, looking at these concepts as two sides of the same coin. It also 
outlines the multi-dimensional identity which combines different dimensions of 
Kurdish society into one entity. This is the core of the revived version of society 
in the ME, particularly in Kurdistan, in comparison to societies and political 
parties over the last century which were divided between secularism and 
Islamism. In this limited sense, one could either be a secular nationalist, with no 
credit to the Islamic dimension of society, or a devote Islamist, with no attention 
paid to nationalism.  
In relation to this, Shamerani (2012) reflects his feelings towards being an 
Islamist as well as Kurdish, as follows:  
 “Being a Muslim or an Islamist comes after my birth. However, in 
regards to my nation, it starts with my birth from Kurdish parents. Then 
when I was older,willingly I chose my religion. Hence, before being a 
Muslim, I was a Kurd, then I have chosen Islam, or I could possibly have 
chosen another religion. Even then, my Kurdish identity would remain as 
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it is. Choosing any religion, according toIslam is people's choice. 
However, one has no option in choosing his nation”. 
This is an advanced version of nationalism as seen in the KIU. Regarding the 
nation as the base of identity is a new idea for Islamists, especially given that 
this particular statement has been announced by a cleric leader of the party. 
Promoting this kind of understanding from an Islamic perspective is seen to be 
more influential than ever before, where both nationalism and Islamism had two 
different paths. Combining these two together, as seen by the KIU, we can see 
the Kurdish version of religious nationalism.    
 
7.3 Nationalism: 
When we look back to the time that Islam came to the Arabian Peninsula, their 
society was linked to tribalism, with no nationalism in today's sense. Contrary to 
this, these days there are strong feelings of nationalist in many Muslim societies 
which has taken the place of tribalism. In order to understand Islam's modern 
day stance to nationalism, we need to look back at Islam's historic treatment of 
tribalism. In the same way that the first generation of Islam didn't prefer one 
tribe over another, today there is no preference of a nation over another. 
Therefore, Islam recognises all nations as it recognised all the tribes at the 
beginning, meaning every nation is as proud of and loyal to their nation as tribes 
were proud of their own tribe. When I asked Abubakir Ali (2012) whether their 
stance on nationalism is different than that of the other Kurdish nationalists, 
such as the KDP and PUK, in regards to the issue of Kirkuk, he replied that "We 
have no differences to the KDP or PUK in answering this question. If we were in 
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power instead of them, we would benefit from our Islamic background in 
approaching Kirkuk and its other components, such as the Arabs and Turkmen, 
with a different rhetoric”. When the former and first Secretary General of the KIU 
was elaborating this in regards to their relationship with the MB, (Bahaddin, 
2012) highlighted this issue as follows:  "In regards to an issue like Kirkuk, the 
Iraqi Islamic Party's position is the same as that of Allawi, and our position is 
like that of the KDP and PUK”. 
The arrival of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula led to cohesion between all of the 
tribes. This was because it did not allow what the Qur'an describes as „Jahiliah‟ 
(ignorance), one of its dimensions being a blind loyalty to the tribe and to be on 
its side even when it was aggressive towards other tribes‟ rights. Islam made 
those tribes as cohesive as being brothers. This brotherhood was not at the 
cost of the small tribes. As Abubakir Ali expressed, Islam can play this role 
between nations too, in encouraging them to have a softer tone towards each 
other. In other words, it can bridge the gap between them.  
The problem in this is that, despite the existence of this Islamic tie, when it 
comes to the right of a nation like Kurdistan, the Muslim nations' stance remains 
a pre-Islamic tribalism one. Similar to the efforts of the pre-Islamic tribes in 
obliterating the weaker tribes, nowadays the stronger Muslim nations have the 
same stance towards the Kurds and their national rights. They all enjoy the 
privileges of being nation states, but do not recognise the same right of a nation 
like Kurdistan. This is the real challenge for the KIU, as well as other Kurdish 
Islamists, in their struggle to convince the other Islamists in other nations to 
recognise the rights of Kurds. But many of those non-Kurdish Islamists regard 
nationalism as a Jahiliah, in a sense that the Kurdish Islamists shouldn‟t 
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struggle for their national rights. However, as they have already guaranteed 
rights for themselves with no problem as the Kurds have, it is common for them 
to deny having such a feeling, or not having realised it. As a result, the struggle 
of the Kurdish religious nationalists is extremely difficult.     
In regards to what the KIU have contributed into Kurdish nationalism, Professor 
DlawerAlladeen (2014), the former minister of higher education and scientific 
research of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and political commentator, 
commented as follows: 
"From my point of view, I can see the following: 
a.      KIU was founded on the brotherhood‟s principles by people who 
were either affiliated to, or closely associated with, MB.  From the outset, 
they adopted a very moderate or diluted nationalistic approach.  They 
adopted a non-violent and non-confrontational approach to advance their 
cause, thereby avoiding overt nationalistic policies, which contrasted with 
other Islamist parties.  KIU had a long term vision that defined their 
pathway to power.  They initially focused primarily on preaching and 
aiding the poor, the young and the educated.  This strategy served their 
objectives well.  They grew exponentially, particularly during the difficult 
times for the 1990s, gathering palpable support and sympathy across 
Kurdistan Region.  Up to this point, they did not need to engage in public 
debates on nationalism. Their transformation came when they needed to 
translate their ground support into votes for power. 
b.     In keeping with MB movements elsewhere and with the Turkish 
AKP, the KIU entered the parliamentary political process in Kurdistan 
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and began competing for votes in subsequent elections. They needed to 
appeal to a wider (more secular) audience than their traditional Islamic 
sympathisers. They had to compete with the secular nationalistic parties, 
including the KDP and PUK, as well as the other Islamist parties (Komall 
[KIK] and Bizutnawa [IMIK]). They therefore introduced numerous 
Kurdish nationalistic narratives into their literature and began to debate 
these openly. They had to be seen to be promoting the Kurdish cause, 
Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism in addition to moderate Islam. 
As a result, by design or by default, they have ended up contributing 
significantly to Kurdish nationalism. The evidence becomes clearer when 
you look at their policies and the performance of their MPs and Ministers 
in Baghdad against the anti-Kurdish lobby.  
c.     On the international stage, KIU founders and supporters presented 
themselves as Kurds while integrating with international Muslim world. 
They promoted the Kurdish cause, Kurdish culture, and Kurdish 
distinctive identity. They achieved milestones for the Kurds among 
Islamic movements in the Arab and Islamic world.  They won financial 
and political support too”. 
To reflect on this last point, when the KIU was participating in the former Iraqi 
opposition conferences, such as those which were held in Washington, London 
and Salahaddin, they were not classified alongside the Islamists due to their 
nationalist politics. Right from their early years of being a political party, the KIU 
behaved politically as a nationalist party. This was the political realisation as 
what was required from them as a political party. These days, with the Kurds 
fighting against ISIL, despite there being disagreement between many of those 
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non-Kurdish Islamists in the region of the ME and worldwide, we haven‟t yet 
heard an honourable condemnation by them on the ISIL‟s aggression towards 
Kurdistan. This shows the extent of the nationalist politics of the Islamists 
against Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, despite their criticism of the nationalist 
views of the KIU, their own nationalist politics is slowly becoming more clarified.    
 
7.4 Nation State: 
After the First World War, under the mandate of the British and French and 
according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, many nation states in the Middle East 
first came into existence. Kurds were the biggest nation that was deprived from 
the equal rights that all the other nations gained. This was not the only 
deprivation which the Kurds suffered under the new circumstances; they also 
lost their unity due to the geopolitical map drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreement. 
Where the Ottoman Empire had controlled the territory of Kurdistan, this land 
was divided between the newly created Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This follows the 
historic first division in 1639 which drew a border between the warring Ottoman 
and the Safavid Empires at great cost to the Kurds. 
Therefore, every ethnicity in the region was granted a nation state apart from 
the Kurds. Since that moment, the Kurds have been in an ongoing struggle to 
regain their national rights. To this end, they have undergone and experienced 
many revolutions, rebellions, prolonged guerrilla warfare, massacres, chemical 
bombing and genocide from the invading regimes of Kurdistan.  
These days, with the existence of the Kurdish Islamic political parties, it has 
become a priority for the public to know the stance of those Islamists in regards 
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to the national rights of the Kurds, particularly the right of self-determination. 
The main two Islamic parties, the KIU and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) (also 
known as KIK), have already called for the right to self-determination. To 
elaborate on this issue, I asked some of the leaders of the KIU the following 
question: "In your recent congress in early May this year, you adopted self-
determination and called for a nation state as a strategic aim in your manifesto. 
What does this mean, and how are you going to achieve it?". Abubakir Ali 
(2012) answered as follows: 
"Obviously, we alone cannot achieve this. What is important is to 
recognise this right, and the level of thought in our party at this level. 
Creating a Kurdish nation state is a natural right for the people of 
Kurdistan. Like all the nations in this world, Kurds must have their right to 
self-determination. Nowadays, we are raising the idea of intellectual 
education, and try to normalise this idea with the other Islamists in the 
region in order to encourage its use. Another strategic point of ours is to 
gain the support of the other Islamists on the Kurdish issue. Wherever 
there is any attempt to gain the self-determination of the people of 
Kurdistan, we will participate in these”.  
Burhan Ahmad (2012) answered the question as follows: 
"I think the best mechanism to achieve this important issue is the unity of 
the Kurdish people. I am afraid, many times, that the KDP and PUK don't 
come to a unified statement or come to a disagreement with the central 
government [of Iraq] unless they are under pressure. We haven't yet 
reached this step of having a nation state; this is the fault of the KDP and 
PUK, as they couldn't step towards this. In all these nations which have 
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achieved self-determination, the first step for them was their own internal 
unity. Hence, the best mechanism is that we as Kurds have a big aim 
such as this and gather around it. To make that big aim our strategy, 
then we all as seculars, Islamists and communists must work for it".  
From this quote, we can see that what is important for the KIU is their belief in 
and calling for self-determination and having a nation state for the Kurds. An 
important step in this, in the viewpoint of the KIU, is to gather around a goal 
which unifies all the Kurds despite their ideological differences. In regards to the 
position of the surrounding nations in Iraq, Iran and Turkey towards the Kurds 
taking this step, they believe that those nations must ultimately come to a 
conclusion to admit the rights of the Kurds, then work together for the benefits 
of all the nations of the region. This approach by the KIU in believing their ability 
to convince them may be naive, but for them the Islamic tie is an important one 
in order to build trust between them and in order to convince those brother 
nations. This conclusion is necessary in the long run, to avoid further wars in 
the region and to benefit from the revenues of the region. However, it relies 
upon the politics of the entire region, as well as the politics and assistance of 
international players, which until this moment have not helped to contribute 
towards solving the issue. It also depends on the independent evolutions of the 
societies of the region, especially in their understanding and reaction to the 
concept of nationalism. Shamerani (2012) further elaborates on this strategy of 
working towards achieving this goal: 
"We believe, in terms of our religion and nationalism, in the rights of self-
determination for the Kurdish people. For this reason, we have made it 




Theoretically, we will have dialogues, especially with our neighbours who 
are Arabs, Turks and Persians, in cooperating through the mechanism of 
religion. We will work hard on supporting this dialogue. 
We will work together with all of the political parties in Kurdistan to strive 
to achieve and safeguard this right and to demonstrate that it is our 
religious and nationalist duty to strive for it”.  
 
Bawamurad (2012) answered as follows: 
"We came to the conclusion that the Turks are practicing good 'Turkism', 
the Persians are practicing good 'Persianism' and the Arabs are 
practicing good 'Arabism', both in terms of nationalism and religious 
commitment. In the face of this, we believe that our nation is facing a 
three-sided attack. We have the prerequisite requirements and viability to 
be a state. One of the prerequisites for having a state is a good 
economy, and we have this economy in Kurdistan. We are surrounded 
by few religious powers [states], which have a negative effect on 
Kurdistan; we as Islamists in the region have our influence. We try to 
introduce this idea to them, because we share an identity, which is the 
religious identity. However, we are different in our national identity. It 





Similarly, Mohammad Ahmad (2012) answered as follows: 
"We consider that we have two pathways. The first one is to try to keep 
our unity as Kurds against the external influences. The second one is to 
work hard internally to encourage a fundamental reform in the 
administration and in the political system of the region. Through this, our 
political system will grow. In terms of the other parts of Kurdistan, each 
part will have to endure democratic, political and civil strife in order to 
gain their national rights. The other states in the Middle East have been 
built on the basis of nationalism; our nation, too, has to have its own 
nation state. Therefore, similar to the European Union, we can form a 
nation which will benefit all the nations in the region, on the basis of 
shared interests. Through democracy, human rights and self-
determination, we can build a nation state for the Kurdish people. We are 
in no way whatsoever, and never will be, against the national interests of 
any state".   
Since the rapid changes in much of the world's politics, including Middle Eastern 
politics, it is likely that changes may come to the Kurdish issue in the region. 
Already, the situation in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq has advanced so that it is 
in some ways a semi-independent region. Keeping within Iraq whilst continuing 
to support and develop constitutional rights and economic progress 
demonstrates an advanced example to the rest of the Kurds in the region. For 
the Kurds in Syria, although there are still many challenges, but through 
changes of regime or not, they are likely to in time guarantee a kind of self-
ruling which can already be somewhat observed.  
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In Turkey, the Kurdish case has reached a level which is impossible for the 
Turks to deny anymore. The peace process has already theoretically proved the 
existence of the Kurds as a political case with its own national rights. In order 
for Turkey to advance its economic growth and political model, there is no other 
option for them but to settle down to developing the recognition of the Kurdish 
people to a level that would be acceptable to the Kurds in Turkey. As for Iran, in 
comparison to the results of the Kurdish situation in the mentioned three 
countries, and with Iran's attempts to enter the international arena with an 
acceptable policy, there is certainly room for improvement in developing a fairer 
policy towards the Kurdish issue. Nonetheless, it can be seen that the Kurdish 
issue is advancing, and is in no danger at the time of writing to returning to the 
dark stages of the twentieth century.  
 
The Middle East at some point must resolve its conflicts and reach a level of 
peace; therefore, a necessary and serious issue which would help to stabilise 
the region is to fairly reconcile the Kurdish issue. The Kurds themselves are 
realising this fact, and to some extent they are already ready for the upcoming 
stage of this journey. One indication of this is their avoidance of Sunni Shia 
sectarianism, and their attempts to develop a balanced policy with the major 
players in the region. The fighting of ISIL on a land area of over 1000 kilometres 
has already advanced the Kurdish case more than ever. To further understand 
the issue of nation state and self-determination as recognised by the KIU, 
Amin's answer (2012) is relevant: 
"We, from our Islamic perspective, recognise and admit the right of every 
nation to have its own state. In previous years, the KIU has had many 
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Turkmen members; the KIU encouraged them to go and establish an 
Islamic, nationalistic Turkic party, which has turned into the Turkmen 
Justice Party. Most of these members were our members, whom we 
encouraged them to go and establish their own party for their nation. 
Because whatever we consider as a right for ourselves, we have to 
consider it for the Arabs, Turkmen, Persians, and all other nations too. 
Alongside this, we believe that the Kurdish nation must be satisfied and 
have its own self-determination. This is a natural right for the Kurdish 
nation”.  
 
In answering the similar question, "Is this an attempt for Iraqi Kurdistan, or for all 
parts of Kurdistan?”. Amin (2012) answered "Now, at this stage, it is for the Iraqi 
Kurdistan, with a demand for federalism for the other parts of Kurdistan. 
However, principally for us, the existences of an independent state on the whole 
land of Kurdistan, for the Kurds as a nation, is a legitimate right". 
 
Although all the answers recorded from the leadership of the KIU are focused 
on peaceful means and dialogue, it is clear that they ultimately are calling for 
the national rights of the Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan. Solving the issue of the 
Kurds as a package gives a real and realistic solution for the issue in the entire 
region. Otherwise, solving the issue only partially will cast a shadow over the 
whole region and lead to further turbulence in the area. There is a crucial point 
that must be reached by all the four countries under which the land and the 
people of Kurdistan are divided. For instance, when they adopt and practice a 
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nationalist politics, they must realise that the real solution for the Kurds under 
their power must be a nationalist solution too. If nationalism were to be 
diagnosed as a disease, the treatment must be the same medication for the 
same disease everywhere; unless the disease were to be eradicated meaning 
no medication is required. 
 
In answering the question, "What does Kurdish and Kurdistan mean to you? Is it 
worth continuing the tension over being Iraqi or Kurdistani?”.Mohammad Ahmad 
(2012) answered as follows: 
"As states are built on the nationalist basis, we too say that we are a 
nation. It is our right to have our own nation state. Otherwise, let's have 
other nations abandon their own nation states, and then we can agree. 
Then we have no problem, and would not need to talk about being Iraqi 
or Kurdistani".  
 
Similar to the issue of secularism and Islamism in the Middle East, nationalism 
too seems to be a reaction by both secular and Islamist nationalists. In a sense 
that a nationalist from one nation might argument with another in other nation 
when it comes to nationalism. For instance, if any individuals or groups from the 
Middle East live in Europe or American, they would not raise the issue of 
nationalism and they would all live happily in homogeneous and multicultural 
societies despite their national diversities. However, when these same people 
go back to the Middle East, or even discuss nationalism whilst in the west, they 
can easily disagree and become agitated over the joined issues of nationalism 
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and ethnicities. This clearly demonstrates the limitations of nationalism over all 
other human social forms, including Islamism. However, if an actor such as the 
KIU could possibly convince other Islamic players to give national rights to the 
Kurds, then that would disprove this allegation.                                                                                                            
 
7.5 Reform: 
Nowadays, the concept of reform in Kurdistan is constantly discussed. In the 
Kurdistan region over the last years, this has been heavily discussed in the 
media, especially by the opposition political parties. Among the political parties 
calling for reform was the KIU. In other occasions, the KIU has claimed to be 
the pioneer in calling for reform. It is claimed that this call for reform has cost 
the party hugely, and led to it being under attack by the ruling party in the 
Badeenan region on a couple of occasions in 2005 and 2011. In regards to this, 
I asked them “What would you reform?”. Mohammad Ra'uf (2012) commented 
on this: 
"When we say we are a reformist party, we are not radicals. We 
gradually reform individuals, society and the political system. Reform in 
our perspective is an ongoing process, and we are not a radical 
movement which believes in rapid changes that make no long-term 
difference. The reformist movements work on the human's mind and on 
society, and then continually work on the political system. Hence they 
have an internal dynamic. At the same time, we have focussed on two 
things; the first one is society, which we always need to advance. The 
second one is ruling in a just manner; if there is no just ruling, it would be 
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a dictator ruling. A society is never going to be prosperous, unless the 
ruling is just. This is what we consider to be the essence of the 
philosophy and thought of Islam. One of the characteristics of the KIU is 
that we haven't drawn this idea from any Islamic resources of 
jurisprudence".   
 
Drawing justice and reform from Islamic principles is one of the ideas which the 
KIU claims to be working on. For them the broader political philosophy in Islam 
is to implement justice, and to maintain this justice continual reform is 
necessary. For the Secretary General of the KIU, reform is a form of social 
remedy. Mohammad Faraj (2012) commented in regards to reform as follows: 
"Reform has two meanings, an Islamic and a political one. In Marxism it 
is the opposite to radicalism, in a sense of revolution and fundamental 
changes. However, for us, reform is remedy. In society, we have to rely 
on reform. We have to fix the mistakes. We in the KIU believe that the 
individuals by default are all respected, because God in the Qura'n (17: 
70) says that “Indeed we have honoured the children of Adam”. This 
means every human has to be looked at as a human and has to be 
respected. What we reform is the human's action. The radicals, on the 
other hand, dismantle the human and the action together. This is wrong; 
we do not do so. We try to remedy the action, because he is a human, 
and he has his own rights just like me. It is true his action is wrong, but 
we need to fix his mistakes for him, not eradicate him. Therefore, the 
concept of reform for us is to remedy the actions, not to eradicate the 
action and the actor together. Sometimes if a person has made a 
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mistake, he has at the same time done many good deeds too; I cannot 
because of the mistake deny the many good deeds".   
 
When we talk about remedy in a society, this gives the impression that by 
nature that society is healthy, but that, due to some unfortunate circumstances, 
it needs treatment. This kind of vision made the KIU right from the start a 
different and distinct Islamic and political party.  
 
In terms of its Islamic nature, as a reformist movement, it separated it from the 
other Islamist parties, who regard society and the ruling elites as deviations 
from Islam. This is the boundary between the extreme radical Islamists and the 
moderates‟ reformists, who consider the society, including the rulers as 
Muslims, as needing to reform through an ongoing process. In any society, 
reform in this sense is crucial and always necessary.  
 
In terms of its political nature, the KIU wanted and strived for a reasonably 
moderate reform in comparison to the other opposition political parties, save for 
some of their members who were under the influence of the Change movement 
in Sulaimani. The general trend of the opposition was moderate and realistic, 
which led to reasonable negotiation by the leadership of the party and therefore 
a strong participation in the coalition government that came to exist after the 
general election of 2013 in the region.  
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This led to them also having a stronger position in governance when examining 
the level of their criticism during the opposition, and the performance of the 
governing within the coalition government. Right after the election, Mohammad 
Ra'uf (2013) in a television interview on Rudaw mentioned that they proudly 
wish to participate in the coalition government, as they had no extreme 
opposition which would lead to any embarrassment in working with others. 
Without a reform policy, this was not an easy message for the leadership of the 
KIU to deliver. Adopting a language for reform is one of the characteristics 
which helped the KIU shift from a mere Islamic movement to a credible political 
party with a strong political weight in the region.        
 
7.6 Realpolitik: 
This segment will consider the realpolitik of the KIU,and its political practices as 
a Kurdish nationalist party,on behalf of the Kurds in the Kurdistan region, 
Baghdad and the wider Kurdistan. However, it is crucial to note that I am 
looking here at the nationalistic progress of this political party, not necessarily 
aiming to praise it. Therefore, it is not my interest to consider the many 
criticisms that have been highlighted in critiques of the party.   
 
7.6.1 In Kurdistan region: 
7.6.1.1 Mediating and Peace Making: 
Right from the beginning of the party in 1994, due to the fact that the KIU had 
no militia, as a civil political party, it always relied on peaceful means to 
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demonstrate its politics. This civil politics and non-militia platform provided an 
opportunity for it to mediate between the fighting factions in the region. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four,Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) summarised the KIU‟s 
attempts in mediating between the fighting parties in the aforementioned period. 
Even after the growth of the opposition, and during the peaceful political 
struggle between the different political parties, the KIU maintained this role. 
According to the Anadolu Agency (2015) Mohammad Faraj, the Secretary 
General of the KIU, was nominated as the Figure of the Year 2015 by the 
Garmian Centre for a referendum. In the celebration of the nomination, 
Bawanoori (2015), the director of the centre,declared the main two reasons of 
the nomination as: "for his prominent role as the Secretary General of the KIU in 
serving the political process and his peace making and mediating between the 
Kurdish political parties". As tensions arose between the main political parties in 
2015, as the result of the dispute over the election of the president79 of the 
region, again the KIU endeavoured to mediate and sought a peaceful resolution 
of the crisis. According to Kurdiu.org (2015a) Mr. Angus McKee, the Consul 
General of the United Kingdom in Erbil, in a meeting with the Secretary General 
of the KIU highly praised the KIU's efforts in the process of bringing the political 
parties of the Kurdistan region together, and its emphasis on generating a 
consensus between the parties over the question of the presidency of the 
region. With regard to the same issue, Kurdiu.org (2015b) reports that in a 
similar meeting the Consul General of the USA, Matthias Mitman, further to his 
appreciation of the KIU,called for the KIU to continue in its efforts, which in his 
opinion were appropriate for Kurdistan. 
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Apart from the statements mentioned, there are many others by politicians80, 
journalists81, organisations and other political institutions that gave credit to the 
KIU for its peaceful approaches and mediations. Kurdiu.org (2014) records the 
award of a prize to Salahuddin Mohammad Bahaddin on the anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The prize was conferred by the Human 
Rights Development Organisation, which stated that Salahaddin Mohammad 
Bahaddin is one of the figures of Kurdistan Region who has served prominently 
in the scope of humanitarian, peace, and human rights inside and outside the 
region.  
 
7.6.1.2 Maintaining the Unity of the Region: 
The renowned Kurdish journalist Qurbani (2016), who is associated with the 
PUK, in an article published in Rudaw prior to the seventh congress of the KIU, 
said that his main objective in writing about the KIU was "the necessity of 
preservation of the KIU and its advantage to the unity of the Kurds is linked to 
its overall political existence [in the entire of the region]82". The principle reason 
for Qurbani's article is to bring to light the fact that the region is already divided 
between two different areas – one called Badinan controlled by the KDP, and 
                                                          
80 For the praises of politicians from different political backgrounds to the KIU in its first three 
years as a political party See Ali, A., (Karwani), 1997, Yakgrtooi Islami Kurdistan La Waqi9 w 
NaxiCamawarda(KIU in the Actual Life and Heart of the Masses), Ministry of Education Press, 
Sulaimani, Kurdistan Region.  
 
81
 See the media mogul RebinHardi (2014) describing the role of Salahaddin Bahaddin the 
Secretary General of KIU in pacifying the tensions between the PUK and Change movement 
(Gorran).   
 
82
As stated earlier, virtually all the Kurdistan region is divided between the two controlled areas 
dominated by the KDP and PUK, accordingly their existence in the area under the other party remained 
relatively weak. This is the case with all the other parties. Thus, the only major political party that exists 
equally in the two areas is the KIU.   
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the other called Soran controlled by the PUK. This kind of division has a 
historical background, which is highlighted by Qurbani (2016) as follows: 
"From the beginning of the linkage of this part of Kurdistan to the Arabic 
Iraq, one of those tactics that all the Arab regimes were working on, was 
to create political and social chasms between (Badinan and Soran). 
Which during theKurdish revolution became the dominant areas of 
Malayi and Jalali83, andlateron the yellow and green administrative 
zones. This chasm has beenworking till this moment, in which its 
aftermath is still ongoing, and willdeepen. The risk of the chasm is not 
only maintaining two different crackedfronts,but also it will grow on the 
bases of hatred, refusal of the otherand opposing each other". 
 
Hence, for Qurbani the KIU can be a shared entity between the Badinan and 
Soran regions,with the major Kurdish political parties cooperating with the KDP 
and PUK, who had worked on deepening the chasm between the two 
regionsthat originally had two different dialects,Badini and Sorani,to distinguish 
them from each other. Qurbani (2016) refers to the necessity for the existence 
of the KIU as such "probably themselves[the KIU members] do not realise the 
necessity of preservation and growth of the KIU how much it serves the national 
unity for the time being and for the future of the Kurds". The whole discussion 
comes from the viewpoint that the KIU exists equally in both regions, which is a 
unique case among the political parties, which generally exist in one or other of 
the regions. This by itself is an ongoing potential danger for the unity of the 
Kurds in the region.  
                                                          
83
the terms Jalali and Malayi refer to the traditional rivalry between the faction that followed Jalal 
Talabani, which is called alali after him, and Malayis refers to the followers of Mula Mustafa of Barzan.   
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It is not merely an accidental position that the KIU was blessed and distinct 
among the Kurdish political parties in southern Kurdistan. More importantly, it is 
the practical position of the KIU, thatintervened to safeguard the unity of the 
region. In addition to what has been recorded by Abdulaziz (2011: 70-81) by 
highlighting the KIU's efforts in mediating between the fighting parties of the 
region to maintain its unity, there are other examples of action by the KIU. 
When on 14 January 2015 there were attempts to separate theShangal district 
into an independent canton (Mohammad, 2015),   according to Islam Paik 
(2015) the Secretary General of KIU made a statement against it, in which 
stated "we are against proclamation of the canton of Shangal, because it will 
fragment us. The Kurdish nationalist movement should have thought of uniting 
all parts of Kurdistan, not attempting to fragment the southern Kurdistan under 
any name or excuse". This was a case of the KIU calling and working for a 
unified position between all the political parties,before and after the regime 
change in Iraq. Ikhwanweb (2006) refers to the statement of the KIU Politburo 
on the tenth anniversary of its declaration, where it emphasised the call for 
internal unity of the region, stating "Unify the internal home and relation of 
Kurdistan by ending the period of double administration of the Kurdistan Region 
Government; unify the political discourse on federal system basis".    
 
Immediately after the proclamation of the party in 1994, when the civil war 
between the KDP and PUK broke out, the KIU began its efforts to reunify the 
region by initiating a peace process between the fighting parties. In its first 
political project to rectify the situation in Kurdistan, which was issued on 27 
June 1994, the KIU suggested seven points. In point five, where Abdulaziz 
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(2011: 201) recorded the KIU's initiation, it states the following: "reopening the 
headquarters and offices84 of the both major parties [KDP and PUK] all over 
Kurdistan, in the same way before the clashes. This is in order to abandon all 
thoughts of dividing Kurdistan, and regain the trust by the two parties". By taking 
an overview of the points of the KIU‟s political manifesto85, it becomes clear that 
the nationalistic feelings and keenness for the unity of the Kurdistan region 
come from their belief in what they are doing. Furthermore, to prove these 
behaviours truly emerge from their political belief, the KIU membership office 
(2008e: 61-220) has adopted topics such as: nationalism, nation loving, human 
rights, lessons from the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan, and the geography 
of Kurdistan in the Cultural Curriculum: Cultural Appendix of the Educational 
Curriculum for Nominees. In the first stage of party membership, the members 
of the KIU are going to be educated on these elements, in order topromote the 
values of nationalism in them.  
 
7.6.1.3 Combating all Kinds of Terror in the Name of Islam and Pioneering 
Non-Militia Political Model:  
The KIU from its beginning tried to make its hallmark a moderate, non-militia 
Islamic party, and in this waydifferentiate itself from other Islamists and non-
Islamists. Its first manifesto, published on 6th February 1994, clearly underlined: 
“We believe that in our struggle principles, in order to reach our 
objectives, we have to believe in freedom of thought and thought 
                                                          
84
 When in May 1994 clashes between the supporters of the PUK with supporters of KDP occurred 
(Global Security, 2014) in all controlled areas by the PUK, all the headquarters and offices of the KDP 
were controlled by the PUK supporters and vice versa. Thus the situation became as if the Badinan region 
became a region for the KDP and Soran for the PUK. 
85
 See the manifesto in Abdulaziz (2011: 155-194). 
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differences. Compulsory and imposing is not acceptable in Islam. (Quran 
2: 256) „There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion‟. We 
believe in moderateness in intelligibility, media and preaching. We do not 
prefer any kind of extremism in religiosity”. (KIU Media office, 1998: 11) 
 
Essentially, being a civil political party without any kind of militia was pioneering 
a political model that, after the liberation of Iraq in 2003, became a role model in 
the process of de-radicalisation. Although it was questionable for a political 
party to survive in such a chaotic environment without a militia to protect itself, 
the KIU tried to make it a feature of its strength. Ali (2008) commented that: 
“the messiah was KIU and its new model of the political challenge. The 
first right decision made by KIU was to avoid any military activities and 
remained without any militia. This political farsightedness helped KIU get 
along with all of the different parties, groups and interests in the region. 
At that time, it was fairly unbelievable to have a party without militia and 
survive, but was able to read the facts and the figures correctly and not 
to do the same mistake of the others. KIU general secretor, Salahuddin 
Muhammad Bahaddin in the answer of a Turkish journalist who had 
asked about the ability to survive without militia said that their civilian 
nature is the secret of their success”. 
 
The KIU paid the price of calling for moderation starting from the first year of its 
proclamation as a party. On 6 October 1994, just eight months from its 
foundation, a terrorist group called the Islamic Jihad Clique in Iraqi Kurdistan 
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assassinated FuadChalabi, one of its leaders in Hawler, and started attacking 
their charitable medical clinics in Akre and elsewhere. As mentioned in chapter 
three, the main reason for this hatred of the party of the KIU was from their 
standpoint of refusing extremist behaviour and publicly denouncing all kinds of 
extremism and violence. However, the response of the KIU was to insist on 
continuation of the same policy of denouncing all kinds of extremism and calling 
upon the role of law in reaction to violations. The KIU, in a statement issued on 
7 October 1994, in reaction to the assassination reiterated its policy, stating that 
terrorists would never be able to stop the moderate peacemakers, in particular 
the KIU (KIU Media office, 1998: 39). 
 
In its literature, the KIU persistedwith this stance. For instance, in the KIU Media 
office (1998), which contains the manifestos and statements of the Kurdistan 
Islamic Union from 6th February 1994 until 27th December 1998, there are 
statements showing the position of the KIU against terror, terrorists, militia and 
violation of the human rights. In a statement after its second congress on 24 
August 1996, it emphasized that the congress renewed its non-militia strategy. 
It also considered dialogue to be the best solution for communication between 
the political entities. (KIU Media office, 1998). Furthermore, on the occasions on 
the first, second, third and fourth anniversaries of the proclamation the party, 
the politburo of the KIU focussed on dialogue, freedom of thought and 
expression, pluralism, moderatism, fighting against terror and militias. (KIU 




More importantly, the KIU was consistently working on the education of its 
members and followers through its membership curriculum, publications and 
media. Internally, for instance, the members‟educational curriculum, in the third 
stage, course two, lessons two, three and four have three subjects entitled 
'Qadhiat al-takfeer wal-9unf al-fikri fee al-tareekh wal-waqi9 al-mua'sir: 1, 2 and 
3' (the issue of blasphemisation and the thought violence in history and 
contemporary situation 1, 2 and 3) (KIU Membership Office, 2008c: 22-56). 
Externally, the KIU became a role model and a school for moderatism for 
Islamists and non-Islamists alike. The Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG) and 
Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), after the 2003 events, followed suit 
in adopting a non-militia political party stance. Also, newly emerged non-Islamist 
political parties such as the Change Movement (Gorran) benefited from the 
experience of the KIU in this regard. 
 
Nowadays, several members of the KIU are leading moderatism think tanks and 
forums, such as International Moderatism Forum, which opened its branch in 
Kurdistan86 on 3 October 2015, led by Salahuddin Bahaddin, the Secretary 
General of the KIU. This was another timely reaction to ISIS and combatting 
extremist thoughts among the Kurds. The former politburo member and head of 
the KIU's parliamentary bloc, Dr. Omar Abdulaziz, is a leading thinker of this 
forum, who has written extensively about extremism and terror, especially in his 
series articles entitled 'ZnciraiTwnrawi'87 (the Series of Extremism) published in 
the local media. He is also a prominent speaker on the subject in the media, 









lectures and forums throughout the region. Abubakir Ali (Karwani), a former 
politburo member and candidate for the Secretary General post in the seventh 
congress, is another leading member who has his own stamp in this regard. 
Karwani in 2015 wrote a book entitled 'Daesh La NewanTwndrawiAeeni w 
ShkstiDawlatda' (ISIS between religious extremism and state failure).  
 
Further, in combatting all kinds of extremism, Tahsin Hama Ghareeb of the KIU 
cadre, and scholar, founder and director of Hazhan88 magazine and website, 
has been working on presenting a Kurdish version of Islam. He cautions against 
moderate Islam among the Kurds being hijacked by non-Kurdish extremists. 
Similarly the former member of the KIU politburo, Abdulrahman Siddiq89, works 
in the same direction criticising the extreme interpretation of Islamic texts that 
have been utilised by terrorists, and calls for a Kurdish version of Islam. Finally, 
there is a list of new young generation scholarswho work in the same 
direction90, an example being Qani9 Xursheed, the founder and director of 
'ProjaiBiriMianarawee' moderatism thought project, which so far has published 
more than 40 books91, presented a series of radio programmes, published CDs, 
run courses, organised talks, lectures and educational camping.   
  
Overall, when we talk about moderatism, we need to bear in mind that it is 
growing in a democratic context.The less room that is afforded to religious 
nationalism, the more terror grows. In other words, either we deal with the 










Islamists democratically in the context of religious nationalism, or the chance for 
the rise of terror is increased. Using the example of depriving the MB in Egypt 
from democracy and the active participation of AK party of Turkey can help in 
this regard. However, the responsibility of a political party such as the KIU will 
increase in a democratic framework due to its religious background. Also, the 
shared responsibility is extended to other local and international entities who 
care for democracy and are serious in combatting terror. Because,firstly, when 
we talk about religion, we talk about submission, servitude, sincerity, 
faithfulness, peace, harmony, and kindness towards one‟s self and others. 
However, when we see a deviation within a particular religion by a group of 
people or individuals, this is no more a religious act. Secondly, it is the duty of 
the followers of that particular religion, before anyone else, to repel, face the 
deviation and treat it. It is then the duty of other people to work with the people 
of that religion to remedy the deviation, instead of taking advantage of the 
situation to accuse the religion itself for what that group or individual(s) have 
done. Thirdly and finally, by ignoring the second point, the circle of deviation will 
widen, and will eventually reach globally.  
 
7.6.1.4 Introducing Good Character Cadres and Statesmen:  
In order to examine the KIU‟s claim of providing good character statesmen to 
the nation, I first will look at what my interviewees said in this regard. ThenI  will 
look at elements in the member‟s curriculum. Finally, I will be looking at some 
examples whohave gone through the process of the KIU‟s preparation. 
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Muhammad Ra‟uf (2012)92 in reply to „how do they prepare statesmen?‟ 
answered as follows: 
“We through three mechanisms create statesmen. We have already 
practiced two of them, and will step towards the third one from now on. 
The steps are: 
The first mechanism is preparing individuals on the basis of our 
moderate thinking, and in the light of our programme. We produce an 
individual, whenever he/she undertakes a post will be dealing with it 
professionally. He/she would not betray the post, and would not mix 
between politics and the post. We will grow in the mind-set of our 
individuals to treat on the basis of citizenship concept, and not to practice 
a narrow-minded partisan in the framework of the state.  
The second mechanism is through those members who already 
gone through the first mechanism and have undertook state posts; they 
have practiced the required professionalism. This makes them pioneers 
for the later statesmen. 
Third mechanism is our plan for the future candidates for the 
parliament and the governorates councils to participate in special 
courses. Those courses will benefit from the expertise of those who 
already have experience in those fields, as well as other professionals, 
such as university professors and other technocrats”. 
There are a few elements in the membership curriculum of the KIU that indicate 
a positive inclination in preparing their members and cadres for the future as 
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 See appendix three.  
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principled statesmen. Here, we shall refer to some of those elements. In the 
educational curriculum, KIU Membership Office (2007: 261-271), in the series of 
the educationalcurriculum, stage one, part two, there is a subject entitled 
„Karigari Haram LasarJianiMrov‟ (the influence of ill-gotten on the human 
being‟s life). When looking at the many complaints about the corruption of the 
state officials, starting from the citizens, opposition parties, and ending up with 
the president of the region93, reconsidering education and values are 
fundamental and crucial from stage one of the political party‟s membership to 
combat stealing and dishonesty. Also, in the KIU Membership Office (2008e: 
83-98), in the series of the educational curriculum, stage two, part one, a 
subject under the title of trueness is thoroughly covered. Again, this is another 
important subject for future professionalism and political reform.    
Despite the above ethical examples in the membership curriculum of the KIU, 
there are other good political elements for educating the KIU‟s members. The 
following are subjects according to the referred sources: 
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 7-31), in the series of the cultural 
curriculum, cultural appendix of the educational curriculum for 
Enoch‟s stage: Politics. 
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 33-62): Political parties.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 63-72): Conducting a successful 
dialogue. 
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 73-90): „Shurra‟ (consultation), in 
which it interprets the concept differently as being as a system that 
obliges the rulers to listen to the citizens.  
                                                          
93
 See Zaman 2016.  
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- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 91-110): Democracy.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 111-124): Socialism.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 125-140): Westernisation.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 141-150): Globalisation.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008d, 194-207): The contemporary struggle 
of the people of Kurdistan.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008e, 185-234): The contemporary Islamic 
awakening and trends.  
- KIU Membership Office (2008e, 287-314): The history of the Kurds.             
Mustafa Abdullah (2016), the head of the KIU membership office, verified the 
following list of former members and supporters of the KIU who play political 
roles or as journalists in other political parties or media:  
Name Position 
Dr. Yousif Mohammad  Speaker of the Kurdistan Region Parliament 
Dr. Haval Abubakir Governor of Sulaimani Province 
Dr. Farhad Atrushi Governor of Duhok Province  
Hoshiar Abdullah Head of the Change Movement (Gorran) bloc in Iraqi 
Parliament, and the former director of KNN94. 
                                                          
94
KNN (Kurdish News Network) was founded in 2008 as a subsidiary of the Wusha Corporation, 
an independent Kurdish media group, and first started broadcasting on the 31st of December 
2008. KNN has been found as an independent channel linked with Wusha Cooperation for 
Kurdish Independent media, but Following the Gorran Conference in 2014, the media channels 
of Gorran Movement has been collected in a single organ of Gorran Movement which includes 





Ali Hama Salih Kurdistan Region Parliament Member 
Dr Mohammad Ali Hawrami Coordinator (Head) of Political Research Room of 
Gorran 
 
Abdulrahman Siddiq Moderatism thinker  
Dr. Zana Ra'uf  Former Kurdistan Region Parliament Member 
Ahmad Mira Editor in Chief of Liven Magazine and Press95 
Omed Qaradaghi Journalist and TV presenter   
Hiwa Jamal Presenter at Rudaw TV96 
Mohammad Ra‟uf  Presenter at KNN TV  
Hawar Jalaladin Presenter at Rudaw 
Shoxan Abubakir  Presenter at KNN TV 
 
                                                          
95
Lvin is a leading free media magazine and online press that reveals the truth about the corruption in the 
region. On different occasions its journalists were subjected to attacks by the corrupt officials, Soran 
Mama Hama its Kirkuk office's director was assassinated on 21 July 2008 (Reporters without Border, 
2011).  According to mission and the vision of the press, its objectives are the following: 
 1) Creation and growth of the free media in Kurdistan. 
 2) Publication of meticulous and correct information about the events and the changes related to 
the  daily life of the citizens. 
 3) Preserving the nationalistic strategy of the people of Kurdistan globally, without any 
chauvinistic  involvement.  
 4) Creation the utmost transparency in administration and politics in the Kurdistan Region. 
 5) Scrutinize the state and government institutions upon their responsibilities towards the 
citizens.  
 6) Practice of the values of democracy and humanism, and broadening the freedom of expression 
and  human rights.      
 7) Educating the masses in regards to anything that endangers the system of democracy, human 
 rights and wastes the national wealth.  
8) Abiding the journalism ethics and principles, especially the code of journalism conduct items, 




 See Rudaw Media Network: About Us (http://rudaw.net/english/about).  
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Critics blame the KIU for not being able to retain all  those good members, yet 
the KIU officials take the more positive view of presenting such good examples 
to society wherever they are serving.    
 
7.6.2 In Baghdad: 
The officials of the KIU proudly and always claim that they are the first line 
defenders of the interests of the people and the land of Kurdistan. This kind of 
defending has taken place in Kurdistan, Baghdad, abroad, and has been 
expressed in Kurdish, Arabic and English. On some occasions, because of 
these nationalistic sentiments, they have been accused by some non-Kurd 
Islamists as non-Islamist or even nationalists. Atroshi (2016) claims that: 
“The KIU had a pioneering role in Baghdad in regards to the Kurdish 
issue, and the unity of the Kurds and its outstanding stances in the Iraqi 
Parliament since the collapse of Saddam‟s regime in 2003. Since the 
participation of the Secretary General in the Iraqi Interim Governing 
Council (IIGC), he proved to all the unity of the Kurds. While in Baghdad 
the standpoint of the Islamist political parties were different than that of 
the secular ones. The KIU was presenting the Kurdish issue as an issue 
of a people, which is the people of Kurdistan, before anything else such 
as a religious or an ethnic issue”.   
 
It was an important historical juncture for the KIU to play nationalistically rather 
religiously after the fall of the regime in Baghdad. Many of the Islamists in Iraq, 
especially the Sunnis, were against the change and a foreign existence on the 
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land of Iraq. In Bahaddin‟s memoirs (2009: 13), relating his membership of 
IIGC, he recorded that during the meeting of a delegation of the IIGC with 
Michael Ancram, the British Shadow Foreign Secretary, on 23rd July 2003, the 
KIU Secretary General and IIGC member stated that “we need a just 
parliamentary federal civil ruling, not a religious ruling that some people 
imagine”. Undeniably, this was the call of the Kurdistan Parliament and KRG 
since 1992. Likewise, Haladny (2016) reiterates that “in Baghdad shoulder to 
shoulder with the other parliamentary blocs, we have been defending the 
national rights of our people”.      
 
These political positions of the KIU emanated from its political thought that since 
its establishment had worked on and educated its members. The second man 
of the party at the time, Hadi Ali, who at the tenth anniversary of the 
proclamation of the KIU published a book entitled „the KIU at its tenths 
anniversary: history, stances and achievements‟ elaborates on this as follows: 
“this characteristic of the KIU, i.e. being Kurdistani has no contradict at all 
with being Islamic. Because from our point of view, Islam as religion and 
source of values is a global and universal. However, as a social and 
political project, it has to be patriotic and nationalistic with reference to 
the society and homeland that works on”. (2004: 26).  
 
It has never been recorded that on any single occasion, in Baghdad, whether by 
members of parliament, ministers or other officials of the KIU, has a stand 
against the interests of the Kurds been taken due totheir  being Islamists or for 
315 
 
any other reason, even after being subject to attacks by the Kurdish ruling 
parties, such as those of the 2005 and 2011.  
 
7.6.3 In Other Parts of Kurdistan: 
According to the bylaws of the KIU (2008:10) in article five, specifically, under 
Kurdistani issues: point five, the Kurdish nationalist issue in other parts of 
Kurdistan has been adopted. It clearly “supports the nationalistic Kurdish issue 
in the other parts of Kurdistan for the sake of achieving their rightful demands in 
a peaceful and democratic manner”. Similarly, the draft of the bylaw adopted by 
the leadership council on 07 May 2016, which was presented to the seventh 
congress, has reiterated the same principle under article five, point six. (The 
KIU Leadership Council, 2016b: 5).   
 
Some other Kurdish political parties in southern Kurdistan had to work with 
Iran97 or Turkey against the Kurdish movements of those parts of Kurdistan, in 
order to guarantee the support of those countries on their side. However, the 
situation was extremely different with the KIU, as it has kept its hands clean 
towards fellow Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan due to its non-militia platform. 
Furthermore, the KIU has rendered possible services to them instead. 
According to Bahaddin (2009: 76) when the IIGC discussed the non-Iraqi 
organisations that the former Iraqi regime allowed to work in Iraq, he raised with 
                                                          
97
 For further details in this regard, please see author‟s article: „Iran’s Role in the Kurdistan Region‟. 
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the council the issue of the Kurdish opposition to Iran and demanded to 
dissimilate between them and the People‟s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran98.  
 
Haladny (2016) claims that “the KIU bloc [in Kurdistan region parliament] has 
supported and expressed its backing to the other three parts of Kurdistan by 
conveying parliamentary delegations and issuing formal statements or directly 
in bilateral meetings with the political parties and entities of other parts of 
Kurdistan”. Furthermore, in answering my question: (what has the parliamentary 
bloc of the KIU in Kurdistan region‟s parliament done for the sake of the Kurdish 
nationalism question?), Haladny (2016) summarised the main points, only in 
regard to western Kurdistan, as follows:  
“After the invasion of Kobani99 by ISIS, the Kurdistan Parliament 
delegated a parliamentary team, led by the KIU bloc, to visit the 
displaced people of the city on the border of Turkey and Syria. The 
delegation played the following roles: 
1. Visiting the displaced people and delivering the aids of 
parliament, this subsequent visit led to set up a camp for them. 
2. Meeting with all the political parties of the Western Kurdistan, 
particularly with the Democratic Union Party (PYD)100. 
3. Consecutively the delegation retuned to Kurdistan, and issued 
two important resolutions in the Kurdistan parliament as 
follows: 
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https://www.mojahedin.org/home/en 





A. Resolution number 24 of 2014: supporting the people of 
the Western Kurdistan in any kind of autonomy. This 
was the formal recognition of the Kurdistan Parliament 
to the will of the people of Western Kurdistan. 
B. Resolution number 28 of 2014: with regard to sending 
the Peshmarga forces to liberate Kobani”.  
 
As for northern Kurdistan, occasionally the KIU‟s officials claim that they have 
been trying to help the people of that part of Kurdistan. Khalil Ibrahim (2016), 
the former head of the relationship dossier of the KIU on Kurdish affairs in 
northern and western Kurdistan, and member of the executive body of KIU 
political bureau, stated that since the time of Najmaddin Arbakan101, we have 
been talking about the solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey with the Turkish 
government. We have told them that it is so crucial to solve this issue by the 
Islamists of Turkey. He added that this was our position with the AK party, too. 
Ibrahim (2016) summarised their efforts in the peace process between the PKK 
and AK party as follows:  
“We directly went to the PKK and delivered their demands to Ankara, and 
spoke to AK party as the ruling party directly conveying our message. 
Thus, we encouraged both sides, and we presented our opinions to 
them. Although, the peace process unfortunately has stopped now, we 
continued with both parties during the two and a half to three years of the 
process. Our role between the PKK and the Turkish government was 
initially secret. However, in 2013, the Secretary General Mr. Mohammad 
                                                          
101Najmaddin Arbakan: Turkey‟s first Islamist Prime Minister.  
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Faraj and I overtly visited Qandil102. This came after my other few visits 
to Qandil, then we visited Ankara and went back again to Qandil. Both 
sides thanked the KIU for our efforts, and Salahuddin Dameertash and 
his delegation in Sulaimani mentioned the role of the KIU103”.     
 
7.7 Concluding Remarks: 
This chapter highlighted the nationalist sentiments of the KIU. The elements of 
examining the feelings of nationalism were two types: theoretical and realpolitik. 
On the theoretical side, I looked at few thematic aspects, such as: Kurdish or 
Muslim, nationalism, nation state and reform. This part of the chapter dealt with 
the growth of the feelings of nationalism within the KIU, where the participants 
clearly expressed this feeling. For instance, when we looked at the theme 
(Kurdish or Muslim) clearly we noticed the growth of nationalism, by the 
participants expressing themselves as equally being Kurds and Muslims. 
Nationalism and nation state were two other aspects which touched upon the 
growth of nationalism and the nationalist demands of the KIU. Finally, the issue 
of reform that the party has been calling for, over the last decade, clarified the 
nature of the reform that the party hopes for, and framing the envisaged 
nationalism was another aspect to explore, to make it feasible within the field of 
the religious nationalism.           
   
                                                          
102
Qandil Mountain: is a mountain alone the KRG and Iranian border, where the central command centre 
of the PKK is based.  




In order to examine another side of the claimed nationalist slogans of the KIU, it 
was important to look at the practical day-to-day policies of the party. To test the 
realpolitik, I investigated the policies of the KIU in the Kurdistan region, 
covering: mediating and peace-making, maintaining the unity of the region, 
combatting all kinds of terror in the name of Islam, and its pioneering in 
becoming a non-militia political party model, with introducing good character 
cadres and statesmen. Then, I looked at the role of the party in Baghdad in the 
interest of Kurdish nationalism. Finally, I scrutinised the role of the KIU towards 
other parts of Kurdistan.   
 
Throughout the chapter, it became clear that the KIU is not a fundamental, 
dogmatic Islamic party that disregards the feelings for nationalism, nation state, 
with the one and only objective being towards a religious-framed ruling party 
that many of other Islamists strive for. Rather, it became quite clear that the 
political strife of the KIU towards Kurdish nationalism lacks nothing other than 









This study aimed to explore the concept of religious nationalism as a new trend 
among the Islamic political parties of the Middle East, with a focus on the 
establishment of a nation state. The importance of this issue comes from the 
fact that, over the last century, the establishment of territorial nation states in 
the Middle East faced many challenges, above all that of the Islamists 
considering the newly emerged nation states as anti-religious entities. 
Furthermore, highlighting and studying the juncture of the change through the 
stance of those Islamists at the level of political parties, and the challenge of 
becoming genuine nationalists with recognition of the nation states, is at the 
core of this project. The choice of using Islamism in Kurdistan as an anchor for 
this study is of particular importance due to the Kurds‟ deprivation of their 
desired nation state.Conversely other Middle Eastern nations, the Arabs for 
example, have no such problem; Kurdish Islamism is a unique case when 
discussing the experience of religious nationalism. 
 
Religious nationalism, defined by Juergensmeyer (1993: 40) as “the attempt to 
link religion and the nation-state”, is not a usage adopted by this study. Rather, 
the term „religious nationalism‟ here means specifically the reconciliation of 
those religious movements that, at the outset, opposed the new nation states, 
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which were, at the time, considered a cause of fragmentation in the united body 
of the Islamic caliphate. However, over time, as more Islamists integrated into 
politics, the more the reality of the new politics of the region was accepted, in 
the context of nation statehood. For instance, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) 
began as an Islamic movement with few nationalist objectives, though now it 
fervently supports Kurdish Nationalism. Thus, it is argued that the term „religious 
nationalism‟ in this context consists of the combination of previous religious 
movements, or Islamist movements, and the nationalism that they initially 
opposed.  
 
This new phenomenon of religious nationalism, according to the findings of this 
study, comes down to many factors.Above all, according to the Islamist‟s new 
political vision, the nature of Islam is as a religion that has left politics and the 
way of ruling entirely in the hands of the Muslim population; the political form is 
not determined by Islam as a particular type of caliphate, for instance. In other 
words, the existence of nation states is not contradictory to the teachings of 
Islam. For the Kurdish Islamists, and according to the leading figures of the KIU, 
the ultimate objective of Islam in ruling a state is to fulfil a judicial role, and as 
long as this role is fulfilled, the political form is not important. According to the 
findings of this study, another factor in the rise of religious nationalism is the 
treatment of Islam within a political context. Previously, Islam accepted the 
existence of Arab tribes, and similarly, it does not reject the existence of the 
national and ethnic diversity at the current time; this phenomenon has emerged 
from the introduction of Islamic political parties into nationalism, and the 
acceptance of this as the new political climate.   
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This study is not about religious authentication or judgement of any kind; neither 
is it a religious validation of any other  political behaviour or ideology. Rather, it 
is about the interrelation between religion and nationalism in a political context, 
with regard to Islam and the new nation states that emerged in the Middle East 
after the Ottomans. This relationship has gone through tumultuous phases, until 
eventually they came together and created a unified entity in the shape of 
religious nationalism. The initial opposition came after the rejection of secular 
nationalism to Islam, which led, consequently, to the Islamists reacting to this 
kind of nationalism.  
 
The typical nationalism that was adopted by the Kemalists in Turkey was 
exemplified as a secular nationalism, after which many of the nationalists in the 
Middle East followed suit. This type of nationalism, continuing with the example 
of Turkey, tried to assimilate all the ethnicities, languages and cultures into the 
amalgamated nation of Turkey. This policy eventually failed as it was in 
contradiction to the current successful examples of nationalism globally; in 
terms of the concept of citizenship, no single race governsits citizens. This 
policy was also in contradiction to the historical background of the region, 
where, for hundreds of years, the Islamic Empires, including the Ottomans, 
could not effectively run all the diverse groups under their control, without even 
attempting to assimilate them, in a sense of trying to making them a single race.  
 
When the Turkification policy of the Kemalists began, it provoked all ethnicities 
to call for racial nationalism. In practice, this kind of policy, in the name of 
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nationalism, was neither in line with the current nation states, nor with the 
historical background of Islamic coexistence. Despite the harsh opposition of 
the extreme secular nationalists towards religion in the Middle East, secularism 
has never been accepted by the masses. Overall, in the Middle East, since the 
early days of nationalism up to the present day, nationalism has never been 
accepted as a rival or surrogate to Islam by the public. Rather, recently, both 
secular and religious nationalists are attempting to theorise for the legitimacy of 
nationalism using Islamic texts and related literature.  
 
The historical relationship between religion and nationalism goes back to what 
Smith, (2003: 255-256) refers to as:  
“Four kinds of cultural resources and sacred foundation, drawn from 
earlier religious belief-systems, have been of particular importance in this 
regard: 
A myth of ethnic election, the conviction of being chosen for a 
covenant or mission, or both, by the deity; 
A long-standing attachment to particular terrains regarded as 
sacred and as belonging to the community, and it to them; 
A yearning to recover and realize the spirit of one or more golden 
ages, epochs of communal heroism and creativity; 
A belief in the regenerative power of mass and individual sacrifice 
to ensure a glorious destiny, and the importance of 
commemorating and celebrating the community and its heroes”. 
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In the early stages of Islam, such sacred ethnic homelands were regarded as 
„Jahiliah‟ (ignorance), and Islam abolished all kinds of ideas. Theconcept as 
stated by Smith (2003: 256) “was transferred, particularly in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition, to other lands in much later periods of history”, and 
eventually into Islam too. In all cases, religion has been used to philosophise 
and moralise the idea of „chosen people‟ and „sacred land‟, despite the fact that 
Islamic texts clearly regard such sentiments as ignorant. By developing such an 
ideology, when a nation portrays itself as a chosen one and its land as sacred, 
this encourages other nations to raise similar ideologies.  
 
The rise of nationalism in the Middle East over the last century, and the 
acceptance of nationalism and nation states by the Islamists, has created a 
multi-dimensional national identity. Karwani (2012) remarks “I am at the same 
time a Muslim and a Kurd, Oriental and cosmopolitan...etc.”. Taking into 
account the extreme religious and nationalist ideas that have led to global 
terror, finding shared values within the religion and humanity is a springboard 
towards peace and coexistence; religious nationalism can cross the path of 
religion and nationalism within different ethnicities of a given religion. The 
interest of each of those nations, as long as it is not on the basis of the religious 
dogma, will lead to further healthy relations across the world. In other words, if 
in the past the strong sense of belonging to religion led to war between the 
religious groups, then, in the era of nation building in the Middle East, the 
existence of this kind of religious nationalism could be the remedy, a step 
towards the coexistence of multiple nations within one religion; Islam, then, 
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would provide a pragmatic relationshipwith the rest of the world on the basis of 
shared interests.     
 
When a religion is subject to oppression, the sense of affiliation to the religion 
grows within both religious and non-religious individuals; the example of the 
Bosnian Muslims was highlighted by Smith (1987: 23) "In Yugoslavia, where the 
Muslims of Bosnia have decided to adopt the name „Muslim‟ as an ethnic 
designation in the Yugoslavian census, which requires everyone to name their 
nationality”. This is also the case with Muslim populated client states in Israel, 
Pakistan and the former Soviet Union, where religion led to nation states. At the 
same time, in these cases, it can be said that nationalism protected religion; 
within one nation in the Middle East, Islamism has grown as a reaction to 
secularism, as with Arab Islamists, and the early Kurdish Islamists too. 
However, when oppression is focused on ethnicity, the growth will be on the 
basis of nationalism. Furthermore, in cases like that of Kurdish nationalism, 
where the oppressors are other Muslim ethnicities, this inspires both secular 
and religious nationalists alike. Based on the arguments made, we will call the 
phenomenon under investigation a “Neo-religious nationalism” since it is not 
completely in line with Juergensmeyer‟s (1993: 40) view as the “attempt to link 
religion and the nation-state”. One of the characteristics of neo-religious 
nationalists is their claim that their political participation is for the sake of the 
religion and to serve the nation. In other words, serving their nation is one of 
their religious duties. Another characteristic is their understanding of Islam itself. 
They classify Islam into two different circles, a circle of creed and worship, 
which they call a closed circle, and an open circle for all other businesses 
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including politics. In the closed circle, innovation is prohibited, and it has to be 
as it was at the time of the prophet. As for the open circle, according to them, it 
is up to the interests and demand of the time, and they can be as creative as 
possible within it.    
 
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) came into existence on 6th February 1994, 
after a series of battles between the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) throughout 1992 and 1993. Although 
it was not an easy task for the KIU to present itself as a non-militia Islamic party, 
it was a source of pride for it as the first civil and non-militia Kurdish party in the 
Kurdistan region. Thus, this became a political model for the de-radicalisation 
process of both the IMIK and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), which followed 
after 2003, as well that of the Change Movement in 2009. More importantly, the 
KIU‟s vision of coexistence was religiously theorised. This was beneficial on two 
levels; firstly, it knocked down the barrier of ideological and religious hatred, 
andsecondly, it worked towards the concept of citizenship and being equal in 
the eyes of the law, in terms of equal citizenship, not on other religious, 
sectarian, racial or tribal affiliations.   
   
In order to highlight the shift by the KIU from being a preaching group to being a 
political party with many nationalism characteristics and demands, I adopted 
semi-structured interviews for my fieldwork, in which I interviewed many of the 
leading figures of the KIU. As a result, seventeenthemes, and another six 
themes under realpolitik, totalling 23 themes were identified in the fieldwork; 
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each of those themes demonstrated a side of this shift. Overall, the data is 
highly contributory towards the project, and aids the hypothesis. From the 
concluded themes, it is difficult to distinguish the differences between the KIU 
and any other nationalist parties. The evidence shows that the Islamic 
dimension cannot be a hindrance in efforts by the KIU to be an active religious 
nationalist political party, and conversely, has tried to use it to help the national 
demands of the Kurds.  
 
However, there are other obstacles faced by the KIU in their desire to be as 
popular as the AK of Turkey;for instance, the major issue is the combination of 
preaching and politics. The main challenges preventing the KIU from separating 
of the two are: internal disagreement, the nature of the voters, other Islamist 
rivals, and the risk of losing the trust of the grassroots. Other contributory 
factors include a long history of other parties calling for nationalism, the rentier 
economy that has already classified a large ratio of the voters on the side of the 
ruling parties and the sudden emergence of the Change (Gorran) movement in 
2009. 
 
Above all, the long history of the Kurds‟ call for nationalism, and the struggle of 
the whole nation in this regard, with no rights of self-determination and nation 
statehood as of yet, made the benchmark for any kind of political party a 
nationalist one.There is no raison d‟être for political parties without nationalist 
demands in the Kurdish political arena. In other words, for the Kurdish people, a 
political party with no or little nationalist demands will not survive. Therefore, it is 
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my hypothesis that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism, 
though this is the case with all other Islamic political parties including those in 
Turkey and in the Arab countries. However, the nature of the politics portrays 
different images; when the issue is a bread-and-butter issue or justice and 
development, then the political parties will align themselves accordingly. 
Nonetheless, they are all nationalists, and each of them reflects its own 
condition, the Kurdish nationalism being ever more highlighted. 
 
There are many examples that highlight the phenomenon of religious 
nationalism among the Islamic political parties of the Middle East.Each of them 
proves the reality of the nationalistic dimension of those political parties, just as 
with their sister non-Islamic parties in their struggle for their nations and nation 
states. To take the example of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Kuwait during 
the Iraqi regime's invasion in 1990, Kuwait had exerted every effort to liberate 
its land from the neighbouring Arab nation of Iraq, with the help of the non-
Muslim western coalition forces led by the USA. This was despite the stance of 
almost all other MBs worldwide which was against western „interference‟; yet 
the nationalistic logic of the Kuwaiti MBs, like their fellow Kuwaitis, welcomed 
that kind of „interference‟ to liberate their state. The position of all the Iraqi 
parties against the rights of the Kurds in Iraq since 2003, and the regime 
change, is still same as the Baath nationalists. This is despite the fact that all 
those political parties, apart from the Communist party, are Islamists. In Turkey, 
when the cease-fire ended and the war broke out, the AK party did not hesitate 
to fight the brother Kurds. This evidence demonstrates that all of these Islamic 
329 
 
parties are, in fact, nationalist. In the interest of their nations, they have no 
hesitation in fighting for their nations, just like any non-Islamic nationalist.      
Hence, in answering the research question, „Is Islamism defined by nationalism 
in Kurdistan?‟, the conclusion reached, through observed evidence and the 
findings of this research, as well as from the behaviour of all similar religious 
nationalists across the Middle East, is to the affirmative. Therefore, my 
hypothesis „that Islamism in Kurdistan is limited by the politics of nationalism‟ 
was, to some extent, correct. However, when we refer to Islamism, we mean 
the Islamic political parties, or what is sometimes called „political Islam‟. 
Otherwise, we do not refer to those Islamists who are not yet involved in politics 
as political parties. The main reason for this is, firstly, the political focus in 
Kurdistan is nationalism due to the deprivation of self-determination rights and 
the nation state of Kurdistan. Secondly, as mentioned above, and according to 
the findings, Islam itself demands nationalistic politics from Islamists. This is not 
only the case with the Kurdish Islamic parties, but also with all Islamic political 
parties across the Middle East; they are all religious nationalists. The only 
difference is the fact that the Kurdish situation is more prominent than other 
cases.       
 
Therefore, those Islamic political parties in the Middle East which are well 
integrated into politics and exhibit an advanced level of political performance 
are no longer Islamists in the traditional understanding of this term; rather, they 
represent a form of religious nationalism. Initially, Islamism as a political 
ideology in opposition to all other ideologies came into existence as a result of 
the harsh treatment of the secular nationalists towards Islam and its teachings. 
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However, the decrease in the perceived sense of threat, as well as the 
integration of political parties with Islamic teachings into mainstream political 
life, led to the birth of a new trend called religious nationalism. The more these 
„new‟ Islamists have integrated into the politics of nationalism, the more they 
have steered away from Islamism as an ideological dogma. Eventually, these 
Islamic political parties assumed the characteristic of religious nationalists.    
 
Finally, my recommendation for further study is to highlight the phenomenon of 
terrorism in the Middle East, including ISIS, under the shadow of the 
phenomena of religious nationalism. My personal initial hypotheses for such a 
relationship are as follow:  
The less room that is offered to religious nationalism, the more terror grows. In 
other words, either we deal with the Islamists democratically in the context of 
religious nationalism, or the opportunity for a rise of terror is increased. Using 
the example of depriving the MB in Egypt from democracy and the active 
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 چــاوپێـکەوتـوو لەگەڵ ئەبوبکـر عەلــی، ئەندامـی مەکتەبـی سـیاسـی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامــیی کوردسـتان 
 
/ چـۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی، هەرٌەن لە کورد بـوون وموسـڵمان بوون چـی 1پ
 دەگەٌەنێت بۆت؟ 
و/ ئەگەر تۆزێـن بگەڕێٌنەوە بۆ مـێژوو، لە لۆناؼی پێـش سەرهەڵدانـی حـٌزبـی کوردٌدا، لە کاتێـکدا لە ڕەفـزە 
ناسـٌوناڵٌستکانٌـان کردووە لە کۆمەڵگای کوردٌدا، هٌـچ  ئاٌنٌە مٌللٌەکانـی کۆمەڵگا، ڕابەراٌەتی بزوتنەوەی
دژاٌەتٌەن لە نێـوان ناسـنامەی ناسـٌوناڵٌزمـی وئاٌنی خەڵکدا نەبووە. واتە جۆرێـن لە هارمۆمۆنٌەت و(انسجام) 
ـا لە ناو خەڵکـدا بووە. بەڵام لە دوای دەرکەوتنـی پارتە سٌاسٌٌەکانەوە، ووردە وردە پەڕٌنەوەی ئاٌندۆلوجٌ
سٌکۆلارٌـستەکانەوە بۆناو کوردسـتان وەن بەشـێن لە ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاست جۆرێـن لە (تنالض) لە نێـوان 
شوناسی ئٌـسلامـٌی وشوناسی نەتەواٌەتی خەڵکەکەدا بە پاشـخان وپاڵنـانـی ئاٌدۆلۆجـی؛ بە تاٌبەت چەپ 
م من موسـڵمان بوون وکورد بـوونی من ٌان ومارکـسٌزم دێتەکاٌەوە. ئەگەر کورتی کەٌنەوە بۆ ئێـستا، بە بـڕوا
هەر تاکێـکی تـر لە کوردسـتاندا دوو ڕووی ناسـنامەی کەسـێتی نٌـشتمانـی مـنن. ئێمە ناسـنامەی فـرە 
ڕەهەندمـان هەٌە، من لە ٌەن کاتدا موسـڵمانٌـشم وکوردٌـشم، ئٌـسانٌـشم وڕۆژهەڵاتٌـشم...هتد. لەسـاٌەی 
دی ناسـنامەٌەدا ئێمە کێـشەٌەکمـان بۆ درووسـت نابێـت. ئەم ڕەهەندانە ٌەکـتری بـڕوابـوون بە فـرە ڕەهەن
تەواوکـردنە، وە بەسەرٌەکەوە شـوناسـێن ئەبەخـشن بە مـن، بۆٌە لە ٌەن کاتدا من هەست دەکەم بە موسڵمان 
م لە هەموو ئەم بـوونی خۆم، وە بە کورد بوونی خۆم، هەر وەها بە ئٌـنسانی بوونی خۆم، ئٌـنتما بـوونـٌـش
 شـێوازانە ٌەکـتری تەواو دەکەن، وە شـوناسـێکی فـرەڕەهەند بۆ من درووسـت دەکەن.
 .
/ وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی ٌان ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکی کورد گەر دەتەوێت، چـۆن سەٌری ئٌـسلام دەکەٌت وەکو 2پ
 ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانـی؟ جٌهـانٌـبوونـی ئٌـسلام چـی دەگەٌەنێـت؟ 
ۆم نووسـٌنم هەٌە لەم بارەٌەوە. ئٌـسلام ئاٌنـێکی بان نەتەوەٌٌە، ئٌـسلام ئاٌنـێکی سەروو نەتەوەٌٌە. واتا و/ من خ
هەر هەوڵێـن بۆ ملکەچکـردنـی ئٌـسلام وەکـو ئاٌنێـکی ٌەکتـاپەرسـتی جٌهـانـی بۆ خواسـتێـکی ناسـٌونالٌـستی 
ێچەوانەی ئەوەٌە. دٌارە هەندێ لە ناشـٌوناڵٌـستەکان، لەوانە دٌاری کـراو، ئەوە خـٌانەتە بە ئٌـسلام، وە ئٌـسلام پ
ناشـٌوناڵٌـستە عەرەبەبـی وفارسـی وتاڕادەٌەکٌٌـش لە هەندێ کاتدا ئەم پـرۆسەٌان کـردووە. بەڵام ئاٌا ئەمە ئەوە 
ـٌوناڵٌزم لەبەر دەگەٌەنێـت کە تێـگەٌـشتنی ئٌـسلامـٌانە بۆ ناشـٌوناڵٌزم نەتوانٌن بەرهەم بهـێنٌن؟ نەخـێر، ناش
ئەوەی والعێکە، فاکتـێکە لە کۆمەڵگاکاندا، لە کۆمەڵگاکا هاوچەرخەکاندا ئەم فاکتـانە پۆلێن کـردنـی، وە 
(مـترتبـات)ی هەبووە لە سەری. وە والعـێکی خولمـاندووە، ئەم والعەش لەٌرانی خولماندووە، وە زوڵمـی لـێ 
پێـوەری دروسـتکـردووە. لەبەر ئەوە لە ڕوانگەی بەها  بووەتەوە، وە چـاوەڕوانـی دروسـتکـردووە، وە
ئٌـسلامـٌەکانەوە ئێمە ئەتوانٌن لسە لەسەر ناشـٌوناڵـٌزم بکەٌن، نەن لە ڕوانگەی خودی ئٌـسلام خۆٌەوە. بۆ 
نمـوونە ئٌـسلام سەرەتای دادپەروەری هەٌە، سەرەتای ڕەتکـردنەوەی زوڵمـی هەٌە، سەرەتای ٌەکـسانی گەلانـی 
، ڕێـزی زمانێـن نادات بەسەر زمانێـکی تـردا، ڕێـزی (عـرق)ێـن نادات بە سەر (عـرق)ێکی تـردا، هەٌە
ئٌنـسان هەمـوو لەبەردەم خوا ٌەکـسانن بە ئٌـنتمای جـٌاوازی نەتەواٌەتی، زمانەوانی ونەژادی. لێرەوە ئێمە 
ن بزوتنەوەی ئٌـسلامٌمـان هەبێت بە ئەتوانٌن باس لە مامەڵەکـردن لەگەڵ ناشـٌوناڵـٌزم بکەٌن، وە دەتوانٌ
هەناسەی ناشـٌوناڵـٌـستانەوە. لە ڕووانگەی ئەم بەها ئٌـسلاممـٌانە ئەم بەها ئٌسلاممـٌانە تێکەڵ دەکات بە بەها 
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ناشـٌوناڵٌـستەکان، لەبەر ئەوە بزوتنەوەی ئٌـسلامـٌی پاشـخان ناشـٌوناڵٌـستی، ٌان بزوتنەوەی ناشـٌوناڵٌـستی 
  ـی دێتە کاٌەوە. ئێـستا ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان خۆی ٌەکێـکە لەو بزوتنەوانە.پاشـخان ئاٌن
 
/ چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێـشەی کەرکون؟ وەن کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی چی دەبێت گەر دەسـت بەرداری 3پ
 ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسـڵمانەکانتـان؟
  ئەو پـرسە دەکەٌن:  و/ ئێمە لە چەند ڕوانگەٌەکەوە سەٌری
ٌەکەم: لە ڕوانگەٌەکـی (حـمولً)ٌەوە، دٌارە (حمولً)ٌـش لە چـوارچێـوەی ئەو دۆخەٌەدا   
 سەٌـری دەکەٌن کە دەوڵەتی (لطـری) ودەوڵەتی نوێ وناشـٌوناڵٌـستی نوێ خولمـاندوٌەتـی.
  دووەم: لە ڕووی ستەمە مـێژووٌٌەکەوە.             
 سـێٌەم: لە ڕووی چـارەسەرکـردنـی کێـشەی کورد لە عـێرالدا سەٌـری ئەم پـرسە دەکەٌن.  
لە ڕووی (حمولً)ٌەوە بە پێـی کۆمەڵێـن پـێدراوی جوگـرافی ومـێژووٌـی، کەرکون بەشـێکی سـروشـتٌە لە 
ی خاکـی هەرێمـی کوردسـتان. مادام پێـوەرٌـش ئێـستا جٌـاوازی خان وزمـان ونەتەوەو شـوناسـی ناشـٌوناڵٌـست
ودەوڵەتەکان لەسەر ئەو بنەماٌە درووسـت دەبن، کەواتە مافـی گەلـی کوردسـتانە کە داوای بکاتەوە. کاتـی 
خۆٌـشی پاٌتەخـتی ولاٌەتی شـارەزوور بـووە لە کاتی دەوڵەتی عـوسـمانی. وە ئەم ناوچەٌە لە سەروبەندی 
شـور. لە چـوارچـێوەی سـٌاسەتێـکی دٌارٌکـراودا پێـكهێـنانـی دەوڵەتی عـێرالٌـشدا پێـی ووتـراوە کوردسـتانی با
ئەم کوردسـتانی باشـورە بە بـێ پـرسـی خەڵکەکەی لکـێنراوە بە بە عـێرالـی عەرەبٌەوە. ئەمەش لەبەر 
پێـداوٌـستی کۆڵۆنٌـاڵٌـستەکانـی ئەو سەردەمەو، ڕاگـرتنـی هاوسەنگـی (مذهب)ی لە عـێرالدا ئەمەی 
(عـمد)ێـکی کۆمەڵاٌەتی حـکومەتی عـێراق درووسـتکـرابێ وکوردەکا بەشـێکـبن لەو خولمـاندووە، نەن بەپێـی 
 گـرێ بەسـتە. 
کەرکون هێمـای ستەمێـکی گەورەٌە، هەزارەها خـێزان لەو شـارە لەسەر کورد بـوون دەرکـراون. موڵن 
وێنەکانـی خۆٌان، موڵن وماڵٌـان وماڵٌـان دەسـتی بەسەردا گـٌراوە. ئێـستا ئەم خـێزانانە دەبێـت بگەڕێنەوە بۆ شـ
. وە  چەندٌن ەیەبۆ بگەڕێنـرێتەوە. ئەمەش لابـردنـی ستەمە مـێژووٌٌەکەٌەو، گـێڕانەوەی بەشـێن لەو (حـموق)
جـار شۆڕشـی کورد لەسەر پـرسی کەرکون تێـن شـکاوە، وە خەڵکـی کوردسـتان کەرکون بە بەشـێکی 
ـن، وە کەرکون بوتە سومبولێـن لە برٌندارکـردنـی شوناس وکەرامەتی جـٌانەکـراوە لە ووڵاتەکەی خۆٌان دەزان
ئٌـنـسان ونەتەوەی کوردی. وە بـێ چـارەسەری پـرسـی کەرکون، کێـشەی کورد لە عـێرالـدا جـارەسەر نابێـت. 
رد وە ئەگەر کٌـشەی کورد لە عـێرالدا چـارەسەر نەبێـت، تـرسی ئەوە هەٌە کە زوڵمـە مـێژووٌەکان دژی کو
 درێـژەی هەبێـت، وە (اسـتمرار) لە کوردسـتان وعـێراق وڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـتٌـشدا درووسـت نابێـت.
لە هەموو ئەم ڕوانگانەوە ئێمە جەخـت لەسەر ئەوە دەکەٌن کە کەرکون وناوچە دابـڕێنراوەکانـی تـری  
مان ڕێگاٌەکـی ئاشـتٌخوازانەٌەو، کوردسـتان بگەڕێنەوە سەر هەرێمـی کوردسـتان. بەڵام جەخـتکـردنەوەکەشـ
لە دەسـتوری عـێراق، کە پـرس بە خودی  ١٤٠خەباتێـکی دەسـتورٌە. لە ڕێگای جـێبەجـێکـردنـی مادەی 
خەڵکـی هەرێمـەکە دەکات بۆ ئەوەی جـارەنووسـی خۆٌان دٌاری کەن، ئاٌا دەٌانەوێـت بگەڕێنەوە سەر هەرێمـی 
ەشـێن لە عـێراق بمـێنەوە؟ پێـشێل کـردنـی ئەم پـرنـسٌپەش کە دٌارٌکـردنـی کوردسـتان ٌاخود دەٌانەوێـت وەکو ب
کە دٌارٌکـردنـی مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـی ناوچەٌەکـی دٌاری کـراو لەڕێـی ڕاپـرسـٌەکـی گـشتٌەوە بۆ خەڵن 
 ودەنگدەرەکانـی زوڵمـێکی گەورەٌە کە ئێمـە نابێـت لبـوڵـێ بکەٌن.
 
ەی ئێـوە هٌـچ جٌـاوازٌەکـی هەٌە لەگەڵ هەڵوێـستی ناشـٌوناڵٌـستەکانـی تـر، بۆ نمـونە / ئاٌا ئەم هەڵوێـست4پ
 پارتی دٌموکـراتی کوردسـتان وٌەکێـتی نٌـشتمانـی کوردسـتان؟ 
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و/ هٌـچ جٌـاوازٌەکمـان نٌە لەم پـرسە لەگەن پدن وٌنـن، تەنهـا ئەوە نەبێـت ئەگەر ئێمە دەسەڵاتدار بووٌنـاٌە لە 
ئەوان لە کەرکون سودمـان دەبٌـنی لەو هەناسە وباکگـراوندە ئٌـسلامـٌەی خۆمان. ڕەنگە (خطاب)ێـکی  جٌـاتی
نەرم تـرمان بواٌە بەرانبەر بە پێکهـاتەکانـی تـری کەرکون وەکو عەرەب وتورکمـان. ئەم هاوبەشە 
ن بە چـارەسەرێـکی ئاشـتٌخوازانە ئٌـسلامـٌەمان بەکار دەهێـنا بـۆ لەناعەت پێـکردنـی ئەوان، بۆ ئەوەی ڕازی بـ
 بۆ کێـشەکە بە لازانجـی چارەسەری کێـشەی کورد لە عـێراق. 
 
  / ئەگەر ڕازی نەبن؟ 5پ
و/ هٌـچ هـێزێـن لە کوردسـتان ناتوانێـت بە ئاسـانی دەسـتبەرداری ئەو مافەبێـت. ئەوکاتە ئەگەر هەر جـێ 
وردسـتاندا بکـرێت بۆ چـۆنێـتی ڕووبەڕووبوونەوەی بەجـێ نەبـوو، دەبێـت ڕٌفـراندۆم لەناو خەڵکـی ک
 ڕەتکـردنەوەی مادەٌەکـی دەسـتووری ومافێـکی نەتەواٌەتی خوراو.
 
/ کامێـن لەم شـوناسـانە گـرنگـترن بۆت: کوردبـوون، موسـڵمـان بـوون، کوردسـتانـی بـوون؟ ئەی ئەوەندە 6پ
کێـشەکان ئەوەندە درێـژە پـێ بدەٌن وەکو لاٌەنە  دەهێـنێت لەسەر کوردسـتانـی بـوون وعـێرالـی بـوون
 ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکانـی عـێراق لە کورد وعەرەب؟ 
و/ وەکو ووتم ئەم ڕەهرندانە ڕەهەندی ٌەن ناسـنامەن، وە تەواوکەری ٌەن (شـخصٌة)ی نٌـشتمانٌن. ئەمەم لە   
کـردووە لە کتێـبی (عٌلمـانٌەت لە نێـوان بابەتێـکی خۆمدا بە چەسـپاوە نٌـشتمانٌەکانی هێـزە کوردسـتانٌەکان باس 
ڕۆژهەڵات وڕۆژئاوا: سەرنجـێن لە والٌـع). وە نووسـٌومە کە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان دەبێـت چەند چەسـپاوێکـی 
هەبێـت: کوردبـوون، کوردسـتانی بـوون، موسـڵمان بـوون، دٌموکـراسـی بـوون. دەبێـت ئەمانە چەسـپاوە 
نٌـشتمانٌەکان بن. ئەمانەش بە بەشەکانـی ڕەهەندی شوناسـی خـۆم دەزانم. کوردبـوون ئاماژەٌە بە ڕەهەندی 
نەتەواٌەتی من. کوردبـوون من کۆدەکاتەوە لەگەڵ هەمـوو ئەوانەی کە لە ڕێـی نەژادی وزمانەوە کوردن. 
موسڵمـان بـوون من کۆ دەکاتەوە لەگەڵ هەمـوو پێکهـاتەکانـی کوردسـتان وعـێراق وجٌهـانی ئٌـسلامـٌی، کە 
شـوناسـی ئٌـسلاممـٌان هەٌە. ئەمەش ئٌنتمـای منـە بـۆ (أمـة)ێـکی عمـٌدی. کوردسـتانـی بـوون ئٌنتمـای من بـۆ 
نٌـشتمانێـن درووسـت دەکات. وە شـوناسـێکـی تـرم پێـن دەبەخـشێت بۆ هەمـوو ئەوانەی کە لەسەر ئەو نٌـشتمانە 
دەژٌن بەدەر لە ئاٌن ومەزهەب ونەتەوە. لـێرەوە من کۆدەکاتەوە لەگەڵ (مەسـٌحٌەن وٌزٌدٌەن وتورکمـانێـن).  
اتەکانـی کوردسـتان کوردسـتانـی بـوونە. چـونکە تاکە شـوناسە کە سەرجەم دٌارە فـراوانـترٌن شـوناس بـۆ پێکهـ
پێکهـاتەکانی کوردسـتان بە نەتەواٌەتی وئاٌنی ومەزهەبی کۆ دەکاتەوە. ئێمە لە کوردسـتان هەمانە لە ڕەهەندی 
ـوون وکورد کوردسـتانی بـوون وموسـڵمان بـووندا ٌەن دەگـرنەوە وەکو تورکمان. هەمانە لە کوردسـتانی ب
بـووندا ٌەن دەگـرٌنەوە وەکو ٌەزٌدی، هەمانە تەنهـا لە کوردسـتانی بـوونـی دا ٌەن دەگـرٌنەوە وەکـو 
 مەسـٌحٌٌەن کە کوردسـتانـٌە، بەڵام نە کوردە نە موسـڵمانٌـش. 
(تنالض) ٌان  / ئەمانەی لای خوارەوە چـی دەگەٌەنن بۆت: ئٌـسلام، دەوڵەت، وە نەتەوە؟ ئاٌا هٌـچێـن لەمانە٧پ
 نەگونجـان هەٌە لە نێـوانٌـاندا؟ 
و/ ئٌـسلام ئاٌنـێـکی جٌهـانٌە، لە ڕێـی باوەڕ بـوون پێـی مـرۆڤ دەبێتە موسڵمان، وە جۆرێـن لە ئەرن وئٌـلتزام 
وچاوەڕوانـی ڕووی تـێ دەکات. ئٌـسلام بە پێـچەوانەی کەنٌـسەی کاسۆلٌـکی سەدەکانـی ناوەڕاسـت پێکـهاتێـکـی 
ە ناکـرێـت. دەتوانٌت لە زٌاد لە چوارچێـوەٌەکـی هٌـراتٌـکی نٌە. ئٌـسلام لە چوارچـێوەٌەکـی سـٌاسـٌدا پێـناس
سـٌاسی پێـناسەی ئٌـسلام بکەٌت. چونکە ئٌـسلام لە خۆٌدا چوارچێـوەٌەکـی هٌـراتٌـکی ئٌداری پلە بەندکـراوی 
نٌە کە بڵێـٌت ئەمە پێچەوانەی ئەم دەوڵەتەٌە. ئەوەی کە جێگای باٌەخـی ئٌسلامە لە چوارچـێوەی دەوڵەتی 
ئەوەی کە سـٌـستمی سـٌاسی لەسەر بنـاؼەی جٌاکاری ودژاٌەتـی وزوڵم وناعەدالەتی نەبێـت.  نەتەواٌەتی
پێچەوانەی پرانٌسپەکانی ئٌسلام نەبێت، پێچەوانەی مافی هاوڵاتی وجٌاکاری نەتەوەٌی وئاٌنی ومەزهەبی نەبێت. 
اسە لە نێـوان موسـڵمان بوون واتا ئەوەی جێگای باٌەخە لە دەوڵەتی نەتەوەٌی عەدالەتە، وە ئٌنـسجامی شـون
وناشـوناڵٌـست بوون و فـرە کلـتوری لە ووڵاتدا. دەوڵەت بە واتا هاوچەرخەکەی چوارچێـوەٌەکە دەبێـت لەسەر 
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بنەمای گرێ بەسـتی کۆمەڵاٌەتی درووسـت بـووبـێ، وە ناسنامە جٌـاوازەکانـی ناوخۆی لەخۆبگـرێت، وە هەموو 
سەٌـربکات. وە ئەگەر پارێـزگاری لە شـوناسـی زۆرٌنەش بکات دەبێـت بە  پێکهـاتەکانـی بەچـاوی ٌەکـسان
جۆرێـن لە جۆرەکان ناوەندێـکی بێ لاٌەن بێـت بەرانبەر پێکهـاتەکانـی. وە نابێـت ئامـرازێـن بێـت بەدەست 
تەکانـی تــر زۆرٌنەٌەکـی دٌنـی ٌان مەزهەبـی ٌان ئاٌدۆلۆجـی سـٌاسی بۆ جٌـٌاکاری وسەرکووت کـردنـی پێکـها
  .یەکەیلە کۆمەڵگادا. بەدەر لەمە نابێـت بە نەتەوە بەواتا سـٌاسـٌە هاوچەرخە (اخـلاق)
نەتەوە خۆپێـناسەکـردنێـکی هاوچەرخە لە چـوارچێـوەی کەسـێتٌەکـی (معـنوي) گـرٌمـان کـراودا، کە ئٌـنـسان 
ت. وە کۆمەڵێـن ئەرکـی دەکەوێتە ئەسـتۆ، لە لەڕێـی ئٌنتمــا بـۆی هەسـتێـکی دٌاری کـراوی بۆ درووسـت دەبێـ
هەمان کاتدا کۆمەڵێـن ماؾ وچاوەڕوانٌـشی بۆ دروسـت دەبێـت. نەتەوە دەتوانێـت لە چـوارچێـوەی دەوڵەتێـکدا 
ٌان چەند دەوڵەتێـن خۆی ڕێـن خات. ٌاخود لە دەرەوەی نەژاد خۆی ڕێکخـات. دٌارە بە پێـی ئەو تٌـۆرە 
درووسـت بـوونی نەتەوە دەکەن. دٌدی ئٌـسلامٌـٌش زٌاتر لەگەڵ فۆرمێـن لە نەتەواٌەتی  جٌاوازانە کە باس لە
 داگونجـاوە کە ناوەڕووەکێـکی نٌـشتمانـی هەبێت نەن نەژاد پەرسـتانە.
 
/ چـۆن زٌاتـر دروشـمەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان (ئازادی، بـراٌەتی، دادپەروەری) ڕاڤە ٨پ
  ڕووانگەی پەٌوەندٌتـان لەگەڵ بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان، بە تاٌبەت کە ئێـوە نەتەوەٌەکـی بـێ دەوڵەتـن؟ دەکەٌت لە 
و/ پەٌوەندی ئێمە لەگەڵ بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان هەر ئەوەٌە کە ئێمە لە ڕووی مـێژووٌٌەوە لەژێـر کارتێـکردنـی 
هەمـوو ئەزموونە فٌـکرٌە ئٌـسلامٌەکان  فٌکـری ئەواندا بووٌن. دوواتـر گەشـتٌـنە لۆناؼـێـن سـوودمان لە
وەرگـرتـووە. ئێـستا سـوود لە هەمـوو ئەزموونە فٌـری وسـٌاسـٌە سەرکەوتووەکانـی جٌهـان وەردەگـرٌن بە 
ئٌـسلامـی ونائٌـسلامٌەوە. ئێمە دەتوانٌن بڵـێٌن چۆن سـۆشـٌال دٌموکـراتەکان لە دنٌـادا هەرٌەکە لە ووڵاتـی 
نٌـشتمانٌن، بەڵام لەبەر ئەوەی لە ڕێـی فٌکـرٌٌەوە لە ٌەکـتر نـزٌکـن، لە چـوارچێـوەٌەکـی  خۆٌاندا هـێزێـکی
جٌهـانٌدا بەناوی ئەنتەرناشـٌوناڵ سـۆشـٌاڵ دٌمـوکـرات کۆبـوونەوە، ئێمەش بەو جۆرەٌن. ئێمە هـێزێکـی 
ی ٦کۆنگـرەی  [ کۆنگـرەشـدا کوردسـتانٌن پارێـزگاری لە لە بەرژەوەندٌەکانـی کوردسـتان دەکەٌن، وە لەم 
سـتراتـٌژی گەٌـشتن بە مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌن ولەوارەی   ] دا بەڕێـوە چـوو٢٠١٢ٌەکگـرتـوو کە لە ئاٌاری 
ئازادٌمـان کـردووە بە ٌەکێـن لە لە سـتراتٌژەکانـی حـٌزبەکەمـان. ئێمە زٌاتـر ئٌخـوانـی بـوون وەن 
بەرانبەر گـروپە جٌهـادٌەکاندا. وە ئێمـە خۆمـان (اضـافة)مان بـۆ سەر ئەو مٌـانەڕەوبـوون سەٌـرمان کـردووە لە 
فٌـکرە هەٌە. ئێمە لە سـنوری فٌـکری (تملٌدي)ی ئٌخـواندا نەوەسـتاوٌن، خۆمان گەشەٌەکـی تاٌبەت بە خۆمان 
بـڕوابـوون بە کـردووە لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتاندا. بەڵام کۆمەڵێـن خاڵـی هاوبەش هەٌە وەن مٌـانەڕەوبـوون و
دٌمـوکـراسـی وپەنانەبـردنە بەر توندوتـٌژی وڕێـزگـرتن لە ئاراسـتەکانـی خەڵن، کە ڕەنگە ئەمانە لەگەڵ هەندێ 
 حـٌزبـی تـری ئٌخـوانـی وؼەٌـرە ئٌخـوانـی کۆمانکاتەوە لە ناوچەکەدا. 
نەوەی کۆمەڵگای کوردسـتانە کە (ئازادی وبـراٌەتـی ودادپەروەری) دٌارە ئەم سـێ درووشـمە بەشـێکی ڕەنگـدا
کاتێـن ٌەکگـرتـوو درووسـت بـوو لە کوردسـتان شەڕی بـمراکوژی هەبـوو. بەشـێکی ڕەنگـدانەوەی باکگـراوندە 
دروسـت بـوو، کە ئەو کات کوردسـتان بە لۆناؼـی  ٤٩٩٠ئٌـسلامـٌەکەی ٌەکگـرتـووە. دٌارە ٌەکگـرتـوو لە 
ەتی ودادپەروەری دوو چەمکـی ڕەسەنـی ئٌـسلامـٌن، لە هەمان کاتدا بـراٌەتی شەڕی ناوخۆدا تـێ دەپەڕی. بـراٌ
ودادپەروەری دووچەمـکی سـٌاسی وفەلـسەفٌـن (کونـً)شـە. دٌارە ئەم دروشـمانە لە دوو ئاسـتدا خوێـندنەوەٌان 
، بە ئاشـتی بـۆ دەکـرێت: ٌەکەم بۆ کۆتاٌـی هێـنانـی شەڕی ناوخـۆ، ناوچەگەری، عەشـٌرەت گەری. ئاواش
وپێـکەوە ژٌان و، لە سـاٌەی ٌاسـای پارتەکاندا (ئازادی وبـراٌەتی ودادپەروەری) دروشـمێـکی گـرنگـن. بەڵام 
لە ئاسـتی ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـتدا ئێمە بـراٌەتٌـمان بەوە (تفـسٌر) کـردووە کە هەوڵ دەدٌن بـۆ گـێڕانەوەی 
رەکانـی ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت، کە کورد وفارس وعەرەب هاوسەنگـی مـێژووٌـی لە نێـوان نەتەوە گەو
وتورکە. ئەو ناهاوسـەنگـٌە بە هۆی بـێ بەشـکردنـی کورد لە لەوارەی خۆی تێـن چـووە. لە ڕێـی ئەوەی کورد 
مافی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌنـی هەبێـت، وە لەوارەی خۆی دروسـت ببـێتەوە دەبێـت کوردٌـش لەوارەی سەربەخۆی 
وەکو ئەوانـی تـر. ئەگٌـنا بە نەبـوونـی ئازادی بۆ گەلی کورد وەکو گەلانـی تـری ناوچەکە، کە  خۆی هەبێـت
هەم مافێـکی خواٌـٌەو، هەم مافێـکی سـٌاسـی هاوچەرخە، نە بـراٌەتی و، نە دادپەروەرٌـش دێـتە دی. کەواتە 




  / ئێـوە چـۆن دەتوانـن وەکـو پارتێـکی سـٌاسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لەگەڵ ئەو هەمـوو عٌلمـانٌە هەڵ بکەن؟ ٩پ
و/ ئێمە لەبەر ئەوەی بـڕوامان بە فـرە کەڵچەری وفـرە بـوونـی هەٌە (تبـنً) دٌموکـراسـٌمان کـردووە. ئێمـە 
ەڵکـو پارتێـکی باکگـراوند ئٌـسلامـٌی، نٌـشتمانی دٌموکـراسی تەنهـا پارتێـکی باکگـراوند ئٌـسلامـٌی نٌن، ب
هاوچەرخـٌن.  لەبەر ئەوە ئێمـە بـڕوامان بە دٌمـوکـراسی هەٌە وەکو شـێوازێـکی (عمـلانـً)ٌانە بـۆ 
بەڕێوەبـردنـی جٌـاوازٌەکان ودەسەڵات ووەدەرنانـی توندو تـٌژی لە کاٌە سـٌاسـٌەکان. ئەوە خۆی بۆ خۆی 
لـێ دەکات کە ئێمە بـڕوامـان بە ئاڵوگۆڕی ئاشـتٌانەی دەسەڵات، بە فـرەٌـی سـٌاسـی لە کۆمەڵگاکەمـان،  وامـان
بە ڕێکەوتن لەسەر دەسـتورێـکی هاوچەرخ هەبێـت. لە هەمـوو شـتێـکٌـشدا جٌـاواز نٌن،  ئێمە ئەگەر لە هەندێ 
ٌن، وە لە هەندێ جـۆری بـٌرکـردنەوەماندا جٌـاوازبٌن، شـتدا بـۆ نمـوونە لە ئاٌدۆلۆجٌـادا لە عٌلمـانٌەن جٌـاوازب
بە هەمان شـێوە کۆمەڵێـن شـتی تــری هاوبەشـمان هەٌە. بۆ نمـوونە لە کورد بـووندا، لە کوردسـتانـی بـووندا، 
لە باوەڕبـوون بە مافـی هاوڵاتـی بـوون ودٌموکـراسـی، لە ئٌـشکـردنمـان بـۆ لەوارەٌەکـی سەربەخـۆ بـۆ 
للەتەکەمـان، بـۆ چەسـپاندنـی دادگەری لە ووڵاتەکەمـان؛ هەرٌەن لە دٌدی خـۆٌەوە. لە بەر ئەوە ئەگەر لە مٌ
هەندێ شـتدا جٌـاواز بٌن کۆمەڵێـن شـتی تـری هاوبەشـمان هەٌە. چەسـپاوی نٌـشتمانٌـمان هەٌە، کە هەمـوومان 
  هاوچەرخ هەموومان پێـکەوە بـژٌن. کۆدەکاتەوە. وە دەبێـت ئێمە لە چـوار چێـوەی دەسـتورێـکی 
 
/ چـۆن لە دٌموکـراسـٌەت تێ دەگەن وچۆنٌـش پەٌـڕەوی دەکەن؟ ئەگەر بە دٌموکـراسـی بگەنە دەسەڵات، ١٠پ
 هەروەهـا بە دٌموکـراسی دەسەڵات (تـسلٌم) دەکەنەوە گەر لە هەڵبـژاردن دەرنەچـوون؟ 
سـاڵ  ١٠-٤٠کە لۆناؼـی دەوڵەتـی ئاٌدۆلۆجٌمـان تـێ پەڕاندووە. و/ بە بـڕوای مـن ئێـستا ئێمە لە لۆناؼـێـکداٌن 
لەمەو پێـش کە ناوچەکە بە لۆناؼـی ئٌـسلامـٌی ئاٌدۆلۆجـی هاوچەرخ وعٌلمـانـی بە ئاٌدۆلۆجـی کـراودا تـێ 
ن. ئێمە دەپەڕی، وە هەردوو ئەو ئاٌدۆلۆجٌـاٌە شـکـستٌان خـوارد. وە نەٌانتـوانـی لەگەڵ دٌمـوکـراسـی هەڵ بکە
ئێـستا لە لۆناؼێـکداٌن دەسـتەبەری دٌمـوکـراسی لەم لۆناؼە بـرٌتی ٌە لە  بـوونـی دەسـتورێـکی  مەدەنـی. 
پێـشتر حـزبێـن کودەتای دەکـرد و، دەسـتورێـکـی دادەنٌـا.  ئێـستا پێکهـاتەکانـی گەلێـن ئەو دەسـتورە دادەنـێن بە 
ٌکـری وسـٌاسـٌەکانٌـانەوە. کەواتە خـواسـتی دەسـتورێـن هەٌە کە جٌـاوازی هێـزە سـٌاسـٌەکان وئٌنتمـا ف
عٌلمـانٌەکان وئٌـسلامٌەکان و، موسڵمـانەکان وناموسڵمـانەکان بەشـداری تێـدا دەکەن. ئەم دەسـتورە ئٌـسلامٌەو 
کـراسی دەبێتە ئٌـسلامٌـش نٌە، عەلمانٌە وعەلمانٌـش نٌە. پارێـزگاری لە شـوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەکات، وە دٌمو
خـاڵـی هاوبەشـی نێـوان سەرجەم هێـزەکان. لە چوارچێـوەی ئەم دەسـتورەدا کە ئێمە لە سەری ڕێککەوتـووٌن 
گـرێ بەسـتێـکی کۆمەڵاٌەتی بـۆ چۆنێـتی بەڕێوەچـوونـی دەسەڵات و، (ممـارسـة)کـردنـی جٌـاوازٌەکانمـان پێـن 
دەسەڵاتدا بمێـنێـتەوە لە ئارادا نابێـت. چـونکە سوپای دێـت. ئەوکاتە ئەگەری ئەوەی کە هێـزێـن لە 
ئاٌدۆلۆجـٌکـراومـان نابێـت، ئاٌدۆلۆجٌـٌەکـی (مهٌمـن)مان نابێـت. دەزگاٌەکـی (أمـنً) بە ئاٌدۆلۆجٌـکـراومـان 
ٌەکە بـۆ نابێـت. بەڵکـو ئەم دەزگاٌانە دەبنە دەزگای (مهـنً) ونٌـشتمانـی. لەم چـوارچـێوەٌە دٌمـوکـراسـی ڕێگا
گەٌـشتن بـە دەسەڵات، لە هەمان کاتدا مٌکانٌزمێـکٌـشە بـۆ هێـنانە خوارەوەی کاتێـن کە متمـانەی خەڵن 
ئەدۆڕێـنێـت لە هەڵـبژاردن. بەڵـێ ئێمە لە چـوارچێـوەی ئەم دەسـتورە کە کە لەگەڵ عٌلمـانٌەکاندا ڕێـن دەکەوٌن 
کاتێـن متمـانەی خەڵکمـان دۆڕاند ئەوکاتە ئەرکـی ئەخـلالـی بـۆ بەڕێوەبـردنـی کۆمەڵگای خۆمـان، وە وە هەر
وئاٌنـی ونٌـشتمانـی ئێمەٌە  بـێـنە خوارەوە. وە جـارێـکی تــر هەوڵ بدەٌن ئەو متمـانە بە دەسـت بێـنٌنەوە لە 
 ڕێگای خەباتـی مەدەنـٌەوە. 
 
/ ووتاری بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان لە ئاسـتی تٌـۆرٌدا ئاماژە بە سـتراتٌژی بنـٌاتنـانەوەی تاکـی موسـڵمان ٠٠پ
وخـێزانـی موسـڵمان وکۆمەڵگای موسـڵمان وحکومەتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی وگـێڕانەوەی خٌـلافەتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەکات، 
  ٌـژٌەدان؟ ئاٌـا خٌـلافەت درووسـت دەبێـتەوە؟  ئێـوە وەکـوبـراٌانـی موسـڵمانـی کورد لە کوێـی ئەم سـترات
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و/ باسـێن لە فەرهەنگـی ئێمـەدا نٌە بەناوی خٌـلافەت. پێمـان واٌە ئەوە فۆرمێـکی ڕابـووردووی مـێژووی 
موسڵمانانە. ئەمە مانای ئەوە ناگەٌەنێـت کە نەتوانٌن (تصور)ی فـۆرمێـن لە فۆرمەکانـی ٌەکێـتی موسـڵمانان 
وناوچەکە بکـرێت. بەڵام ئەو فۆرمە (تصور)کـراوە دەبێـت: ٌەکەم: لە سەر بناؼەی ئٌـرادەی ئازادی گەلانـی 
موسـڵمانی ناوچەکە درووسـت ببـێت، هـٌچ هـێزێـن بـۆی نٌە بە ناوی ئٌـسلام ودروسـتکـردنـی خٌـلافەتەوە بە 
و موسـڵمانانی ناوچەکە خۆٌان بە زۆر ٌەکێـتی بە سەر موسـڵماناندا بـسەپێـنێـت. دەبێـت گەلانـی ناوچەکە
پێـداوٌـستٌەکـی پێـشکەوتـنی ژٌاری وشـارسـتانـی خۆٌانـی بـزانـن، وە لە سەر ئٌـرادەی ئازادی خۆٌان بێـت. 
دووەم: پێـوٌـستە هەموو گەلان لەو چـوارچێـوەٌەدا سەربەخـۆٌـی وناسـنامەی خۆٌان پاراسـتبێـت. سـێ ٌەم: 
زمـە هاوچەرخەکانـی هاوشـێوەی ٌەکێـتی ئەوروپا وەرگـٌرێت بۆ دروسـتکـردنـی دەبێـت سـوود لە مٌـکانـٌ
ٌەکێـتٌەن لە ناوچەکە. وە دەبێـت هەم پارێـزگاری لە ناسـنامەی گەلان ولەوارە سەربەخـۆکان بکات، هەم 
رێت ووڵاتە جۆرێـن لە ٌەکێـتی درووسـت بکات. وە مەرجٌـش نٌە هەمـوو ئەو لەوارانە موسـڵمانٌـش بن. دەشـک
موسڵمـانەکان ٌەکێـتٌٌەكی تاٌبەت بە خۆٌان بەو شـێوەٌەی باسـکرا هەبێـت. بەڵام لە ناو ئەو ئەو دەوڵەتە 
موسـڵمانانە خەڵکـی ؼەٌـر موسـڵمانٌـش هەٌە، دەبێـت تەواوی مافەکانـی پێکـهاتە نا موسـڵمانەکانـی ناو ئەو 
ٌەکێـتی چاوەڕوانکـراودا پارێـزراوبێـت. وە مافی هاوڵاتـی دەوڵەتە موسـڵمانانە، وە لە ناو هەر فۆرمێـکی 
بـوونٌـان وەکو هەر موسـڵمانێـکی تـر هەبێـت. ئەمەش باس لە فۆرمـی ڕێکخـراوی ناوچەٌـی دەکەٌن، ئەگٌـنا لە 
 ] کانوەکو نەتەوە ٌەکگرتووە [ چوارچێـوە جٌهـانٌەکەدا هەر هەمـوومان ئەندام دەبٌن لەو ڕێکخـراوە جٌهـانٌـانە
 چـونکە ئەرکـی جٌهـانٌـشمان لە ئەسـتۆداٌا.
 
/ تێڕوانٌنی ئەندامانتـان بـۆ چەمکـی خٌـلافەت چۆنە؟ ئاٌا هٌـچ جٌـاوازٌەن هەٌە لە ڕای سەرکـرداٌەتٌـتان ٢٠پ
 لەم لۆناؼە؟ 
مـٌم) دەکەٌن. و/ ئێمـە لەبەر ئەوەی (منهـج)ی پەروەردەٌـی ئەندامانمـان هەٌە، بـٌرو ڕاٌەکانمـان بەردەوام (تع
ئەم شـتەش (مطـرح) نٌە، لەبەر ئەوە لە ئەدەبٌـات وفٌکـری حـٌزبەکە (مطـرح) نٌە. وە ئێـستا شـتێـن لە 
ئەدەبٌـات وفەرهەنگـی ئێمـەدا نەماوە بەناوی خٌـلافەت. پێمـان واٌە فۆرمێـکی ڕابـووردوو بـووە لە 
وسـٌنی خەڵکـی کوردسـتان دەکەٌن. ئێمـە وەکو جۆڕێکخـستنەوە، ئێـستا ئێمـە باس لە مافی چـارەی خۆنو
ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان باس لە مافـی خەڵکـی کوردسـتان وگەلی کوردسـتان دەکەٌن بۆ 
درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەتی سەربەخـۆی خۆی. دوای درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەتـی سەربەخـۆی خۆی، ئەو کاتە 
س ونەتەوەکانـی تـرەوە بە تێـگەٌـشتنـێکی هاوبەش گەشـتنە ئەو لەناعەتە ئەگەر ناوچەکە بە کورد وعەرەب وفار
بۆ دروسـتکـردنـی فۆرمێـکی هاوچەرخ بـۆ هاوکارٌکـردنـی ٌەکـتری، ئەو کاتە مافی خۆٌانە کە بەشـداری 
 بکەن ٌا نا. ئەمەش دەمێـنێتەوە بـۆ ئٌـرادەی ئازادی نەوەکانـی داهـاتـوو.
 
  بە هٌـچ جۆرە ڕکابەرٌەن لەلاٌەن ئٌـسلامٌەکانـی تـرەوە؟ / ئاٌا هەست دەکەن ١٠پ
و/ جاران چونکە بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی چەکـداری هەبـوو، دٌدمان زۆر لە ٌەن جٌـاواز بـوو. بەڵام لەبەر ئەوەی ئێـستا 
ن ئەوانٌـش چەکٌـان دانٌـاوە، وە خەباتـی مەدەنـی دەکەن دەتوانم بڵێـم ڕۆژ لە دوای ڕۆژ لە ٌەکتـری نـزٌ
دەبٌـنەوە. ئەگەر چـی ئەوپەرەسەندنە مـێژووٌٌە جٌـاوازە هێـشتا تاٌبەتمەندی فٌـکری وسـٌاسی بۆ هەرٌەکەمان 
هێـشتۆتەوە. ڕەنگە بـۆ نمـوونە بٌرۆکەی خٌـلافەت لای ئٌـسلامٌەکانـی تـر زٌاتـر (مطـرح)بێـت، کە لای ئێمە 
 ئەو شتەمان (تجـاوز)کـردووە. 
 
  نەوەی (دعـوة) وسـٌاسەت لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوودا چـۆنە؟ / پـرسـی جٌـاکـرد٤٠پ
و/ ئێـستاش ئەم بابەتە (منـالـشة)ی گەرمە لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوو، ئەوە پـرسـێکە تاٌبەت نٌە بە ٌەکگـرتـوو، بەڵکـو 
بە  پـرسـێکە تاٌبەت بە سەرجەم حـٌزبە ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکانی جٌهـانی ئٌـسلامـی، بە تاٌبەت ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت.
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تاٌبەتتـرٌش ئەوانەی کە لە ڕووی مـێژووٌٌەوە کارٌگەر بـوون بە فٌـکری ئٌخـوانـی. لە بەر ئەوە لە زۆرێـن لە 
ووڵاتـاندا حـٌزبـی سـٌاسی درووسـت کـراوە و، دەعـوە لە چـوارچێـوەی بـزوتنەوەٌەکـدا ماوەتەوە. ئەو 
عـوە موسـڵمـان بـوون دەکات بە (اسـاس)ی ئٌنتمـا، بەڵام (منـالـشة)انە درێـژەی هەٌە ٌەکگـرتـوو. لە بەر ئەوە دە
حـٌزبـی سـٌاسی دەبێـت هاوڵاتی بـوون بکات بە (اساس)ی ئٌـنتمـا وئٌـش کـردنـی سـٌاسی. وە پـرۆژەٌەکـی 
 سـٌاسی (طـرح) بکات بۆ سەرجەم هاوڵاتٌـان، وە ئەو هاوڵاتٌـانەی کە باوەڕٌان بەم پـرۆژە سـٌاسـٌە هەٌە لە ناو
ئەم حـٌزبە جێـٌان دەبێـتەوە. لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوودا کۆمەڵێـن هەن کە من ٌەکێـکٌانم داوا دەکەٌن ببـٌنە حـٌزبێـکی 
دٌموکـراتی (محـافظ) باکگـراوند ئٌـسلامـٌی، نەن کۆمەڵێـکی ئٌـسلامـی دەعەوی بٌن. بە واتاٌەکـی تــر هەمـوو 
ژەی ئێمـە هەٌە لە ناو ئێمەدا بتـوانـن خەباتـی سـٌاسـی بکەن بۆ ئەوانەی لە کوردسـتاندا کە باوەڕٌان بەم پـرۆ
 بەدٌهـێنانـی ئەو ئامانجە هاوبەشـانەی بـڕوامان پێـٌەتـی.
 
/ پێـت واٌە سەلەفٌەکانـی مٌـسر کە لە پـڕێکـدا پاش شـۆڕشەکە دەرکەوتن وپارتێـکی سـٌاسـٌٌان پێـن هێـنا، ٠٠پ
  ـراٌانی مٌـسر؟ وە چ وانەٌەن لەم بارەٌەوە ٌەکگـرتـوو فـێر دەبێـت؟ڕێگـر بـوون ٌان ٌارمەتٌـدەر بـۆ ب
و/ لە ڕووٌەکەوە ڕێگـر بـوون، وە لە ڕووٌەکـەوە ٌارمەتٌـدەر. ٌارمەتٌدەر بـوون چـونکە پاش سـاڵانێـكی دوور 
دە ووردە لە ڕەتکـردنەوەی حـٌزبـی ئٌـسلامـٌی گەشـتنە ئەو لەناعەتە کە حـٌزب پێـن بهـێـنن. ئەمەش وور
(ممـارسـة)کـردنی کاری سـٌاسی دەٌانکاتەوە، وە وازٌان لە کۆمەڵێـن لەناعەت پـێ دەهێـنێت. وە بەرەو 
دوورکەوتنەوە لە فٌـکرە کۆنەکانـی خۆٌان دەٌانبـات. وە لە هەندێ کاتی هەسـتٌاردا وەکو هەڵـبژاردنی 
کخـراو بـوون ئەم پـشتٌوانٌە ڕۆڵـی بـٌنی. بەڵام سەرۆکاٌەتی، پـشتٌوانـی (محمـد مـرسـً)ٌان کــرد. چـونکە ڕێ
چـونکە تازەن وداواکارٌەکانٌـان (اصـولـً)تـرە لەوەی ئٌـخوان، ڕەنگە لە کاتی بەڕێـوەبـردنـی دەوڵەتدا جۆرێـن 
لە کێـشەو (اشـکالٌة) بۆ ئٌخـوان درووسـت بکەن، وە جـۆرێـن لە (مـزاٌدة)ی ئٌـسلامـٌی بە سەر ئٌخـواندا 
  ئەوەش جۆرێـن لە ئٌـشکالٌەت بۆ ئٌخـوان درووسـت بکات. بکەن.
 
 
/ لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چارەی خـۆنـووسـٌنتـان کـردە سـتراتـٌژ وخـستانە ناو بەرنامەی کارەوە، ٦٠پ
 ئەمە چـۆن بەرجەسـتە دەکەن؟ وە مٌـکانـٌزمـتان چـٌٌە بـۆی؟ 
کارە بکەٌن. ئێمە گـرنگ ئەوەٌە ئەمە وەکـو حەلێـن بنـاسـٌن. وە و/ دٌارە ئێمە خۆمان بە تەنٌـا ناتوانٌن ئەو 
ئاستی فٌـکری حـٌزبەکە ٌەکـلا بـووەتەوە لەو بارەٌەوە. درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەتـی کوردی بە مافـێـکی 
سـروشـتی خەڵکـی کوردسـتان دەزانـٌن. وەکـو هەمـوو مٌللەتێـکی تـر لەم جٌهـانە پێـوٌـستە کوردٌـش مافـی 
چارەی خۆی دٌاری بکات. ئێمە ئێـستا (توعـٌة)ی فٌـکری دەکەٌن، وە هەوڵ دەدەٌـن کە ئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی تـر لە 
ناوچەکەدا ئەم بـٌرۆکەٌەٌان لا ئاسـاٌـی بکەٌنەوە، وە لەناعەتٌـان پـێ بکەٌن. وە خاڵێـکی تـری 
رە بۆ (لضـٌة)ی کوردی. وە هەر هەوڵێـکی سـتراتٌژٌەکانمـان بەدەسـت هێـنانـی پـشتٌوانـی ئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی تـ
تـری جـٌدی هەبێـت بۆ ئەوەی خەڵکـی کوردسـتان بگاتە مافـی چارەی خۆنوسٌن، ئێمە بەشـداری ئەو هەوڵانە 
 دەکەٌن.
 
  / ئەمە بـۆ کوردسـتانی عـێراق، ٌان بۆ هەمـوو پارچەکانـی تـری کوردسـتان هەوڵ دەدەن؟ ٧٠پ
ۆ کوردسـتانـی عـێراق، وە داوای فٌدراڵـی بـۆ پارچەکانـی تـری کوردسـتان دەکەٌن. و/ ئێـستا بـۆ ئەم لۆناؼە ب
بەڵام لە ڕووی (مبدأ)ٌەوە بـوونـی دەوڵەتێـکی سەربەخـۆ لە سەر تەواوی خاکـی کوردسـتان بۆ گەلـی کورد 




  دا لە پرۆگـرام وپەٌـڕەوی ناوخۆدا؛٤مادەی / لە ٨٠پ
ٌەکەم: بنەماو بەها ئٌـسلامـٌە نەگۆڕەکان وبەها مـرۆٌە چەسـپاوەکان بە سەرچاوەی کاری سـٌاسـی "
 "بەها مـرۆٌە چەسـپاوەکان"مەسـتتان لە؟"دەزانن
(کونـً)ٌانەن کە بەشـێوەٌەن لە و/ ئەتوانم بڵـێم بەهاکانـی مافـی مـرۆڤ ودٌموکـراسـی و، هەمـوو ئەو بەها 
شـێوەکان ئێـستا فەرهەنگە زٌندووەکانـی دنٌـا و(بـشرٌة) تٌـاٌدا هاوبەشـە، ئەوانە کە گەشـە بە بەهاکانی مافی 
 مرۆڤ وچەسـپاندنٌـان دەدەن. لەوانە چەمـکی دادپەروەری ولێـبوردەٌـی وفـرەٌـی و...هتد.
 
  نجـێکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی وپێـوٌـستٌەکـی ژٌانە/ "حـوکمـڕانـٌی ڕاشـد ودادگەر ئاما٩٠پ
 ، حوکمـڕانـٌی ڕاشـد چـی دەگەٌەنێـت؟ "
و/ حـوکمـی ڕاشـد ئێـستا چەمکـێکـی جٌهـانٌە کە نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتووەکان بەکاری دەهێـنێـت. بەو حـکومەتانە 
ت بۆ گەلەکانٌـان. ئەو جۆرە دەڵـێن کە کۆمەڵێـن مەرجٌـان تـێداٌا، لەوانە حـکومەتێـکی دٌموکـراسـی و، ڕەفاهٌە
حـکومەتەٌە کە بەلای نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتـووەکانەوە سـتانداردی تاٌبەت بۆی هەٌە. وە ئەو جۆرە حـوکمە لە هەر 
کۆمەڵگاٌەکدا بچەسـپێت هەست بە دادگەری، وە بە جۆرێـن لە ٌەکـسانـی و، جۆرێـن لە خۆشـگوزەرانی مادٌـش 
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چـاوپێـکەوتنـی بورهـان ئەحمەد / ئەندامـی سەرکـردایەتـی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان و، 
  ندی چـواری گەرمیــانلێـپرسـراوی مەڵبە
 
  / چـۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێـن، وە چـۆن هەست دەکەٌت وەکو موسـڵمانێـن؟1پ
و/ دٌارە ئێمە وەکو کورد لە سەرەتای سەرهەڵدانـی ئٌـسلامەوە کورد وەکو نەتەوەکانـی تـر ئارەزوومەندانە 
ن گەلـی تـری سەر ئەم ئەرزە شـانازی دەکەٌن بە موسـڵمان بـڕٌاری داوە موسـڵمان بێت. ئەمـڕۆش وەکو سەدا
بٌن. دٌارە کوردبوون ٌان عەرەب بوون   401بوونمـانەوە. وە هٌـچ ڕێگـرٌەن نابٌنٌن لەوەی کوردبٌن وموسڵمان
ٌان تورن بوون، ٌان هەر نەتەوەٌەکی تـر لەدەرەوەی دەسەڵاتی مـرۆڤەکانەو، خوا بەو نەتەوە درووسـتی 
کـردووٌن، وە (حکمة)تێـکی خوای تێداٌە. هەر بۆٌە ئێمەش شـانازی بەو (جعـل)ە خواٌٌەوە دەکەٌن. دٌارە 
ڕۆڵـی خۆم ببـٌنم، وە لەگەڵ نەتەوەکانـی تـر هاوکاری وهەماهەنگـی خواش دەٌەوێـت من وەکو کوردێـن 
 وهارٌکاری لەو کارانەی کەوا خاڵـی هاوبەشـن لە نێـوان نەتەوەکاندا بکـرێـت.
 
/ وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی ٌان ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکی کورد گەر دەتەوێت، چـۆن سەٌری ئٌـسلام دەکەٌت وەکو 2پ
  انٌـبوونـی ئٌـسلام چـی دەگەٌەنێـت؟ ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانـی؟ جٌهـ
و/ ئەگەر سەٌـری ئاٌەتەکانـی لورئانـی پـٌرۆزبکەٌن بۆمان دەردەکەوێت کە سەرەڕای ئەوەی کە بە زمانـی 
عەرەبـی هاتووە، ئەم ئاٌنە ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانٌە. وە ئەم پێؽەمبەرە (خاتم)ی هەمـوو پێؽەمبەرانە، وە تەواوکاری 
کە پێؽەمبەرانـی پێـش خۆی هێـناوٌانە. وە لورئان تەواوکاری ئەو پەٌامانەٌە کە تورات هەموو ئەو پەٌامانەٌە 
وئٌنجـٌل هێـناوٌانە لە لاٌەن خواوە. ئەڵبەتە هەر لە سورەتی (الفرلان)دا کە سوورەتێـکی مەکٌٌە، خوای گەورە 
ە لٌکـون للعـالمـٌن نذٌـرا). ٌان لە ئاماژە بە جٌهـانگـٌری ئٌـسلام دەکات (تبـارن الذي نـزل الفـرلان عـلی عـبد
شـوێنـێکی تـردا دەفەرمـوێت (وما ارسـلنان الا کافة للنـاس بشـٌرا ونذٌرا). وە هەر لەسەرەتای هاتنی ئٌـسلام 
هەموو نەتەوەکان جگە لە عەرەب لەدەوری کۆبوونەتەوە، سەلمانی فارسی وصهٌبی ڕۆمـی وبٌلالـی حـەبەشـی، 
وردی لێـرەوە لە کوردسـتان ڕۆشـتووە بۆ مەدٌنە کاتێـن هەواڵـی هاتنـی ئاٌـنێـکی تازە وە تەنانەت کاوانـی ک
هاتـووی بٌـستووە، وە سەرەنجـام باوەڕی پێهـێناوە. وە هەر لەبەر ٌەکـسانـی تێـڕوانٌـنی ئٌـسلام بۆ سەرجەم 
اتە خـزمەکانی کاتێـن کە بەشەرەکان و بە ٌەکچـاوسەٌـرکـردنٌـان، ئەوەتە پێؽەمبەر (د. خ.) پـشتهەڵدەک
دەسـتهەڵنـاگـرن لە سـتەمکاری و، دەرەنجـامٌـش کۆچ دەکات بۆ مەدٌنەو خەڵکەکەی کە خـزمٌـشی نەبوون 
تەواوی پـشتگـٌرٌٌـان لــێ کـردووە. ئەمە وەکو هەڵوێـستی کردەٌـی ئٌـسلام، لەڕووی تٌـۆرٌـشەوە پێؽەمبەر (د. 
انە وەسـتاوەتەوە کە لەسەر بنەمای ڕەگەز، ٌان ڕەنگ تانەٌان لە خ) زۆر بە توندی بەرەوڕووی ئەو کەسـ
کەسـانـی تـر دابێـت.  هەر بـۆٌە ئٌـسلام جٌـاوازٌەن ناکات لە نێـوان نەتەوەکان. وە ئێمەش وەکو کورد شـانازی 
 دەکەٌن بەم جٌهـانبـٌـنی ئٌـسلام کە هٌچ جٌـاوازٌەن ناکات لە نێـوان نەتەوەکان. 
 
ڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێـشەی کەرکون؟ وەن کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی چی دەبێت گەر دەسـت بەرداری / چۆن مامە3پ
ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسـڵمانەکانتـان؟ بۆ ئەوەی لانـی کەم خوێن نەڕێـژرێت، ٌان لەٌـرانەکە کۆتاٌـی 
 پێـبێت. 
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اتۆرٌە فاشـستانە کە حـوکمـی عـێرالٌـان و/ ئێمـە وەکو کورد وعەرەب کێـشەمان نٌە بە ٌەکەوە، ئەو ڕژێمە دکتـ
کـردووە هەوڵێـان داوە لە ڕووی دٌموگـرافی وجٌـوگـرافـی وکارگـێڕٌٌەوە کەرکون بگـۆڕن وبٌـکەن بە 
شـارێـکی عەرەبـی. بەم شـێوەٌە ئەو ڕژێمە دژاٌەتـی کوردی ئەوشـارەٌان کـردووە، هەر وەهـا دژاٌەتـی 
دەرکـردنـی دەٌان هەزار خـێزانـی کورد وتورکمـانـی کەرکون لەو شـارە ،  تورکمـانٌـشٌان کـردووە. وە بە
خـستنە سەری ناحـٌە ولەزاکانـی بە سەر پارێـزگاکانـی تـر، هەوڵـی بە عەرەب کـردنٌـان داوە. بەم شـێوەٌە هەر 
الـی کـردن داوە. وە لە کۆنەوە ئەو ڕژێمانە هەوڵـی گۆڕٌـنی ناسـنامەی ئەم شـارەٌان لە کوردٌەوە بـۆ بە عـێر
سەرجەم ئەو شـۆڕشـانەی کورد لە عـێراق ونەگەٌـشتن بە ڕێکەوتن هۆکارەکەی دەگەڕێتەوە بـۆ کەرکون. ئەو 
ڕژێمـانە دانٌـان بە کوردسـتانٌـی کەرکون دا نە نٌـاوە. دٌارە مـێژووش هەر وا هاتـووە، ٌەکێـن زاڵمـە 
ٌەکٌـش داگـٌرکـراو. بـۆ نمـوونە کاتێـن کە ڕژێمـێـکی وٌەکێـکٌـش مەزڵوم، وە لاٌەن داگـٌرکەرە ولا
داگـٌرکەری وەکو عـێرالـی سەددام داگـٌری کوٌەٌت دەکات، وە پاش نەمـانـی ئەو ڕژێمـە ئٌـتر مانای ئەوە نٌە 
کە عـێرالٌەکان لەرەبـووی ئەو زەرەرانەی کوٌەٌتـٌەکان بکەنەوە. هەر وەکـو چـۆن ئەو هەوڵەی سەدام بۆ 
ی کوەٌت بە پارێـزگاٌەکـی عـێراق و، سەرەنجـام هەوڵەکەی سەری نەگـرت ولە لاٌەن دنٌـاوە دژاٌەتی کـردنـ
کـرا، ئاواش پاش نەمانـی هەمان ڕژێم دەبێـت ئەو سـتەمە لە سەر کەرکون لاببـرێـت. وە سەرجەم بەڵگە 
تانـی بـوونـی کەرکون مـێژووٌەکانـی کاتـی عوسـمانٌەکان و، ڕووسەکان وئٌـنگلـٌز نەن هەر کوردسـ
دەسەلمـێـنن، بەڵکـو ئەوەش دەسەلمـێـنن کە بەدرەو جەسـانٌـش کوردسـتانـٌن. لە بەر ئەوە ئێمە نابێـت ملکەچ بٌن 
بـۆ سـٌاساتێـکی چەوتـی داگٌـرکارانەی ڕژێمـە دکتـاتۆرەکان کە وٌـستووٌانە بە زۆر بٌـسەپـێنن. وە چـونکە 
ێٌەو عـێرالێـکی فٌدراڵە، دەبێـت هەمـوو پێـکهاتەکان بگەن بە مافەکانٌـان وە چـی ئەمـڕۆ عـێراق، عـێرالێـکی نو
تـر بە بەهانەی زۆرٌنەو کەمٌنەوە مافەکانٌـان پێـشێل نەکـرێـت. وە عـێراق ئٌـشتا دەسـتورێـکی هەٌە، ئەو 
ـارەسەری کێـشەی دەسـتورەش هەموومان لە سەری ڕێکەوتـووٌن و، دەنگمـان پـێ داوە. وە لەم دەسـتورە چ
کەرکون کـراوە. بەڵام ئێـستا دەبێـت بـپرسـٌن کە کـێ ناٌەوێـت چـارەسەری کێـشەی کەرکون بکات؟ وە نابێـت 
 بە ناوی دٌموکـراسٌەوە چـی تـر درێـژە بە سـٌاسەتی ڕژێمـە دٌکتـاتۆرٌەکان بدرێـت. 
 
کانـی عـێراق لە سەر بنەمای ناشـٌوناڵٌـستی / مەبەسـتمان لەم پـرسـٌارە ئەوەٌە کە کاتێـن رژێمە پێـشووە٤پ
عەرەبـی ئەم جۆرە سـٌاسەتەٌان پەٌـڕەو کـردووە، کوردٌـش چـونکە عەرەب نەبـووە ملـی نەداوە بەو سـٌاسەتە. 
بەڵام ئێـستا ئێـوە وەکو ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان، بـۆچـی (تنـازل) بـۆ بەرانبەرەکانتـان کە ئەوانٌـش ئٌـسلامـٌی 
  ناکەن؟ عەرەبـن
و/ پێـش هەمـوو شـتێـن موسـڵمانێـکی عەرەب ٌان تورن گەر بٌەوێـت بـراٌەتی لە گەڵ مـندا بکات، دەبێـت ماڵم 
داگـٌر نەکات. وە تەنانەت لە فەرمـوودەی پێؽەمبەردا هاتـووە (من لتل دون مالە فهـو شـهٌد) با ئەو کەسەی کە 
ێت. کەواتە هەر کەسـێن لە پێـناو ماڵ ونەفـس وکەرامەتـٌدا دەٌەوێـت ماڵەکەت داگـٌر بکات موسـڵمانٌـش بـ
بکوژرێت شەهٌدە. ئـٌتر کاتێـن ئەو کە ئٌدعای موسـڵمان بـوون دەکات، وە کاتێـن کە بەڵگەی کوردسـتانـی 
بـوونـی کەرکون دەخـرێـتە ڕوو دەبێـت ملکەچـی ڕاسـتی بێـت. نەن بە پێـچەوانەوە داوا لە ئێمە بکـرێت کە 
ون لە کاتێـکدا کوردسـتانـٌە دەسـتبەرداری بـٌن بـۆ خەڵکـێن کە خۆشـٌان دەزانـن ئەوە بە زوڵم دەسـتکاری کەرک
% کەرکون کوردە، وە پێـش ئەو کاتەش ١٦لە  ٠٦٩٠دٌموگـرافـی وجوگـرافـی وکارگـێڕی کـراوە. تا سـاڵـێ 
زۆر جـارٌـش ئٌعـترافٌـان کـردووە کە  ئەم ڕێـژەٌە زٌاتـر بـووە، وە ڕێـژەٌەکـی تـرٌـش تورکمـانـن. وە
کوردسـتانٌە، بەڵام لەبەر ئەوەٌە شـارێـکی نەوتـٌە دەڵـێن ئێمە ڕازی نابٌن ببێـتە شـارێـکی کوردسـتانـی. لە بەر 
ئەوە ئەم بٌـانکەی نەوتە ناهێـڵێت دان بە حەلدا بنێـن. ئەگەر ئێمە بگەڕێـنەوە بۆ دەسـتوری عـێراق ئەو 
ەسەر کـردووە، نەوت کە سـامانێـکی نٌـشتمانـٌە داهاتەکەی دەگەڕێتەوە بـۆ خەزٌنەی گـشتی کێـشەٌەی چـار
 !فٌدراڵ. دەی کەواتە کە داهاتـی نەوت دەگەڕێتەوە بـۆ حـکومەتی مەرکەزی ئـتر بـۆچـی دان بە حەلـدا نانـێن
ێـت داهاتەکەی بگەڕێتەوە بۆ تەنانەت ئەو نەوتانەش کە لـێرە لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان بەرهەم دەهـێنرێت دەب
خەزٌنەی گـشتی فٌدراڵ، کەواتە هـێچ جـٌاوازٌەکـی نٌە گەر کەرکون بگەڕێتەوە بۆ سەر هەرێمـی کوردسـتان 
 ١٤٠ٌان بەم شـێوەٌە بمێـنێـتەوە. لە بەر ئەوە ئەو دەسـتورە کە مادەٌەکـی تاٌبەت کـردووە بەم پـرسە کە مادەی 
وە دەبێـت ڕێـزی لێـبگرٌن وپابەندی بٌن. ئەم مادەٌە باس لەوە دەکات کە ئەم و، هەمـوومان دەنگمـان پـێدا
کێـشەٌە دەبێـت بە سـێ لۆناغ چـارەسەر بـکرێت، ٌەکەم: ئاسـاٌـی کـردنەوە، دووەم: ئامـار، سـێٌەم: ڕٌفـراندۆم. 
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تا ئێـستاش لۆناؼـی  کەواتە لە کۆتاٌـٌدا خەڵکـی شـارەکە خـۆٌان بـڕٌاری چـارەنـووسـی خۆٌان دەدەن. وە
ٌەکەمٌـان جـێ بە جـێ نەکـردووە. وە ئامادە نٌن ئەم مادەٌە جـێ بە جـێ بکەن. وە ئێمە بە پلەی ٌەن دەسەڵاتـی 
جـێبەجـێکار کە حـکومەتە بە تاوانبـار دەزانـٌن لەم بارەوە. کەواتە ئٌـسلام نەن داوامان لـێ ناکات دەسـتبەرداری 
  مـان لـێ دەکات کە پارێـزگاری لـێ بکەٌن.کەرکون بـٌن؛ بەڵکـو داوا
 
/ بەڵام ئەوە چەند مانگـێکە حـکومەتـی ناوەندی عـێراق هەرێمـی کوردسـتان تاوانبـار دەکات بەوەی کە 5پ
داهاتـی نەوت ناخەنە ڕوو، وە ئەوان نازانـن کە هەرێم چـۆن گـرێ بەسـتە نەوتٌەکانـی کـردووە وچـۆنٌـش بە 
ەرانبەردا حکومەتی هەرێم دەڵـێت کە داهاتی نەوتـی هەرێم لە دەسەڵاتەکانـی هەرێم داٌا ڕێووەی دەبات. لە ب
 وپەٌوەندی بە حکومەتی ناوەەندٌەوە نٌە. 
و/ سەبارەت بە ٌاسـای نەوت وگازەوە، پەرلەمـانـی عـێراق (ممصـر)ە، وە هێـشتا ٌاسـاٌەکـی لەو بارەوە پەسەند 
دا هاتـووە کە هەرێم حەلـی ئەوەی هەٌە کە گـرێ بەسـتی نەوتـی بکات، نەکـردووە. وە لە دەسـتوری عـێرال
%ی داهاتی عـێراق وەردەگـرێت. بـۆ ئەوەی ٧٠بەڵام داهاتەکەی دەبێـت بگەڕێتەوە بـۆ ناوەند. وە هەرێمـٌـش 
کە ئەم ئەم (نـزاع)ەی هەرێم وحکومەتی ناوەندی ٌەکـلاٌـی بکـرێتەوە دەبێت دادگای فـٌدراڵـی بـڕٌار بدات 
گـرێبەسـتانەی هەرێم ٌاسـاٌٌە ٌان نا ٌاسـاٌـی. بەڵام لە بەر ئەوەی کە لە ناوەند ٌاسـای نەوت گاز هێـشتا نٌە، ئەو 
لـسانەی کە دەٌکەن ٌاسـاٌـی نٌە، بەڵکـو لـسەی کاربەدەسـتانـی وەکو شەهـرسـتانـی ومالکـی وکەسـانـی تـرە. 
گاز هەٌە. وە بە شـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی چـونکە ئێـستا هەندێ کێـشەی تـر بەڵام لە هەرێم ٌاسـای تاٌبەت بە نەوت 
هەن لە نێـوان هەرێم وناوەنددا، ئەم پـرسەش ئێـستا چـڕ دەکەنەوە. وە ناوەند دەٌەوێـت هەندێ هەژمـوونـی خۆی 
  بـسەپـێـنێت بە سەر هەرێم دا، لە بەرانبەردا حکومەتی هەرێمٌـش هەندێ پەرچەکـردار دەنوێـنـێت.
 
  / کامێـن لەم شـوناسـانە گـرنگتـرن بـۆت: کورد بـوون، موسـڵمان بـوون ٌان کوردسـتانی بـوون؟ 6پ
و/ کورد بـوون هـٌچ دەسەڵاتێـکی خۆمـی تێـدا نٌە، خوا بە کورد درووسـتی کـردووم، دٌارە حکمەتێـكی تێـداٌا. 
سەبارەت بە کوردسـتانـی بـوونٌـش بە هەمان لە بەر ئەوە دەبێـت منـٌش وەکو مـرۆڤێـکی کورد خـزمەت بکەم. 
شـێوە دەسەڵاتی خـۆمـی تێدا نٌە، من لە کوردسـتان لەداٌن بـووم نەن لە جێگاٌەکی تـر. هەر بۆٌە چـۆن باون 
وداٌن کۆمەڵێـک مافٌـان هەٌە لەسەر منداڵ بەهەمان شـێوە نٌـشتامنٌـش مافـی هەٌە بە سەر هاوڵاتٌەکانٌەوە. وە 
بەرگـری لـێ بکەن و، شـانازی پێوە بکەن هەر وەکو چۆن شـانازی دەکەن بە باون وداٌـن کە هـٌچ پێـوٌـستە 
دەسەڵاتێکـٌان لە هەڵـبژاردنٌـاندا نٌە. هەر بۆٌە پـێوٌـستە هەمـوو هاوڵاتٌەن بە وەفا بـێتبەرانبەر بە خان وبە 
ـی بکات کە لەو نەتەوە نٌـشتمانەدا خولماوە نٌـشتمانەکەی. لە هەمان کاتدا پـێوٌـست دەکات کە شـانازی بە خۆش
کە حـٌکمەتێـکی خوای تـێداٌا. سەبارەت بە ئاٌنـٌش پێـکهاتەٌەکـی گـرنگـی شـوناس وبـوونـی مـرۆڤە. کاتـێـن 
کە من بمەوێـت وەکـو مـرۆڤـی کورد ڕۆڵ بـبٌنم دەبێـت موسـڵمان بم چـونکە گەلـی کورد موسـڵمانە، بەم 
ی کورد بـوونم دەبـٌنم. هەر بۆٌە دەبـێت من شـانازی بەوە بکەم کە کوردم وە لە کوردسـتاندا شـێوەٌەش من ڕۆڵـ
لە داٌـن بوو، کە نٌـشتمانمە هەر وەها بە ئٌـسلامـٌشەوە بکەم کە ئاٌنمە، بەم شـێوەٌە من ڕۆڵـی تەواوی خۆم 
  وردی کوردسـتانی موسـڵمانە. دەبـٌنم. وە ئەمانەش تەواوکەری ٌەکـن، وە چەند ڕەهەندی شوناسـی منـی ک
 
/ لە بارەی عـێرالی بوونـی ئێـوە، ئاٌە ئێـوە بە ڕەزامەندی خۆتان وبە گـرێبەسـتێـکی کۆمەڵاٌەتی بـوون بە ٧پ
عـێرالـی؟ ڕەنگە ئێـستا لەسەر شەلامەکانـی کوردسـتان بپـرسـٌت لە گەنجەکان هەر عەرەبٌـش نەزانـن و، هـٌچ 
  نەکەن. ئاٌا ئێـوە بە ئەمـری والـع بـوون بە عـێرالی ٌان هەر لە پێـناو بەرژەوەندی؟شـانازٌەن بە عـێرالەوە 
و/ لە ڕاسـتٌدا عـێراق وتەواوی ووڵاتانـی ناوچەکە لە ڕۆشـناٌـی ڕێکەوتـنی سـاٌکـس پٌـکۆدا درووسـت 
العەش هـٌچ لە لەناعەت کـراون. وە کوردسـتانٌـش بە زۆر والعـێکٌـان بە سەردا سەپاندووە. وە ئەم ڕێکەوتن وو
وباوەڕی ئێمە ناگۆڕێت کە ئەم کوردەش مٌللەتێـکە وەکو مٌللەتانـی تـر، وە کوردسـتانٌـش ئەگەر چـی 
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لەوارەٌەکـی سـٌاسی نٌە ئێـستا بەڵام لەوارەٌەکـی جوگـرافی نکولـی لـێ نەکـراوە، وە نٌـشتمانـی سەرجەم 
ێدەوەش دەژٌـن، وە مافـی خۆشـمانە کە لە سەر ئەم خـاکەی کوردانە. وە ئەمە ئومێدی ئێمەٌە، وە بەو ئوم
کوردسـتان لەوارەی سـٌاسی کوردسـتانٌـش هەبێت، کە دەوڵەتـی کوردسـتان دەبـێت. وە مافـی چـارەی 
خۆنووسـٌن کە بەڵێـنامە نێـونەتەوەٌٌەکان ومافەکانـی مـرۆڤ دانـی پێدا دەنـێن دەبێـت بۆ کوردٌـش فەراهەم 
م ئێمە ئێـستا کە لە عـێرالدا دەژٌـن کە کورد وعەرەب وتورکمانٌـشی تێداٌا، وە بە دەسـتورێـن پێـکەوە بێـت. بەڵا
دەژٌن. ئێمە ڕازٌن بەو دەسـتورە وە هەموومان دەنگمان پـێ داوە، بەڵام پێـوٌـستە لاٌەنەکانـی تـرٌـش کە 
لۆناؼەدا ڕازٌـن بە پـێی ئەم دەسـتورە لە گەڵ  دەنگٌـان پـێ داوە ئەوانٌـش ڕێـز لەم دەسـتورە بگـرن. ئێمە لەم
نەتەوەکانـی تـردا لە عـێراق دا بـژٌن. بەڵام لە هەمانکاتدا، وەکو ئامانجـێکـی باڵاتـر لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە کورد 
ی نەتەوەٌەکە وەکو نەتەوەکانـی تـر. وە لە دەسـتوری عـێرالٌـشدا نە نوسـراوە کە کورد مافـی چـارەی خۆنووسـٌن
 نٌە.
 
  / دەوڵەت چـی دەگەٌەنێـت بۆتان؟٨پ
و/ دەوڵەت (مٶسـسة)ٌەکـی سـٌاسٌە، وە دەبێـت بە شـێوەٌەکـی مەدەنـی بێت. وە لە سەر بنەمای هاوڵاتـی بـوون 
 ژٌانـی هاوڵاتٌـانی ڕێـن خات بە دەر لە ئٌنـتمای ڕەگەزی وئاٌـنٌٌان، وە هەوڵ بدات بۆ خۆشـگوزرانٌـان. 
ڕاڤە دەکەن لە ڕوانگەی پەٌوەندٌتـان لەگەڵ  "ئازادی بـراٌەتی دادپەروەری " / چـۆن درووشمـەکانـی ٩پ
 بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان، بە تاٌبەت کە ئێـوە نەتەوەٌەکـی بـێ دەوڵەتـن؟ 
و/ سەبارەت بە ئازادی ئێمە لەناعەتمان واٌە ئەگەر مـرۆڤ ئازاد نەبێـت ناتوانێـت تەنانەت پەٌـڕەوی لە 
ئاٌـنەکەشـی بکات. هەر بۆٌە ٌەکەم پـرنـسٌپ ئەوەٌە کە مـرۆڤ ئازاد بێـت، وە ئازادانە بـٌر بکاتەوە، وە 
ی خـێزان چ لە سەر ئاسـتی کۆمەڵگا چ لە ئازادانە بـڕٌاری خۆی بدات چ لە سەر ئاسـتی تان چ لە سەر ئاسـت
سەر ئاسـتی دەوڵەتٌـش. وە لە ئٌـسلامٌـشدا (لا اکـراە فـً الدٌن) کە دەبێـت مـرۆڤ ئازاد بـێت لە هەڵبـژاردنـی 
ئاٌـنی ٌان بـٌرو بۆچـونـی ٌان جۆری ژٌانـی. وە بە ئەزمونٌـش بۆمان دەرکەوتووە گەر کاتێـن حـٌزبێـکی 
ستبێـتی بە زۆر بـٌرو باوەڕەکانـی بـسەپێـنێـت، سەرەنجام سەرکەوتـوو نەبـووە. وە ئێـستا ئٌـسلامـٌی ووٌـ
ئەوانەش لە کوردسـتان لەناعەتٌـان هاتۆتە سەر ئەوەی کە حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی بـن، وە وەکو ئێمە ئەوانٌـش 
ەوە، ئاواش دەبێـت فەراهەم خەباتی سـٌاسی مەدەنـی بکەن. وە هەر وەکو ئازادی پـرنـسٌپی ٌەکەمە لە تاکەکان
بێـت لە نێـوان گەلانـدا، وە دەبێـت گەلان ڕێـز لە ئازادی ٌەکتر بگـرن. وە بە زۆر سەپاندن وتوندوتـٌژی بـٌرو 
بۆچـون، توندوتـٌژی تـری لـێ پەٌدا دەبێـت. ئەم توندوتـٌژٌەش گەر لە نێـوان وڵاتێـکدا بێـت ئەوا کاولـی دەکات، 
وڵاتاندا بێـت ئاواش ئەو ووڵاتانە دٌـسان کاول دەکات. وە ئەگەر ئازادٌـش نەبـوو بـراٌەتٌـش وە گەر لە نێـوان و
پاشـان دادپەروەرٌـش نابـن. وە (العـدل اساس الملن) وە هەر شـتێـن لە سەر بنەمای دادپەروەری نەبـوو ئەوا 
ٌە کە ئەو ووڵاتانە لە سەر بنەمای بەردەوام نابێـت. ئەمەش کە لە بەهاری عەرەبی دا دەٌـبٌنٌن لە بەر ئەوە
 دادپەروەری بەڕێوە نەچـوون؛ هەر بـۆٌە گەلان لێـٌان ڕاپەڕٌون. 
 
  / چۆن دەتوانـن وەکو پارتێـکی سـٌاسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لەگەڵ هەمـوو ئەو پارتە عٌلمـانٌانەدا هەڵ بکەن؟ ١٠پ
چ کۆمۆنٌـست بـن، چ عٌلمـانـی وەکو پدن و/ دٌارە ئێمە خاڵـی هاوبەشمان هەٌە لە گەڵ پێکهـاتە سـٌاسٌەکان 
وٌـنن، ٌان هەر پاتێـکی تـر. وە چەندٌن پـرنـسٌپـی هاوبەش هەٌە کە ئێمە لەگەڵٌـاندا کار بکەٌن. وە لەوانەٌە لە 
ڕووی فٌـکرٌەوە لەگەڵٌـان جـٌاواز بـٌن، بەڵام ئێمە (ممـارسـة)ی سـٌاسەت دەکەٌن. ئێمە نەهاتووٌن (صـراع)ی 
ـان لەگەڵـدا بکەٌن. وە لە هەندی لۆناؼـدا هەندی (حـساسٌة) هەبووە، بەڵام بۆ خـزمەتی گەل ووڵاتمـان ئاٌدۆلوجٌ
خاڵـی هاوبەشـی زۆر هەن کە بتـوانٌن پێکەوە کارٌان بۆ بکەٌن. وە ئێمە ئێـستا کاری هاوبەشـی ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆن 
شـدا لە لٌـستێـکی ٩١١٢. لە هەڵـبژاردنـی دەکەٌن لە گەڵ کۆمەڵـی ئٌـسلامـی وگۆڕان کە پارتێـکی عٌلمـانٌە
هاوبەشـدا دابەزٌن لە گەڵ کۆمەڵـی ئٌـسلامـٌی وحـٌزبـی سـۆشـٌال دٌموکـرات وزەحمەتکێـشـان کە دوو پارتـی 




  / چۆن لە دٌموکـراسی تـێ دەگەن وە چـۆنٌـش بەرجەسـتەی دەکەن؟ ٠٠پ
ی دەسەڵاتەکانە، وە ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤی دٌکتـاتۆرٌەتە، ٌان بە پێچەوانەوە. وە و/ دٌموکـراسی مٌکانـٌزمی ڕێکخـستن
ئێمە لە ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاسـت تاڵاوی دٌکتـاتۆرٌەتمـان لە هەمـوو شـوێنـێن زٌاتـر چەشـتووە، ئەوٌە 
ـی تـر. لە نمـوونەکانـی سەدام حوسـێن وبەشـار ئەسەد وموبارەن وزەٌن ئەلعـابدٌن وعەلـی عەبدوڵا سـاڵح وئەون
بەر ئەوە لەم ناوچەٌە ئێمە زٌاتـر تامەزرۆی دٌموکـراسـٌن. وە گەلٌـش سەرچـاوەی دەسەڵاتەکانە، هەر بۆٌە 
دٌموکـراسـی مٌکانـٌزمێـکی باشە بۆ ڕێکخـستن ودابەشـکـردنـی ئەم دەسەڵاتانە. بـۆ نموونە ئێمە وەکو 
% ١٠% موسـڵمـانن، بەڵام ئێمە لە ١٩کەکەش لە ٌەکگـرتـوو لە کوردسـتان کە پارتێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌن وخەڵ
دەنگەکانٌـش ناهـێنٌن لە هەڵـبژاردن، بەڵام بە سەرەنجـامەکانٌـش ڕازٌن. خەڵـن تاتێـن دەنگ بە عٌلمـانٌەکان 
دەدەن وبە ئێمەی نادەن ڕێـزٌان لـێ دەگـرٌن وبەلاشـمانەوە ئاسـاٌـٌە. لە هەمانکاتدا لە شوێـنێـکی تـر وەکو 
  اتێـن ئٌـسلامٌەکان زۆرٌنە دەهێـنن بە هەمان مٌکانـٌزمـی دٌموکـراسـی بەرانبەرەکانٌـش پـێی ڕازٌن. مٌـسر ک
 
/ ئەگەر ٌەکگـرتـوو لە هەڵـبژاردنەکاندا وەکو بـراٌانـی مٌـسر زۆرٌنەی بە دەسـت هێـنا، وە دوای ٢٠پ
  ە دەسەڵات دەداتە دەسـتی بـراوەکان؟چوارسـاڵ لە هەڵـبژاردن ئەو زۆرٌنەی نەهێـناٌەوە، ئاٌا بە ئاشـتٌان
و/  بە دڵنـٌاٌٌەوە، ئێمە باوەڕمان بە دەسـتاو دەسـتی ئاشـتٌانەی دەسەڵات هەٌە، ئەمەش ٌەکێـکی تـرە لە 
بنەماکانـی دٌموکـراسی. فـرەٌـی ٌەکێـکی تـرە لە بنەماکانـی دٌموکـراسی، مافـی مـرۆڤ، ڕێـزگـرتنـی ٌاسـا، 
رنـسٌپەکانـی دٌموکـراسـٌن، وە ئێمە باوەڕمان بە هەمووٌان هەٌە. وە لە پەٌـڕەو ئەمانە هەر هەمـوو پـ
 وپـرۆگـرامـی ٌەکگـرتـوودا هەٌە، وە خۆمان داوای دەکەٌن، ئـٌتر چـۆن دەکـرێت لەناعەتمـان پـێی نەبێـت.
 
تنـانەوەی کەسـێتی / لە ووتاری بـراٌانـی موسـڵماندا، لە ئاسـتی تٌـۆری ئاماژە بە سـتراتـٌژی بنـٌا١٠پ
موسـڵمان، خـێزانـی موسـڵمان، کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمان، حکومەتی ئٌـسلامــٌی وە خـٌلافەتـی ئٌـسلامــٌی دەکات 
وەکو شـێوازی کۆشـشی بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان. ئێـوە وەکو بـراٌانـی موسـڵمانـی کورد لە کوێـی ئەم سـتراتـٌژەدان، 
 ئاٌا خـٌلافەت درووسـت دەبـێت؟ 
ئێمە باوەڕمان واٌە کە بناؼەی هەموو کۆمەڵگاٌەکی تەندروسـت، هەموو دەوڵەتێـکی (رشـٌد) دەبێـت تاکـی  و/
چاکە وهاوڵاتـی ساڵح بێـت، لە بەر ئەوە ئێمە لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە دەبێـت لە تاکەوە دەسـت پـێ بکەٌن ئەگەر 
ی بەهـێزت نەبێـت دواتـر بٌـناکەت لاواز دەبێـت بمـانەوێـت دەوڵەتێـکی بەهـێزمان هەبێت. وە ئەگەر بنەڕەتێـک
ولە هەموو ساتێـکدا ئەگەری ڕووخـانـی هەٌە. وە ئەگەر ئێمە توانٌمـان تاکـی باشـی نـێر ومـێ پەروەردە بکەٌن 
لەو ڕێگاٌەشەوە خـێزانـی پەروەردەکـراوی باش پەٌدا دەبێـت. وە دٌـسان بەٌەن گەٌـشتنی دوو کەسـی 
هەڵبەتە منداڵـی چاکٌـش دەخەنەوە. وە بە پەٌدابـوونـی کۆمەڵێـن خـێزنـی باش، دٌارە ڕۆشـنبٌری وچان 
کۆمەڵگاٌەکـی باشٌـش دێتە کاٌەوە. جۆرە کۆمەڵگاٌەن کە گٌـانـی لێـبوردەٌـی وئاگالێـن بـوون ووەلانانـی توندو 
ەو کۆمەڵگا چاکەدا بـڕٌاری تـٌژی وخۆپەرەسـتی وبوؼـز ولـٌن، کۆمەڵگاٌەکـی بەخـتەوەر دێتە بـوون. وە ل
هەڵبـژاردنـی کەسـی چاکٌـش دەدەن بـۆ ئەوەی بەڕێـوەٌان ببـات. وە بەم شـێوەٌە کاتێـن کە کۆمەڵگاٌەکـی 
(رشـٌد) درووسـت دەبێـت، حـکومەتی (رشـٌد)ٌـش پەٌدا دەبێـت. سەبارەت بە خـٌلافەتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی ئێمە لە 
ـلافەت دەلێـن لە لورئان ٌان لە سـونە لەسەر نٌە. تەنهـا ئەوەندە هەٌە ئەمە لە ٌەکگـرتـوو لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە خٌ
سەردەمە پێـشووەکاندا فۆرمێـن بـوو لە دەوڵەتداری. بەڵام ئێـستا والٌعـەکە گۆڕاوە. بۆ نموونە دەوڵەتی نەتەوەٌـی 
ناوێکـی پـٌرۆز نٌە. بەڵکـو  درووسـت بـووە، وە چەندەهـا مٌکانـٌزمـی تـر پەٌدا بـووە. وە خـٌلافە بۆخۆی
دەبێـت ئەمـڕۆ بگەڕێـٌن بە دوای مٌکانـٌزمـی سەردەمٌـانەو پێـشکەوتودا.  بـۆ نمـوونە ئێـستا لە ئەوروپا لە 
ڕووی سەربازٌەوە پەٌمانـی نەٌتـۆی هەٌە، لە ڕووی ئابورٌەوە بازاڕی ئەوروپـی هاوبەشـی هەٌە، لە ڕووی 
ها لە چەندٌـن ڕووی تـرەوە توانٌـوٌەتـی ٌەکێـتٌەکـی بەهـێز بهێـنێـتە کاٌەوە. دراوٌـشەوە ٌورۆی هەٌە. هەر وە
ئێمە بـڕوامان واٌە کە دەکـرێت ووڵاتە موسـڵمانەکان لە سەر بنەمای بەرژەوەندی هاوبەش جۆرێـن لەم ٌەکێـتٌە 
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موونە ئێـستا دەوڵەتـی بهێـننە ئاراوە. وە مەرجٌـش نٌە ئەو ٌەکێـتٌە بەواتای ٌەن دەوڵەت بـوون بێت. بۆ ن
کۆنفٌدراڵـی هەٌە، ئەم دەوڵەتانە هەر ٌەکەو سەروەری خۆی هەٌە، وە لە نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتـووەکان ووڵاتـی 
سەربەخـۆن، بەڵام لەسەر بنەمای بەرژەوەندی هاوبەش ٌەن دەگـرن. وە لەوانەشە لەم ٌەکگـرتنە دەسـبەرداری 
ژەوەندٌەکـی باڵاتـردا. دەکـرێت ئەم جۆرە هاوبەشـٌەش لە نموونەی هەندێ بەرژەوەندی خۆٌان بـن لە پێـناو بەر
ئەم ٌەکێـتٌانە بۆ پارمەتـی دانـی ٌەکـتر بێـت. وە بـوونـی ٌەکێـتٌەکٌـش جـٌاوازە لە بە ٌەن بـوون، وەکو ئەو 
مە کۆنەکەی کە نمـوونەی ٌەکێـتی ئەوروپا کە ئاماژەمان پـێکـرد. کەواتە ئێمە ناکۆشـٌن بـۆ خـٌلافەت وەکو فۆر
واتای ٌەن دەوڵەت بـوون دەگەٌەنێـت. بەڵام ئەگەر بەرژەوەندی بخوازێت دەکـرێت چەند ووڵاتێـکـی موسـڵمان 
 وە ناموسـلمانٌـش لەو جۆرە ٌەکێـتٌە بهێننە کاٌەوە. 
 
ەرکـرداٌەتی پ/ باشـە تێـگەٌـشـتنی ئەندامانتـان هـٌچ جـٌاوازٌەکـی هەٌە لەم تێـگەٌـشتنەی بەڕێـزتان وەکو س
 ٌەکگـرتـوو؟ 
و/ لەوانەٌە ئەندامێـن لە خوارەوە ئەم تێـگەٌـشتنەی مـنی نەبێت. بـۆ نموونە هەموو تاکێـکی کورد خەون 
دەبٌـنێت بە دەوڵەتـی کوردٌەوە، بەڵام کاتێـن گوێ دەگـرن لە سەرکـردەٌەکـی سـٌاسی لەوانەٌە هەندێکٌـان وا 
ٌنە. ٌان لەوانەشـە تۆمەتبـاری بکەن بە خـٌانەتٌـش. ئێمەش کاتێـن کە بـٌر بـزانن ئەو سەرکـردەٌە زۆر ڕەش بـ
لە والعـی ئەمـڕۆی جٌهـان دەکەٌنەوە خةٌلافەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی بە ڕاسـتی ئاسـتەنگی زۆرە، تەنانەت هەندێ جـار 
ئەو هەمـوو دەوڵەتە  لە ناو ٌەن دەوڵەتدا دوو حـٌزبـی ئٌـسلامـٌی ناتوانن بەٌەکەوە هەڵ بکەن. ئەی ئـٌتر چـۆن
کە ئابوری جٌـاوازو کلـتوری جٌـاواز وزۆر شـتی تـری جـٌاواز، مەگەر هەر بە لـسە ئاسـان بێـت ٌەکٌـٌان پـێ 
بگـرٌت لە ٌەن دەوڵەتـدا. بەڵام لە والعـی کـردەٌـی دا زۆر لورسە. وە لە مـێژووشـدا زۆر جـار خـٌلافەت تەنهـا 
ـنا لە زۆر کات ولە زۆر شـوێـندا خەلٌفە هٌـچ جۆرە دەسەڵاتێـکی کـردەٌـی شـتێـکی سـٌبۆلێـن بووە، ئەگٌ
نەبـووە. وە ئەمەش بە شـێوەٌەکـی کـردەٌـی گەشـتوٌنەتە ئەم لەناعەتە. کاتێـن کۆمەڵێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی کاری 
ەتٌـان لەو بارەوە سـٌاسـی ناکەن لەوانەٌە زۆر شـتی تٌـۆری هەبێـت باوەڕٌان پـێی هەبێت ٌان تێـگەٌـشتنی تاٌب
 هەبێـت. بەڵام والـع جٌـاوازە لە تٌـۆری. 
 پ/ ئاٌا ئێـوە هەسـت بە ڕکابەری دەکەن لە لاٌەن ئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی تـرەوە؟ 
و/ وەکـو شـێوازی کار ئێـستا ئەو ئٌـسلامٌـانەش کە کاتی خۆی چەکـداربـوون وەکو ئێمە کاری سـٌاسی مەدەنی 
ن و، هەسـت بە تەنگـژە ناکەٌن لە گەڵٌـان. بەڵام لە وانەٌە وەکو هەر حـٌزبێـکی تـر دەکەن، وە لە پەرلەماندا هە
لە ئاسـتی لەناعەت پێـکـردنـی تاکەکانـی کۆمەڵگا هەر حـٌزبەو حەزبکات خەڵن بەلای خۆٌدا ڕابکێـشێت. بەڵام 
 وەکو کێـشە نەخـێر، بەڵکـو بەردەوام (تفاهم)مان هەٌە.
 
ی سەلەفـی لە مٌـسر کە دوای شۆڕشەکە پارتێـکی سـٌاسـٌٌان ڕاگەٌاند، هاوکار بـوون پ/ پێـت واٌە بـزوتنەوە
 ٌان ڕێگـر لە بەردەم بـراٌانـی مٌـسر؟ 
و/ من بـڕوام واٌە بـوون بە حـٌزبـی سەلەفی زٌاتـر لە بەرژەوەندی ئٌخـوانداٌا. چونکە گەر نەبـن بە حـٌزب 
ن دێـنێـت. بۆ نموونە ئێـستا لە کوردسـتان چـونکە سەلەفـی حـٌزب خەڵکـی تـر بە جۆرێـن لە جۆرەکان بەکارٌا
نٌن، حـٌزبە دەسەڵاتدارەکان بکارٌان دێـنن بۆ بەرژەوەندی خـۆٌان. بەڵام کاتێـن کە بـوونە کٌـانێـکی سـٌاسی 
ەندی ئـٌتر دەتوانٌـت ڕاستەو خۆ لەگەڵٌـا مامەڵە بکەٌت. وە لەگەڵٌـان بگەٌتە مٌکانـٌزمێـن کە بەرژەو
هەردوولامـان بپـارێـزٌن. ئەڵبەتە سـٌاسەت (ٌعـنً) بەرژەوەندی. کەواتە من ئەوەم پـێ باش بـوو کە لە مٌـسر 
سەلەفٌەکان حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـٌٌان پێـن هێـنا. بە هەمان شـێوە پێـشم خۆشە کە لە کوردسـتان سەلەفٌەکان هەمان 




پ/ لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌنتان بـڕٌاردا وەکـو سـتراتـٌژی کارتان، چـۆن ئەم سـتراتـٌژە 
بەرجەسـتە دەکەن؟ بە تاٌبەت کە هەر ئێـستا ووتت هێـشتا ئەندامتـان هەٌە کە بـڕوای بە خـٌلافەت هەٌە، 
  انەٌە بەلای سـٌاسٌەکانەوە بەرژەوەندی نەبێـت لە درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەت لەم کاتەدا. ئەوەشـت ووت کە لەو
و/ دٌارە کۆنگـرەی ٌەکگـرتـوو لە کاتێـکدا گـرێ دراوە کە بەهاری عەرەبـی و والعـێکی تازە لە ئاراداٌا. 
ـورٌا والعـەکە بەرەو تەنانەت ئێـستا تورکٌـا شـێوازی مامەڵەی لەگەڵ هەرێمـی کوردسـتان گۆڕاوە. لە س
گۆڕانکاری دەچـێت. وە لە تورکٌـاش والعـێکی تـر لە ئاراداٌا بۆ کورد لە هەردوو بـواری خەباتـی چەکـداری 
پەکەکە ٌان ٌان پارتی ئاشـتی ودٌموکـراسی، لە بەر ئەوە ئێـستا باسـی کورد لە ناوچەکە باسـێکی جـٌدٌە. وە 
مافـی چارەی خـۆنـووسـٌن بکەٌن. وە ئێمە لە لۆناؼەکانـی پێـشووتـردا لۆناؼەکە ئەوە دەخوازێـت کـە باسـی 
ئاماژەمان بەم مافە کـردووە، بەڵام لە سـتراتـٌژدا دامان نەنٌـابـوو. بۆٌە بەلای ئێمەوە بارودۆخـی کورد 
ـتراتـٌژمان. وناوچەکە ودنٌـاش گۆڕانکاری بە سەردا هاتووە، هەر بۆٌە ئێمەش ئێـستا ئەو مافەمان کـردووە بە س
ئەمەش گەر خەون بێت بەلای هەندێ کەسەوە، ئەڵـێٌن هەر خەونەکانـن دەبم بە والـع. گۆڕٌـنی ئەو ڕژێمە 
سـتەمکارە عەرەبٌـانە دوێـنی بە خەٌاڵـی کەسـدا نەدەهات کە ئاوا ئەمـڕۆ لە ناوبچـن. ئەمەش ئەوەمان پـێ دەڵـێت 
نٌـبێت کە ئاوا ڕژێمەکانٌـان لە ناوبچـن ئەمـڕۆ ئاواتەکانٌـان هاتە کە ئەگەر گەلانـی عەرەب بە خەونٌـش نەٌانبـٌ
دی، ئێمەش دەبێـت گەشـبٌن بٌن، وە ڕۆژێـن لە ڕۆژان ئەم ئاواتەمان دێتە دی. بە مەرجـێن خۆمان باوەڕمان 
رە گـرنگە. پـێی هەبێـت وە کاری بۆ بکەٌن. من پێـم واٌە ٌەکـڕٌـزی گەلـی کورد باشـترٌن مٌکانـٌزمە بۆ ئەم کا
بە داخەوە زۆر جار پدن وٌنن تا زۆرٌان پـێ نەٌەت وە لە گەڵ حـکومەتی ناوەنددا تێـن نەچـن ناٌەن داوای ٌەن 
هەكوێـستی بکەن لە پارتە سـٌاسـٌەکانـی تـر. وە تا ئێـستاش بۆ ئەم هەنگاوە کە کورد دوا کەوتووە تاوانـی (ٌنـن 
ـی کوردی هەنگاو بـنێـٌن. وە هەمـوو ئەو مٌللەتانە کە گەشـتوون بە مافـی وپدن)ە، کە نەٌانتوانٌـوە بەرەو دەوڵەت
چارەی خۆنـووسـٌان هۆکاری ٌەکەمٌان ٌەن ڕٌـزی ناو خـۆٌان بـووە. بـۆٌە باشـترٌن مٌکانـٌزم ئەوەٌە کە 
ـتراتـژمان، ئێمەی کورد ئامانجـێـکی گەورەمان هەبێت ولە دەوری کۆبٌنەوە، وە ئەو ئامانجە گەورەٌە بکەٌنە س
ئەنجـا بە عٌلمانـی وئٌـسلامـٌی وکۆمۆنٌـست، هەر هەموومان کاری بۆ بکەٌن. ئـٌتر شـتە بچـوکەکانٌـش با 
(خٌـلاؾ)مان هەبێـت لە سەری بخەٌنە کەنارو کار لە سەر ئەم سـتراتٌژە باڵاٌە بکەٌن. وە ئەمەش بە ئەرکـی 
بە خەونـێـکی نە گونجـاوی بـزانێـت ٌان ئامادەٌـی نە بێـت سەرشـانـی خۆمانـی دەزانٌن، ئـٌتر کە خەڵکـی تـر 
لەم پێـناوە، ئەوە ئـٌتر هەڵوێـستی ئەوانە. وە ئێمە سـوورٌن لە سەر پاراسـتنی ئەم ئەزموونە، وە بە لۆناؼـێكی 
 دەزانٌن بەرەو مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌن، کە مافێـکی ڕەوای گەلەکەمانە. 
 
 پ/ ئاٌە ئەمە تەنهـا تاکتٌکـێن نٌە ٌەکگـرتـوو بەکاری بهـێـنێت بۆ سەرنج ڕاکێـشانـی جەماوەر بەلای خۆٌدا؟ 
و/ زۆر جار هەبـووە ئێمە خەرێـن بـوونە بە ڕێـن خـستنی کوردسـتان ونەهێـشتنی شەڕی ناوخۆ ونەهێـشتنی 
ـازی بـوو بۆ ئامانجـی باڵا دەبێـت کاری لە سەر کێـشەکانـی نێـوان هەرێم وعـێراق. وە کاتێـکٌـش کە زەمٌنە س
بکەٌن. وە بۆ جـێبەجـێ کـردنـی ئەم سـتراتٌژەمان هەوڵ دەدەٌن زەمٌنە سـازی بکەٌن، وە ناوماڵـی کورد 
ڕێکبخەٌن. وە مەرجٌـش نٌە کاتێـن کە سـتراتـٌژێکمان هەبوو بە ئاسـانی ولە کاتێـکی کەمدا بێتە دی. بۆ نموونە 
ساڵ دێتە دی. گـرنگ ئەوەٌە کە ئێمە لە  ١٠درووسـتکـردنـی ئٌـسرائٌـل دەکـرێتە ئامانج، پاش  ٧٩٨٠کاتـێن لە 
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 چـاوپێـکەوتنـی محمـد ڕٶوف، سەرۆکـی ئەنجومەنی سەرکـردایەتی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان
 
/ خـزمەتی گەل ووڵات چـی دەگەٌەنێـت لە ئٌـسلامدا؟ چۆن ٌەکگـرتـوو دەتوانێت پرۆژەی سـٌاسی خۆی لەو ٠پ
  ەوە بەرهەم بێـنێت؟ڕونگەٌ
ساڵە بە چەند  ٩٠و/ ٌەکگـرتـوو وەکو حـٌـزبێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی هاوچەرخ، وەکو عٌزبێـکی خاوەن ئەزموونێـکی 
لۆناؼێکدا تێپەڕٌوە کە دەتوانٌن بڵێٌن گەشەی سـٌاسی هاتەرٌبە لەگەڵ گەشەی مەعـرٌفی وتێگەٌـشتنی بۆ ئٌـسلام 
مـٌی. وە خوێندنەوە نوێـی بۆ بۆ دەلەکان کە توانٌوێـتی کاری ومـێژووی ئٌـسلامـٌی وکەلتووری ئٌـسلا
ئٌـسلامـٌی سـٌاسی خۆی لەگەڵ کارە ئٌـنـسانٌەکانی و، داخوازٌەکانـی مـرۆڤ لە ژٌاندا گەشە پێبدات بە جۆرێـن 
کە (تملٌدي)کەس نەکات، وە چاولێگەری وکۆپـی کەس نەبێت، بەواتای (حرکات)ی ئٌسلامـٌی وفٌـکری 
ی تر. وە هٌچ (تملٌد)ێکی نەکردووە تا لە چوارچێوەی فٌکری مٌانەڕەوی ئٌـسلامـٌدا نەبێت. ئەوەش لە ئٌسلامٌ
پێـناو گەشەپێـکردنی هەلو مەرجی کۆمەڵاٌەتی وسـٌاسی وئابووری کوردسـتان. وە ٌەکگـرتـوو هەوڵی داوە 
 ٤و ١و ٢ەشدا هاتـووە کە لە بـڕگەی (شـتی نوێ بهێـنێتە کاٌەوە، وە بە پێـی پێـناسەی حـٌزب کە لە کۆنگـرەی ش
)ی پـرنـسٌپە گـشتٌەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو کە لە کۆنگـرە بـڕٌاری لە سەر دراوە، وە ئٌـشی لەسەر دەکەٌن بۆ ٠و
 چـوار سـاڵـی ئاٌـندە. 
ری کاتێـن ئێمە ئەڵـێـٌن ٌەکگـرتـوو حٌزبێـکی ئٌصـلاحـٌٌە، لە هەمان کاتدا جـگە لە ئٌـصـلاحی، کۆمەڵێـن تـ
حـٌزبێـکی ئٌصـلاحـٌە، ڕٌفـۆرم "دەسـتەواژەمـان لە پاڵدا دانٌـاوە بـۆ تەواوکاری واتای ئٌصـلاحـی، لەوانە 
خوازە، نٌـشتمانٌە، تێـدەکۆشـێت لە پێـناو بنـٌاتنـانـی کۆمەڵگەٌەکـی گەشـە سـەنـدوو، وەهێـنانە کاٌەی 
کەس کە ئەندامـی  ٠٢٧لە سەر بـووە کە ئەم پێـناسەٌەش (اجماع) کۆنگـرەی  "دەسەڵاتێـکی دادگەر
کۆنگـرەبـوون بە نوێنەراٌەتـی سەرجەم ئەندامـانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو. لـێرەوە دەردەکەوێـت کە ٌەکگـرتـوو حـٌزبێـکی 
 ئٌصـلاحـٌە؛ ڕادٌکاڵ نٌە.
 
  / ئٌصـلاح لە چـٌدا دەکەن؟ ٢پ
.ئٌصـلاح لە تان وکۆمەڵگاوە بۆ سـٌـستەم بە و/ کاتێـن کە دەڵـێٌن حٌـزبێـکی ئٌصـلاحـٌن کەواتە ڕادٌکاڵ نٌـن
(تدرج). وە ئٌصـلاح لە ڕوانگەی ئێمـەوە پـرۆسـێـسێکی بەردەوامە و، کۆتاٌـی ناٌەت. وە ئێمە بـزوتنەوەٌەکی 
ڕادٌکاڵ نٌن کە گۆڕانکارٌەکـی خـێرا بکات وکۆتاٌـی پـێ بێـنێت. بـزوتنەوە ئٌصـلاحـٌەکان لەسەر (عمل)ی 
و، پاشـان لەسەر ڕٌفۆرمـی سـٌـستەمی سـٌاسـی بە بەردەوام کار دەکەن. کەواتە دٌنـامٌـکٌەتی مـرۆڤ وکۆمەڵگا 
لەناو خۆٌاٌەتی. لەهەمان کاتدا ئێمە دوو شـتمان لە بەرچـاو گـرتـووە، ٌەکەم کۆمەڵگا، کە بە بەردەوام 
بێـت. دەسەڵاتٌـش ٌان دادگەرە دەمانەوێـت کۆمەڵگا بەرەو پێـشەوە بەرٌن. دووەمٌـش دەسەڵاتـی دادگەرمـان هە
ٌان دٌکـتاتۆر. هەرگـٌزٌـش کۆمەڵگا گەشـەسەندوو نابێـت تا دەسەڵاتەکە دادگەر نەبێـت. ئەمەش بە ئامانجـێکی 
ئٌـسلامـٌی دەزانٌن، ئەمە بە (جوهـر)ی فٌـکر وفەلـسەفەی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەزانٌن. ٌەکێـن لە تاٌبەتمەندٌٌـەکانـی 
ئەم تێـگەٌـشتنانە لە هٌـچ سەرچـاوەٌەکەوە وفٌمـهێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌەوە وەرنەگـرتـووە. ٌەکگـرتـوو ئەوەٌە کە 
ڕاسـتەوخـۆ چـی لە ناو لورئاندا هەٌە ئێمـە مامەڵەمـان لە گەڵـدا کـردووە. تەنانەت لەم پـرسـانە مامەڵەی زەق 
ەوهەر وداخـوازی لورئان وڕاستەوخـۆمان لەگەڵ (حـدٌث)ٌـشدا نەکـردووە. بەڵکـو ئەمە ڕاسـتەوخـۆ بە ج
وداواکاری لورئان دەزانٌن کە پێـشخـستنی کۆمەڵگا وحـوکمێـکی دادگەرە. هەر بـۆٌە ئەو بنـەما گـشتٌانە لە 
خـزمەتـی ئەم دوو خاڵەداٌا. ڕەهەندەکانـی ئٌصـلاح، وە چـۆن بەرەو دەسەڵاتێـکی دادگەرانە دەڕۆٌـت لە 
. لە ئامانجە گـشتٌەکانٌـشدا شـرۆڤەمان کـردووە. بۆ نمـوونە لە خـاڵـی سـتراتٌـژەکاندا ئاماژەمـان پێـکـردووە
چـوارەمـدا باس لە گەلـی کورد دەکات، باسـی ئەوەمـان کـردووە کە نەتەوەٌەکـی سەربەخـۆٌە. لـٌرەوە 
ی نٌن ئەمانەوێـت ئاماژە بە ئەوە بکەٌن کە ئێمە نە بەشـێکٌن لە نەتەوەی عەرەب ٌان فارس ٌان تورن، وە ڕاز
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بە بن دەسـتی وپلە دووٌـی. گەلـی کوردسـتان کە پێـن هاتـووە لە کورد وتورکمـان وئاشـوری و....هتد بە ٌەن 
خـێزان دەزانـٌن لە ژێـر ڕۆشـناٌـی چەمکـی هاوڵاتـی بـووندا کە خواسـتێـکی دٌموکـراسـٌە. لە ناو 
. لە شـوێنـێکی تـردا باس لەوە دەکەٌن کە کورد خـێزانێکٌـشدا دەبێـت مافەکان بەبـێ (تمـٌٌز) دابەش بکـرێت
بەشـێکە لە (أمـة)ی ئٌـسلامـی، ئەمەش ئاماژەٌە بـۆ ئاٌن وەکو ئاٌدۆلۆجـٌا وبۆ ئٌنتمـا مـێژووٌٌەکە. وە کورد 
هەمان مافـی سـٌاسی ونەتەوەٌـی وئٌـنـسانـی وەکو بەشەکانـی تـری (أمة)ی ئٌـسلامـٌی هەٌە بە درووسـتکـردنـی 
  ەتٌـشەوە. هەر بۆٌە باسـی مافـی چـارەی خۆ نـووسـنمان لە هەمان بـڕگەدا کـردووە.دەوڵ
 
/ 'ئێمـە بەشـدارٌن نەن ئەڵتـەرناتٌـڤ'، درووشـمێکە هەر لە سەرەتای درووسـتبوونـی ٌەکگـرتـووەوە بە دی ١پ
  دەکەن؟  کـراوە، ئاٌا ئەمە تاکتـٌکی سـٌاسـٌە بۆ لۆناؼـێـن؟ ٌان چـۆن لە ئێـستادا ڕاڤەی
 
و/ ئەوە بۆ دوو شـت کاتی خـۆی ووتـوومانە: ٌەکەم، بۆ ئەوەی (سـمؾ)ی طموحـی ئەندامانمـان ئەوەندە نەرز 
نەکەٌن. چونکە ئێمـە تازە بـووٌن لە کاری سـٌاسـٌدا. دووەم، لە هەمان کاتدا وەڵام بـوو بۆ ساحەی سـٌاسی کە 
لە باوچەکە دٌموکـراسـٌەت دروشـمی هەمـوو حـٌزبەکانە، ئـٌتر بەردەوام تـرسـاندووٌان لە ئٌـسلامٌـی. ئێـستا 
ئەم درووشـمە واتای نٌە، چـونکە مۆدێلـی ئٌڵـتەرناتٌـڤ وحـٌزبـی سەرکـردەو تاکە حـٌزب نەمـا. هەر بۆە 
 پێـوٌـست ناکات باسـی ئەڵـتەرناتٌـڤ بکـرێت. تەنانەت ئەو حـٌزبانەش کە لە هەڵـبژاردن زۆرٌنە دێـنن دەڕۆن
داوەتـی حـٌزبـی تـر دەکەن بـۆ ئەوەی بەشـداری لە حـکومەتدا بکەن، بە ناوی گەشـەی دٌموکـراسـی وگەشـەی 
کۆمەڵگاوە حـکومەتی ئێـئـتلافی دروسـت دەکەن بۆ ئەوەی پێـکەوە چـارەی کێـشەکانی کۆمەڵگا بکەن. ئێمە 
اهـێـنٌن. بە شـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی چونکە لە %ی دەنگەکان بـێنـٌن، بە تەنهـا حـکومەت پێـن ن٠٠ئەگەر ئێـستا 
ناوچەکە دٌموکـراسـٌەت لە سەرەتاٌە، هـٌچ جۆرە حـٌزبێـن ناتوانێـت حـکومەت پێـن بهـێنـێت 
ئەگەر کۆمەڵگاش پێـشکەوتـووبێـت وەکو بەرٌتـانٌـا ٌان ئەمـرٌکا، بە تەنهـاش حـکومەت [ .وسەرکەوتـووبێـت
دن دەچـٌتە سەر حـوکم وپاش چـوارسـاڵـی تـر دەرناچـٌت، کەواتە بەشـداری پێـن بهـێنٌت، چـونکە بە هەڵـبژار
 دٌموکـراسی دەکەن، نەن ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤن.
 
/ لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوودا چـۆن پـراکـتٌـکی دٌموکـراسـی دەکەن، بە تاٌبەت کە تـۆ کاندٌد بـووٌت بۆ بـۆسـتی ٤پ
ێژووی کەلەپـوری ئٌـسلامـٌی بکەٌن هەر لە نمـوونەی ئەمـٌندارێـتی ٌەکگـرتـوو؟ ئەگەر بێـتوو سەٌری مـ
کەس بـوون. وە  ١٠ٌەکەمەوە، ئەنجومەنـی شـوراٌەن هەبووە کە ژمارەٌەن کەس بـوونە، کە بۆ ٌەکەم جـار 
کەسە هەڵـبژێـرن. ئاٌا لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوودا دەسەڵاتێـكی شـاراوەی وا  ١٠خەڵن تەنهـا بـۆی هەبـووە لە نێـو ئەو 
  ە چەند کەسـێن کاندٌد بکات، ٌان هەمـوو ئەندامان ئازادن خۆٌان بپاڵێون؟ هەٌە ک
و/ ئێمـە بە چەند لۆناؼـێـکدا تێـپەڕٌـوٌـن. ڕێکخـستنەکانمـان لە خوارەوە تا سەرکـرداٌەتی ومەکتەب سـٌاسـی بە 
هەمـوو حـٌزبێـکی دنٌـادا  هەڵـبژاردنە بە پێـی ئەو مافانەی کە پەٌـڕەو وپـرۆگـرام پێـٌان دەبەخـشێت. ئەمەش لە
هەر واٌە. ئەمجـارە لە کۆنگـرەدا بە دەسـتپێـشخەری ئەمٌـنداری پێـشوو پۆسـتی ئەمـٌندارێـتٌش خـراٌە بەر 
پـرۆسەی هەڵـبژاردن، چـونکە ئەمٌـنداری پێـشوو خـۆی کاندٌد نەکـردەوە. ئٌـتر لەمەودووا بۆ کۆنگـرەکانـی 
ە بۆٌان هەٌە خۆٌان کاندٌد بکەن بە پێـی پەٌـڕەوی ٌەکگـرتـوو. بـۆ نمـوونە بۆ تـرٌـش هەروا دەبێـت. ئەوانەش ک
پۆسـتی ئەمـٌندارێـتی، ئەوانەی کە لانی کەم دوو خـوولـی مەکتەب سـٌاسـٌٌان تەواو کـردبێـت بۆٌان هەٌە خۆٌان 
کەس خۆی ٤ڵام تەنهـا کەس بۆٌان هەبوو جۆٌان کاندٌد بکەن بۆ ئەو پۆسـتە، بە ٦٠کاندٌد بکەن. ئەمجـارەش 
 کاندٌد کـرد. 
 
  / چـۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ چەمکەکانـی عٌلمـانـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لە کاری سـٌاسـٌدا؟ ٠پ
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و/ زۆر بە کورتـی، ٌەکەم: ئێمە هەر لە سەرەتاوە باوەڕمـان بە شەڕی عٌلمـانـی وئٌـسلامـٌی نەبـووە. دووەم: 
ـٌٌەکـی سەلەفـی ڕادٌکاڵی تـوند ڕەو نٌە، باوەڕمـان بە عٌلمـانـی ئێمە هەر وەکو چـۆن باوەڕمـان بە ئٌـسلام
ڕادٌکاڵـی توند ڕەونٌـش نٌە. وە هٌـچ کەسـێن لەگەڵ ئەم توند ڕەوانە هەڵنـاکات. هەر وەکو چـۆن لە ناو 
ەوانەن کە ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکاندا (تکـفٌر)ی هەٌە، لە ناو عٌلمـانٌەکانٌـشدا (تکفـٌر)ی هەٌە. (تکفـٌر)ی عٌلمـانٌـش ئ
هـٌچ ئٌـسلامـٌٌەكٌـان لەبول نٌـە. تەنانەت ئاٌـنٌـشٌان لەبول نٌە. ئەمانە نەن هەر باوەڕٌان بەوە هەٌە کە ئاٌن لە 
دەوڵەت لە ٌەن جٌـابـن، بەڵکـو باوەڕٌان واٌە کە ئاٌـن وژٌـنٌـش لە ٌەن جٌـا بـن. ئێمە لە گەڵ ئەم عٌلمـانٌەدا 
ٌفـی وفٌـکری بگـێڕٌن، ئەگٌـنا هەڵکـردن وپێـکەوەژٌانـی سـٌاسـی زەحمەتە لە مەگەر بتوانٌن داٌەلۆگـی مەعـر
گەڵٌـان. چـونکە ئەوانە دەسـتپێـشخەری لە ڕەتکـردنەوە دەکەن. ئەوانە باوەڕٌان بەوە نٌە کە هـٌچ جۆرە 
ژٌاندا هەبێـت. جگە بـٌرکـردنەوەٌەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی هەبێـت. وە باەڕٌان واٌە کە نابێـت ئاٌن لە هٌـچ کاٌەٌەکـی 
لەو جۆرە عٌلمـانٌە، ئێمە لەگەڵ هەمـوو جۆرە عٌلمـانٌەکدا دەتوانٌن هەڵـبکەٌن، تەنانەت پێکەوە دەسەڵات 
بەڕێـوە بەرٌـن. من لەناعەتـی شەخـسی خۆم واٌە کە ئەم سەدەٌە لە ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت دەسەڵات بە دەسـت 
ڕەو دەبێـت. ئٌـسلامـٌی مٌـانەڕەو ئەوانەن کەوا دەوڵەتـی دٌـنی بەواتای ئٌـسلامـٌی مٌـانەڕەو وعٌلمـانـی مٌـانە
ثٌـولراطـی دروسـت ناکەن. بە واتاٌەن لە هەمـوو شـتێـکی ژٌاندا تفـسٌری دٌـنی وعەلـٌدی بـۆ بکەٌت. 
عەتٌـٌان بە عٌلمـانـی مٌـانەڕەوٌـش ئەوانەن کە باوەڕٌان بە پـرنـسٌپە بـنەڕەتٌەکانـی ئٌـسلام هەٌە. وە لەنا
بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامـٌٌە مٌـانەڕەوەکان هەٌە. لەناعەتٌـٌان بەوە هەٌە کە هەمـوو ئەم ووڵاتە پێـکەوە بەرەو کەناری 
ئارامـی وگەشەسـەندووٌـی ودادگەری کۆمەڵاتـی وحوکمـی ٌاسـا بەرٌن. جـا ئـٌتر گـرنگ نٌە کە سەرۆکـی ئەم 
  ـن، بەم واتا مٌـانەڕەوٌە ئٌـسلامـٌی وعٌلمـانٌە. دەوڵەتانە ئٌـسلامـٌی ٌان عٌلمـانـی دەب
 
/ ئێـوە چـۆن (رجـل دولـة) بەرهەم دەهـێـنن؟ بە واتاٌەن کە ئەندامێـن بـێت ئٌـش بـۆ ئەو ووڵاتە بکات، وە ٦پ
بۆ هاوڵاتٌـانـی ئەم ووڵاتە کار بکات و، باوەڕی هەبێـت بە چەمکـی هاوڵاتـی بـوون. وە بتـوانێـت هەنگاو بنـێت 
انٌـشدا بەدی دەکـرێت، کە لەوانەٌە کەسـێن سەرۆن بەسەر ئەم والٌعـە سـٌاسـٌە کە لە عـێراق وکوردسـت
وەزٌـران بێت وتائٌـفی بێت، کەسـێن کار بۆ حـٌزبێـن ٌان بۆ هۆزێـن بکات. ئاٌا ئێـوە دەتوانـن کەسـێن بەرهەم 
 بهـێنن کە بەشـێوەٌەکـی مۆدێـرن کار بۆ دەوڵەت بکات؟ 
وە تا ئێـستا دوومـان (ممـارسـة)کـردووە، بەڵام و/ ئێمە بە سـێ مٌکانـٌزم (رجـل دولـة) دروسـت دەکەٌن. 
ٌەکێـکٌان ماوە. وە بـڕٌارە لە دوای ئەم کۆنگـرەوە ئەمەش ٌەکێـن بـێت لە سـتراتـٌژەکانـی کارمـان. ٌەکەم 
پێـگەٌاندنـی تان لە سەر بنەمای ئەو بـٌرکـردنەوە مٌـانەڕەوانە کە هەمانە. لە سەر بنەمای ئەو پـرۆگـرامەی کە 
نـڕشـتووە. بەم شـێوەٌە ئێمە تاکێـن بەرهەم دەهێـنٌن کە کاتێـن هەر کارێـکی گـرتە دەسـت پـرۆفٌـشـناڵانە داما
مامەڵە بکات، خـٌانەت لە کارەکەی نەکات، کاری حـٌزب وـٌاسەت نەباتە ناو کارەکەی. ئەو کێـشەٌەی کە ئێـستا 
ئێمە لە ئێمە لە (ذهـنٌة)تـی تاکـی خۆمان لەگەڵ دەسەڵات هەمانە کە حـٌزب ودەسەڵات تێـکەڵ کـراون، 
دەربهـێنٌن. بۆ ئەوەی ممـارەسەٌەکـی ئٌجـابـی وئٌـنسانـی ولەسەر بنەمای چەمکـی هاوڵاتـی بـوون کارەکانـی 
بکات، نەن ممارەسەٌەکـی حـٌزبی تەسـن لە چـوارچـێوەی دەوڵەتدا بکات. دووەم: ئەو کەسـانەی کە تا ئێـستا 
ن وەرگـرتـووە لە ئێمە، لە پێـشدا بە مٌکانـٌزمـی ٌەکەمـدا دەڕوات، ئەنجـا بە ممـارەسە پۆسـتی دەوڵەتٌـا
پـراکـتٌزی پـرۆفٌـشناڵانەی دەخاتە ڕوو. شـێٌەم ئێـستاش لە بـٌری ئەوەداٌن کە مٌکانـٌزمـێـکی تـر کە بـرٌتـٌە لە 
انەی کە کاندٌد دەکـرێن بۆ پۆسـتەکانـی وەکو بەشـداری پێـکـردن لە خـوولـی تاٌبەت بگـرٌنە بەر. بۆ نمـوونە ئەو
پەرلەمـان، ئەنجـومەنـی پارێزگاکان....هتد خـوولـی تاٌبەت بۆ شـارەزابـوونٌـان لەو بوارانە بۆ بکەٌنەوە. 
ئەمەش بە سـوود وەرگـرتـن لە ئەزمـوونـی ئەو کەسـانەی کە لەو بـووارانەدا ممـارەسەٌان هەبـووە. بە هەمان 
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  کوردسـتان چـاوپێـکەوتـنی مەولود باوەموراد، ئەندامـی مەکتەبـی سـیاسی یەکگـرتووی ئیـسلامـیی
  ٣٠:٠٠، ٥٠١٥/٨/٢٥
 
/ چـۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی، مەبەسـت هەر ٌەن لە کورد بوون وموسـڵمان بـوون 1پ
 چـی دەگەٌەنـن بـۆت؟
و/ لە ڕاسـتی دا مرۆڤ لە هەر کۆمەڵگاٌەکـدا تەنهـا ٌەن ئٌـنتمـای نٌە. مـرۆڤ کۆمەڵێـن شـوناس وکۆمەڵێـن 
ئٌـنتمائاتـی هەٌە. من لە ڕووی ئاٌنـٌەوە موسـڵمانم، ئەم شوناسەش دەمبەسـێتەوە بە هەزاران وملٌۆنەها 
ا، کە ئەوٌـش دٌنـی ئٌـسلامە. شـوناسـێکی وملٌـارەها خەڵکـی تـرەوە لە ڕووی زەوی لە چوارچێـوەی دٌنـێکد
تـرم کورد بـوونە، وە خەڵکـی ئەم کوردسـتانەم. وە (خاصـٌة) نەتەوەٌەکانم بـرٌتـٌە لە زمانەکەم، کەلتـورەکەم، 
جـل وبەرگەکەم، (عادات وتمالٌد)، وە ئەو چـوارچێـوە جوگـرافٌە کە باو باپـٌرمان لە سەری ژٌاوٌن. واتە 
من لە خەڵن جٌـا دەکاتەوە کە پێـی دەبم بە کورد. کەواتە شـوناسـی کوردبـوونم کاتێـن دٌارە کە کۆمەڵێـن شـت 
بەرانبەرم عەرەب وفارس وتورن هەٌە. لێرەوە من هەڵگـری تاٌبەتمەندٌەکـی ئٌنـسانـٌم کە پێـی دەوتـرێت کورد 
من کوردم وەکو کائٌـنێـکی مـرۆٌـی، بـوون. ئەمەش کۆمەڵێـن جٌـاکارٌە لە نێـوان ئێمەو ئەوان.   لـێرەوە 
 هەروەهـا موسڵمانٌـشم وەکو ئٌـنتما بـۆ ئاٌنـێکی (توحـٌدي) ئاسـمانـی. 
 
ەوە سـتراتٌژٌەکٌـان  ٨٢٩٠/ ئەگەر بێـتو سەٌـری تٌـۆری بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان بکەٌن دەبٌنٌن هەر لە سـاڵـی 2پ
ـڵمان وخـێزانـی موسـڵمان وکۆمەڵگای موسـلمان هەبووە بۆ کار، کە ئەوٌـش درووسـتکـردنەوەی تاکی موس
وحکـومەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی وٌەکپێـگـرتنەوەی خاکەکانـی ئٌـسلام وپاشـان درووسـتکـردنەوەی خـٌلافەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی. 
ئێـستا ئێـوە وەکو مٌللەتێـکی بـێ دەوڵەت لە کوێـی ئەم سـتراتٌژٌەدان؟ ئاٌا خٌـلافەتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی درووسـت 
  ؟دەبێـت
و/ بە شـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی بـٌرکـردنەوەی بـراٌانی موسـڵمان کاردانەوەی ئەو بارودۆخە بـووە کە تێـٌدا درووسـت 
بـوون. لە ژێـر کارٌگەری هێـرشـە گـشت گٌرەکانـی دەوڵەتە کۆڵۆنٌـالٌـستەکاندا، کۆمەڵێـن بەها هاتە کاٌەوە لە 
موسـڵمانەکانەوە، پێـش هەمووٌان بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان زۆرێـن نێـو کۆمەڵگا موسـڵمانەکاندا. وە بە لای کۆمەڵە 
لەو شـتانە کە لە ژێـر ساٌەی ئەو سەردەمەدا هاتنە کاٌەوە نامۆ بـوون بە کۆمەڵگا موسـڵمانەکان. هەر بۆٌە لە 
ٌـنا کاردانەوەی ڕووخانـی خـٌلافەتی عوسـمانـی بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان ووشـەی خٌلافەت دەکەنە ئامانجٌـان، ئەگ
هەمـوو کەس دەٌـزانـی پاش دابەش کـردنـی مـٌراتی دەوڵەتـی عوسـمانی لە پاش گـرێبەسـتی سـاٌکـس پٌـکۆ وە، 
ئٌـتر زۆر ئەسـتەمبـوو کە جارێکـی تـر ئەو خاکانە ٌەکٌـان پـێ بگـٌرێتەوە. بەڵام بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان لەبەردەم 
ئامانجـی خٌـلافەتٌـان هەڵگـرت. لە بەر ئەوە لەو کاتەدا نە ئەم کـردارە گەورە ئەم کاردانەوەی هەڵکـردنـی 
دەکـرا کۆمەڵـێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی هەسـتێـت بەو جۆرە کارە، بە بـێ ئەوەی لـسەی هەبێـت لە سەر خٌـلافەت. ئەگٌـنا 
وتنەوە لە کاردانەوەی بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان بەرانبەر بە کۆڵۆنٌـالٌـستەکان کاردانەوە بـووە بەرانبەر بەو دوورکە
ئاٌـن وبەها ئاٌنٌەکان. لە بەر ئەوە دەتوانٌن بڵێێن براٌانی موسـڵمان بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی دەسـتگـرتنە بە شـوناسـی 
ئاٌنـی و، زٌندوکـردنەوەی گٌـانـی ئاٌنـٌە. وە بـۆ دەسـتگـرتنەوە بە بەهاکانـی ئٌـسلام شـتێـکی سـروشـتٌە کە 
رێت، پاشـان خـێزانٌـش لە دەرەنجامـدا درووسـت دەبێـت و، پاشـانٌـش دەبێـت بانگەواز لە ئاسـتی تاكدا بکـ
کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمان. ئەنجـا ئامانجەکانـی تـر لە ڕۆشـناٌـی (وما أرسـلنان الا رحمة للعـالمـٌن)ەوە هاتـووە. بەڵام 
اٌـن وەکو (طـرح)ێـکی لـێرەدا دوو شـت تێـکەڵاو بـوون، ئاٌـن وەکـو پەٌامـی خودا بۆ هەمـوو مـرۆڤەکان، وە ئ
سـٌاسـی. بەڵام بـوونـی کٌـانێـکی سـٌاسـی ٌەکگـرتـوو جٌهـانـی لەت ناتوانێـت حوکمـی جٌهان بکات، چونکە 
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دەبێت سەرۆکـی هەبێت، دەبێـت دەسەڵات هەبێـت. بە درێـژاٌـی مـێژووش ڕووی نەداوە کە دەسەڵاتێـن هەبێـت 
  اتر دروشـمن جوانـن، نەن تـێزی سـٌاسـی عەللانـی. حوکمـی دنٌـا بکات. هەر بۆٌە ئەمانە زٌ
بـێـننەوە سەر ٌەکگـرتـوو، ٌەکگـرتـوو وەکو کۆمەڵێـکی بانگخوازی پاشخـان ئٌخوانـی، وە ئٌخوان کاتێـن لە 
عـێرالدا لە حەفتاکان تووشـی شـکـست ولەبەر ٌەن هەڵوەشـاندن بـوو، وە مـرالب عامـی ئٌخوان لە عـێرالدا 
بەواتای [ داوە کە ئەو حـٌزبە ڕابگـرێت. وە لە بەر ئەوە لە کوردسـتاندا هەردەم جۆرە ئازادٌەن هەبووە بـڕٌاری 
، وە بە تاٌبەتی کە عـێراق زۆر دژاٌەتی بزوتنەوەی ]تۆزێـن حکومەتی عـێراق دەسەڵاتی لاواز بـووە
ە چەپ بوون، جۆرێـن لە پەراوێـزی ناشـٌوناڵٌـستی کوردی دەکـرد، بە تاٌبەت کە هەندێـن لەو ناشـٌوناڵٌـستان
جوڵانەوە بۆ تەوژمـی ئٌـسلامٌـانە هەبوو. لە بەر ئەوە تەوژمـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لە سەر شـێوازی بانگەوازی 
ئٌخوانـی کۆتاٌـی پێـنەهات. ڕاسـتە ڕێکخـسـتنی نەبـوو، بەڵام وەکو بانگەواز بەردەوام بـوو. لە بەر ئەوە 
نـی (جٌل)ی دووەم لە هەشـتاکاندا کەوتنە بـٌری ڕێکخـستن. هەر بانگەوازی کەسـاٌەتٌە کوردٌە ئٌخوانٌەکا
ئٌخوانـی بۆخۆی ئاکارێکـی گرنگی هەٌە کە ئەوٌـش بانگەوازەکە ڕێکخـستنە (نحـن ندعـوا بالتنظـٌم، ولا ندعـوا 
ـی بانگەوازٌان للتنـظٌم). ئەمەش وای کـردووە کە ئٌخوان هەرچەندە توشـی لەٌـرانٌـش ببـن، هەر کە دەرفەت
هەبـوو، لەبەر ئەم سـتراکچەرەی بانگەوازەکەٌان بە ئاسـانـی هەڵدەسـنەوە. وە لە بانگەوازەکەدا پلە بەندی هەٌە، 
کە ئەوٌـش بۆ خۆی پلە بەندی وسـتراکچەری ڕێکخـستنە. وە ٌەکگـرتووش لە سەر بنەمای کێـشەی کورد 
ڵامـدانەوەی چارەسەرکـرنـی کێـشە نەتەوەٌەکانـی بە ئٌعـتباری درووسـت نەبـووە. واتا حـٌزبێـن نەبـووە بـۆ وە
ئەوەی کە کورد بەشـێکە لە عـێراق لە ڕووی دابەشـکـردنـی جوگـرافٌەوە، بەڵام نەتەوەٌەکـی سەربەخۆٌە 
پێـوٌـستە مافـی چارەی سەربەخۆٌـی هەبێـت. گەر بگەڕێنەوە بۆ سەرەتای درووسـت بـوونی ٌەکگـرتـوو، وە لە 
انـی ٌەکەمـی دا هاتووە کە بۆ ئەوە درووسـت بـووە کەوا وەکو چوارچێـوەٌەکـی سـٌاسی خۆی کۆبکاتەوە، بەٌ
 وە:
  ) خۆی لە (ممـنوع) بـوون واتا خۆی لە لەده ؼەکـردن بپـارێـزێت.٠
  ) ئەنجـا ئەم حـٌزبەش ئۆرگانێـن بـووە بۆ بانگەوازکـردن.٢
  ـا بکاتەوە. ) ئەم کۆمەڵە لە کۆمەڵەکانـی تـر خۆی جٌ٣
ئەوکاتەش دٌارە ئەحـزابی تـری ئٌـسلامـٌی هەبوو، وەکو بـزوتنەوەی ئٌـسلامــٌی، کە بزوتنەوەٌەکـی چەکداری 
بـوو. ئەنجـا سەلەفٌەکان هەبوو وە هەٌە کە ئەوانٌـش جۆری بـٌرکـردنەوەی خۆٌان هەٌە. ئەنجـا ئٌخـوان 
وسـطـً اعـتدال)ي. وە سەرکـرداٌەتی ئەوکاتەی ئٌخوان لە موسـلمٌن هەبوو کە ناسـراوە بە بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی (
کوردسـتان لەناعەتـی وابـوو کە پێـوٌـستە ئێمە ئەم ئارامٌەی هەرێم بپـارێـزٌن. ئەنجـا لەو سەرەتاوە ٌەکگـرتـوو 
ت. هەوڵـی داوە کە لە ڕێگای ڕێکخـراوە خـێرخوازٌەکانەوە زۆرتـرٌن خەڵکـی کوردسـتان بەرەو دٌنداری بەرێـ
بەڵام لە هەمانکاتدا هەر لە بەٌاننـامەی ٌەکەمـی حـٌزبدا هاتووە کە ئێمە هەوڵ دەدەٌن کە سەرنجـی ڕێکخـراوە 
ئٌـسلامـٌەکان بەرەو کێـشەی کورد ڕاکێـشٌن. وە لە کۆنگـرەی دووەم هەندێ شـت کرانە سـتراتٌژٌەت لەوانە 
ٌـان بۆ کێـشەی کورد، هەوڵدان بۆ پاراسـتنی فـرەٌـی لە هەوڵدان بۆ هێـنانی ڕێکخـراوە ئٌـسلامٌەکان وپـشتگـٌرٌ
 کوردسـتان، هەوڵدان بۆ پاراسـتنی ئاسـاٌـشی هەرێم. وە ئەمانە کۆمەڵە سـتراتٌژٌەتێـكی ئەوکاتەی حـٌزب بـوون. 
ەکـی وە خٌـلافەت بەلای ئێمەوە فۆرمێـکە لە دەسەڵاتی موسـڵمانانـی ئەو سەردەمە، وە بە هٌـچ شـێوەٌەن بەڵگەٌ
شەرعـی لەسەر پابەندبـوون بە خٌلافەت نٌە. وە سـٌاسەت پـرۆسەٌەکـی عەلـلانٌە، وە محکومە بەو والعـە 
سـٌاسـٌٌەی کە تٌـاٌدا دەژٌـٌت. ئێمە ئێـستا لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان محکومٌن بە کێـشەی نەتەوەکەمان کە بـرٌـتٌە 
انـی ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت. لە بەر ئەوە ووردە ووردە بە لە مافە سـٌاسـٌٌەکانـی گەلـی کورد لە نێـوان گەلەک
تـێپەڕبـوونـی کات ٌەکگـرتـوو بەم ئالارەدا هاتـووە. وە ٌەکگـرتـوو بە هٌـچ شـێوەٌەن بـٌرکـردنەوەی خـٌلافەی 
ٌەتێکەی نٌە. ئێمە لە کوردسـتاندا دەژێـٌن، وە محـکومٌن بەو والٌعـەی کە تٌـاٌدا دەژٌـٌٌن. وە زەمٌـنە کۆمەڵا
ئێمە، وە زەمانەکە تحـکوم دەکات بە ئەوەی کە ئەم حـٌزبە چۆن جموجوڵ بکات. وە هەموو حـٌزبێـن کۆمەڵێـن 
فاکتەری سـٌاسـی وکۆمەڵاٌەتـی وژٌنگە سـٌاسٌەکە ئاراسـتەی دەکەن کە بەرەو کـوێ بـڕوات. حـٌزب 
سـروشـتی پاسـکٌـلی هەٌە، ئەگەر بە بەردەوام باٌدان لـێ نەدەٌت دەبێـت ٌان بوەسـتٌت ٌان دەکەوٌـت. لە بەر 
ئەوە ئێمە ناتوانٌن کۆمەڵە خەڵکێـن کۆبکەٌنەوە لە دەور کۆمەڵە درووشـمێـن کە نە ئاسۆٌەکـی ڕوونـی هەٌە، نە 
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لە ئێـستاشـدا بـوونـی هەٌە. ٌەکێـن لە شـکـستی زۆرێـن لە حـٌزبە ئٌـسلامـٌی وعٌلمـانٌەکانـی ئەم ناوچەٌە 
ناتوانـن داهێـنان بکەن لە کارە سـٌاسٌەکانٌـان. چونکە سـٌاسەت داهێـنانێـکی عەلڵـٌە بۆ ئەو والٌعەی  ئەوەٌە کە
کە تێـٌدای. وە سـٌاسەت (تدبـٌر الامور)ە، بەڵام لە پەنجا سـاڵـی پێـشوودا ئٌـسلامـٌەکان لە ناو بـٌری مـێژوودا 
، ناوی حوکمـی خواٌـی لـێ دەنێـٌت، ٌان پـٌرۆزی دەکەٌت ژٌاون، ئٌـتر ئەو مـێژووە ناوی خٌـلافەی لـێ دەنێـٌت
چـونکە هٌـچ داهێـنانێـکٌان تێدا نەکـردووە سەر ناگـرێت. لە بەرابنەرٌـشدا ئەوانەی کە بە ناوی عٌلمـانٌەتەوە لە 
نتـوانٌـوە نە لە ڕۆژئاوا شـتێـکٌان هێـناوە و، بە هەمان شـێوە داهێـنانٌـان تێدا نەکـردووە. وە لە بەر ئەوە کە نەٌا
گەڵ والٌعـەکەی خۆٌاندا بـژٌـٌن، وە نەٌـشٌان توانٌـوە موتوربەی ئەو شـتە هێـنراوە بکەن سەر کەوتـوو 
نەبـوون. وە من هۆی سەرەکـی شـکـستی ئەم وڵاتانە بۆ ئەوە دەگەڕێنمەوە چـونکە سـٌاسەتمەدارەکانـی ئەم 
سـٌاسی وتدبـٌری ئوموری خۆٌان ناتوانـن لە سەر کۆمەڵێـن  ووڵاتانە داهێـنەر نٌن. خۆٌان داهێـنانـی بـٌری
تـێززو بـٌرو بۆچون بکەن کە لە کەلتـووری خۆٌان ووالعـی خۆٌان ووالعـی ئٌـنسانی وکەونـی درووسـت 
بـووبـێت. ئەمـڕۆ لە دنٌـادا کۆمەڵێـن تـێزی فٌکـری وسـٌاسی هەٌە لە بـٌری دٌموکـراتی ولـٌبراڵـێدا بۆ ئێمە 
(حـٌاة)ٌـن، ئەوەندە بە کەڵـن وگەورەن، چـونکە سـٌاسەت مادام پـرۆسەٌەکـی عەللانـی بـوو وەهەمـوو  شـتی
بەرهەمە چاکەکانـی مـێژوو سـٌاسەتٌـان گەٌاندوەتە ئەمـڕۆ، کەواتە تۆٌـش مادام سـٌاسەت دەکەٌت بەشـێکٌـت 
وری مـرۆڤاٌەتی ئەم بەرهەمە سـٌاسـٌانە لەوان وبەشـێکٌـکت لەم بەرهەمە سـٌاسـٌە. ئێمە دەتوانٌن لە کەلت
بـێـنٌن. ئەو هەڵەٌەی عٌلمـانٌەکان وئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی وڵاتانـی ئێمـە تێـکەوتوون ئەوەٌە لە بـری ئەوەی بەها 
سـٌاسٌە سەرکەوتووەکان بهـێـنن، دەڕۆن فۆرم وسـکێـج وچـوارچێوەکان دەهێـنن. لە کاتێـکدا حـسابی ئەم زەمٌنە 
ێرەٌان نەکـردوە. وە هەموو پـرۆژەٌەکی سـٌاسی ئاوا بە مٌکانٌـکی هێـنانـی وەکۆ فۆرم، نەگۆنجاو سـٌاسـٌەی ئـ
دەبێت لە گەڵ ژٌنگە سـٌاسـٌەکە لە هەموو بوارە کۆمەڵاٌەتـی وکەلتوری وڕۆشـنبٌری. لە بەرانبەرٌـشدا هێـنانـی 
وە شـکست دەخۆن، چـونکە ئێـرەو ئێـستا ئەو فۆرمە مـێژوٌانەش وەکو فۆرم وچوارچێوەی سـٌاسی بە هەمان شـێ
والعـێـکی تـری سـٌاسـٌە. وە باشـترٌن شـت بۆ ئێمە ئەوەٌە کە ئاٌا لە مـێژوو ٌان لە دەرەوە دەٌهـێنٌن بەها 
سـٌاسٌە سەرکەوتوەکان بهـێـنٌن. بـۆ نمـونە هەتـا ڕۆژی دواٌـی بەهای دادگەری نەمـرە، ئـٌتر لە هەر کوێەن 
  ئەوەٌە کە دادگەری بەرپا بکات.  بٌـهـێنٌت گـرنگ
بە هەر حـاڵ ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان پاش تێـپەربـوونـی چەندٌن کۆنگـرە، وە بە هۆی ئەوەی کە 
تێکەڵاوی سـٌاسەت بـوو والعـٌەتێـکی سـٌاسی جٌاوازی هەٌە لەو ساتە وەختەی کە تٌـا هاتە ڕاگەٌاندن. ئەمەش 
بەشـێکە لە چارەسەری کێـشەکانـی نەتەوەکەی خۆی بە شـێوەٌەکـی (حمـٌمً). وە  ئەوەٌە کە ٌەکگـرتوو ئێـستا
ئێمە چەندٌن ساڵە ئەوەمان ڕاگەٌاندوە کە ئێمە هاوکاری هـێزە سـٌاسٌە کوردسـتانٌەکانـٌن. وە بـٌرۆکەی 
اوخۆی لـێ ئەڵتەرناتٌؾ لە کوردسـتان دا بـٌرۆکەٌەکـی نا سەرکەوتووە، وە ئەزمونـی شەڕی چەند سـاڵەی ن
کەوتەوە کە لە سەر کێـشەی هاوبەش وئەڵتەرناتٌـڤ بـووە. چونکە ئەوکاتە پدن وٌنن ٌەکترٌان لەبوڵ نەدەکـرد 
وەکو هاوبەش، وە نەشٌان دەتوانـی ببنە ئەڵتەرناتٌڤ. بەڵام لە داهاتوودا دەبـێت هەڵـبژاردن ئەم کێـشانە ٌەن لاٌی 
  تی واتای ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤی دەسەڵات دەگەٌەنێـت. بکاتەوە. وە بـوونـی حـٌزبٌـش بە سـروشـ
ڕۆشـتوٌنەتە نێـو پـرۆسەی سـٌاسـی، پاش ئەوەی کە هەڵـبژاردنـی  ١١١٢وە بەشـێوەٌەکی کـردەٌـی ئێمە دوای 
ئەنجومەنـی پارێزگاکان ئەنجام درا، کە کۆمەڵێـن خەڵکمان هەڵـبژێردران، ئەنجـا پاشـان هەڵـبژاردنـی 
لە عـێراق کـرا، وە بە پێـکهاتن لە گەڵ هاوپەٌمانی کوردسـتانـی کۆمەڵێـن پەرلەمانتارمان  ئەنجومەنی نوێنەران
لە هەڵبژاردنەکانـی  ١١١٢هەبوو. کەواتە ئێمە بە شێوەٌەکـی ڕاستەو خۆ وە بە شێوەٌەکی کـردەٌـی لە داوی 
مـان کـردە. وە بەشـداری پـرۆسەی سـٌاسی هەرێمـی کوردسـتان وعـێرال ١٠١٢و ٩١١٢و ٦١١٢و ٠١١٢
ڕاسـتەو خۆ پاش ڕوخانـی ڕژێمـی عـێراق مامۆسـتا صـلاح الدٌن ئەمٌنداری ئەوکاتەی ٌەکگـرتوو ئەندامـی 
 ئەنجومەنـی حوکمـی عـێراق بـوو، وە مـن لەو کاتە جێـگری بـووم. 
ڕاوە، لە لاٌەکـی وە کاری سـٌاسی کارێکـی زۆر زۆر زۆر ئاڵۆزە، وە لە لاٌەکـی ترەوەش کارێکـی بەردەوام گۆ
ترەوەش کارێکـی گـشت گـٌرو هەمەلاٌەنەٌە. وە کار وکاردانەوەکانـی ڕووداوە سـٌاسٌەکان هەموو کاتی تۆی 
سـٌاسی دەگـرێت، وە تۆ ناتوانٌت لاڵ بٌت لە ئاست ئەو ڕووداوانە. وە هەموو حـٌزبێـن لە دنٌا ٌەکێـن لە 
ێـن لە کۆمەڵگاٌەکدا کێـشەٌەن هەٌە کۆمەڵێـن نوخبە کە هۆکارەکانی درووسـت بوونی بـوونی کێـشەٌە. کات
توانای ئەوەٌان هەٌە بکەونە پێـش کۆمەڵێـن خەڵن پێـن دێن لە سەر ئەوەی کە چۆن چارەسەری ئەو لەٌرانە 
بەڵام بە داخەوە زۆر جار لەم وڵاتانەی ئێمە حـٌزب دەبێتە چوارچێوەٌەن بۆ مەزهەب ٌان بۆ ئاٌن ٌان بۆ   .بکەن
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ٌان بۆ نەتەوە ٌان بۆ خێـڵ ٌان بۆ عەشـٌرەت. بەم شێوەٌەش حـٌزب لەو چوارچێوە ٌان مەبەسـتەی کە  تاٌفە
دەبێت لە پێـناوٌدا درووسـت بێت لادەدات. بەمەش حـٌزب کە دەبێت پـرۆسەٌەکـی سـٌاسی ئٌنـتخابـی بێت، وە 
نێتە دەسەڵات دەچێتە دەرەوە. ئێـستا هەوڵـی ئەوەٌەتی کە کۆمەڵێـن خەڵن بە کۆمەڵێـن بـٌروبۆچوونەوە بگەٌە
وای لێهاتووە کاتێـن ڕەخە لە حـٌزبێـن دەگـرٌت، واتا ڕەخە ٌان لسەت بە ئاٌنێن ٌان نەتەوەٌەن ٌان تٌفەٌەن 
ووتووە. بۆ نموونە ئێـستا ڕەخنەٌەن لە حـٌزبی دەعوە ٌان ئەنجومەنی ئٌسلامـی لە عـێراق بگرە، وای لـێ دێت 
  عە گـرتـبێت. کە تۆ ڕەخنەت لە شـٌ
 
/ کەواتە ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی چۆن حـٌزباٌەتی دەکات؟  وە سـٌاسەت چـی لە ٌەکگـرتوو دەخوازێت، ١پ
 چٌـشی سەپاندوە بە سەرٌا؟ 
و/ ئێمەش وەکو حـٌزبەکانـی تـر هەٌکەلێـلی ڕێکخـستنمان هەٌە، وە سەرکـرداٌەتٌمان هەٌە، ئێمە 
جەماوەرێکمـان هەٌە، وە ئێمە کۆمەڵێـن ئەفکار وپرنـسٌپی سٌاسٌمان هەٌە کە لە بەرنامەی سـٌاسی خۆماندا 
ی جاری واش هەٌە شوناسی نوسـٌومانە. وە لە ڕووی سـٌاسـٌەوە شوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌمان هەٌە، ئەگەر چـ
ئٌـسلامـٌی بوون بۆ حـٌزبـی سـٌاسی دەبێتە هەڵە چونکە شوناسی ئٌسلامی بوون شوناسـی زۆربەی تاکەکانـی 
کۆمەڵگاکەمانە. بەڵام لـێرەدا شوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی بـوونـی ئێمە لە بەرانبەر بە عٌلمانـی دا درووسـت بـووە. وە 
لەسەر بنەمای دژاٌەتی کۆڵۆنٌـالـٌزم وبەها نامۆکانـی بە کۆمەڵگای ئێمە  لە بنەڕەتدا حـٌزبـی ئٌـسلامـٌی
بە دواوە ڕەوتە مارکـسی  ١٢٩٠درووسـت بـووە. لە بەر ئەوە ئەم شتە بەردەوامە تا ئەمـڕۆش، پاشـان لە 
وە وعٌلمانٌەکانٌـش هاتنە ئارا، وە چونکە ئەمانەش لە بنەڕەتدا بـزوتنەوەی دژە ئاٌـنی بـوون، بزوتنە
ئٌـسلامـٌەکان بۆ هٌـچـٌش درووسـت نە بووناٌە بۆ بەرگـری لە بەها ئاٌنٌەکانٌـان بەرانبەر بەمانە درووسـت 
دەبـوون. کەواتە ڕەوتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی کاردانەوەٌە بە شـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی بۆ پاراسـتنی بانگەوازی ئٌـسلامـٌی. 
ە ئەحـزابی ئٌـسلامـٌی پێوٌـست ناکات پاشـگری ئەگەر نا من هەر لە زوەوە ڕای خۆی لەم بارەوە هەٌە، ک
ئٌـسلامـٌی هەبێت. بەڵام چونکە لە کۆمەڵگادا ئەحـزابـی سۆشـٌالـست وکۆمەنٌـست ولٌـبراڵ هەٌە ئەم ناوەش کە 
ئەحـزابـی ئٌـسلامٌە لە بەرانبەردا پەٌدا بـووە. وە چونکە ئەمـڕۆ (فولهاء)ی ئەمـڕۆش کۆمەڵێـن فەتواٌان داوە 
ێت بـڕۆٌتە ناو ئەو جۆرە ئەحـزابانەوە، دەرنجام ئەمە بوەتە پێوٌـستٌەن. ئەنجا بوونـی پاشـگری ئٌـسلامـٌی کە ناب
ئاماژەٌە بۆ شوناسـی ئاٌنی نەن شوناسـی سـٌاسی، بۆ نموونە کاتێـن کە دەڵێٌت ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی 
ە پابەندە بە (حـلال وحـرام) و دروشمە کوردسـتان، پاشـگری ئٌـسلامـٌی ئاماژەٌە بۆ ئەوەی کە ئەم حـٌزب
ئاٌنٌەکان وەن تان، هەر وەها پابەندە بە ڕێنماٌە ئٌـسلامـٌەکان. ئەگٌـنا لە والعـی سـٌاسـٌدا ئێمەش ئێـستا لە 
هەرێمـی کوردسـتان وەکو حـٌزبەکانـی تـر پێداوٌـستٌە حـٌزبٌەکانمـان هەٌە وە وەکو ئەوانٌـش کۆشـشی 
خان وخەڵکەٌە. وە هەموو ئۆرگانە حـٌزبٌەکان وڕاگەٌاندنەکان وجەماوەرٌەکانمان هەٌە، وە سـٌاسـٌمان بۆ ئەم 
خەڵن کاندٌد دەکەٌن بۆ پۆستە سـٌاسٌەکان وەکو حـٌزبەکانـی تــر. وە لە هەموو کێـشە سـٌاسٌەکاندا بە جـٌدی 
ئەنجام دەدەٌن. وە دەمانەوێت بەشـداری دەکەٌن. وە ئێـستا لە بەرەی ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆندا کارێـکی سـٌاسی گـرنگ 
گەندەڵـی سـٌاسی وئٌداری وئابوری لە هەرێمدا بنەبـڕ بکەٌن، وە خودی ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆنٌـش بۆخۆی خواسـتێـكی 
 سـٌاسی گرنگی دٌموکراسـٌە. 
وە ئێمە بەشـێکٌن لە نەتەوەکەی خۆمان، وە نوێنەراٌەتی بەشـێن لەو کۆمەڵگاٌەی خۆمان دەکەٌن. وە هەرکاتێـن 
زۆربەر دەنگەکانمـان بە دەست هێـنا دەبٌنە نوێنەری گەلەکەمان. کەواتە ئێمە باوەڕمان واٌە دەسەڵاتی کە 
سـٌاسی هەڵموڵاوی دەنگ ومتمانەی ئەو خەڵکەٌە، وە گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەڵاتەکانە. وە لە کەلتوری 
لە خواوە نٌە، دەسەڵاتی من لە ئٌـسلامٌـشدا هەروا هاتووە کە (امة) سەرچاوەی دەسەڵاتەکانە. وە دەسەڵاتی من 
ئٌـرادەی ئەو خەڵکەوەٌە کە من دەسەڵاتدارٌان بم. ئەوان منٌـان دانٌـاوە کە دەسەڵاتدارٌان بم، خوا منـی دانەنٌـاو. 
خوا تەنها پێؽەمبەرانـی ناردووە، ئٌـتر پاش پێؽەمبەران سەرچاوەی دەسەڵات لای گەلانە. وە 'گەل سەرچاوەی 
ەی ئٌـسلامـٌەکان (حـرام)ە، چونکە ئەوان پێـٌان واٌە کە ئەمە تـێزێـکی دٌموکـراتٌە. وە لە لای زۆرب 'دەسەڵاتە
ڕاسـتٌدا ئەگەر گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەڵات نەبێت، ئەی کـێٌە؟ ئاٌا جێگەٌەن ٌان شـوێنێـن هەٌە سەرچاوەی 
مەڵە دەلێکە بۆ دەسەڵات بێـت بۆ من؟ ئەگەر دەڵێـٌت لە شەرٌعەتەوە سەرچاوە دەگـرێت، شەرٌعەت کۆ
پـراکـتٌزەکـردن، نەن بـۆ متمـانە دان بە من. گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەڵاتە بەواتای ئەو دەسەڵاتە دەدات بەو 
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کەسانەی کە حوکمـی بکەن، ئەگٌـنا ئەو حوکمە شەرعـی نٌە. وە هەرکاتێـکٌـش بٌانەوێت ئەو دەسەڵاتەم لـێ 
   . ەسەڵاتەکەن کە ناٌانەوێت من ئٌـتر دەسەڵاتداربموەرگـرنەوە، ئٌـتر ئەوکاتەش هەر ئەوان سەرچاوەی د
 
  / ئاٌا شـرٌعـة چـی دەگەٌەنێـت بەلاتانەوە؟ ٤پ
و/ ئێمە بە هٌـچ شـێوەٌەن وەکو ٌەکگـرتوو لسەمان لە سەر شەرٌعەت بە واتای فمە نٌە، واتا شـەرٌعەت بە فمە 
رەتانەی ژٌان کە لە (کتاب وسـنة)دا هەٌە تێ ناگەٌن. بەلای ئێمەوە شـرٌعەت ٌعـنی کۆی هەموو ئەو شتە زەرو
ٌان لە عالەمی (مـشهود وسـنن)دا هەٌە وەکو سـٌد لطـب باسـی دەکات. کەواتە شـرٌعەت بـرٌتٌە لە هەموو ئەو 
ٌاسـا وپێوەرە گەورەو گـشتٌانە کە لەم ژٌانەدا هەٌە بۆ ئەوەی ئەم کەونەی لەسەر بـڕوا بەڕێوە، وە هەندێکـٌش 
ی و(سـنن)ی کۆمەڵگاٌە هٌـچ بەڵگەٌەکـی لورئانـی پێـوٌـست نٌە، بازێکـٌش ئەوەٌە کە لە (سـنن)ی ئەخلال
لورئان و(السـنة الصحٌحة)دا هاتووە. ئێمە پێمان واٌە هەموو شـتێـکی باش لەو ژٌانە شـرٌعەتە. وە هەموو شتە 
اوای جـێ بە جـێکـردنـی چاکەکانـی مـرۆڤ وئەم کەونە لە خواوەٌەو شەرعـٌە. وە زۆر جـار ئەوانەی کە د
شـەرٌعەت دەکەن، داوای جێـبەجـێ کـردنـی جۆرێن فمە دەکەن. وە زۆر جارٌـش بـٌر لە (لصاص) وئەحکامـی 
تـری شەرٌعەت دەکەنەوە. ئێمە وا بـٌر دەکەٌنەوە کە کاتێـن بگەٌنە دەسەڵات ئـٌتر دەسەڵاتی تەشـرٌعـی کاری 
ڵن پێـٌان وابـوو کە بەندێکـی شەرعـی بکـرێت بە ٌاسـا، ئەوکاتە ئەوە ٌاسا دانان دەکات. وە ئەگەر زۆر بەی خە
ٌاساٌەکـی شەرعٌە. وەکـی تـر ئێمە جێـبەجـێکـردنـی فمە بە شەرعـی تێ ناگەٌن، بەڵکـو ئەوە کاروباری 
 ٌاسـادانانە کە نوێنەرانـی گەل لە دەسەڵاتی تەشـرٌعـی هەڵدەسـتن بە کاروباری ٌاسا دانان. ئێمە وەکو
ٌەکگـەتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان خوازٌارٌن خەڵن بە شێوەٌەکـی گـشتی پابەند بێت بە دروشمەکانـی ئٌـسلام، 
خەڵن پابەند بێت بە فەرمانەکانـی ئاٌن، خەڵن دٌندار بێت بەواتا تەواوەکەی نەن بەواتای تەنها نوێـژکـردن 
ستی، بە واتای هاوکاری وپێکەوە ژٌان وڕۆژوگـرتن، واتا بە واتای لێـبوردەٌـی بە واتای خۆشەوٌـ
جار باسی کـردار ٌان کار هاتووە، بەڵام سەٌـر دەکەٌت کار لای  ٢٢٢وچاکەخوازی. وە لە لورئاندا زٌاتر لە 
مارکـسٌەکان دەبێتە درووشم، وە جـٌدٌەت لە کار لە ئەوروپا هەٌە نەن لای ئێمە. سەٌر دەکەٌت لورئان زۆر 
باس لە (عمـل) دەکات، تەنانەت ئەو کەسانەی کە باڵاتـرٌن پاٌەٌان لای خوا هەٌە  زٌاتـر لە فٌـکری مارکـسی
ئەوانەن کە کـرداری باڵاٌان هەٌە، (وان لٌـس للانـسان الا ما سـعی، وان سـٌعٌە سوؾ ٌـری) (سـوؾ) ئـٌتر لە 
ون وگەٌـشتن بە پاداشـتی ئەو لە لٌامەتدابێت ٌان لە دنٌـا کەواتە (عمـل) مەرجـی گـرنگە بۆ بە ئٌـنسانـی باش بو
 کـردارە. 
ئێمە لە ٌەکگـرتوو هەر لە کۆنگـرەی دووەوە خۆمان ٌەکـلاٌـی کـردۆتەوە، کە ووتومانە کێـشەی کورد کێـشەی 
خەڵن وخاکە. کەواتە ئێمە کێـشەی نەتەوەکەمان هەٌە لە سەر خاکەکەمان کە کوردسـتانە. کەواتە ئێمە هەردوو 
وڵەت بوونمـان هەٌە کە ڕەگەزی خەڵن وڕەگەزی خاکە. وە ئەو ڕۆژگارە کە کۆنگـرە ڕەگەزی گـرنگـی بە دە
ڕێکخـراوی خـێرخوازی لەم هەرێمەدا کارٌان دەکـرد، هەمـووشـٌان  ١٧تا  ١٦لە  ٦٩٩٠دوومـان بەسـت لە 
سـپاند کە کێـشەی باسـٌان لەوە دەکـرد کە کێـشەی کورد لەم هەرێمە کێـشەٌەکـی مـرۆٌـٌە. بەڵام ئێمە ئەوەمان چە
کورد کێـشەٌەکـی سـٌاسـٌە کە کێـشەی مٌلەتێکە لە سەر خاکەکەی. ئەمەش بەو واتاٌەی کە وەکو هەموو 
نەتەوکانـی تـر کوردٌـش مافـی سـٌاسـی خۆی هەٌە. ئەمەش دەتوانٌن بە خاڵێـکی وەرچەرخانـی ئەوتۆی دابنێـٌت 
م هێـشتا ئەو کات ئەمە نەبـووبـوو بەوەی کە تەوژمـی لە بـٌری ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان. بەڵا
نەتەوەٌـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوودا بە هـێز بکات. بە داخەوە هەردوو باڵـی ئٌـسلامـی ئەو کات، هەم باڵە 
 ئٌخوانٌەکە هەم باڵە سەلەفٌە جٌهادٌەکە کارٌگەر بوون بە دەرەوەی خۆٌان. هەٌە تا ئێـستاش باوەڕی واٌە کە
هەر لە کێـشەی نەتەواٌەتی گەڕێـٌن، وە بە شـتێـکی خـراپـی دەزانن. وە زۆر جار لای جٌهادٌەکان ناوی 
معـسکەرەکان دەنـران جەوهەر دوداٌٌـڤ بۆ نمونە، ئەمەش ئەوە دەگەٌەنێـت کە ئەم خەڵکە باس لە دامەزراندنـی 
تٌکانٌـان چارەسەر بکەن. وە لە بنەڕەتدا حکومەتێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەکەنەوە، نەن خەرٌن بن کێـشە نەتەواٌە
حکومەت بـرٌتی ٌە لە ئٌدارەو بەڕێوەبـردنـی کۆمەڵگا. وە حکومەت هەر شوناسـی نٌە، بەڵام ئەمە 
کاردانەوەٌەکـە لە ژێـر کارٌگەری بـٌری مارکـسی چەپدا کە ئەوان حکومەتێـکی کۆمۆنٌـستی وحکومەتێـکی 
بـٌری تاٌبەتی خۆٌاندا هاتووە. وە لە بەرانبەردا کاردانەوەی لە سەر  کـرێکاری وچەپ، دەسەڵاتێـن کەوا لە
 ئٌـسلامٌەکان هەبوو کە ئەوانٌـش داوای حکومەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی بکەن. 
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لە ناو هەر حـٌزبێـکدا پێـنج ڕەگەز هەٌە، ٌەکەم بـرٌت ٌە لەو کۆمەڵە خەڵکەی کە لە دەوری کۆ دەبنەوە، ئەم 
فکارو مبادئ کۆ دەبنەوە کە دەکاتە ڕەگەزی دووەم، لە بەر ئەوەی ئٌـستا ئەوەندە خەڵکەش لە دەور کۆمەڵێـن ئە
باوی ئەفکار نەماوە دەتوانٌن بڵێـٌن پـرۆژەٌەکـی سـٌاسـی. وە ڕەگەزی سـێٌەم بۆ حـٌزب بـرٌتٌە لە ڕێکخـستن، 
رم وسـتاٌڵـی حـٌزبی وە هەموو حـٌزبەکانـی ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت بە ئٌـسلامـٌی وعٌلمـانٌەوە لە سەر فو
مارکـسی بەڕێوە دەچـن. ڕەگەزی چوارەم جەماوەرە، ئەگٌـنا ئەو حـٌزبە دەبێتە حـٌزبی نەخبە، ٌان حـٌزبی 
بنەماڵە. وە ڕەگەزی پێنجەم هەوڵـی گەٌـشتنە بە دەسەڵات. وە ئێمەش هەر لە سەر هەمان شـێوازی حـٌزباٌەتی 
ٌە لە ڕێکخـستنی حـٌزب. وە بۆ ئەم ڕێکخـستنەش چۆنێـتی کار دەکەٌن. جەوهەری ئەساسی حـٌزب بـرٌتی 
پەروەردەو پێگەٌاندن زۆر گـرنگە. وە بۆ ئەوەی بتەوێت ئەفکاری حـٌزب بگۆڕٌت پێوٌـستە بەرنامەی 
پەروەردە وپێگەٌاندنی ئەندامان بگۆڕٌت، ئەگٌـنا هەرچەندە درووشـمەکان وئامانجەکانٌـش بگۆڕٌت ئەوەندە 
ـلاتۆن ٌەکەم کەسە کە باس لەوە دەکات کە سـٌاسی باش ئەو سـٌاسٌەٌە کە پەروەردەکـراوە. کـرنگ نٌن. وە ئەف
لەبەر ئەوە پەروەردە تەنهـا چەمکێـكی ئٌخوانـی ئٌـسلامـٌی نٌە. هەر بۆٌە ئٌفلاتۆن ئەوەشـی ووتووە کە 
فەکان دەکەن، واتا عەلـڵی دەسەڵاتدارەکان ٌان دەبێت فەٌلەسوفەکان بن ٌان ئەوانە بـن کە ڕاوێـژ بە فەٌلەسو
ئەوەٌان هەٌە کە لە فەٌلەسوفەکان تێـبگەن. ئێمە ئەگەر چـی لە کۆنگـرەی دوو ووتمان کێـشەی کورد کێـشەی 
خەڵن وخاکە، بەلەد ئەوە خەڵن وهۆشـٌارٌمان بڵاونەکـردەوە. چونکە لە ڕاسـتٌدا پارتە نەتەوٌٌەکان ومـٌژووی 
ەو پێـش دەسـتی پـێ کـردبـوو. ئەمەش بەشـێکی ناشـٌوناڵێـستێـکی توند بووە، تەوژمـی نەتەوەٌـی پەنجا سـاڵ لەو
وە بەشـێکی تـرٌـشی ناشـٌوناڵێـستێـکی چەپ بـووە، وە بە هەردووکٌـشٌان بەرانبەر بە عەرەب وئاٌـنن. ئێمەش 
 بەلای هەندێکٌانەوە بە نوێنەری ئاٌن وعەرەبٌـشی دانـراوٌن. 
پێـشکەوتووە، وە  ٦٩٩٠فٌـکری سـٌاسی ٌەکگـرتـوو لە کۆنگـرەی دووەوە لە بەم شـێوەٌە ووردە ووردە  
پـرۆژەی سـٌاسـٌەکەی بۆ خـزمەتی نەتەوەو نٌـشتمانەکەٌەتی. وە ئێـستا ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان 
ی ئێمە بەشـێکە لە هٌـچی کەم نٌە لە پارتە ناشـٌوناڵـستەکانـی تـر، وە ئێـستا هۆشـٌاری نەتەوەٌـی لای ئەندامـان
ناخ ونەسـتٌان. ئێـستا لە هەسـتی هەموو ئەندامانمـاندا ئەوە درووسـت بوو من وبەرانبەر. ئاوا هەسـت دەکەٌن کە 
ئێمە ئەگەر بـراٌن لە گەڵ عەرەبێـکدا، بەڵام مافـی سـٌاسـی خۆمان هەٌە. بە هەمان شـێوە لەگەڵ تورن وفارس 
ەندامانمـان درووسـت بـووە. ئەگەر چـی ئێمە شـۆڤٌـنٌـست نٌن وبەکەم سەٌـری ونەتەوەکانـی تـرٌـشدا ئەوە لای ئ
نەتەوەکانـی تـر ناکەٌن. هەر بۆٌە بەلای ئەمـرٌکٌـکانەوە کاتێـن کە لە عـێراق بـوون ئەم شـێوازەی 
ی نەبێـت، وە ٌەکگـرتووٌان بە پـردێـن دەزانـی بۆ نێـوان خۆشـی نەتەوەکانـی عـێراق. بۆ ئەوەی شەڕی نەتەوەٌـ
پێکدادان ڕوو نەدات لە نێـوان نەتەوەکان کە لە ڕووانگەٌەکـی (عـنصري)ٌەوە لەوانەٌە هەر کاتێـن 
هەڵگـٌرسـێت. بەڵام ئەمـرٌکٌەکان لەوانەٌە ئێـستاش دەرکـی ئەوەٌان نەکـردبێـت کە ئێمە وەکو کورد کێـشەی 
افە نێـو نەتەوٌٌکان ومافە ئٌسلامٌەکان وئاٌنەکانـی سـٌاسـٌمان هەٌە نەن ڕەگەزپەرسـتی. وە بە پێـی هەموو م
تـرٌـش کوردٌـش وەکو مٌللەتانـی تـر تەواوی مافـی نەتەوەٌـی خۆی هەٌە. ئەم گەشەکـردنە لە بـٌری 
ناشـٌونالـٌزمی لای ٌەکگـرتوو گەشەکـردنێـکی سـروشـتٌە. ئێـستا بزوتنەوە ئٌخوانٌەکان بە هٌـچ شـێوەٌەن 
ناڵٌـزمـی کوردی ناکەن، بەڵکو تاوانبارٌـشی دەکەن. بەڵام ئەگەر لە ئـێران بزوتنەوەٌەکـی پاڵپـشتی ناشـٌو
ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردی بواٌە چونکە ئێران لە نەتەوەی عەرەب نٌە، ئەوا ئٌخوان زۆر بە جٌدی پـشـتٌوانـی لـێ 
 دەکـردن. 
دەسەپێـنێت بە سەر کاری سـٌاسـٌدا. وە سـٌاسەت هەردەم لە والع دا دەکـرێت، وە والعٌـش هەردەم زۆر شـت 
کاتێـن کە پێؽەمبەر (د. خ.) وەحـٌـشی بـۆ دەهات، وەحـی داوای ئەوەی لـێ دەکـرد کە بەشـێن لەو کۆمەڵگا باشە 
% کەلتوری دٌموکـراتـی ٠٩بٌکە. لە بەر ئەوە من لەناعەتم واٌە گەر ئێـستا پێؽەمبەر (د. خ.) لەم والعە بواٌە 
داهێـنانێـکی مرۆٌـی چاکە، مرۆڤ دەتوانێت بٌکاتە بەشـێن لە بەرنامە بۆ خۆی. ئەوەتە  وەردەگـرت، چونکە
خەلٌفەکان داهێـنانـی فارسەکانٌـان هێـناوە، چونکە داهێـنانێـکی مرۆٌٌە. لەبەر ئەوە کێـشە لە سـٌاسەت نٌە، 
دەگۆڕێت. بۆ نمونە کاتی خۆی بەڵکو کێـشە لە تێگەٌـشتن لە سـٌاسەتە. ئەم تێگەٌـشتنەش بە پێـی والع وکات 
زۆربەی سەرکـردە ئٌخوانٌەکانـی عـێراق لەوانە محمد احمد الراشد وعدنان الدلێمـی وطارق الهاشـمی وزۆرێکـی 
تـرٌان فٌدراڵٌەتٌان بە گەورەتـرٌن فٌتنە بۆ عـێراق دەزانـی، بەڵام ئێـستا گەورەتـرٌن داوای ئەوان 
وونە ئێـستا کە ئٌخوان داکۆکـی لە عـێراق ٌان مٌـسر ٌان سورٌا ٌان لەتەر جـێبەجـێکـردنـی فٌدراڵٌەتە. بۆ نم




/ تۆ لە لـسەکانتدا ووتت هەموو شـتێـکی باش لەم دنٌاٌە شـەرعٌە، وە بەشـێکە لە شەرٌعەت ئاٌا گەر وابێت ٠پ
  ار عٌلمانٌەت شـتی زۆر باشـی هەٌە؟بۆچـی ڕەخنەتان لە عٌلمانٌەت هەٌە، وە زۆر ج
و/ علٌمانٌەت ڕاستە کە پرۆسەٌەکی ڕۆژئاواٌٌە لە هەڵوەشـاندنەوەی پەٌوەندی نێوان ئاٌن وسـٌاسەت، بەڵام ئاٌن 
بە واتای ئاٌن نا، بەڵکو بە واتای دەسەڵاتێـکی ئاٌـنی فەرزکـراو بە سەر کۆمەڵگا. وە ئێمە هەر لە کۆنگـرەی 
وەمان کـردووە کە پـشتگٌری لە دەوڵەتێـکی دٌموکـراتی مەدەنـی فـرەٌـی دەکەٌن. کەواتە ٌەکەمەوە باسـی ئە
عٌلمانٌەت پـرۆسەٌەکی گۆڕٌـنی دەسەڵاتێـکی ئاٌـنٌە بۆ دەسەڵاتێـکی مەدەنـی بە شێوەٌەن کە هەمـوو خەڵن لە 
ات بەڕێوە. ئێمەش لە باسـی سەر بنەمای هاوڵاتی بـوون پێکەوە بـژٌـن، وە خەڵن بە ناوی خواوە دەسەڵات نەب
. کەواتە لای ئێمە شەڕی ئاٌن ودەوڵەتمان ەجێـبەجـێکـردنـی شەرٌعەت باس لە جێـبەجێکـردنی ئەحکامـی (فمە)
نٌە. لە ڕۆژئاوا شەڕی دەسەڵاتێـکی دٌـنی هەبووە لەگەڵ کۆمەڵگاٌەکی مەدەنـی، وە هەموو کەس دەبێت مامەڵە 
ون، نەن هاو ئاٌـنی بـوون. ئێمە دەکـرێت هاو ئاٌن بٌن لەگەڵ کەسـێن لە بکـرێت لە سەر بنەمای هاوڵاتی بـو
فەرەنـسا ٌان ناٌجـٌرٌا، بەڵام هاوڵاتی بـوون لە سەر بنەمار ئەو گـرێ بەستە کۆمەڵاٌەتٌە ٌە کە خەڵکێـن 
ڕۆحـی دەبەسـتێتەوە بە خاکێـکەوە، وە سـٌستەم وحکومەتێـن بەڕێوەی دەبات. هاوئاٌـنی بوون هەسـتێـکی 
وٌژدانـی پـٌرۆزە. کەواتە ئێمە لە ئٌـسلامـدا کێـشەی دەسەڵاتی ئاٌـنٌمان نٌە، ئەگەر چـی خەڵکێـكٌش بە ناوی 
خەلٌفەشەوە حوکمی کـردبێت. بەڵام ئێمە لە ناو دەلە شەرعٌەکان شـتی وامان نٌە کە بە ناوی خواوە حوکم 
  اودێـرٌـشی دەکات ولاشـی دەبات. بکـرێت، دەسەڵات هی ئومەتە وە دەسەڵاتدار دادەنێـت وچ
بەڵام ئەوانەی کە لە سەر بنەمای هاوڵاتی بوون مامەڵەی ٌەکـسان ناکەن لەگەڵ هاوڵاتٌـاندا چونکە موسـڵمان 
نٌن، لە ڕاسـتٌدا ئەوانە تێگەٌـشتنێـکی چەوت وهەرزەکارانەٌان هەٌە، وە بۆ چونەکانٌـان هٌـچ پەٌوەندٌٌەکٌـان بە 
ەڵام عەلمانٌەت لە وڵاتی ئێمەدا عەلمانٌەتێـکی دژە ئاٌنە. وە ئەم بەناو عەلمانٌەتەش لە ڕاسـتٌدا ئٌـسلامەوە نٌە. ب
بەهاکانی لەگەڵ بەهای کۆمەڵگاکانمـاندا ناخوات. وە زۆر جار لە خوا چـٌٌە، پێؽەمبەر چـٌٌە، مزگەوتت بۆ چـٌٌە 
ڵگا بـێ باوەڕ بکەن، نەن دەسەڵات عەلمانی چ سودێکی لـێ دەبٌنٌت وە دەست پێ دەکەن. لـێرە دەٌانەوێت کۆمە
کەن. بەڵام لە ڕۆژئاوا عەلمانٌەت بەواتای دەسەڵاتێـکی مەدەنـی بەواتای دەسەڵاتی هەموو هاوڵاتٌـانە لە سەر 
بنەمای هاوڵاتی بـوون. عەلمانٌەت لای ئێمە لە دژاٌەتی کـردنی ئاٌندا بٌـست هەنگاو چون، بەڵام لە 
ەسەڵاتی سـٌاسی دا نٌو هەنگاو نەچوون. چونکە ئەم بٌرانە (اسـتٌراد) دەکـرێن لێرە دٌموکـراتٌزەکـردنـی د
بەرهەم ناهێـنرێن، لە کاتێـکدا ئێمە پێوٌـستمان بە داهێـنانە لە والعـی کۆمەڵگاکەمان. ئەگەر چـی لە دوای 
هێنانی بلۆکـی ڕۆژهەڵات  نەوەدەکانەوە و، لە دوای دەرکەوتـنی ڕەوتی بەهێزی ئٌسلامـٌی لە تورکٌـاو هەرەسـ
 ئەم بۆچونانە تا ڕادەٌەن گۆڕاون. بەڵام هێـشتا ڕەوتـی ئٌـسلامـٌی (مراجعـاتً) زۆری پێوٌـستە. 
 
  / پاشـگری ئٌـسلامـٌی خۆتان حەز دەکەن هەبێت ٌان والع پێـی بەخـشٌون؟ ٦پ
ە وڵاتی ئێمەدا شـتێـن هەٌە ناوی و/ لە ڕاسـتٌدا بەشـێکە جٌـاکـردنەوەی ئەو شوناسە کە ئێمە هەمانە. مادام ل
حـٌزبی سـوشـٌالـٌست وکۆمۆنٌـست وناشـٌوناڵٌـستە، شـتێـکی سـروشـتٌە کە حـٌزب هەبێت ناوی ئٌـسلامـٌی 
بێت. ئەم پاشـگرەش ئاماژەٌە بۆ جٌاکـردنەوەی ئەو کۆمەڵە خەڵکەی کە لە چوارچێوەی ئەم حـٌزبەدا کاردەکەن 
ەکانـی ئاٌن. وە خەڵکـێکـن سەرچاوەی کاری سـٌاسـٌٌان لە بـٌر وپـرنـسٌپەکانـی کە پابەندن بە ئاداب ودرووشـم
شەرٌعەتەوە وەرگـٌراوە. بەڵام ئەمە شوناسـی سـٌاسی بۆ ئێمە درووسـت نەکـردووە. ئەمە ئێمە لە ئەانی تـر 
نەبێت هٌچ لە کێـشەکە  وەکو ئٌلتزام بە ئاٌـنی ئٌـسلامەوە جٌاکـردۆتەوە. وە ئەم پاشـگرەش وەکو ناو هەبێت ٌان
ناگۆڕێت، چونکە ناوەڕۆن گرنگە نەن ناو. وە ئەم پاشگرە ئٌسلامٌەش نەبوەتە بار بە سەرمانەوە. وە ئێـساش لە 
بەهاری عەرەبی دا هەرچی حـٌزبی ئٌسلامٌی هەٌە هەموو بە ناوی عەدالەت وئازادی وگەشەسەندنەوە هەٌە، 
ە ڕاسـتٌدا ئێمە هێـشتا نەمانتوانٌوە جەماوەرێـن لە سەر بنەمای نەن بە پاشـگری ئٌسلامٌەوە. بەڵام ئێمە ل




  / ئەگەر ئێـستا ٌەکگـرتوو دامەزرێـنن، ئاٌا پاشـگری ئٌـسلامـٌی هەڵدەبـژێـرن؟٧پ
حەزمان کـرد کە  و/ نەخــێر. هەر لە بنەڕەتدا ناوی ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان، لە ڕاسـتٌدا خۆمان
هاوشـێوەی ڕابٌطەی ئٌـسلامـٌی کورد بێت کە ڕێکخـراوێکـی خـێرخوازی خۆمان بـوو. ئەگٌـنا هەر ئەو کات 
لەوانەٌە ناومان بنٌاٌە (عدالة واحـسان). وەگەر ئێـستاش درووسـتمان کـردباٌە بە دڵنٌـاٌٌەوە ناومان دەنٌـا 
 شـتێـکی وەکو (عـدالـة والتنمـٌة).
 
  ۆن مافـی چارەی خۆنـووسـٌنتان کـردە سـتراتـٌژی سـٌاسـٌتان؟ / چـ٨پ
و/ ئێمە دڵنٌـا بووٌن کە تورکەکان باش تورکاٌەتی دەکەن و، فارسەکان باش فارساٌەتی دەکەن و، عەرەبەکان 
تەی باش عەرەباٌەتی دەکەن، لە پاڵ ئەوەشـدا باش دٌـنداری دەکەن. ئێمەش گەشـتٌنە ئەو لەناعەتەی کە ئەم مٌللە
ئێمە لە بەردەم شـاڵاوێکـی گەورەداٌەو، (ممومات)ی دەوڵەت بـوونٌـشی تێداٌە. ئێمە بە دەر لەوەی کە پارەی 
نەوت دەڕواتە گٌرفانـی کێوە، بەڵام ٌەکێـن لە (ممومات)ی بە دەوڵەت بوون بـرٌتی ٌە لە ئابورٌەکـی باش، ئەم 
ئێمە کۆمەڵێـن دەسەڵاتی مەزهەبی هەٌە، کە ئەمە ئابورٌەش لە کوردسـتاندا هەٌە. ئەنجـا لە چواردەوری 
کارٌگەری سەلبی لە سەر هەرێمی کوردسـتان هەٌە. لە هەمان کاتدا ئێمە وەکو ئٌـسلامـٌی لە ناوچەکە لە هەموو 
زٌاتـر هێزترٌن. وە ئێمە هەوڵ دەدەٌن ئەم پـرۆژەٌە (تـسوٌك) بکەٌن بۆلاٌان، چونکە ئێمەو ئەوان لە ٌەن 
بەشـٌن کە بـرٌتی ٌە لە شوناسـی ئاٌـنی، بەڵام لە شوناسـی نەتەوەٌٌـش لە ٌەکـتر جٌـاوازٌن. بەڵام شوناسـدا هاو
ئەوە دەمێـنێتەوە کە ئاٌا ئێمە لەم کارە سەرکەوتوو دەبٌن؟ وە دەتوانٌن ئەمە بکەٌنە بەشـێن لە مادەی خەباتی 


















Appendix 5: Dlawar Aladdin, the former minister of the Higher Education 
and Scientific Research of the region, who answered my question by 
email 
 
Dear Kak Mohammad, 
 
Apologies for the delay in responding. 
 
Your question on the contribution of KIU into Kurdistan Nationalism is a 
complex one, and requires historic, cultural, political and social considerations.  
You might be well advised to debate this with some of the KIU leaders such as 
Mr Salahaddin Bahaddin and Abubakir Karwani, who are well versed with this 
topic.  
 
From my point of view, I can see the following: 
 
a.      1. KIU was founded on the brotherhood‟s principles by people who were 
either affiliated to, or closely associated with, MB.  From the outset, they 
adopted a very moderate or diluted nationalistic approach.  They adopted a 
non-violent and non-confrontational approach to advance their cause, thereby 
avoiding overt nationalistic policies, which contrasted with other Islamist parties.  
KIU had a long term vision that defined their pathway to power.  They initially 
focused primarily on preaching and aiding the poor, the young and the 
educated.  This strategy served their objectives well.  They grew exponentially, 
particularly during the difficult times for the 1990s, gathering palpable support 
and sympathy across Kurdistan Region.  Up to this point, they did not need to 
engage in public debates on nationalisms.  Their transformation came when 
they needed to translate their ground support into votes for power. 
b.     2. In keeping with MB movements elsewhere and with Turkish AKP, KIU 
entered the parliamentary political process in Kurdistan and began competing 
for votes during subsequent elections.  They needed to appeal to a wider (more 
secular) audience than their traditional Islamic sympathisers.   They had to 
compete with the secular nationalistic parties, including the KDP and PUK, as 
well as the other Islamist parties (Komall and Bizutnawa).  They therefore 
introduced numerous Kurdish nationalistic narratives into their literature and 
began to debate these openly.  They had to be seen to be promoting the 
Kurdish cause, Kurdish identity and Kurdish nationalism in addition to moderate 
Islam.  As a result, by design or by default, they end up contributing significantly 
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to the Kurdish nationalism.  The evidence becomes clearer when you look at 
their policies and performance (of their MPs and Ministers) in Baghdad against 
anti-Kurdish lobby.  
c.       On the international stage, KIU founders and supporters presented 
themselves as Kurds while integrating with international Muslim world.  They 
promoted the Kurdish cause, Kurdish culture, Kurdish distinctive identity.  They 
achieved milestones for the Kurds among Islamic movements in the Arab and 
Islamic world.  They won financial and political support too. 
d.      3. As a competitive political party, KIU had to keep an eye on its Islamist 
competitors Komall, Bizutnawa.  In considering religious nationalism in 
Kurdistan, the other parties cannot be ignored.  Therefore, I suggest you 
introduce some comparative alignment between all three Islamist parties.  
Bizutnawa was established well before KIU in Kurdistan and has a much longer 
history of engaging in internal and external debate on religious nationalism.  
 



















 eht fo rebmem a dna UIK fo orubtilop a ,damhA nayaB :6 xidneppA
 tnemailraP natsidruK
 
بەیان ئەحمـەد ئەندامـی مەکتەبـی سـیاسی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان و، ئەندامـی پەرلەمـانـی 
 کوردسـتان
 
 پ/ ڕۆڵـی خوشـن چـٌە لەناو ڕٌزەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان؟
ٌەکگـرتـوو بۆ کاری خوشـکان  و/ سەرەتا وهەر لە دامەزراندنـی ٌەکگـرتـوو تـێڕوانٌـنی سەرکـرداٌەتـی
هەڵموڵاوە لە تێـگەٌـشتنی ئٌـسلامـی بۆ کاری ژن. لە ئٌـسلامدا ژن هـاوبەشـی پٌـاوە بۆ ئاوەدانکـردنەوەی سەر 
زەوی. هەر بۆٌە ئٌـسلام ژن بە تەواوکاری پٌـاو دەزانێـت، وە هاوکارو شەرٌکێـکی ڕاستەلٌنەٌە لە خٌلافەت. 
تـوو هەر لە سەرەتای دامەزراندنٌەوە تا ئٌـستا ئەم تێگەٌـشتنە وای لێکـردوون کە بۆٌە سەرکـرداٌەتی ٌەکگـر
(توظٌؾ)ێکـی باشـی ژن لە ناو ڕٌـزەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو بکەن. وە هەر لە بـٌرۆکەی دامەزراندنـی پارتێـکی 
شێوەٌەو لەو کاتانەدا سـٌاسـی، ٌەکگـرتـوو ڕای خوشـکٌـان وەرگـرتووە، کە ڕەنگە هـێزە سـٌاسٌەکانـی تـر بەو 
حـساب بـۆ ژن نەکەن. کە کۆمەڵێـکی دەعەوی هەر لە بٌرۆکەی دامەزراندنـی حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسٌەوە پـرس 
وڕای خوشـکی پـێ گـرنگ بـووە و، حـسابٌـان بۆ بۆچـونەکانٌـان کـردووە. وەکاتێـکٌـش لٌـستی دامەزرێنەرانـی 
بۆ دامەزراندنـی حـٌزب ناوی خوشـکی تێدابـوو، ئەمەش  ٌەکگـرتـوو پێـشکەش بە حکومەتی هەرێم کـرا
 ئامـاژەٌەکـی تـری ئەم بەشـدارٌە گـرنگەٌە.
 
 پ/ بەشـداری خوشـن لە دروسـتکـردنـی بـڕٌاری سـٌاسی لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوو چۆنە؟ 
تـووەوە دەسـت کەواتە بەشـداری خوشـن لە بـڕٌاردا وەکـو ئامـاژەمان پـێ کـرد هەر لە دامەزراندنـی ٌەکگـر 
پاش دوو سـاڵ لە دامەزراندن خوشـن بە بـێ بوونـی هـٌچ  ٦٩٩٠پـێ دەکات. وە لە دووەم کۆنگـرەی حـٌزب  لە 
لە کۆی  ٩٩٩٠کۆتاٌەن بوو بە ئەندامـی سەرکـرداٌەتـی ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان. وە لە کۆنگـرەی 
 ٠١١٢ان بۆ ئەندامـی سەرکـرداٌەتـی. وە لە کۆنگـرەی خوشـن هەڵـبژێـردر ١ئەندامـی سەرکـرداٌەتی  ١١
ئەندامـی سەرکـرداٌەتـی، وە  ٠١خوشـن ئەمەش دٌارە لە کۆی  ٠ژمـارەی خوشـکان لە سەرکـرداٌەتـی بووە 
خوشـکێـن لەوانە هەڵـبژێـردرا بـۆ ئەندامـی مەکتەبـی سـٌاسی. وە بەم شـێوەٌە کاری خوشـکان هاتـووە لە ناو 
، وە ئەگەر سەٌـری ئامـارەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو بکەٌت نـزٌکەی 501 ی ٌەکگـرتوو تا ئەم کۆنگرەی دواٌـیڕٌـزەکانـ
ئەمجـارە سـٌستەمـی کۆتامـان بەکار هێـنا بۆ هەموو نٌـوەی ئەندامـانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو خوشـکن. هەر بـۆٌە 
ن بـۆ سەرکـرداٌەتـی. وە لەوانەش خوشـن هەڵـبژێـردرا ٩ئەندامـی سەرکـرداٌەتـی  ٠١ئـۆرگانەکان، وە لە کۆی 
خوشـن هەڵـبژێـردران بـۆ مەکتەبـی سـٌاسـی. ئەگەر چـی سـٌسـتەمـی کۆتا من خۆم زۆر باوەڕم پـێ نٌە،  ١
چـونکە لەوانەٌە بەم سـٌستەمە کەسـێن بێتە پێـش ئەو تواناٌەی نەبێـت. بەڵام بۆ ئەم کۆمەڵگاٌە وتەواوی 
  ٌان بە تواناکانـی ژن نٌە لەوانەٌە شـتێـکی باش بێت بۆ ئێـستا. کۆمەڵگاکانـی ناوچەکە کە باوەڕ
 
پ/ ئاٌا سـٌستەمـی کۆتا لە خۆٌدا جۆرە موجامەلەٌەکـی نا بەجـێ نٌە بۆ ژن کە وەکو خۆت ووتت لەوانەٌە 
 کەسـانێـن بێنێتە پێـشەوە شـاٌانـی ئەو پۆستە نەبن و، سەرەنجـام ڕەخـنە بەرانبەر ژن زٌاتر بکەن؟ 
ڕاسـتە ئەمـڕۆ بە کۆتا هەندێ پۆسـت تەنانەت لە پەرلەمانٌـش بەر ژن کەوتـووەو، ئەو ڕۆڵەش نابٌنن. بەڵام و/ 
هەر ببێـت باشـە، چـونکە ئەمە شـتێـكی کاتٌە تا کۆمەڵگا هۆشـٌار دەبێـت و، هەسـت دەکات بە تواناکانـی ژن 
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رنگ دەبٌنن لە زانکۆکان وڕێکخـراوەکانـی ودانـی پٌـا دەنێـت. هەر ئەمـڕۆ سەدان ژن هەن رۆڵـی زۆر گـ
کۆمەڵگای مەدەنـی و، بوارەکانـی تـردا. وە ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەوەش کۆتامـان بەکار هێـناوە، بەڵام کاندٌدە 
خوشـکەکانمـان بە هەڵـبژاردن ئەو پۆسـتانەٌان دەسـت خـستووە. وە ٌەکێـن لە شـانازٌەکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو ئەوەٌە 
ی سەرکـردەی لە ئاسـتە جٌاکاندا هەڵخـستووە، ئێـستاش لە پۆسـتەکانـی وەکو پەرلەمان زۆر کە بە سەدان خوشـک
 خەڵن هەٌە پێمان دەڵێت بەڕاسـتی ئێوە جێگای ڕێـزن بۆ ئەو ڕۆڵە چـالاکانەی کە دەٌـبٌنن. 
 
پ/ بەشـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی لە ناو پارت وکۆمەڵە ئٌـسلامٌەکان تا ئێـستاش باسـی ئەوە هەٌە کە نابێـت ژن 
سەرکـرداٌەتـی گـشتی بگـرێتە دەسـت. ئێـوە ئەگەر چـی خوشـکتان هەٌە لێپـرسـراوی ٌەکەمە بۆ نمـوونە 
د حـٌدەری لێـپرسـراوی لمـی لێـپرسـراوی مەکتەبە، ٌان چەند خولێـن لەمەو پێـش لە سوٌد خوشـکە خلو
ٌەکگـرتـوو بووە کە لێـپرسـراوی ٌەکەمـی ٌەکگـرتـوو بووە لەو ووڵاتە. ئاٌا چـۆن دەڕواننە ئەم پـرسە، دەکـرێت 
ژن ببێتە سەرۆن کۆمار ٌان دادوەر بۆ نمـوونە، کە هەندێـن لە ئٌـسلامٌەکان دەڵێـن نابێت چـونکە دەلـی (حدٌث) 
  ێـوە تێـۆرێـکی تاٌبەتتـان هەٌە لەم بارەٌەوە؟   ڕێگـری دەکات. ئاٌا ئ
و/ سـروشـتٌی، لەو بارەوە شـتی تازە هەٌە، ئەگەر ئێمە سەٌـری لورئانـی پـٌرۆز بکەٌن ئێمە (حجة)ێـکی 
لورئانٌمـان هەٌە، کە ئەوٌـش باسـی (بلمٌـس)ە کە خوای گەورە لەبەر حٌکمەتێـن لە لورئان ناوی هێـناوە، وە بە 
ێـهاتـوو وە بە پاشـا باسـی کـردووە. ئەمەش ئاماژەٌەکـی باشـە بـۆ ژنان بە درێـژاٌـی مـێژوو، کە ژنێـکی ل
ژنێـکی سەرکـردەی لێهـاتـوو بـووە و، ووڵاتەکەی لە خەتەرناکـی وە بە ڕاوێــژ و، بە (مواصفـات)تێـکی 
کـی زۆر گەورەٌە، هەر بۆٌە ئێمە لە سەرکـرداٌەتی باش ڕزگارکـردووە و، بـردووە بـۆ ئٌـسلام. ئەمەش بەڵگەٌە
ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان هـٌچ لارٌەکمـان نٌە کە ژن ببێتە سەرۆکـی حـٌزبٌـش. وە لەم کۆنگـرەٌەش 
باسـی ئەوە هەبـوو کە کاندٌدی خوشـن هەبێـت بۆ پۆسـتی سەرۆکـی حـٌزب، لە بەر ئەوە لە ناو ٌەکگـرتـوو 
ن متمـانەی بـراٌان وخوشـکان بە دەسـت بێـنێت هـٌچ لارٌەن نٌە. وە ئێمە ژن بۆ ئەوە لەناعەتە کە خوشـکێـ
سەرۆکاٌەتـی کۆمارو سەرۆکاٌەتـی هەرێمٌـش هٌچ لارٌەکمـان نٌە، وە هـٌچ ڕێگـرێـکی شەرعٌـش نٌە. وە 
ێـستا دەسەڵاتەکان سەرۆکاٌەتـی ئێـستا وەکـو خەلٌفە ٌان ئەمـٌری موسڵمـانانی جـاران هەموو دەسەڵاتێـکی نٌە. ئ
دابەش دەکـرێن، وە بۆ هەر پۆسـتێکـی گـرنگی لەو جۆرە ڕاوێـژکار هەٌە.  وە بە هٌـچ جۆرێـن ئەمـڕۆ بـڕٌار 
لەو ئاسـتانە بـڕٌاری تاکە کەس نٌە. هەر بۆٌە سەرۆن ژن بێـت ٌان پٌـاو هـٌچ جـٌاوازٌەن نٌە، وە بە لەناعەتی 
  نێـوان ژن وپٌـاو بۆ هەر پۆسـتێـن. ٌەکگـرتـوو هـٌچ جـٌاوازٌەن نٌە لە 
 
 پ/ ڕۆڵـی خوشـکی ٌەکگـرتـوو لە پەرلەمـان، بە تاٌبەت پەرلەمانی کوردسـتان کە تۆ ئەندامٌـت تٌـاٌدا چۆنە؟ 
خوشـن ئەندام پەرلەمان بوون.  ١ئەندامـی ٌەکگـرتـوو لە پەرلەمـانـی کوردسـتان  ٩و/ پێـش ئەم خولە لە کۆی 
ٌـی خوشـکٌن. ئەمەش ١ئەندمـی پەرلەمانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو  ٦ٌن، لە ١٠بە  ١٠لەگەڵ بـراٌان وە ئێـستاش ئێمـە 
ئەندامٌن لە  ٦پێـشکەوتنێکە و، بەڵگەٌە لە سەر چۆنێـتی باوەڕی ٌەکگـرتـوو بە ئەندامـی خوشـن. وە ئێمە کە 
لٌژنەٌەن کاردەکەٌن. وە بە کەس کاردەکەٌن. وە هەر ٌەکەمان لە زٌاتر لە  ١٦پەرلەمانی کوردسـتان بەرانبەر 
 بەردەوام (حضور)ێـکی تەواومان هەٌە لە ناو جەماوەر. 
 
پ/ پەٌوەندی خوشـکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو لەگەڵ ڕێکخـراوە ژنانەکانـی تـر بە تاٌبەت عٌلمـانٌەکان چـۆنە؟ وە چۆن 
لەگەڵ پٌـاو، بەڵام زۆر سەٌری (عدالة) وٌەکـسانی دەکەن کە زۆرٌـن لەو ڕێکخـراوانە داوای ٌەکـسانی دەکەن 
جار دەبٌستٌن کە ڕێکخراوە ئافرەتٌە ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکان باسـی (عدالة) دەکەن، وە ئەوش دەڵێن کە مەرج نٌە هەموو 
   !ٌەکـسانٌەن عدالة بێت وهەموو عدالەتێـکٌـش ٌەکـسانی
و/ ئێمە پەٌوەندی بەردەواممـان لە گەڵ سەرجەم ڕێکخـراوەکاندا هەٌە. وەکو ٌەکگـرتـووش بە چاوێـکی والعٌـانە 
سەٌری هەموو شـتێـن دەکەٌن. وە ئێمە زۆر کـراوەٌن بەرانبەر بە بٌرو بۆچـوونی خەڵکانـی تـر، وە (تفهم)ٌان 
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نێـوان پٌـاو وژندا، وە بەهٌـچ شـێوە ٌەن ئٌـسلام  دەکەٌن. وە هەوڵـی ئێمە بۆ ئەوەٌە کە دادگەری هەبێت لە
لەبوولـێ دەرەجە دووٌـی ناکات بـۆ ژن. لە لورئاندا دە فەرموێت (ان اکـرمکـم عـند اللە اتماکم) کەواتە ژن وپٌـاو 
ە . ئێمە لە گەڵ ئەو ڕێکخـراوانیهـٌچ فەرلێـکٌان نٌە.  وە ڕۆڵەکانٌةان لە کۆمەڵگا تەواوکارٌە نەن (تفاضل)
پەٌوەندی باش وهاوکارٌمـان هەٌە کە بۆ ژن تێدەکۆشـن. وە ئێمە چـی وەکو خوشکانـی ٌەکگـرتـوو، چ وەکو 
پەرلەمانتارٌـش زۆر دژاٌەتی هەندێ عورفی دواکەوتوو دەکەٌن کە دوورن لە دادگەری ئٌـسلام، بەڵکو بەشـێکن 
جـێندەر)ی وەزارەتـی ڕۆشـنبٌری هاتە لە بـٌری دواکەوتووی کۆمەڵگا. بەڵام کاتێـن کە پرۆژە ٌاسـای (
پەرلەمان، کە بە تەواوەتـی باسـی لە ٌەکـسانی ژن وپٌـاو دەکـردو، هـٌچ حـسابێـکی بـۆ والعـی کۆمەڵگا 
نەدەکـرد، ئێمە تێـگەٌـشتنمـان بۆ کۆمەڵگای خۆمان خـستە ڕوو. بـۆ نمـوونە کاتێـن کە سەٌری ڕۆڵـی پٌـاو وژن 
ری لە کۆمەڵگا دەکەٌت دەبٌنٌت عدالەتێـکی تەواوە هەٌە ئەگەر چـی لە ڕواڵەتدا وەکـو تەواوکاری ٌەکـت
وابـزانٌـت ٌەکـسان نٌن. ئەمەش بەڕاسـتی خـزمەت بە کۆمەڵگا دەکات. هەر کاتێـن بە کەم سەٌری ئافـرەت 
تـوو هاتۆتە كـراوە، ئەوە نا عدالەتٌەو، دوورە لە تێـگەٌـشتنی ئٌـسلامـٌی. هەر بۆٌە لەو کاتەوە ٌەکگـر
دامەزراندن ئێمە شەڕێـکی گەورەمان لەگەڵ ئەو (عورؾ وعادات)ە چەوتانەی کۆمەڵگا هەبوو بەرانبەر بە ژن. 
کە ئەوانەش عورؾ وزادەی کۆمەڵگان ودوورن لە دادگەری ئٌـسلام. وە هەر کاتێـکٌـش کە ئٌـسلام گەشە 
کاتـی پێؽەمبەر (د.خ.) وخەلٌفە ڕاشـٌدەکان، سەندوو بـووە ئافـرەت ڕۆڵـی بەرچـاوی هەبـووە. بۆ نموونە 
دەبـٌنٌن ئافرەت ڕۆلـی بەر چـاوی هەبووە لە درووسـتکـردنـی بـڕٌار ولە جٌهادو لە سەرجەم بوارەکانـی تــردا. 
هەرکاتێـکٌـش کە ئٌـسلام لاواز بـووەو (عـدالة) نەماوە جارێـکی تــر سـتەمـی کۆمەڵگاکان باڵـی کێـشاوەتەوە 
نانداو سـتمٌان لــێ کـردوون. هەر بۆٌە ئێمە وەکو ٌەکگـرتـوو شـۆڕشـێکی گەورە دەکەٌن لەم بـوارەدا، بەسەر ژ
ەوە تا ئێـستا بە بەردەوامـی لەم پێـناوەدا خەرٌـکٌن. ئێمە کاتێـن کە بەشـداری دەکەٌن لە  ٤٩٩٠وە هەر لە 
ڕێکخـراوەکان (اعجـاب)ٌان هەٌە بە  کۆنگـرەی کاروباری ئافـرەتان لە ناوخۆ ودەرەوەی عـێراق، هەموو
ٌەکگـرتـوو لەم بوارە. بۆ نموونە لە ٌەکێـن لە کۆنفـرانـسانە ژنێـن کە نوێنەری حـٌزبێـکی عـێرالـی بـوو، ووتـی 
خۆزگە هەمـوو حٌـزبەکان وەکـو ٌەکگـرتـوو دەبـوون لە مامەڵەکـردنٌـان لە گەڵ ئافـرەت. دٌـارە هێـشتاش هەر 
انەت لە ٌەکگـرتـووشـدا هەنگاوی تـرمان ماوە لەم بوارە، بۆ ئەوەی ژن بە تەواوەتـی ڕۆڵـی خـۆی ماومـانە، تەن
 ببـٌنێت. وە ئێمـە سەدان خوشـکمان هەٌە کە بە خۆبەخـشی دەوامێـکی تـر لە ڕٌکخـراوەکاندا دەکەن.
 
ۆژە ٌاسـاکانی کوردسـتاندا پ/ هەوڵتـان وەکـو ڕێکخـراوی خوشـکان بـۆ پاراسـتی مافەکانـی ئافـرەت لە پـر
 چـۆنە؟
و/ ئێمـە سـکرتارٌەتـی خوشـکانمـان هەٌە کە بەبەردەوام ٌاداشـت لەسەر بابەتـی جۆراوجـۆر لە بارەی   
مافەکانـی ئافـرەت دەنـووسـن، بۆ نموونە ٌاداشـتێـن لە بارەی کەمـی بەشـداری ئافـرەت لە کابٌنەی شەشەم 
ە بەراورد لە گەڵ بـوونـی ژن لە پەرلەمـاندا. هەرئێـستا بە هاوکاری وحەوتەمـی حـکومەتـی هەرێـم ب
سکـرتارٌەتی خوشـکان من پـرۆژە ٌاسـاٌەن لە بارەی پاراسـتنی مافەکانـی مـنداڵم لە بەردەسـتداٌا. ئێمە هەم لە 
ەم مافەکانـی ڕێکخـراوی خوشـکان، هەم لە پەرلەمانٌـش داکۆکٌـکارٌن لە مافەکانـی ژن. وە هەوڵ دەدەن سەرج
ژن بە ٌاسـاٌـی بکـرێت. وە ئٌمە ڕۆڵـی بەرچـاومان هەبـوو لە دەرکـردنـی ٌاسـای بەڕەنگار بـوونەوەی توندو 
تـٌژی خـێزانـی کە پارسـاڵ لە پەرلەمـانـی کوردسـتان دەرچـوو. وە هەوڵـی زۆرمان هەٌە لە سەنتەرەکانـی ژنان 
مافەکانٌـان. وە هەسـتمان کـردووە کە بە ڕاسـتی توندو تـٌژٌەکـی زۆر وسەنتەرەکانـی داڵدەی ژنان بۆ پاراسـتنی 
هەٌە بەرانبەر بە ژن، بەرانبەر بە منداڵ، هەر بۆٌە ئەو ٌاسـاٌەی کە ئاماژەمان پـێ کـرد بەڕاسـتی ٌاسـاٌەکـی 
ی باری کەسـێتی. وە باش بـوو لەم بوارە. وە ئێمە ڕۆڵمـان هەبـوو لە هەمـوارکـردنـی چەندٌن ٌاسـا لەوانە ٌاسـا
لە سەرجەم ئەم ٌاسـاٌانەدا هەوڵمـان داوە کە ڕۆحی عـدالەت بچەسـپێنٌن، وە باری ژن ومنداڵ باشـتربکەٌن. 
ئێـستاش خەرٌکـٌن بە پـرۆژە ٌاسای بٌنٌـنی منداڵ لە کاتی جٌـابوونەوەی داٌن وباوەن. دٌارە هەوڵەکانـی ئێمە بۆ 




پ/ وەکـو خوشـکانی ٌەکگـرتـوو ئەم جل وبەرگە کە بە واجـبی شـەرعـی دەزانن، ئاٌا لە کاتـی بە دەسـت 
هێـنانـی زۆرٌنەی پەرلەمان وپێـن هێـنانـی حکومەت، هەر وەکـو هەندێ خەڵن تـرسـی هەٌە ئێـوە ئەم جـل 
  ئەفؽـانـستانی تالٌـبان ناسەپێـنن بەسەر خەڵکـدا؟ وبەرگە ناکەنە ٌاسـاو بەزۆر وەکـو ئـٌران و
و/ ئەو جۆرە بٌرکـردنەوەٌە بٌرکـردنەوەٌەکی سەلەتە، چـونکە جل وبەرگ بەشـێکە لە ئازادی تاکە کەس، وە 
نابێـت کەس دەسـتێوەردانـی تێـدا بکات. هەمـووکەس ئازادە کە چـی لە بەر دەکات. وە لەلاٌەن ئٌـسلامٌشەوە 
دێ مەرج هەٌە ئەگٌـنا زٌاتـر جـێهێـڵراوە بۆ کەلتـووری گەلان. دٌارە لە کۆتاٌٌـشدا ئەمە وەکو وەتمـان تەنهـا هەن
پەٌوەندی هەٌە بە ئازادی تاکەکانـی ناو کۆمەڵگا وبـٌروباوەڕٌان، وە نابێـت بسەپێـنرێت بە سەر کەسـدا، هەر 
فەرمووێت (لا اکـراە فـً الدٌن) کە پـرنـسٌـپـێکە وەکو خوودی ئٌـسلام نابێت بسەپێـنرێت، لەم بارەوە لوئان دە
ونابـێت بە هـٌچ شـێوەٌەن هـٌچ بـٌروباوەڕێـن بـسەپـێنرێت بەسەر خەڵـکدا. تەنانەت با ئەو کەسە موسـڵمانٌـش 
بێت کەس بۆی نٌە بەزۆر جل وبەرگـی بە سەردا بسەپێـنێت. وەهەر ئێـستاش ئێمە زۆر هاوڕێمـان هەٌە کە 
اموشـۆمان هەٌە و، زۆر ڕێـزی ٌەکتری دەگـرٌن، وە تەنانەت لە هەڵـبژاردنٌـشدا دەنکمـان دەدنـێ، تێکەڵـٌی وه
 بەڵام بۆ جۆری جل وبەرگ خۆٌان ئازادن هەر چـۆنێـن پـێٌان باشـە.
 
پ/ فـرەژنـی لە نێـوان پەرلەمـانـی عـێراق وپەرلەمـانی کوردسـتاندا، لە عـێراق (مـشروع)ە لە کوردسـتان 
  ـنوع)، ئێـوە لەم بارەوە بۆچـوونتـان چـۆنە؟ (مم
و/ ٌەکێـک لەو ٌاسـاٌانەی کە لە بارەی باری کەسـێتٌەوە هەمووارکـرا، فـرەژنـی بـوو. فـرە ژنـی لە کوردسـتاندا 
بە ڕەهـاٌـی وەکو عـێراق ئازاد نٌە، بەڵکـو مەرج دارکـراوە. وە نابێـت بە زەولـی پٌـاو بێت و، بۆ ئەزێت دانـی 
ئافـرەت بەکاربهـێنرێت. لـێرەبەدواوە دەبێـت ژنـی ٌەکەم ڕازی بێـت وە لە دادگا مارەبـڕٌنەکە بکـرێت. هەر 
وەکو لە زۆر شـتی تـردا خـراپ حـاڵـی بـوون هەٌە، لە بارەی فـرەژنـٌـش خـراپ حـاڵـی بـوون هەٌە. وە 
ی جائـزە ئەگەر پێـوٌـستی هەبـوو، بەڵام ئەسـڵ بەکارهێـنانێـن ؼەڵەت هەٌە بۆی. لە ئٌـسلامـدا حوکمـی فـرەژنـ
لە ئٌـسلامـدا ٌەن ژنـٌٌە. وە زاناٌان باسـی مەرجەکانـی فـرەژنٌـان کـردووە لەوانە کاتێـن کە ژنەکە توانای منداڵ 
بـوونی نەبێت، ٌان ژن زۆر نەخۆش بێت، ٌان بۆ هەندێ پٌـاو کە حاڵەتـی تاٌبەتٌـٌان هەٌە، ئەمانەش جەند 
ێـکی (اسـتـثناء) ناوازە وکەمن. کەواتە فـرە ژنـی بـۆ (معـالجة)ٌە نەن ڕەهـا. وە ئٌـسلام لە فـرەژنـی حاڵەت
ڕەهاوە سـنورداری کـردوە، لە سـنوردارٌـشەوە مەرجـی بۆ دانٌـاوە. وە لە والعـٌـشدا ئێمە ڕۆژانە ڕووبەڕووی 
زۆرێـکٌـش لە دووژنـی (فـشل) دەهـێـنێت. زۆر  چەندٌن کێـشە دەبٌـنەوە کە بە هـۆی فـرەژنـٌەوە ڕوو دەدەن.
جارٌـش بە هـۆی ئەوەوەٌە کە پٌـاو نەٌتوانٌوە دادگەر بێت لە نێوان ژنەکانٌدا، کە مەرجـی سەرەکی ئەم بابەتەٌە. 
دەرەنجـام سـتەم وکارەسـاتی لـێ دەکەوێتەوە. بەم شـێوەٌەش ٌاساکەی پەرلەمانی کوردسـتان شەرعـی تـرە بە 











 fo licnuoc hgih ecnausrup eht fo daeh eht ,inaremahS nassaH :7 xidneppA
 UIK eht
 چـاوپێکەوتـنی حــەسـەن شـەمـێرانـــی 
  پـرسـیارەکان پێـشکەش کـراون ٥٠١٥/٨/٢٠لە بەرواری 
  مگەشـتۆتەوە دەسـت ٥٠١٥/٨/٢٥نـووسـراو لە بەرواەی وەڵامـی پـرسـیارەکان بەشـێوازی 
 
/ چۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی؟ کورد بوون وئٌـسلامـٌی بوون هەر ٌەکەٌان چـی ٠پ
 دەگەٌەنێت بـۆت؟ 
و/ کورد بوونم وئٌـسلامـی بوونم لەٌەن کاتدا زۆر سـروشـتٌە وهٌـچ (تنالض) ودژاٌەتٌەن لە نێـوانٌانا نابٌنم. 
چونکە دوو چەمکـی جٌاوازن وتەواوکاری ٌەکـن، کورد بـوونم هٌـچ پەٌوەندی بە هٌـچ ئاٌنێـکەوە نٌە، چونکە 
ـرم من ئەبێـت سەر بە نەتەوەٌەن بم، وە ئەوەش بە من پێـش ئەوەی ئاٌنـی ئٌسلام ٌان هەر ئاٌنـێکی تـر وەرگ
دەس خۆم نەبووە. کورد بوونم واتە من لە داٌن وباوکێـن بووم کە سەر بە نەتەوەٌەن بوون کە پـێی ئەڵـێة 
(کورد) ئٌتر منٌـش بوومەتە (کورد)، حەز بکەم وحەز نەکەم لە بەر ئەوە نە کەس بۆی هەٌە دەرم کات لەم 
سەٌە، نە منٌـش بۆم هەٌە شـانازی پێوە بکەم کە بوومەتە کورد چونکە بە دەسـت خۆم نەبـووە. نەتەوە ولەم پێـنا
لە بەر ئەوە هەر مـرۆڤـێ کە لە داٌـن ئەبێت لە داٌـن وباوکێـن، ئەوان سەر بە هەر نەتەوەٌەن بـن ئەمٌـش 
ن کە لە داٌن وباوکێـکی کورد ئەبێـتە کەسـێن لەو نەتەوە، ئٌتر حەز بکات ٌان حەز نەکات. جا لەبەر ئەوە م
بـووم ئەوا منٌـش کوردم. کوردٌـش وەکو هەر نەتەوەٌەکـی تـری ئەم جٌهـانە کۆمەڵـێ مـرۆڤـن لە سەر خاکـێ 
 ژٌاون وپێـناسەی نەتەوەٌان وەرگـرتـووە. هٌـچ گـرفتێـکم نٌە لەوبارەوە. 
ٌە لە نێوان (موسڵمان وئٌسلامٌا)، موسڵمان بە نٌسبەت ئٌسلامی بوونم ٌان موسڵمان بوونم، چونکە جٌاوازی هە
بەو مرۆڤە ئەڵێن بە ئارەزوی خۆی موسڵمان بووبێت ومەرجی موسڵمانٌەتی تٌا بێت لە بڕوابوون بە خوای 
گەورە هەتا لەناعەت بە ڕاستی ودروسـتی ئەوەی لە لورئان وسونەتی (صحٌح)دا هاتووە. بەڵام ئٌـسلامـی بەو 
لەگەڵ موسڵمان بوونٌـا بڕٌاری دابێت خەبات بکات لە پێـناو بڵاوکـردنەوەی ئاٌنـی مرۆڤە موسـڵمانە ئەوتـرێ 
ئٌـسلامـدا وهەوڵ بدات بێ زۆر لـێ کـردن وگـرتنەبەری ڕێگای توندو تـٌژی مـرۆڤەکان ئاٌـنی ئٌـسلام لـبوڵ 
ڕۆژ ئەم مرۆڤە پێـی بکەن وبٌکەنە بەرنامەی ژٌانـی دونٌـاٌان بە هٌـوای بەختەوەری دونٌـاو سەرفرازی دوا
ئەڵـێن ئٌـسلامـی. ئەمەش وەن کورد بـوون وکورداٌەتـی واٌە. واتە مٌللەتی کورد هەموو کوردن، بەڵام مەرج 
نٌە هەموو کورداٌەتی بکەن و، خەبات بکەن لە پێـناو پارێـزگاری لە نەتەوەی کورد ودامەزراندنـی دەوڵەتـی 
  ج نٌە هەموو خەبات بکات لە پێـناو ئٌـسلامـدا. کوردٌدا. ئێمە هەموو موسڵمانٌن بەڵام مەر
جا موسـڵمان بـوون ٌان بـوون بە ئٌـسلامـی دوای ئەوەدێت کە من لە داٌـن دەبم، بەڵام سەبارەت نەتەوە وەکو 
ووتمـان هەر بە لەداٌـن بـوون لەو باون وداٌکە نەتەوەکەم دٌارە. پاشـان کە گەورە دەبم وبە ئارەزووی خۆم 
هەڵ دەبـژێـرم. کەواتە من پێـش ئەوەی موسـڵمان بووبم کورد بـووم، دواتـر ئاٌنی ئٌـسلامـم ئاٌنەکەم 
وەرگـرتـووە. وە ئەکـرا من ئاٌنی ئٌـسلام وەرنەگرم، وە ٌان ئاٌنێـکی تـر وەرگـرم، ئەوکاتەش کورد بوونەکەم 
ـسلامٌـش ئازادی خەڵکە وەری دەگـرێ هەر لە شـوێـنی خۆٌەتی، بەڵام وەرگـرتنـی هەر ئاٌنـێ بە پێـی ئاٌنـی ئٌ
 ٌان نا. 
 
/ وەکـو کوردێکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی، ٌان ئٌـسلامٌەکـی کورد گەر دەتەوێت چۆن سەٌـری ئٌـسلام وەکو ئاٌنـێکی ٢پ
 جٌهـانـی دەکەٌت؟ 
کوردی و/ بە گوێـرەی ئەو وەڵامـەی لە پـرسـٌاری ٌەکەمدا ڕوونم کـردەوە، ئەم دەستەواژەٌە ڕاستە کە بڵێـٌن (
موسـڵمان) ٌان (کوردی ئٌـسلامـی). جـا من وەن موسـڵمان وکوردێکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی سەٌری ئاٌنـی ئٌـسلام ئەکەم 
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کە ئاٌنێکە خوای گەورە ناردووٌەتی بۆ هەموو مرۆڤەکان ودوای ئەو هەموو ئاٌنە ڕاست ودروسـتانەی 
عادەتی خوای گەورە وابـووە هەموو نەتەوە لەپێـشەوە ناردوٌەتی بۆ مرۆڤەکانی پێـشوو، باڵام بەهۆی ئەوەی 
وکۆمەڵە مـرۆڤـێ خوای گەورە پێؽەمبەری بۆ ناردووە وبەٌانـی خواٌـی پٌـاناردووە بۆٌان. ئەوانٌـش 
گەٌاندووٌانە وخەڵکٌـش بە ئارەزوی خۆٌان وەرٌان گـرتووە ٌان نا. بە داخەوە هەندێ بە نەزانـی شەڕی ئاٌنـی 
ی داوە بە زۆر ئاٌنی خۆی بـسەپێـنێ، ئەوەش بە پێـی دەلـی ئاٌنەکان ئەو شەڕانە کـردووە بە ماناٌەن هەوڵـ
ڕاست ودروست نەبوون، وە (لا اکـراە فـً الدٌن) ئەبێت دروشمـی هەموو مـرۆڤێـکی خاوەن ئاٌن بێت. جا ئو 
کـردووە ودواتـر  ئاٌنـنانە بەردەوام هاتوون ودوای وەفاتـی پێؽەمبەرەکە خەڵکـی دەسـتکاری خودی ئاٌنەکەٌان
خوای گەورە پێؽەمبەرێکـی ناردووە راسـتی کـردووەتەوە. بەم شـێوەٌە ئەم حاڵەتە بەردەوام بـوو هەتا خوای 
گەورە (بە لەناعەتی ئێمەی موسڵمان) دوا بـڕٌاری خۆی داو ئاخـر پێؽەمبەری نارد کە (محمـد) بـوو (دروسی 
(لورئانـی پـٌرۆزە) وفەرمووی لە مـرۆڤەکانـی سەر زەوی بە خوای لەسەر)، وە ئاخـر پەٌامـی خۆی نارد کە 
هەمـوو جٌـاوازٌەکانەوە کە ئەم (محمـد)ە پێؽەمبەری هەمووتان بێت وئەم (لرآن)ە پەٌامـی منەو ئاخـر پەڕاومە 
 بۆ هەمووتان ولە رۆژی دواٌٌـدا لە دوای هاتنـی محمـد ولورئانەکەی هٌـچ ئاٌـنێـکی تـر لبوڵ نٌە لای خوای
گەورە. جا ئٌـتر خاوەن ئاٌنەکانـی تـر لەناعەت بکەن بەم بـڕٌارە ئەوە موسـڵمان دەبن، ئەگەر لەناعەت نەکەن 
ئەوە لە دنٌـادا لەسەر ئاٌنـی خۆٌان ئەمێـننەوە وئازادن وپێکەوە لەگەڵ موسـڵمانان ئەژٌـن ولٌامەتٌـش ئٌتر 
ٌارەی خۆی دەکات لەگەڵٌـان، نەن موسڵمـانان لەم دنٌـاٌە پەٌوەندی بە خوا خۆٌەوە هەٌە کە لێـپرسـٌنەوە لەو بـڕ
لێـپرسـٌنەوە لەگەڵ کەس لەو بارەوە بکەن، چونکە خوا خۆی ئازادی داوە بە مرۆڤەکان لە هەڵـبژاردنـی ئاٌـن 
 دا. جا من ئەمە لەناعەتمە کە ئٌـسلام دواٌن پەٌام ودوا ئاٌنـی خواٌە بۆ هەموو مرۆڤەکان وبەو پێ ٌە ئٌـسلام
ئاٌنـێکی جٌهـانٌە وبە پێـوٌـستی ئەزانم لە ڕێگای پـسپۆڕانـی ئاٌنـی شارەزاٌان لە (کتـاب) کە لورئانەو دواٌـن 
فەرموودەی خواٌە بۆ مـرۆڤەکان وئٌـتر بە گوێـرەی لەناعەتی ئێمەی موسـڵمان پێؽەمبەراٌەتی بە هاتنـی (محمـد) 
ارێـزگاری لە لورئان دەکات لە دەسـتکاری وفەوتان، درودی خوای لەسەر کۆتاٌـی هات وخوای گەورە خۆی پ
وە تا کۆتاٌی ژٌانـی مرۆڤەکان لەسەر زەوی ئەمێـنێ. جا زۆر پێوٌـستە زاناٌانی شارەزاو بە تێگەٌـشتنێـکی 
والعٌـانە لەو لورئانە تێ بگەن ووەن ووتم بە بـێ وەسائٌـلی توندو تـٌژی بٌگەٌەنـن بە هەمـوو مرۆڤەکانـی سەر 
خۆشـبەختانە ئٌتر پێوٌـستمان بە (لتال) نٌە بۆ گەٌاندنی ئاٌن بە مرۆڤەکان، ئێـستا لە ڕێگای ڕاگەٌاندنە  زەوی.
جۆراو جۆرەکانەوە ئەتوانـرێ ئاٌنـی ئٌـسلام بگەٌەنـرێ بە جەماوەرو، کەس ناتوانـێ ڕێـی لـێ بگـرێ وبەو 
رمودە ڕاستەکانی (محمـد پێؽەمبەر) دروودی شـێوەٌە سنور نەماوە لە بەردەم گەٌاندنی مەفاهٌمی لورئان وفە
خوای لە سەر، بەڵام ئەوەی گرنگر مرۆڤەکان بـزانن ئەوەی زاناٌان ئەٌگەٌەنـن مەرج نٌە هەمووی مەبەستی 
لورئانەکە بێت، بە مانای لسەی زاناٌان وتێگەٌـشتنٌان لە ئاٌن جٌاوازە لە زودی لورئانەکە. واتا ئەکـرێ ئێمە 
ناٌەکمـان لبوڵ نەبێت، ئەوە مانای وا نٌە ئەوە پێچەوانەی خودی ئاٌنەکەٌە، مەگەر ٌەکـێ ٌان لسە ٌان فەتوای زا
کۆمەڵـێ (ملحـد)بن هەر خودی ئاٌن (ڕەد)کەنەوە، ئەوەش ئازادن ولە لورئان دا ئازادٌان پێ دراوە بە پێـی 
 ئاٌەتی (لا اکراە فً الدٌن). 
 
چۆنە ئەگەر وەکو کوردی موسـڵمان دەسـتبەرداری بـن بۆ  / چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ پـرسـی کەرکون؟١پ
 بـرا عەرەبە موسـڵمانەکانتـان، بۆ ئەوەی چـی تر خوێـن ڕێـژی ٌان لانی کەم ئەو کێـشەٌە کۆتاٌی پێ بێت؟ 
و/  بەداخەوە مەسەلەی کەرکون ئاڵۆز کـراوە ولوربانـی زۆر دراوە بۆ گەٌـشـتن بە چارەسەری ئەو کێـشەٌە. 
) تا ڕادەٌەن، ئەگەر ئەنجام بدرێت شـتێـکی باشـە. ١٤٠ـستا چارەسەر نەکـراوە ودوا چارەسەر مادەی (هەتا ئێ
بەڵام ئەوٌـش لە ڕووی سـٌاسـٌەوە لەمپەری زۆری بۆ درووسـتکـراوە. ئەوەی گـرنگە ئێمە وەن کوردێـکی 
ن داوای لێـکـردووٌن لە کاروباری موسـڵمان وئٌـسلامـی هٌـچ کێـشەٌەکمـان نٌە لە ڕووی دنٌوٌەوە. ئاٌنەکەما
ڕۆژانەمان (عـادل) بٌن هەتا لە گەڵ دووژمنٌـشا (ولاٌجـرمنـکم شـنآن لوم علی أن لا تعـدلوا، اعدلوا هو ألـرب 
للتموی)، واتە: ڕلتان لە کۆمەڵـێ واتان لـێ نەکات نا عـادل ونادادپەروەر بن لە (تعامل) لەگەڵٌـان، پێوٌـستە 
کە لەوەی ئەو پلەی تەلواتان دەس کەوێ کە زۆر مەبەستی موسڵمانانەو پێی ئەچنە عادل بن ئەوە نزٌ
 بەهەشـتەوە. 
جا پـرسی کەرکون ئەبێت بچٌنە ناو مـێژووەوە وئەگەر خاکـی کوردسـتانە (کە ئێمە لەناعەتمـان واٌە) ئەوە 
داوای بکەن وتاوانٌـشە هەر  ئەبێت خەباتی بێ ووچانـی بۆ بکـرێ ولە ڕووی ئاٌـنەوە تاوانە بـرا عەرەبەکان
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کوردێـن ڕازی بێت بٌانداتێ، چونکە مافی خەڵکـی کەرکوکەو بۆ کەس نٌە (تنـازل)ی لـێ بکات بۆ کەسـی 
بێگانە. وە ئەگەر لە بەرانبەرٌـشدا بە پێـی مـێژوو توانـرا بسەلمێـنرێت کە کەرکون کوردسـتانـی نٌە ئێمە نابێت 
ەلمـاندنٌـش ئەستەم بێت ئێمە ئامادەٌن وەن کوردی موسڵمـان لەگەڵ مٌللەتی ب زۆر داگٌری بکەٌن. وە ئەگەر س
خۆمان ئامادەٌن چارەسەری سـٌاسـی بۆ بدۆزٌنەوە وبە (توافك) ڕێکبخـرێت. وە ئێمە ئامادەٌن وەکو لاٌەنێـکی 
کە هەموو گەلـێ  سـٌاسی ئٌـسلامـٌی بچٌنە مواجهەی بـرا عەرەبەکان وبەپێـی ئاراستەی ئاٌن ودەلەکانـی لورئان
خوای گەورە جٌـای کـردۆتەوە وئەبێت زمان وسـنوری خاکـی پارێـزراو بێت ومافـەکانـی دابٌن بکـرێ ولەگەڵ 
 بالـی گەلانـی تـرا (تعارؾ) و(تفاهم) و(تعـاٌـش) لە نێـوانٌـانا هەبێت (وجعلنـاکم شـعوبا ولبـائل لتعـارفوا). 
 
ۆت: کورد بـوون، موسـڵمان بـوون، ٌان کوردسـتانـی بـوون؟ ئاٌا ئەوە / کامێـن لەم شوناسانە گرنگـترن ب٤پ
 ئەهێـنێت کێـشە لەسەر کوردسـتانـی بـوون وعـێرالی بـوون بەردەوام بێت؟ 
و/ وابـزانم لە وەڵامـی پـرسـٌارەکانـی پێـشوودا ئەم وەڵامەت دەسـت دەکەوێت. بە کورتی ئەکـرێت لە ٌەن کاتدا 
م، ئێـستا (عـێراق)ٌـشم. بەڵام ئەکـرێ ئەگەر ڕۆژێ کوردسـتان سەربەخۆٌـی وەرگـرت من کوردم، موسـڵمان
 عـێرالٌەکەم نامێـنێت وئەوکاتە دوو دەوڵەتی دراوسـێ ی هاوکارو هاو دٌن ئەبٌن. 
 
/ هەرٌەن لەمانەی لای خوارەوە چـی دەگەٌەنێت بۆت: ئٌـسلام، دەوڵەت، نەتەوە؟ ئاٌا هٌـچ نە گونجـان ٠پ
  )ێـن لە نێـوانٌـاندا هەٌە؟ ئاٌا چۆنە ئەگەر سەر بە هەمووٌان بٌت؟ (تنالض
 و/ مانای ئەمانە لای من زۆر ئاسـان چارەسەر بوون:
ئٌـسلام: ئەو ئاٌنە پٌرۆزەٌە کە پەروەردگارم بە        
زی ٌەکێـکا کە ناوی (محمـد)ە ولە نەتەوەی خۆم نٌە ناردووٌەتی بۆ هەموو مـرۆڤ ونەتەوەکان بێ جٌاوا
لەخودی ئاٌنەکەدا ئەوەی باس کـردووە وئێـستاش (والعـا) واٌە. منٌـش بە ئارەزوی خۆم ئەم ئاٌنەم لەبوڵ 
کـردووە. هەر ئەو ئاٌنەش تێٌگەٌاندووم ڕێـز لە هەموو ئاٌن ومەزهەب وبۆچونەکان بگـرم وهەرگـٌز شەڕ 
 نەکەٌن لە سەر ئەو جٌاوازٌانە. 
کە ئەبێت هەڵـبژێـردراوانـی جەماوەری ئەو نەتەوەو ناوچانە  دەوڵەت: بە چوارچێـوەٌەی دەزانم 
ئٌدارەی دەکەن وە لە سنورێکـی دٌاری کـراودا دەژٌـن. وە دەبێت دەوڵەت (محـاٌد) بێت ولەسەر بنەمای 
(مواطـنة) واتا هاوڵاتی بوون معامەلەی دانٌـشتوانـی بکات وهەوڵ بدات ئازادی ومافەکانـی هاوڵاتٌان 
وە هەوڵ بدات دادپەروەرانە فەرمان ڕەواٌـی بکات و، هەوڵ بدات کە هەموو تاکەکانـی هەست بپارێـزێت. 
 بکەن کە بـوون وژٌـن وخـزمەت گوزارٌٌـان بۆ دابٌن کـراوە و، ئەو دەوڵەتەش بەرپـرسە بەرانبەر بەو مافانە. 
دەکاتەوە. ئەمەش  نەتەوە: ئەو خەڵکەٌە کە ٌەن زمان وٌەن خان وٌەن مـێژوو وٌەن چارەنووس کۆی 
خوای گەورە خۆی خەڵکـی وا درووسـت کـردووە وئەبێت پارێـزگاری لەو تاٌبەتمەندٌانە بکـرێ وهٌچ 
 نەتەوەٌەن نە سـتەم لە نەتەوەٌەکـی تـر بکات، وە نە سـتەمٌـشی لـێ بکـرێت. 
وموسڵمـان لە ٌەن کاتدا  هٌچ (تعـارض وتنـالض)ێـن نابٌـنم لە نێـوان ئەو دەسـتەواژانە. وە منـی ئٌـسلامـی
       .سەربە نەتەوەی کوردم وموسڵمانم ولە ناو دەوڵەتی خۆمـدا کە کوردسـتانە انشـاء اللە کە درووسـت بـوو ئەژٌم
  
 
/ چۆن زٌاتـر درووشـمەکانـی (ئازادی؛ بـراٌەتی؛ دادپەروەری) ڕاڤە دەکەٌت لە ڕووانگەی پەٌوەندٌتـان ٦پ
 لەگەڵ بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان، بە تاٌبەت کە ئێـوە نەتەوەٌەکـی بـێ دەوڵەتـن؟ 
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) بەم شـێوەٌەٌە: و/ لەبارەی پەٌوەندی ئێمە وەن ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان لە گەڵ (بـراٌانـی موسڵمـان
بـراٌانـی موسڵمان لە کاتێکـدا درووسـت بـوو، وە پێـشەوا (حـسن البنـا) ڕەحمەتی خوای لـێ بێت لە گەڵ 
بناؼەٌان دانا ووڵاتانـی موسڵمان نـشٌن شکـستٌان هێـنا بـوو لە بەردەم هاوپەٌمانـی  ٨٢٩٠هاوکارانـی لە ساڵـی 
ن دابەشـکرد پاش شـکانی ئەو دەوڵەتە لە جەنگی جٌهانمی ٌەکەم. وە بە ڕۆژئاوا کە مٌـراتی دەوڵەتـی عوسـمانٌا
کەوتنە ژێـر ڕکێفـی ئەو وڵاتانە بەرنامە وابـوو کە لە بەرنامە ئٌسلام دوورٌان خەنەوە بەتاٌبەت لە ڕووی ژٌانی 
تێـکی عەلمانٌان لە دونٌاٌٌەوە. ئەوە بوو لە تورکٌا دەستٌان پێ کـردو خٌلافەتی عوسمانٌان هەڵوەشاندەوە ودەوڵە
شوێٌدا دانٌـا. وە ئەو دەوڵەتە عٌلمانٌەکـی بێ لاٌەن نەبـوو وەن ئەوەی لە سٌستەمی ڕۆژئاوا، بەڵکو دژاٌەتی 
وجەنگی چەمکە ئٌسلامی وڕەهەندە ئٌسلامٌەکانی ئەکـرد وسەرپۆش وبانگ وپٌتی عەرەبی وچەندٌن شةتی تری 
ٌە کردو هەوڵـی دا دووبارە هٌمەتی مٌللەتانی موسڵمان بەرزکاتەوە لەدەؼە کرد. پێـشەوا بەنا هەسـتی بەم مەترس
وتێـٌان گەٌەنێت کە ئەم شکـستە کاتٌەو ئەبێت متمانەمان بەخۆمان وئاٌنەکەمان هەبێت ونەکەوٌنە ژێـر 
مان) کارٌگەری ئەم حـاڵەتە نەخوازراوەو بەو پێٌە هات ئەو لوتابخانەٌەی داناو ناوٌان نا (کۆمەڵـی براٌانی موسڵ
بناؼەی بۆ تێگەٌـشتن لە ئٌـسلام داناو  ١٢وهات بەشـێوەٌەکی مٌانەڕەو وتێگەٌـشـتنی جوان لە لورئان وسونەت 
ناوٌان نا (الاصول العـشـرٌن) ولەوێوە چەندەها پەڕاوو نامٌلکە دەرکـرا. ئەمە بۆ خەڵكی مٌـسر ودواتر چونکە 
ێ لوتابی ومامۆسـتا کە چوبوونە مٌـسر ولەوێ بەخـزمەت هەموو مٌللەتانی موسڵمان ٌەن ئاٌنـٌن، بە هۆی هەند
مامۆسـتا حـسن بەنا گەشـتن وبەو شـێوەٌە گونجاوە مٌانەڕەوٌە شەرحـی ئٌسلامی بۆ کردن. ئەوانٌش دەرەنجام 
وەرٌان گرت وهێـناٌانەوە بۆ ووڵاتانی خۆٌان. وە هەندێ لە مامۆستاٌان وزاناٌانی وڕۆشـنبٌران وموسڵمانانی 
کانٌش زۆر بەلاٌانەوە ڕاست ودروست وباش بوو، چونکە ئٌسلام ٌەن ئاٌنەو هەموو ٌەکـێ کە بٌٌەوێ ووڵاتە
موسڵمان بێت ئەبێت لە ڕووی عەلٌدەو عٌبادەت وئەخلالی ئٌسلامٌەوە وەن ٌەن وابٌن، مەگەر هەندێ جٌاوازی 
هەر بۆٌە لە عـێراق ولە کوردستانٌش  بچون لە بٌرو تێگەٌـشتندا لە ئاٌەتەکانی لورئان، ٌان هەندێ بواری فمهٌدا.
پێشوازٌمان لەو لوتابخانەٌە کرد. دەرەنجام بە شێوەٌەکی گشتی لە عێراق ئەندام ولاٌەنگٌری زۆری بۆ درووست 
ەوە ئاشـنا بووم بەو لوتابخانەٌەو بووم بە ئەندام تٌاٌدا. جا ئەو کاتە حـٌزبی شـٌوعـی ٨٦٩٠بوو. وە من لە ساڵی 
تی کوردسـتان هەبوو، بەڵام بەرانبەر بە ئاٌنی ئٌسلام ٌاب دژ بوون، ٌان گرنگٌان پێ نە ئەدا. وپارتی دٌموکـرا
منٌش وهاوڕێکانم ئەمانوٌـست هەم ئاٌنمان پارێـزراو بێت هەم دوونٌاشمان لە ڕووی ئازادی ودابٌن کردنی مافی 
لەناو ئەو لوتابخانەی براٌانی مٌللەتەکەمان وهەر مافێ کە مرۆڤ ئەٌبێت بۆی دابٌن بکرێ، ئێمە ئەوەمان 
موسڵمانە دەست کەوت. لە ڕووی ئاٌنٌٌەوە شەرحێـکی جوانی ئٌسلامٌان کرد وەن عەلٌدە وعٌبادەت وئەخلاق 
وبەهاکان. وەن پرۆژەی سٌاسی وشێوازی خەبات وجٌهاد وهەوڵدان بۆ دابٌن کردنی مافی مٌللەت وشێوازی 
ی کراوی داناوە کە موسڵمانان لە هەر شوێنـێن وەن ٌەن ئەنجامی حوکمـڕانی ئەوە نە ئاٌن چوارچێوەٌەکی دٌار
بدەن، نە ئەو لوتابخانەٌەش دٌاری کردووە. بەڵکو ئێمە وا حاڵٌبووٌن کە ئەم لوتابخانەٌە ئٌمانی ودەعەوەی 
وپەروەردەٌٌە. بەڵام بۆ پرۆژەی سٌاسی ئەوە هەر ووڵات ونەتەوەٌەن بە گوێـرەی زمان وشوێن وتاٌبەتمەندی 
ۆٌان ئەکرێ بەرنامە بۆ خۆٌان دانێن ولەسەری بـڕۆن. وە ئەوان بۆ مٌـسر بەرنامە وخەباتی سٌاسی خۆٌان خ
هەبووە، بەڵام هەرگٌز داوا نەکراوە وناکرێ کۆپی بەرنامەی سٌاسی مٌـسر ٌان ووڵاتێـکی تر بێـنێن بۆ ئـێرە، نە 
و ووتوٌانە هەموو ووڵاتێ بۆ خەباتی سـٌاسی ئاٌنی ئٌسلام داوای ئەوە کـردووە، نە براٌانی موسڵمان. بەڵک
ئازادە، بەڵام پابەندبوون بە بەها وئەخلالە ئٌسلامٌەکانەوە گرنگە. بۆ ئێمەش کە چووٌنە ناو ئەو لوتابخانەٌە وبە 
شـانازٌەوە کارمان تٌادا کـردووە ودٌنمان پارێـزراو بووەو بە گوێـرەی تواناشمـان لە ووڵاتی خۆماندا دژی زاڵم 
گٌرکاران بووٌن ولوربانٌمـان داوە وبەندٌنخـانەمان دٌوە ودەربەدەربـووٌن لەگەڵ بالی حـٌزب ولاٌەنە ودا
سـٌاسـٌەکانـی تــر. بەڵام لەوانەٌە ئاسـتی خەباتی سـٌاسـٌمان لاواز بووبێت وکومتەرخەمٌمـان هەبووبێت. بەڵام 
ٌاندوە بە مٌللەتەکەمان کەوا ئەزانٌن ئەوەش لە ڕووی ئاٌمنی وڕۆحـی عٌبـادەت وئەخـلالەوە سودمان زۆر گە
 خزمەتێـکی گەورەٌە بۆ دنٌـا ودوا ڕۆژمان. 
. وە هاتنەوەمان ٠٩٩٠ئەم شـێوە دٌنداری وخەباتەمان بەردەوام بوو تا ڕاپەڕٌنە گەورەکەی کوردسـتان لە ساڵـی 
ەرێم ودەرچـوونی ٌاسای ودامەزراندنی حـکومەتی ه ٢٩٩٠لە ئێران دوای کۆچە مٌلٌۆنٌەکە وهەڵـبژاردنی 
بـڕٌاری خۆ ڕاگەٌاندنمـان دا لە ژێـر ناوی ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان و،  ٤٩٩٠حـٌزبەکان، لە سـاڵـی 
بووٌنە هەڵگـری دوو پرۆژە، پرۆژەٌەکی دەعەوی بـۆ ئەوەی گـرنگـی بدەٌن بە ڕەهەندی عەلٌدەو عـٌبادەت 
ئٌسلام وبەرنامەٌەکـی پەروەردەٌـی بۆ تان وکۆمەڵگا بۆ ئەو کەسانە کە  وئەخلالی مٌللەتی خۆمان بە پـێی ئاٌنی
بەگوێمان دەکەن بێ بەکارهێـنانـی توند وتٌژی بە فٌکرێـکی مٌانەڕەوانە. وە پـرۆژەٌەکی سـٌاسـی کە ئەوٌـش 
م وگەندەڵـی ئاٌنەکەمان داوا لە مٌللەتان دەکات کە هەوڵ بدەن ووڵاتەکانٌان لە کۆٌلەٌی وژێـر دەستەٌی وستە
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ودٌکتـاتۆرٌەت ڕزگاری کەن. لەم پێـناوەشـدا بەرنامەو پـرۆژەمان ئامادەکـرد ولەگەڵ بالی حـزبە 
نٌـشـتمانٌەکانی تـردا خەباتمـان کـردووە. وە ماوەٌەکٌـش بەشـداری حـکومەتمان کـردووە. ئێـستاش وەکو 
وٌکە سودمان لە مٌانەڕەوی فٌکری براٌانی ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆن بەردەوامٌن لە خەباتی سـٌاسی. جا لە پرۆژە دەعە
موسـڵمان وەرگـرتووە وئەندامانمـان لە سەر پەروەردە کـردووە. بەڵام لە پرۆژە سٌاسٌەکەمان کە باس لە کێـشە 
وگرفتی مٌللەتەکەمان ئەکات  وچارەسەری بۆ دائەنـێ خۆماڵـٌٌەو فۆتۆکۆپی هٌچ شـوێـنێن نٌە. ئەگەر چـی 
ئەزمونێـکی باش لە هەر کوێـٌەن بێت وەربگرٌن. بۆ ئەم پـرۆژە سـٌاسٌەش درووشـمی  دەکـرێت سوود لە هەر
(ئازادی، بـراٌەتی، دادپەروەری)مان دٌاری کـرد، کە وامان ئەزانی دابٌن کـردنـی ئەو درووشـمانە کوردسـتان 
ـوپاس بۆ خوا ئێـستا ەوە تا ئێـستاش خەبات ئەکەٌن لەو پێـناوەدا دەکەٌن. س٤٩٩٠ڕزگار دەبێت. وە هەر لە 
 بووٌنەتە ژمـارەٌەن کە هەموو لاٌەن حـسابی بۆ دەکات
 
  / چـۆن دەتـوانـن وەکـو پارتێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی سـٌاسی لەگەڵ ئەو هەمـوو پارتە عٌلمـانٌە هەڵ بکەن؟٧پ
ر وباوەڕ و/ ئێمە وا لە ئٌـسلام تێگەشـتوٌن کە ئازادی ئەدات بە هەموو تان وگـروپ ولاٌەنێـن لە بواری بٌ
ومەزهەب وئاٌنٌدا، وە هەرگـٌز ڕازی نابێت بٌر وباوەڕی خۆی بە زۆر بسەپێـنێ ولە لورئاندا دەفەرموێت (لا 
اکـراە فـً الدٌن). لە بەر ئەوە ژٌان لەگەڵ هەموو حـٌزبە عٌلمـانٌەکان ئاسـانە وبـڕوامان واٌە ئەکـرێ هەمـوو 
نـی خۆی بکات وکێـشەٌەن نەبێت. وە لە پـرۆژە سـٌاسٌەکەدا ئازادانە مومارەسەی ئاٌن ومەزهەب وبٌر وبۆچوو
وا ئەزانم پێکەوە ژٌان زۆر ئاسـانـترە ودازوازی هەمـوو حـٌزبە ئٌـسلامـی وعٌلمـانٌەکان زۆر نزٌکـن لە 
ٌەکەوە لە دابٌن کـردنـی ئازادی ومافەکانـی مٌللەت وچارەسەرکـردن گەندەڵـی ودامەزراندنـی سـٌسـتەمێكـی 
د وکونجـاو کە مافـی هەمـوو لاٌەن بپـارێــزێ بـێ جٌاوازی. ئەم بـڕواٌەمان وای کـردوٌن لەگەڵ هەموو ڕاشـ
حـٌزبەکان بە ڕاسـت وچەپٌانەوە بـژٌـن وبەڵکو زۆر جـار ئێمە مٌانجـٌگەری وئاشـتەواٌٌمـان دروسـت کـردووە 
 لەناکۆکـی شەڕی ناو خۆٌاندا. 
 
  ەن وچۆنٌـش بەرجەسـتەی دەکەن؟ / چۆن لە دٌموکـراسـی تێ دەگ٨پ
و/ ئێمە زۆر بە سـنگ فـراوانـی ڕازی بـووٌن بە دٌموکـراسـی لە ڕووی عەمەلی ومومارەسەی سـٌاسـٌەوە کە 
باشـترٌن ڕێگەٌە بۆ گەٌـشتن بە دەسەڵات بێ توندو تـٌژی و، زۆر ن<زٌکە لە شورای لورئانٌەوە. بەڵام مەرج 
ێـی ڕازی بٌن وهەموو ئەوانەی کە بۆ ووڵاتانـی ڕۆژئاوا مومارەسە دەکـرێت بۆ نٌە لە هەموو خاڵەکانٌدا ئێمە پ
ووڵاتانی موسـڵمان نـشٌن بـشێ. لێرەدا ئێمە پـرنـسٌپی (الحکمة ضالة المٶمن أنـی وجدها فهو أحك بها)مان 
اٌنەکەمان هەٌە، واتە: شـتی ڕاست ودرووسـت گومبوی مرۆڤـی ئٌماندارە، بەو پێٌە هەر چٌەن پێچەوانەی ئ
 نەبـوو، وە بە سود بوو بۆ مٌللەتەکەمان پـێی ڕازٌن. هەر بۆٌە بە عەمەلی بە دٌموکـراسی ڕازی بووٌـن. 
 
/ ووتاری بـراٌانـی موسڵمـان لە ئاسـتی تٌـۆرٌدا ئاماژە بە سـتراتٌژی بونٌـاتنانەوەی کەسـێتی موسڵمـان، ٩پ
ٌـسلامـٌی، خٌـلافەتی ئٌسـلامـٌی دەکات. ئێـوە وەکو خـێزانـی موسڵمان، کۆمەڵگای موسڵمـان، حکومەتی ئ
 بـراٌانـی موسڵمانی کورد لە کوێـی ئەم سـتراتٌژەدان؟ ئاٌا خٌلافەت درووسـت دەبێت؟ 
و/ ئێمە بـراٌانـی موسڵمـان وەکو لوتابخانەٌەن سەٌر دەکەٌن. ئەم لوتابخانەٌە خاوەنی دوو پـرۆژەٌە، 
لام خۆی واٌە، وە پـرۆژەٌەکـی سـٌاسٌش. جا ووتاری بـراٌانی موسڵمـان لە پـرۆژەٌەکـی دەعەوی کە ئاٌنی ئٌس
پەروەردەو بونٌاتنانەوی کەسـێتی موسڵمان تا درووسـت کـردنـی خٌلافەت باسی هەردوو پرۆژەکەٌە. لە پێشەوە 
م لە بواری باسم کـرد کە ئێمە لە بواری پرۆژە دەعەوٌەکەدا زۆر سوودمان لەو لوتابخانەٌە وەرگـرتووە. بەڵا
پـرۆژە سـٌاسٌەکە ئێمە ئەکـرێ جٌاوازبٌن وڕای تـرمان هەبێت. بۆٌە ئێمە ئێـستا باسی گێڕانەوەی خٌـلافەت بە 
پرنسٌپ نازانٌن و، درووست بوونەوەی بە دوور دەزانٌن، بەڵام بە موستەحٌلٌـش نازانٌن چونکە هەر شتێن کە 




تێـڕانٌنی ئەندامانتان بۆ چەمکـی خٌلافەت چۆنە؟ ئاٌا هٌچ جٌاوازٌەكی هەٌە لەگەڵ تێـڕوانٌنی  /١٠پ
 سەرکرداٌەتٌـتان؟
و/ لە نێـوان ئەندامان وسەرکـرداٌەتی ٌەکگـرتوو لە باسی خٌلافەت جٌاوازی نٌە و، بە پێـوٌـستی نازانٌن 
ٌن نازانٌن، بەڵکو سـٌسـتەمێـکی سـٌاسی بووە ولە خۆمانی پێوە خەرٌـن بکەٌن. وە ئێمە باسی خٌلافەت بە ئا
زەمەنێـکدا موسڵمـانان مومارەسەٌان کـردووە، ئەکـرێ بگۆڕدرێت وشـێوازی تــر مومارەسە بکـرێت. لای ئێمە 
 گـرنگ ناوەڕۆکە و، گـرنگ ئەوەٌە کە مـرۆڤەکان وهاوڵاتٌـانی ناوچەکە ژٌان وئاٌنٌان پارێـزراو بێت. 
 
ٌـشتنتان بۆ چەمکـی خٌلافەت بە پێـی کات گۆڕانکاری بە سەردا دێت؟ گەر واٌە چی هۆکاری / ئاٌا تێگە٠٠پ
 ئەم گۆڕانکارٌە ٌە؟
 و/ لە پێـشەوە وەڵامـی ئەم خاڵە هەٌە.
 
  / ئاٌا هەست بە هٌـچ جۆرە ڕکابەرٌەن دەکەن لە لاٌەن ئٌسلامٌەکانی ترەوە؟ ٢٠پ
لاٌەن وهەر گـروپێـن کە لە گۆڕەپانەکەدا هەٌەو کاری سـٌاسی و/ سـروشـتٌە ڕکابەری لە نێـوان تان وکۆمەڵ و
وئاٌنی دەکات هەبێت. چونکە ئێمە ئاٌنەکەمان فەرمووٌەتی (کل حـزب بما لدٌهـم فـرحون) واتە هەموو لاٌەن 
وگـروپێـن ئەوەی لەسەری کۆبووەتەوە وبـڕوای پێـٌەتی خۆشحـاڵە. لەسەر ئەو بنەماٌە کار دەکـرێت، بەڵام زۆر 
پێـوٌـستە کە چوارچێوەٌەن هەبێت کۆمان کاتەوە بۆ ئەوەی سـنوری ئازادی ٌەکـتر نەبەزێـنٌن. ئێمە بـڕوامان بەم 
حاڵەتە هەٌە وهەوڵمـان داوە لەو سنورەدا کاربکەٌن، وە هەسـتٌـش دەکەٌن ڕکابەری هەٌە لە نێوان لاٌەنە 
راو وپێکدادان وەن ئەوەی لە نێـوان عٌلمانٌەکاندا ئٌـسلامٌەکان، بەڵام سوپاس بۆ خوا نەگەشـتۆتە کاری نەخواز
 ڕووی دا. 
 
/ پێت واتە بـزوتنەوەی سەلەفی مٌـسر ڕێگـر بوون ٌان ٌارمەتی دەر بۆ بـراٌانی مٌـسر؟ چ وانەٌەن لەم ١٠پ
 بارەٌەوە وەکو ئٌسلامٌی کورد فێـردەبن؟
و/ بە ووردی هێـشتا دراسەی حـاڵەتی سـٌاسی ئەم دوواٌٌەی مٌـسرم نەکـردووە و، ٌەنهـا لە دوورەوە لە 
ڕاگەٌاندن هەندێ شـت ئەبٌـنم. بەڵام زۆرم پـێ باش بـووە کە ئٌـسلامٌەکان هاوکاری ٌەکـن بەتاٌبەت 
ـی پێکەوە ژٌانمـان داوە ولە لەسەرخـستنی پـرۆژە سـٌاسٌەکەدا. وە ئێمە لە کوردسـتان پێـش ئەوان هەوڵ
مٌـسرٌـشەوە ئەوە فـێربووٌن کە ئەوەی بە (نظـري) ووتـوومانە لە هاوکاری نێـوان ئٌسـلامٌەکان سەلمـا کە 
 ئەرکە ودەبێت زۆر پێـکەوە بوون وهاوکاری ٌەن بن، ئەگٌـنا سەرکەوتنـی سـٌاسی بە دەست ناهێـنن. 
 
ۆنوسـنتان بـڕٌاردا وەکو سـتراتـٌژی کارتان، چـۆن ئەم سـتراتـٌژە / لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چارەی خ٤٠پ
 بەرجەسـتە دەکەن؟ 
و/ بـڕٌاری مافـی چـارەی خۆنوسـٌن بۆ گەلـی کورد بـڕوامان پێـٌەتی لە ڕووی ئاٌـنی ونەتەوەٌٌمانەوە، بۆٌەش 
  شـێوەٌە هەوڵـی بۆ دەدەٌن:  کـردمانە ٌەکێـن لە سـتراتـٌژی کاری ئاٌـندەمان. بـۆ بەرجەسـەتکـردنٌـشی بەم
لە ڕووی تٌـۆرٌەوە ئێمە باسـی دەکەٌن بە تاٌبەت لە گەڵ دراوسـێکانمـان کە عەرەب وتورن  -٠ 
وفارسـن، وە ئاٌـنٌـش کۆمان دەکاتەوە لە گەڵٌـان. ئێمەش لە ڕوانگەی ئاٌنەوە ئەتـوانٌن کاری باشـی لەسەر 
 بکەٌن لەگەڵٌـان. 
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سـٌاسـٌەکانـی سەر گۆڕەپانـی کوردسـتان هاودەنگٌن وهاوخەبات دەبٌن لە لەگەڵ هەموو لاٌەنە  -٢ 
پارێـزگاری کـردن لەم مافە وبە ئەرکـی ئاٌـنی ونٌـشتمانـی خۆمانـی دەزانٌن وبەپـێی توانــامان هەوڵـی جٌـدی 
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ئێوە وەکو ئەندامی خوشک لە نێو ڕٌزەکانی ٌەکگرتوو ٌان وەکو خوشکان چ ڕۆڵێکتان هەٌە بۆ خزمەتکردنی 
 کێشەی گەلەکەتان وەکو نەتەوەٌەکی بێدەوڵەت؟
بةرنامةي  تاٌبةت بةخإي هةٌة بإ خزمةتً  پلان و تائٌَستا   وه ٌاندنٌە تای خۆ راگە ره سە  كگرتووی خوشكان لە ٌە
گەل و نةتةوةكةي ئةوٌش لة چوارچٌَوةي ئةو دةسةلاتةي كة رٌَكخراوةكان هةٌانة,  وةن بلاو كردنةوة و 
ئاراستة كردنً بةٌان و  ٌاداشت لةكاتً ثٌَوٌست و بةشداري رٌَثٌَوان وبةدةمةو بون و هاوكاري كردنً  
  ناساندنً نةتةوةكةمان لة كإنگرةو كإنفرانسة ناوخإًٌ و جٌهانٌةكان ...هتد لٌَمةوماوانً نةتةوةكةمان و و
 
ڕۆڵتان لە بەرزکردنەوەی هۆشٌاری نەتەوەٌی؟ 
  روونی لە  ش بە مە كان و ئە می بواره رجە سە لة  ٌە لگە كانی كۆمە ی تاكە وه كاري هةنوكةٌٌمان هۆشٌار كردنە  
و  و،لە  ی هٌناوه ندامانٌكۆنگره نگی ئە دا كۆده ناو كۆنگره  و لە  ارٌژراوهماندا د كە وی ناوخۆٌرٌكخراوه ٌره پە
پٌی ئةو ثلانةي لةسكرتارٌةتةوة ئاراستةٌان دةكرٌَت ،هةستاون بة سازدان   كانمان و بە می لمە رجە سە لە  وه شە روه
ةي هإشٌاري لة و كردنةوةي ضةندٌن خول و إرن شإث و سٌمٌنارو ضالاكً جإراو جإر  و بلاو كردنةو
 رٌَطةي بةرنامةكانً خوشكانةوة لة رادٌإ و كةنالةكانةوة  بةمةبةستً  
ندامانی خۆمان و  نٌوان ئە ی ونٌشتمانی لە وه تە رۆحی نە  ی وه رزكردنە مان وبە كە لگە ی كۆمە وه هۆشٌار كردنە
  مان. كە لگە كانی تری كۆمە تاكە
 
لة ِرووى هإشٌارى و ِرإشنبٌرى و فكرٌةوة لةسةركإمةلَگاى كوردى ن ـ ِرإلَى ِرٌَكخراوى ٌةكگرتووى خوشكا 
  توانراوة ژنان هإشٌار بكةنةوة؟  چً بووة؟
خوشكان رإلًَ بةچاوو کارٌگةرٌان لةناو كإمةلگادا بٌنٌوة لة زإر ِرووةوة هةرلة كردنةوةي بنكةكانً نة 
ةوةي ئةو چةمكة هةلانةي كة بةناوي ئٌسلامةوة هٌَشتنً نة خو ٌَندةواري و ثةٌوةندٌة كإمةلاٌةتً  و راست كردن
ذنً ثٌَدةچةوسٌَنراٌةوة ، وهإشٌار كردنةوةي كإمةلگةكةمان لة  رةتكردنةوةي داب و نةرٌتة هةلَة و 
سةپٌَنراوةكان لةناو كإمةلَگةدا،  و بلاوكردنةوةي رإشنبٌري گشتً لةناو ژنان دا ، و لةمةسةلة چارةنووس 
بةتاٌبةت مةسةلةي  ژنان و زإر بواري تري فٌكري و رإشنبٌري دا خوشكان خإٌان سازةكانً كإمةلَگةكةمان 
 سةلماندوة.
 ـ گرنگترٌن بةربةست و ِرٌَگرةكانى بةردةم ئةم ِرٌَكخراوة چٌن؟
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ئةمِرإ لة جٌهاندابةگشتً تةحةدٌٌةكً زإر ِروو بةِرووي ژنان و كاري رٌَكخراوةًٌ ژنان دةبٌَتةوة ، 
ٌَبةش نٌة لةو تةحةدٌات و كٌَشمةكٌَشانة و لةهةندٌَن رووةوة ثشكً گةورةتري ٌةكگرتووي خوشكانٌش ب
بةركةوتووة ،بةسٌفةتً ئٌسلامً بونً هةمٌشة محارةبة كراوةو بةچاوٌَكً نامإ تةماشا دةكراو زإرٌَن مافً 
گرنگةكاندا رةواي خوراوة، وهةمٌشة هةولًَ تةهمٌشكردنً  دراوة،  و ِركابةرةكانً نةٌانهٌَشتوة لةشوٌَنة 
دةركةوٌَت، بةلام كادرةكانً ئةم رٌَكخراوة رإذ بةرإذ خإٌان فەرز دةكةن و بةوالعً بإ ساحةكةي دةسةلمٌَنن 
 كةئةوان خةمخإرو دلسإزي راستةلٌنةي توٌَژةكةٌانن.
نٌة ئةمة جگة لة ئةو هةموو جٌاركارٌەي دةسةلات بةرامبةر رٌَكخراوةكان دةٌكات و پ ٌَوةر ٌَكً دٌارو گونجاوي 
بإ هةلسةنگاندنً كاري رٌَكخراوةكان و تةنها (حٌزبانً) دةسةلات گرنگً بة رٌَكخراوةكانً خإٌان دةدةن لة 
گشت رووٌةكةوة دةعمً مادي زإرٌان دةكةن، هةروةها ئةو جٌاكارٌة رةگةزٌةي كةداب ونةرٌتً نادروستً 
ة پلة دوو تةماشا كردوة ٌةك ٌَكً ترة لة سةپاندوٌةتً و، لةكإمةلگاكةماندا ِرٌشةي داكوتاوة و هةمٌشة ذنً ب
ئاستةنگةكان، چونكة هةر ئةم بإچونة وادةكات نادادٌةن هةبٌَت  بة ب ًَ بونً پٌَوةرٌَكً  والٌعٌانة بإ 
 هةلسةنگاندنً لٌَهاتوٌةكان لةنٌَوان  رةگةزةكانداو هةمٌشة ژنان مةؼدورن 
تنة پٌَشةوةي كةسانً بةتواناو شارةزا ، ٌةكگرتووي تٌَروانٌنً هةلَةي كإمةلَگا بإ كاري رٌَكخراوةًٌ ونةها
 خوشكان فةراؼً كةسً پٌشةًٌ هةٌة جاري واهةٌة بإ كارٌَن پةٌوةندي بةچةندٌن كةسةوة دةكةٌت ناٌةنة پٌَشةوة 
سةرلالً زإرٌَن لة خوشكان بة دةوامً حكومٌةوة واي كردوة داهٌَنانكاري نةبٌَت بإ بةرةو پٌَشبردنً 
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  بابکـر، یاریدەدەری ئەمینداری گـشـتی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتاند. صـلاح الدیـن 
 
  / تێهەڵکـێـش کـردنـی ئاٌن ونەتەوە تا چ ڕادەٌەن لە نێـو ٌەکگـرتوودا بە دەی دەکـرێت؟ ٠پ
ٌەکێـن لەو داهێـنانکارٌانەی کـردی ئەوە بـوو کە  ٤٩٩٠و/ ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـی هەر لە ڕاگەٌاندنٌەوە لە 
کاری ئٌـسلامـٌی. چونکە لە توانـی هاسەنگٌەن دابهێـنێت لە نێوان ئەوەی کە کاری نەتەوەٌـی بکات ٌان 
شۆڕشـی ڕزگارٌخـوازی گەلـی کورد تا ڕادەٌەن ئەو جۆرە هاوسەنگٌە وون کـرابـوو، کە حـٌزبێـن لە هەمان 
کاتدا بتوانێت شۆڕش وخەبات بکات بۆ ئازاد کـردنـی گەل ووڵاتەکەی، وە باکگـراوندی ئٌسلامٌـشی هەبێت. ئەو 
ن هەڵـبژێـردرێت. ٌەکگـرتـوو کە هات توانـی هاوسەنگٌەن لە نێـوان هەردوو کاتە وا ئەبـنرا کە تەنهـا لاٌەکٌـا
چەمکەکە دابنـێت. لە ڕووی نەتەوەٌٌەوە بـڕٌاری دا ناسـنامەی نەتەوەٌـی کورد بێت، وە لە ڕووێ ناسـنامەی 
ڕەنگ بداتەوە  (عمٌدة)ٌـشی ئٌـسلامـٌی بێت. هەر بۆٌە ناوەکەشـی وا (صٌاؼة) کـرد کە هەردوو چەمکەکە تێـٌدا
کە بـرٌتی بـوو لە (ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان)، کە هەم ئٌـسلامـٌٌە هەم کوردسـتانـٌشە. بۆٌە پێم واٌە 
کە توانـی هاوسەنگٌەکـی باش ڕابگـرێت لە نێـوان هەردوو حاڵەتەکەدا، ئەوٌـش لە ڕوانگە تێـگەٌـشتنی بـۆ 
ٌـشتووە هٌـچ جۆرە دژاٌەتٌەن نٌە لە نێـوان ئەوەی کە تۆ کار بۆ ئٌـسلام کە لە لورئان وفەرموودە وا تێگە
نەتەوەکەی خۆت بکەٌت، هەوڵ بدەٌت لە پێـناو ئازادی دا، وە خۆشـگوزەرانـی بۆ فەراهەم بێـنٌت، وە لە هەمان 
ـوونـی کاتدا موسـڵمانێـکی باش ومولـتەزم بٌت خـزمەتی ئاٌنەکەشـت بکەٌت. چونکە ئێمە پێمان واٌە کە کورد ب
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ئێمە (جعـل)ێـکـی خواٌٌە. خوای گەورە ئێمەی بە کور درووسـت کـردووە، وە ئەو مافەشـی پێداوٌن کە 
خـزمەت نەتەوە ووڵاتەکەی خۆمان بکەٌن، وە موسـڵمانێـکی مولتەزٌم ودٌندارٌـش بٌن وپابەنس بٌن بە هەمـوو 
کگـرتـوو لە سـتراتٌژٌەتەکەی خۆٌەوە لە ماوەی ڕێنمـاٌٌەکانـی ئٌـسلامەوە. بۆٌە لەو ڕوانگەوە هەڵ درا کە ٌە
تەمەنٌدا ئەو هاوسەنگٌە ڕابگـرێت، وە تا ئێـستاش لە مومارەسەی عەمەلـی پێم واٌە توانٌـوٌەتی هاوسەنگـی لە 
نێـوان کورد بـوون ونەتەوەبـوونی ڕابگـرێت. بەڵکـو ئێمە زۆر جار دەڵـێٌن بە تـێڕوانٌنـی ئٌـسلامـٌٌانەوە 
نەتەوەکەمان دەکەٌن. چونکە ئێمە وەکو موسـڵمـان لە ڕوانگەی ئٌـسلامەوە سەٌـری ژٌان وبونەوەر  خـزمەت بە
وهەموو ئەو شـتانە دەکەٌن کە لە نێوانٌاندا هەٌە. هەر بۆٌە ئێمە هەوڵمـان داوە ئەو هاوسەنگٌە بپـارێـزٌن، وە 
ئەوەی کە تـووشـی ٌەکـتر بـڕٌن  کار لەسەر هەردوو ڕەهەندەکە بکەٌن بە شـێوەٌەکـی تەرٌـبی بە بـێ
و(تماطـع)بــن. وە بە شـاهٌدی خەڵن توانٌـوٌـشمانە تا ئەم ساتە وەختە کە سەرکەوتنـێکی باش لە ڕاگـرتنـی ئەو 
 هاوسەنگٌە لە نێـوان هەم کورد بـوون وهەم ئٌـسلامـٌی بـووندا ڕابگـرٌن. 
 
مە تاکتـٌکی سـٌاسـٌە، ٌان بۆ ڕەزامەندی خواٌە وئاٌنەکە / کاتێـن کە دەڵێـٌت ڕاگـرتنـی هاوسەنگـی، ئاٌە ئە٢پ
 پاڵـت پێـوە دەنێت؟ 
و/ ئاٌنەکە پاڵنەر بۆمان بۆ ئەوەی خـزمەتی نەتەوەکەمان بکەٌن. کاتێـن کە خوای گەورە لە لورئاندا دەفەرموێت 
ێت کە کورد بـوونـی ئێمە (وکذلن جعلنـاکم شـعوبا ولبـائل لتعـارفوا) لـێرەوە ئەم ئاٌەتە ئەوەمان تێـدەگەٌەن
(جعـل)ێـکی خواٌٌە. خوا گٌـان ئێمەی بە کورد درووسـت کـردووە، عەرەبـی بە عەرەب درووسـت کـردووە، 
فارسـی بە فارس درووسـت کـردووە، وە تورکٌـشی بە تورن درووسـت کـردووە. ئەم جٌاوازی زمانەش 
دٌاری کـردووە کە بۆ ٌەکـتر ناسـٌن وپێـکەوە ژٌانە. هەر  ئاٌەتێـکە لە ئاٌەتەکانـی خـوای گەورە، ئامانجەکەشـی
چـۆن خوا کە باس لە گەورەٌی ئاسـمانەکان دەکات، ئاواش باس لە جٌـاوازی زمانەکان دەکات وەکو ئاٌەتێکـی 
خۆی. خوا خۆی مەبەسـتی بـووە کە زمانـی جٌـاواز هەبێت، وە نەتەوەی جٌاواز هەبێت، بەڵام ئەم زمانە 
. وەکو ووتٌـشمان ئامانجەکەش بۆ یبۆ ئەوەٌە کە ٌەکـتر تەواکەن (تکاملـً) بـن نەن (تماطـع) جٌاوازانە
ٌەکـترناسـٌن وپێکەوە ژٌان وٌەکـتر تەواوکـردنە. لەبەر ئەوە وچەندٌن ئاٌەت وفەرموودەی تــر ئەم ئاٌنە هانمـان 
 دەدات کە خـزمەتی زمان ونەتەوەکەی خۆمان بکەٌن. 
 
ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاست ووڵاتان لەسەر بنەمای ناشـٌوناڵـٌزم درووست بـووە، کوردٌـش دابەش / لە ناوچەی ١پ
کـراوە بە سەر چوار ووڵاتدا، ئەمـڕۆ بەرژەوەندی ئەو ووڵاتانە ڕێگە بە کورد نادات لەسەر هەمان بنەما 
ەوان ڕێگە نادەن دەوڵەتی خۆی بنـات بنێت. کاتێـکٌـش کورد تێـکۆشان دەکات بۆ ووڵاتی سەربەخۆی خۆی ئ
وسەرەنجام شەڕ ڕوودەدات وخوێـن ڕێـژی ڕوو دەدات. ئاٌـنی ئٌـسلام لەمبـارەوە چـی دەڵێـت؟ وە ئێـوە 
هەڵوێـستتان چـٌە، بە تاٌبەت کە ٌەکگـرتوو لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چارەی خۆنووسـٌنی کـردە سـتراتٌژی 
 کاری؟
لە سـتراتٌژی ٌەکەمدا باسـمان لە هەوڵ دان کـردووە بۆ و/ بەڵـێ ڕاستە ئێمە لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـەمدا 
درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەتێـکی کوردی. ئەوەش پێمـان واٌە کە هەر ئەو خواٌەی وە ئەو ئاٌـنەی کە ڕێـی داوە بە 
دەوڵەتـی هەبێت، وە ڕێـی داوە بە فارس چەند دەوڵەتێـکی هەبێت سەربەخۆی هەبێت،  ١٢عەرەب زٌاتـر لە 
بە تورن چەند دەوڵەتێـکی هەبێت، هەر هەمان خـوا وئاٌن ولورئان ڕێـی دەدات بە کورد کە دەوڵەتـی ڕێـی داوە 
سەربەخۆی خۆی هەبێت. مادام خوا زمانـی جٌاوازی داوە بە عەرەب وفارس وتورن ونەتەوەکانـی تـر، وە 
ڵەتـی سەربەخـۆی هەبێت. مافـی دەوڵەتـی سەربەخۆی پێـداون، هەمان خوا هەمان ماؾ دەدات بە کورد کە دەو
لە بەر ئەوە ئٌـتر جێـگای خۆٌەتی کە کورد هەوڵ بدات کە دەوڵەتـت سەربەخۆی خۆی هەبێت وەکو سەرجەم 
نەتەوەکانـی تـر. وە بەمەش چـارەسەری ڕٌـشەٌـی کێـشەی کورد لە ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت دەبێت. وە کورد 
ە خاوەن دەوڵەتێـکی سەربەخـۆی خۆی، بەمەش کێـشەکە گەرەتـرٌن نەتەوەٌە لەسەر ڕووی زەوی کە نەبووت
چـارەسەر دەبێت. ئەم دابەش کـردنەی کوردٌـش دٌارە دابەش کـردنی کۆڵۆنٌـالـٌستەکانە کە هەڵەٌەکـی خـراپـی 
مـرۆڤە ودەبێت ڕاست بکـرێتەوە. لە بەر ئەوە ئٌـسلام دەبێتە ئاسـانکار بۆ درووسـت بـوونـی دەوڵەتـی کوردی. 
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ن کە موسڵمـانێـکی عەرەب، موسڵمـانێـکی تورن، موسڵمـانێـکی فارس خاوەنـی دەوڵەتـی سەربەخۆی کاتێـ
خۆٌانـن و، کوردٌـش بـێ بەشە لەو مافە ناٌەکـسانـی هەٌە. وە بازنەی ٌەکـتر ناسـٌنەکان سـێ بازنەن، بازنەی 
لەم بازنەدا بـراٌن. بازنەی دووەم نەتەوە کە ئێمە کوردٌـن کە لە کوردسـتاندا دەژٌـن، بەمەش ئێمەی کورد 
بازنەی بـراٌەتی ئٌمانٌە کە ئێمە کۆدەکاتەوە لەگەڵ بـراٌانـی عەرەب وتورن وفارس. بازنەی سـێهەمٌـش بازنەی 
بـراٌەتی مـرۆڤاٌەتٌە کە لەگەڵ هەموو مـرۆڤەکان ئێمە خۆمان بە بـرا دەزانٌن، لە ڕوانگەی ئەوەی کە ئێمە 
زنانە دەبێت بۆ ئەوە بێت کە کارەکانمـان بـۆ ئاسـان بێت نەن (تعمـٌد). بـۆ نمـوونە ئێمە هەمـوو مـرۆڤٌن. ئەم با
لە بازنەی بـراٌەتی نەتەوەٌـی کوردٌن، وە لەگەڵ ووڵاتانـی وەکـو عەرەب وفارس وتورکـدا دەژٌـن، ئەمانەش 
ەو سـێ نەتەوە بـۆ ئەوەی ئێمەش بـرامانـن لە بازنەی ئاٌنەکەدا. ئەم بازنەٌەش دەبێت ئاسـانکـاری بکات لای ئ
وەکو ئەوان دەوڵەتێـکی سەربەخـۆمان هەبێت. ئەنجـا پەٌوەندٌەکـی باش وهاوبەش لە نێـوانمـاندا درووست 
دەبێت. هەر بـۆٌە ئێمە پێمـان واٌە کە چارەسەری ڕٌـشەٌـی وسـتراتـٌژی ودوور بـۆ کٌـشەی کورد لە 
ت کە کوردٌـش ببـێتە خاوەنـی دەوڵەتـی سەربەخـۆی خۆی. ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت ئەوەٌە کە ڕێ بدرێ
ئەوجـاش لەگەڵ نەتەوە دراوسـێکاندا لەسەر بنەمای بەرژەوەندی هاوبەش بەتاٌبەت لە ڕووی ئابوری 
وسـٌاسـٌەوە پێکەوە بـژٌن، ئـٌتر هەرٌەکەو خاوەنـی کٌـانـی سەربەخۆی خۆی دەبێت و، کێـشەشـمان بۆ ٌەکـتر 
ەم چارەسەرەش، بەڕای ئێمە (مسـکنات)ە وچارەسەر نٌە. تەنانەت ئێـستاش لە عـێراق نابێت. وە جگە ل
نەتوانـراوە کە پەٌوەندٌەکانـی حکومەتی هەرێم وحکومەتی ناوەندی عـێراق لەسەر بنەمای فٌدراڵـی ڕێکبخـرێت، 
ەندی وهەرێمەکاندا وە کێـشەکان هەر بەردەوامـن. لە هەموو دنٌـا کێـشەی سەرەکـی لە نێـوان حکوماتی ناو
لەسەر دەسەڵات و(صلاحـٌات)، وە ئێمە ئێـستا هەم کێـشەی دەسەڵاتمـان هەٌە هەم کێـشەی (صـلاحٌـات)، جگە 
لە کێـشەی سەروەت وسـامانٌـش. دٌارە ئێمە ئەوشـمان ووتووە کە درووسـتکـردنـی دەوڵەتـی کوردی هەم 
ەوڵەتـی هەٌە. ئەنجـا بـۆ ئەمانەش کاتـی دەوێت، ئەڵبەتە کار ئامادەسـازی نێـوخـۆٌـی، هەم ئەللٌمـی، هەم نێـود
 بـۆکـردنٌـش. 
 
/ ئەگەر دەرەنجـام ئەوان هەر ڕازی نەبـوون و، هێـرشـٌان کـردە سەر کوردسـتان، وەکو ئەزمونەکەی لازی ٤پ
ەڵگـرتووە ئەو کاتە محمـد، ئاٌا هەڵوێـستی ئێوە وەکو ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان کە ئەم سـتراتٌژەتان ه
چـی دەبێت؟ وە ئاٌا هەر ڕاگەٌاندنـی ئاوا سـتراتـٌژێـن لە ئێـستاوە نابێـتە ماٌەی دووژمـن پەٌداکـردن بۆ 
کوردسـتان؟ وە ئەگەر هـێرش کـراٌە سەر کوردسـتان کە دەرەنجـام خوێـن ئەڕێـژرێت، ئێوە چۆن حـسابتان بۆ 
 ئەمە کـردووە؟ 
زی گەلـی کورد لە هەر چوار پارچەی کوردسـتان ئەم ئەزموونـی ڕێگـرتن بەزۆر، و/ لە خەباتی ڕزگارٌخـوا
وە ستەم لـێکـردن، وە کـپکـردنـی دەنگـی ئازادٌخوازانەی کورد، وە بـێ بەش کـردنـی لە مافەکانـی تالـی 
وفـرمێـسکێـکی  کـراوەتەوە لە سەد سـاڵـی ڕابووردوودا. وە هەزارەهـا لوربانـی لە پێـناودا دراوە و، خوێـن
زۆرٌـش ڕژاوە. وە هەمـوو لاش گەشـتونەتە ئەو لەناعەتە کە ئەم ڕێگا چارەٌە ڕێگە چارەٌەکـی خـراپە، وە 
نامانگەٌەنێت بە نەتٌجە، چ ئێمە وەکو کورد چ ئەو گولانەش کە لەگەڵٌـان دەژٌـن. لە بەر ئەوە پێم وا نٌە 
رسـن پەنا ببەنەوە بۆ ئەو ڕێگە چارە. وە ئێمەش کە ئەڵێـٌن جارێکـی تـر ئەم سـێ نەتەوە کە عەرەب وتورن وفا
دەبێت زەمٌـنەسـازی ناوخۆٌـی وئەللٌمـی نێـودەوڵەتـی بـۆ بکەٌن مەبەسـتمان لەوەٌە کە دەبێـت ئەم شـتە لە 
ڕێگای گفـتو گۆ وتەفاهم ولەناعەت پێکـردنٌـانەوە بکـرێت، بۆ ئەوەی جارێکـی تـر تووشـی لوربانٌدان 
ێـسن وخوێن ڕشـتن نەبٌن لەو پێـناوەدا. پاش زەمٌـنەسـازی ناوخـۆ دەبێت لەناعەت بەو دەوڵەتانە بکەٌن وفـرم
کە ئەمە بەرژەوەندی ئەوانٌـشە، چونکە بتەوێت ٌان نا ئەمە کێـشەٌەکـی (تـراکم)ٌە لە ڕۆژهەڵاتـی ناوەڕاسـت 
ەوە زۆر بخاٌەنێت، بەڵام ئەمە سەلامەتـترٌن دەبێت چارەسەر بکـرێت. وە لەوانەٌە کە لە ڕێگای گفتوگۆ وتفاهم
ڕێگاٌە و، هەر بەم ڕێگاٌەش کۆتاٌـی دێت. پاشـان زەمٌـنەسـازی نێـودەوڵەتٌـش زۆر گـرنگە چونکە کاتێـن کە 
دەوڵەت ڕادەگەٌەنٌن پێـوٌـستمان بە دانپـانان وپـشتٌـوانـی نێـودەوڵەتی هەٌە. ئەمەش دٌارە پاش زەمٌنەسـازی 
سـانـتر دەبێت. وە ئێمە کوردی عـێراق دەبێت لەناعەت بە عـێرالٌەکان بکات و، کوردی ئێران بە ئەللٌمـی ئا
ئێرانٌەکان و، کوردی تورکٌـا بە تورکٌـا و، کوردی سـورٌاش بە سورٌا، ڕاسـتە ئەمە لەوانەٌە زۆر بخاٌەنێت، 




پاش هەموو ئەم هەوڵانە وگـرنگٌان، پاش بەدەسـت هێـنانی تەنانەت دانپێـنانانی نێودەوڵەتٌـش ئەگەر ئەو / ٠پ
دەوڵەتانە هەر ڕازی نەبـوون، دەرەنجـام تـووشـی شەڕ دەبنەوە، وە دەبێت گەلـی کورد بەرگـری بکات، ئاٌا 
 ئٌـسلام ڕێگادەدات بەو بەرگـری کـردنە؟ 
ش حەز ناکات تووشـی شەڕ بێتەوە، بە تاٌبەت لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان بۆ گەٌـشتن بەو و/ مـن پێم واٌە کوردٌـ
مافەی. لەبەر ئەوە لەوە دەچـێت کە ڕێگەچـارەی ئارامگـرتن وبەکارهێـنانـی زمانـی گفتوگۆ وداٌەلۆگ بەکار 
ی نێـو دەوڵەتـی ئێـستا بێنێت با درێـژتـرٌـش بێتەوە. وە ئێـستاش کاتـی داگـٌرکـردن بەسەر چـووە، سـٌـستەمـ
ڕێگە نادات کە نەتەوەٌەن نەتەوەٌەکـی تـر داگـٌر بکات. وە ئێمە بـٶ نموونە لەگەڵ عـێرالدا ئێـستا بـڕٌاری 
فٌدراڵٌمـان داوە، ئەمەش (جٌل)ی داهاتـوو پـێی ڕازی نابـن، کەواتە کێـشەکە هەر کۆتاٌـی نەهاتووە. کەواتە 
  کە بەرەو پێـشەوە بـڕۆٌن، نەن بگەڕێٌنەوە بۆ دواوە بۆ خوێـن ڕشـتن.  عەلـڵ ولوژٌن داوامان لـێ دەکات
 
  / چەمکـی ئومەت لە کوێـی ئەم بازنانە: نەتەوە، ئٌمـان، مـرۆڤاٌەتی ٌەن دەگـرێتەوە؟ ٦پ
و/ ئێمە پێمـان واٌە کە ئەوانە هٌچـٌان (تعارض)ٌان نٌە لەگەڵ ٌەن، کاتێـن کە تۆ خوا لە شـوێنـێکی جوگـرافی 
ارٌکـراودا درووسـتی کـردوٌت کە ناوی کوردسـتانە وبە کوردی لـسە ئەکەٌن ئێمە کوردٌنم ئەمە بازنەی دٌ
نەتەوەٌـٌە. بازنەٌەکـی تـر بازنەی ئٌمانٌە کە لەگەڵ گەلانـی تـری موسـڵماندا بازنەی دنٌـای ئٌـسلام پێـن دێنێـت. 
ـرۆڤاٌەتی. وە ئەم بازنانەش ڕێکـر نٌن لە ٌەکـتر. لە ئەنجـا لە بازنە مـرۆٌٌەکە، ئێمە هەموو هاوبەشـٌن لە م
ئٌـسلامٌـشدا هەر کەس لە بازنەی خۆی مافەکان وئەرکەکانٌـشی دٌاری کـردووە بۆی. لە بەر ئەوە ئاٌنـی ئٌـسلام 
لە بازنەی نەتەوەٌـی مافـی تەواوی داوە بە نەتەوەکان، وە لە بازنەی بـراٌەتی دٌندارٌش ماؾ وئەرکـی دٌاری 
ـردووە، بە هەمان شـێوەش لە بازنەی مـرۆڤاٌەتی کۆمەڵێـن ئەرکـی تـری دٌاری کـردووە بۆ موسـڵمان کە ک
هەٌەتی بەرانبەر بە مرۆڤەکان. کەواتە لە ڕووانگەی ئٌـسلامەو ئەرن ومافەکان دٌاری کـراون بۆ هەرٌەن لەو 
 بازنانە. 
 
مای (ولاء وبـراء) مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ مـرۆڤەکان، بە / هەندی کەس پێـی واٌە کە ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکان لەسەر بنە٧پ
واتاٌەن موسـڵمانێـکی خـراپٌـان لە هاوڵاتٌەکـی ؼەٌـرە موسـڵمانی باش پـێ باشـترە. ڕای ئێـوە لەم بارەوە 
 چـۆنە؟ 
کی و/ ئەو کەسە موسـڵمانە کە پابەند نٌە بە بەها مـرۆٌەکان بۆ نموونە ڕاسـت گۆٌـی، لە بەرانبەردا کەسـێ
ناموسڵمـان کە ڕاسـت گۆٌە با موسـڵمانٌـش نەبێت ئەگەر بـڕٌار بێت کە لەگەڵ کامٌـان کاربکەٌت ٌان هاوەڵـی 
ٌان شەراکەت، من پێم واٌە دەبێت لەگەڵ نا موسڵمانە ڕاستگۆکە بٌکەٌت نەن موسڵمانە ناڕاستگۆکە. کەواتە هەر 
ناموسڵمانێـن لە کاتێـکدا کە نا موسڵمانەکە لەو بەهاٌە لە لەبەر ئەوەی کە ئەو کەسە موسڵمانە پێم باشـتر بێت لە 
موسڵمانەکە باشـترە ڕەوا نٌە من هەر موسڵمانەکەم پێ باشـتر بێت. ئەنجـا دٌارە بابەتێـکی تـرٌـش هەٌە کە 
ئەوەٌش ئەوٌە ئەو موسڵمانەش کە لە بازنەی ئٌـسلامەتٌدا بـرامە دەبێت ڕێـز بگـرم وئامۆأگاری بکەم بۆ 
تهەڵگـرتن لەو شتە خـراپەی. وە ئٌـسلامٌـش هەموو مافێـکی دۆسـتاٌەتی وهاوڕێـٌەتی وبەٌەکەوە ژٌانـی دەسـ
دٌاری کـردووە لە نێـوان موسڵمانێـن وؼەٌـرە موسڵمان لەسەر بنەمای بەها مـرۆٌەکان. وە بەها مـرۆٌەکانـی 
ەهانە، بەهای مـرۆٌـٌن، وە لو هەمان کاتدا وەکو ڕاسـتگۆٌـی ووەفاداری وهاوکاری کـردنـی ٌەکـتر هەموو ئەو ب
بەها ئٌـسلامٌـشن. وە هەر مـرۆڤێـن ئەو بەهاٌانەی تێدا بێت تۆ دەتوانٌت هاوڕێٌەتی بکەٌت، وە لەگەڵٌـشی 
 بـژٌٌت، تەنانەت (تفضـٌل)ٌـشی بدەٌت بە سەر کەسـێکی موسـڵمانـی دوور لەو بەهانە. 
 
تٌزەکـردنـی چۆنە؟ ئاٌا ئێـوە وەکو ٌاسـا لە شەرٌعەت تێگەشـتوون ٌان / تێگەٌـشتنـتان بۆ شەرٌعەت وپـراکـ٨پ
 وەکو چـێ؟ 
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و/ ئێمە بەگـشتی وا تێدەگەٌن کە لە ئٌـسلامدا کاتێـن کە باس لە تەشـرٌع وبەڕێوەبـردنـی ووڵات وسـٌاسەت 
ٌەن. بۆ نمـوونە دەکەٌن، شەرٌعەت مەبەسـت لە (ممصد)ەکانە نەن جێـبەجێـکـردنـی جۆرە فٌمهێـن ٌان ٌاسا
کاتێـن کە ئٌـسلام داوا دەکات لە حوکمـدا دادگەری جێـبەجـێ بکـرێت، لورئان وسونەت داوا دەکەن لە موسـڵمان 
کە کاتێـن حوکم دەکات دادگەری جێـبەجێ بکات. کەواتە (تحمٌك)کـردنـی دادگەری (ممصد)ی ئٌـسلامە. بەڵام 
هێـشتووە بـۆ عەلڵـی مـرۆڤەکان خۆٌان. ئەوەی کە ئٌـسلام چـۆنـی (تحمٌك) دەکات ئەمە ووردکارٌە جـێی 
مەبەسـتێتی (تحمٌك)ی دادگەرٌە لە حوکمـدا. ئٌـتر چۆن ئەم دادگەرٌە ئەنجام دەدات ماوەتەوە بۆ عەلڵـی 
ئٌـنسانەکان ومٌکانـٌزمەکانٌـان لەم پێـناوە. لەوانەٌە لە کاتـی پێؽەمبەر وخەلٌفە ڕاشـدٌنەکان بە جۆرێـن 
کانـٌزمێـن بـووبێت، بەڵام ئێـستا بە جۆرێکـی تـر ومٌکانـٌزمێـکی تــرە. ئەو کاتە وا پێـوٌـستی کـردووە، وبەمٌ
وە ئێـستاش وا پێـوٌـست دەکات. کەواتە گـرنگ دادگەرٌە، ئەگٌـنا بە دڵنـٌاٌٌەوە کات وشـوێـن ومٌکانـٌزم 
چونکە بە ناوێکـی ئٌـسلامٌـشەوە دادگەری دابٌن بەردەوام دەگۆڕێت. وە ئەم شتە پەٌوەندی بە ناوٌـشەوە نٌە، 
نەبوو ئەوا ئٌـسلام پێـی ڕازی نٌە، بەڵام مادام دادگەری (تحمٌك) بـبـێت با ناوی حکـومەتەکەش هەر شـتێـکی 
تـرٌـش بێت ئەوا حوکمێـکی ئٌـسلامٌە. ئەم مٌکانـٌزمەش بە جێهێـڵدراوە بۆ مٌکانـٌزم کات وشـوێـن وعەلڵـی 
ـرنگ ئەوەٌە کە دادگەری جێـبەجـێ بکـرێت. بـۆ نموونە ئێـستا لە ڕۆژئاوا ڕێـزگـرتنـی کات، مرۆڤەکان گ
چەمکـی هاوڵاتـی بـوون، نە بـوونـی ڕەشوە، ٌەکـسانـی ئەمانە هەموو لە (مماصد الـشرٌعة)ن وڕۆحـی 
  مـٌن.ئٌـسلامەتٌن، ئەمە با ناوٌـشی سـٌستەمێـکی ئٌـسلامٌـش نەبێت بەڵام (مماصد)ی ئٌـسلا
 
  / چـۆن لە دٌموکـراسـی تێدەگەن، وە چۆنٌـش بەرجەسـتەی دەکەن؟ ٩پ
و/ من پێم واٌە کە دٌموکـراسـی گونجـاوتـرٌن مٌکانـٌزمـی بەشـدارٌە لە دەسەڵات وئاڵوگۆڕی دەسەڵاتە کە 
عەلڵـی بەشەری پێـی گەٌـشتبێت تا ئێـستا. چونکە ئەگەر سەٌـری حوکم وحوکمـڕانـی بکەٌت لە مێـژووی 
وکمـداری پـێ بەڕێوەبەرن. وە ئەوەی مـرۆڤاٌەتـی دا کۆمەڵێـن شـێواز هەبـووە بۆ ئەوەی مـرۆڤەکان حوکم وح
کە مـرۆڤاٌەتی لەم دوو سەد سـاڵەی دوواٌـی پێـی گەشـتووە بۆ بەشـداری لە دەسەڵات وئاڵوگۆڕی دەسەڵات کە 
دٌموکـراسٌە لە هەمووٌان باشـترە. وە هەتا مـرۆڤ وڕێکخـستنی ژٌانـی سـٌاسـی وحوکمـڕانـی هەبێت، دەبێـت 
چون ئەمەش ڕێکدەخـرێت ئەوە ئەو مٌکانـٌزمەٌە کە مـرۆڤەکان بە عەلـڵ پێـی  حوکمـڕانـی ئٌدارە هەبێت.
گەشـتوون، لەبەر ئەوە کە دٌموکـراسـی باشـترٌن بەرهەمی عەلڵـی مـرۆڤە لەم بوارە کە بۆ بەشـداری سـٌاسـی 
ی وئامادەش وئاڵوگۆڕی دەسەڵاتە باشـترە لەو هەموو سـٌـستەمانە کە ڕێگەٌان نەداوە بە بەشـداری سـٌاسـ
نەبـوون بە هٌـچ شـێوەٌەن دەسـتبەرداری دەسەڵات بن با ناوٌان سوڵتـانی موسڵمانانٌـش بووبێت. لەبەر ئەوە من 
(ٌمٌن)م هەٌە کە کاتێـن ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان لە ڕێگای سندولەکانـی دەسەڵاتەوە بگاتە دەسەڵات، 
ٌتوانـی بەڵێـنەکانـی کە داوێـتی بە جەماوەر ٌان ئاواتەکانـی جەماوەر وە لە هەڵـبژاردنـی داهاتـوو کاتێـن کە نە
ناهێـنێـتە دی وجەماوەرٌـش متمانەی پـێ نەداوە و، داگـرت لە کورسـی دەسەڵات، وە بەهەمان شـێوەی چونە 
 سەر دەسەڵات بە دەنگـی هاوڵاتٌـان دەسەڵاتٌـش جـێ دێڵێـت ودەٌداتە دەست لاٌەنـی بـراوە. 
  امەڵەتان لەگەڵ کەماٌەتٌە ئاٌنٌەکان چۆن دەبێت؟ / م١٠پ
و/ ئێمە لە ٌەکگـرتوو، وە لە تێگەٌـشتنمان بۆ ئٌـسلام کە ڕێـزی دانٌـاوە بۆ هەموو زمانێـن، وە بۆ هەموو 
نەتەوەٌەن وە ئاٌنـێن ئـٌتر با ئەو نەتەوە ٌان ئاٌنە هەرچەندێـن بـن زۆر کەم ٌان زۆر زۆر هەمان مافٌـان هەٌە. 
بۆ خاوەن ئاٌنەکان بە ئاشـکرا باس لە ڕێـزگـرتنٌـان ومافەکانٌـان کـراوە لە لورئان وسونەت دا. تەنانەت بۆ وە 
کەسـێکی مولحدٌـش لەسەر بنەمای (لا اکـراە فـً الدٌن) ئازادی خۆی هەٌە وسەربەسـتە. ئەمـڕوش باس لە 
گای دادگەری بـۆ پاراسـتی مافـی سەرجەم جێـبەجـێ کـردنـی دادگەرٌە لە جـێبەجـێ کـردنـی ٌاسـا، وە دەز
هاوڵاتٌـانە بە سەرجەم ئاٌن وبـٌروباوەڕەکانٌـانەوە. وە مێـژووی ئٌـسلامٌـش پـڕە لە نموونەی چۆنێـتی 






 hn hAad df th  Am 'h sn A  Am, Muth nMnAmin htiw weivretnI :01 xidneppA
  au''h
 د. مـثنی أمـین ئەندامـی سەرکـردایەتی یەکگـرتووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان
 
پاش باسـکـردنـی بابەتی توێـژٌنەوەکە، جەنابٌـان بە باشـٌان زانـی پێـشەکٌەن پێـشکەش بفەرموون، ئەنجا 
 وەڵامـی پـرسـٌارەکان بدەنەوە. 
ەچێتەوە سەر ٌەکێـن لە هەرە سەرەکٌـترٌن (ازدواجٌة)ێن دەربارەی دوو چەمن کە لە ئەم توێـژٌنەوەی تۆ ئ
ووڵاتانـی ئٌـسلامـٌی کاری لەسەر ئەکـرێت. کە ٌەکێـکٌان بـرٌتٌە لە چەمکـی دەعوە، کە ئەوە ئامانجی ئٌسلامە 
سلامٌەکانە وەکو ئەرکٌـٌان وەکو ئاٌن. چەمکی دووەمٌـش برٌتٌە لە کاری سـٌاسی، کە ئەوە ئامانجی بزوتنەوە ئٌـ
بەرانبەر بە کۆمەڵگا ودەوڵەتە ئٌـسلامٌەکان. ئەم دوو ئەرکە لە کۆمەڵێـن ئاسـتدا بەرجەسـتە دەبێتەوە. سەرەتا کە 
ئەم بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامٌـٌانە درووسـت بـوون ڕەهەندی بانگەواز لە سەرٌان زاڵ بـوو. وە پەروەردەکـردنەوەی 
وسـڵمان بەرەو بەهاکانی ئٌسلام لە سەری زاڵ بـوو. بەڵام لە هەمان کاتدا جارێکـی تـری کۆمەڵگای م
تاٌبەتمەندێتی ئەم بزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌانەی وەکو ئٌخوان موسلمٌن وەکو نموونەٌەکی ئاشـکرا وگەورە تاٌبەتمەندێتی 
تنەوەی ئٌسلامی ئەو لە کاری بانگەوازدا ئەوە بوو بانگەواز وکاری سـٌاسی بەٌەکەوە گـرێ دابوو. ئێمە بزو
ترمان هەٌە وەکو نوور هەر لە سەرەتاوە لەسەر ئەوە بٌـنا کـرابوو بە حوکمـی ئەو ژٌنگەٌەی کە تـێدا 
پەٌدابووبوو خۆی بپـارێـزێت لە هەر کار وچالاکٌەکـی سـٌاسی. بـزوتنەوەی ترٌـشمان هەٌە ئەو بزوتنەوانەی کە 
ی تـر کە شـێوازی سۆفٌـٌان وەرگـرتـووە. ئەمانە لە پێـش شـێوازی سەلەفٌـٌان وەرگرتووە، وە بـزوتنەوٌەکـ
ئٌخوانٌـشەوە بـوون وئێـستاش هەر هەن. وە تا ئێـستاش ئاراسـتەی زۆربەٌان بەرەو دوورکەوتنەوەٌە لە چالاکی 
 سـٌاسی، وە کاردکـرنە لە سەر زانـستە ئٌـسلامٌەکان وبانگەواز بۆ ئٌـسلام، ڕاستکردنەوەی ئەخلاق. 
ندی بـزوتنەوە ئٌخوانٌەکان وئەوانەش کە هاوشـێوە ئەوانە ئەوەٌە هەر لە سەرەتاوە چالاکـی سٌاسی تاٌبەتمە
وبٌرکـردنەوە لە فەزای سـٌاسی ولێکۆڵٌنەوە لە فەزای سـٌاسی، وە کارکـردن بۆ ئٌصلاحی ئەو فەزا سـٌاسٌە 
ڵێم جٌاوازی نێوان بزوتنەوە بەشـێکی سەرەکی بوو لە ئامانجی ئەو بزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌانە. من لێرەوە دە
ئٌخوانٌەکان ئەوە بوو ئەمانە هەر لە سەرەتاوە پلانٌـان هەبوو بۆ ئەوەی کە ئٌسلام لە بواری سٌاسی دا 
بەرجەستە بکەن، وە ئٌصلاحـێکی سـٌاسی درووست بکەن. چونکە سەرەتا ڕووخانـی خٌلافەت بوو بە شۆن 
ەٌە درووست بکات. ئەمەش لە ڕووی تٌۆرٌدا لە فٌکری وسەدمەٌەن وای کرد کە حسن بەننـا ئەم بزوتنەو
ئٌخوان موسلمٌن دا لەوەوە سەرچاوە دەگـرێت کە ئٌسلام ئاٌنێـکی گـشت گـٌرە وشـاملە. وە مادام ئاٌنێـکی 
گـشتگٌر وشاملە، وە ئەگەر دەتەوێت ئٌسلام وەکو خۆی خـزمەت بکەٌت، دەبێت بەو گـشتگٌری وشمولٌەتە 
ر ئٌسلام سـٌستمێن بێت بۆ عٌبادەت وپەرستن، ئەوا تەشـرٌعێـکٌشە واتا ٌاساٌەکە بۆ خزمەتی بکەٌت. ئەگە
دەوڵەت. ئٌسلام لە دٌدگای ئٌخوان موسلمٌنەوە وەکو ئٌمام بەننا لە (أصول العـشرٌن)دا باسی دەکات ئٌسلام 
ٌە، شارسـتانٌەتە، سٌستمێکی شاملە بۆ هەموو بوارەکانی ژٌانی مرۆڤ. هەر وەکو چۆن فٌکرە، هەروەها دەعوە
ئومەتە، دەوڵەتە، (جٌش)ە، هێـزە، هەموو شتێکە. ئٌـسلام هەر وەکو چۆن سـٌـستمێکە بۆ بٌرو باوەڕ، هەروەها 
سٌستمێکە بۆ پەرسـتش، وە بۆ حوکمـڕانی ودەسەڵات وبەڕێوەبـردنـی کۆمەڵگا. ئەمە تێگەٌـشتنی تاٌبەتی ئٌخوان 
ەکاتەوە لە بـزوتنەوە سۆفی وسەلەفی ونووری وڕەوتەکانـی تـر. هەر موسلمٌنە، وە ئەمە ئٌخوان موسلمٌن جٌاد
بۆٌە ئٌخوان موسلمٌن هەر لە سەرەتاوە بە ئەرکی خۆٌان زانی بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌی گـشتگٌر دروسـت 
بکەن، هەر وەکو چۆن تێگەٌـشتنٌان بۆ ئٌسلام گـشتگٌرە. بەڵام دوای ماوەٌەن کە ڕێگا نە دەدرا بـزوتنەوە 
سلامٌەکان خەباتی سـٌاسی بکەن، لەبەر ئەو ستەم وپەراوێـز خـستنانە، سەٌرت دەکـرد کە بزوتنەوە ئٌـ
ئٌسلامٌەکە هەر خۆٌەتی حـٌزبێـکی سٌاسی درووسـت نەکـردوە. ئەگەر بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌی لە گۆمەڵگای 
ی بە درووسـتکـردنـی خۆی بٌەوێت کارٌگەر بێت و، پرۆژەی هەبێت بۆ ئٌصلاحی کۆمەڵگای خۆی پێوٌـست
 حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسٌە. ئەنجا ئەم حـٌزبە سـٌاسٌە ڕۆڵێـن ئەبٌنێت ؼەٌـری ڕۆڵـی بـزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌەکە.
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هەندێـن حـٌزبی سـٌاسٌش لە کۆتاٌی سەدەی بٌست لە دەوڵەتانـی ئٌـسلامـێێ درووست بوون، ئەم حـٌزبە 
ـوو، لە بەر ئەوە پێکهـاتەو بـٌرو بۆچوون وتاکتٌـن سـٌاسـٌانەش تەنهـا ئامانجی سـٌاسـٌٌان لە خۆ گـترب
وسـتراتٌژٌٌەتٌـان وەن بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامٌٌەکان نەبوو. چونکە ئەمان باسـٌان لە کاری پەروەردەو وبانگەواز 
نەدەکـرد، وە کارٌان لەسەر زٌندوکـردنەوەی خٌلافەی ئٌسلامٌی نەدەکـرد. باسـٌان لەوە دەکـرد کە بە 
ئٌـسلامـٌی دەٌانەوێت ئٌصلاحێـکی سـٌاسی لە ناو کۆمەڵگای خۆٌان درووست بکەن. ئەمەش  مەرجعٌەتێـکی
وای کـرد کە ئٌـتر باس لە دوو چەمن ودوو سـتراکچەر بکـرێت کە ئەوٌـش بەرنامەی حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی 
ندی نێـوان ئەو وبزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌٌن. هەروەها باس لە پەٌوەندی نێوان، ٌان چۆنێـتی ڕێکخـستنی پەٌوە
شـتانەی کە دەعەوٌن وە ئەو شـتانەی کە سـٌاسـٌن هاتە ئاراوە. ئەمەش ىوو بە ٌەکێـن لەو بابەتەت 
وتوێـژٌنەوانەی کە بـزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌەکان وحٌزبە سٌاسٌەکان کەوتنە باسکـردنـی. ئاٌا کاری بانگەواز 
لام دەکـرێت لەگەڵ کاری سـٌاسـٌدا؟ ئاٌا دەکـرێت وزٌندوکـردنەوەی بەها وڕەوشـتە ئٌسلامٌەکان وژٌانەوەی ئٌس
شتە جٌهانـی ونێوخۆٌەکان تێکەڵ بکـرێن بە ٌەکـتری؟ ئاٌا دەکـرێت ئەو بەرنامەٌەی کە بۆ پەروەردەی تان 
دادەنرێت تێکەن بکـرێت بەو بەرنامە سـٌاسٌٌەی کە بۆ گـرتنەدەسـتی دەسەڵاتە؟ ئاٌا کـێبەرکـێی سـٌاسـی ڕلێـن 
اکات لەو حـٌزبە سٌاسٌە لە لاٌەن ئەندامانـی حـٌزبەکانـی ترەوە؟ کاتێـکٌش ڕلێـن درووسـت بوو لە درووسـت ن
حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی، ئاٌا ئٌـتر ئەو حـٌزبە (أهلٌة)ی ئەمێـنێت بۆ ئەوەی بانگەوازی خەڵک بکات بۆ 
ٌاسٌە ئٌتر ئامادە نٌن گوێ بگـرن لە باری پەروەردەٌی؟ چونکە ئەو خەڵکە کە دەبنە نەٌاری ئەو حـٌزبە سـ
ئامۆژگارٌەکانی. لـێرەوە والعـێن درووست بوو کە دوای ئامانجەکانی بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌی ئامانجێـکی 
گـشتگٌرن، وە لە سەروو نەتەوەٌٌن، وە ئامانجی حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـٌش دەبێت پـڕاوپـڕ باسـی ژٌنگەی لۆکاڵـی 
باسی ئەو بەرژەوەندٌانە بکات کە هەندێن جار دژ بە بەرژەوەندی هەندێ  خۆی بکات، وە تەنانەت دەبێت
ووڵاتی تـری ئٌـسلامـٌٌن. وە لێرەدا دەبێت بەرژەوەندی ناوخۆٌـی بخاتە سەروی بەرژەوەندی ئومەت 
وبەرژەوەندی گەورەتر. لـێرەدا ئەم پرسٌارانە کە درووست بوو، وە جۆری هەڵوێـست گـرتن لەم کێـشەٌە کە 
ەٌەکی ڕاسـتەلٌنەٌە و، کێـشەٌەکی شەکڵـی نٌە. ئەمەش وای کـرد کە ئەم کە چەند مۆدێلـێن لە کاری کێـش
 ئٌـسلامـٌی بێتە ئاراوە:
ٌەکێـن لەو مۆدێلانە ئەوەٌە کە بـزوتنەوە وحـٌزب بەٌەکەوە. لە ٌەن سـتراکچەر، وە بە ٌەن ناو وٌەن بەرنامە.  -
ی سٌاسی دەکات، خۆی لە هەمان کاتدا کاری دەعوە وپەروەردەش بەڵام ئەم بـزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌە خۆی کار
دەکات. وەکو ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌسلامٌی کوردستان، (حرکة العدل والاحـسان) لە مەؼرب، (حرکة المجتمع الـسلم) 
لە جەزائٌر، (الجماعة الاسلامٌة) لە پاکـستان، وبزوتنەوەی حەماس لە فەلەسـتٌن. ئەمانە هەموو کاری دەعەوی 
اری سـٌاسٌش دەخەنە ژێـر ڕکێفی ٌەن سەرکرداٌەتی وٌەن پرۆگرام، بەڵام کارەکان لەناو خۆٌاندا دابەش وک
دەکەن. مەکتەبێـن بۆ پەروەردە وبانگەواز، وە دامەزراوەی دەعەوی درووست دەکەن بۆ کاری دەعوە. وە 
کە حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی دامەزراوەی سٌاسٌش درووست دەکەن بۆ کاری سـٌاسی، بەڵام ناٌگەٌەننە ئەوەی 
درووست بکەن، هەر خۆٌان ڕۆڵـی سـٌاسٌش ئەبٌنن و، لە هەمان کاتٌـشدا ڕۆڵـی بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌـش 
   .ئەبٌنن
مۆدێلێـکی تـر ئەوەٌە کە لە خۆٌدا دوو جۆرە، جۆرێکٌان ئەوەٌە کە بزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌەکە حٌزبە سـٌاسٌەکە  -
کەی ترٌان حٌزبە سٌاسٌەکە کۆنترۆڵ کـراوە لەلاٌەن بزوتنەوە ئازاد دەکات بۆ کاری سـٌاسی. جۆرە
ئٌسلامٌەکەوە. جۆری ٌەکەمی ئەم مۆدێلە وەکو ئٌخوان موسلمٌن لە عێراق کە حـٌزبی ئٌسلامـٌی عێرالٌان 
درووست کـرد، وەکو ئٌخوان موسلمٌن لە ئوردن کە (حـزب جبهة العمل الاسلامً)ٌان درووست کـرد، وە لە 
ان موسلمٌن (حـزب الحـرٌة والعدالـة)ٌان درووست کرد. هەروەها (حرکة التوحٌد والاصلاح) لە مٌـسر ئٌخو
مەؼـرب کە (حزب العدالة والتنمٌة)ٌـی درووسـت کـردووە، کە ئێـستا حکومەتە لە مەؼرب. بەڵام ئێـستا (حـرکة 
بانگەوازکـردن ئٌـشی بزوتنەوەکەٌە التوحٌد والاصلاح) کۆنترۆڵـی (حزب العدالة والتنمٌة)ناکات. لێرەدا ئٌشی 
و، ئٌـشی سـٌاسـٌش ئٌـشی حزبەکەٌە، مونافەسە داکات لەسەر دەسەڵات وهەوڵ دەدات کورسـی پەرلەمان بە 
دەست بهێـنێت وحکومەت پێـن بهـێنێت، وە دانانی پرۆژەی سـٌاسٌە بۆ گەشە پێدان بەو ووڵاتە. ئەمەش 
رە دەکات، ناگەڕێتەوە بۆ بزوتنەوەکە بڵێت چـی بکەٌن. کەواتە بە سەرکرداٌەتی حٌزبە سٌاسٌەکە خۆی ئەم کا
تەواوەتی سەربەخۆٌە. بەڵام بەڵێـنامەٌەن هەٌە لە نێـوانٌـاندا کە ئەوٌـش ٌەکگـرتنەوەٌە لە ٌەن سـتراتٌژٌەتی 
ی گـشتی دا. بۆ نموونە دەٌانەوێت ووڵات وبەڕێوەبـردن وگەشەکـردنـی بە شێوەٌەن بێت، ئٌتر ئەوە کار
ئەنجا هەندێـن لە سەرکـرداٌەتٌەکانی بزوتنەوەکە ئەم حـٌزبە دەبەن   .حـٌزبەکەٌە کە چۆن ووردکاری بۆ دەکات
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بەڕێوە. بەڵام سەرکـرداٌەتی حـٌزبەکە ئێـستا (متفرغ)ە بۆ ئەم حـٌزبە. جۆرەکەی تـر لەم مۆدٌلە کە حـٌزبە 
             . ناتوانێت بە تەنهـا بـڕٌار بداتسـٌاسٌەکە سەربەخۆ نٌە بە تاٌبەت لە پرسە گرنگەکاندا 
جۆرێـکی تـر لە حـٌزبی ئٌسلامی هەٌە بـێ بوونی هٌچ باکگـراوندێکی بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامـی، بە واتاٌەن کە  -
بزوتنەوەٌەن هەبووبێت ودرووستی کـردبێـت ٌان لـێی جٌابووبێتەوە، ئەمەش وەکو حـٌزبی ڕەفاە لە تورکٌـا، وە 
  ـٌزبـی داد وگەشەپێدان. ئێـستاش ح
وە لە بنەڕەتدا بۆ جۆری ٌەکەم لە نموونەی ٌەکگـرتوو وجەماعەی ئٌسلامی و(حـرکة العدل والاحـسان) ٌش 
شـوناسـٌان بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌـسلامٌە دەٌانەوێت بە گـشت گٌری خزمەت بە کۆمەڵگاکەٌان بکەن. وە لە نێوان 
سٌاسٌش ببوژێـننەوە، چونکە بەلاٌانەوە بەشـێکی گـرنگی  خـزمەت کـردنی کۆمەڵگادا وٌـستووٌانە پرسی
خزمەتکـردنـی کۆمەڵگا برٌتٌە لە پرسی سٌاسی. جا ئەمانەش تا ڕادەٌەن جٌاوازی هەٌە لە نێوانٌاندا، بۆ نموونە 
کە سەٌری ٌەکگـرتوو دەکەٌت دەبٌنٌت ووٌـستوٌەتی (توازن) بپـارێـزێت لە نێـوان ئەوەی سـٌاسٌە وە ئەوەی 
عەوی وئٌـسلامٌە. بەڵام لەبەر دۆخـی سـٌاسی تاٌبەتی کوردسـتان وای لـێ کـردووە زۆر نزٌن بووەتەوە لە دە
حـزبێـکی سـٌاسی. بەلام لە ڕووی مـێژووٌی وکاری بانگەوازی هەنووکەٌٌـش هەر بزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌسلامٌـشە. 
کو حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی فەلەسـتٌنی زٌاتر ئەمەش وای لـێ کـردووە کە زٌاتر لە حەماس بچـێت لەم بوارە کە وە
دەردەکەوێت لەوەی کە بزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی بێت. ئەمەش لەبەر زۆری گرنگی هەمە سـٌاسٌەکە کە لە 
هەردوو کەٌسەکەدا مٌللەتی بێ دەوڵەتن. هەر بۆٌە ناوکانٌـشٌان هەر حـٌزبی سـٌاسٌە، بەڵام ئەوەی کە 
ەزانێت ئەمانە پێـش لەوەی حـٌزبی سـٌاسی بن بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامٌن. چونکە دەٌاننـاسـێت ولێـٌان تێـدەگات د
ئەوانەی کە لە ٌەکگـرتوو کۆبوونەتەوە بە پەروەردە ودەعوە هاتوون بۆ لای ٌەکگـرتوو. ڕێژەٌەکی کەم کە 
ە ٌەکگـرتوو. دەنگدەرانـی ٌەکگـرتوون لە دەرەنجامی هۆگـربوون بە ئەدای سـٌاسی ٌەکگرتوو دەنگەکانٌـان دەدەن
وە بە لەناعەتم من تا ئێـستاش ئەوانە زٌاتر جەماوەری ئٌسلامـٌن. ئێـستاش دەتوانم بڵێم کە ٌەکگـرتوو لە 
لۆناؼێکی ڕاگواسـتنداٌا بۆ دٌاری کـردنـی شوناسی خۆی. لەم لۆناؼی ڕاگواسـتنە ئەگەر ٌەکگرتوو توانـی ئەم 
ە نێوانٌـان بپارێـزێت، وە هەوادارانی هەردوو کارەکە ڕازی دوو جەمـسەرە بەٌەکەوە هەڵگـرێت، وە بەڵەنـس ل
بکات بەوەی کە ئەوەندە ئەدای پەروەردەٌی ودەعەوی بەهـێز بێت کە کادٌـران وهەوادارانی بزوتنەوە 
ئٌسلامٌەکە دڵنـٌا بن کە ئەم ڕەوتە جێگای خواست وئاواتەکانٌـانی تێدا جێگا دەبێتەوە، ئەوا دەمێننەوە لەو 
لە لاٌەکی ترٌش ئەوانەی کە کادری چالاکی سـٌاسٌن ئٌسلامٌی ، وە ئەو جەماوەرەشی کە دەنگدەرە  هەٌکەلە.
ئەگەر لەناعەتی بەوە کـرد کە ئەم بزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌە کە ناوی ٌەکگرتووە دەتوانێت نوێنەراٌەتٌەکی ڕاستەلٌنەی 
دەبـن ولەبوڵٌـانە هەر شوناسـێکی هەبێت بەهـێزی خواستە سـٌاسٌەکانـی ئەوان بکات، ئەوا ئەوانٌـش لـێی ڕازی 
 مادام ئەوەی کە ئەرکـی سـٌاسٌە بە باشی پێـی هەڵدەسـتن. 
لـێرەدا دوو جۆر ڕکابەر ودوو ڕسـکٌـش لەبەردەم ٌەکگـرتوو داٌا، مۆدێلـێکی ئٌـسلامـٌی بوون کە بەردەوام 
گۆڕانٌـش هەٌە کە بەردەوام بەرەو بەرەو ئٌسلامـٌی بوون وبەرەو بزوتنەوە بوون ڕای دەکێـشێت. مۆدێلـی 
سـٌاسـی بوون ڕای دەکێـشێت. کەواتە ئەم دوو تەحەدٌە لەبەردەم ٌەکگـرتوو داٌا. لـێرەدا چارەسەر ئەگەر 
ٌەکگـرتوو بـڕٌاری دا کە حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی درووسـت بکات و، خۆی وەکو بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامـٌی 
ڕەنگە ئەو ئەزموونە سەرکەوتوو بێت. چونکە ئەو کاتە هەموو ئەو  بمێنێـتەوە بۆ کاری پەروەردەٌـی دەعەوەی
کادرە دەعەوٌە سەرکەوتووانە پـشتٌوانٌەکانٌـان بۆ ئەو حـٌزبە دەبێت کە درووسـت دەبێت. بەڵام ئەمەش گـرفـتی 
% ١١٠تـر دواتـر درووسـت دەکات وەکو بۆ مۆدێلە هاوشـێوەکان درووست بووە. هەر ٌەکەش لەم مۆدێلانە 
ڕاست ودرووست نٌە. پێـشٌنەی مێژووٌی وجوگـرافٌـا وکێـشە نەتەوەٌـی هەموو ئەمانە گارٌگەرٌٌـان هەٌە 
لەسەر هەڵـبژاردنـی جۆری مۆدێلەکە. ئەنجـا هەبوونـی توانا بۆ بەڕێوەبـردنی دوو کاری سـٌاسی ودەعەوی 
دٌـری شارەزاو چالان بۆ هەردوو بوارەکە لەٌەن کاتدا بە (کفائة)ێـکی تەواو تەحەدٌەکـی تـرە. ئاٌا ئەوەندە کا
هەٌە بە سەرکەوتووٌی کارەکان بە ڕێوە بەرن؟ ئاٌا گەر سەر کەوتووش بێت، ئاٌا دواتـر کـێبەرکـێ ومونافەسە 
لە نێوانٌـاندا درووسـت نابێت؟ ئاٌا ئەم حـٌزبە سـٌاسٌە هەمٌـشە دەتوانێت ئەو پێوەرانە بپارێـزێت کە وەلائی ئەم 
وٌە مسۆگەر بکات بۆخۆی؟ وە ئەم کوتلە دەعەوٌە کە لە کاری سـٌاسی دوورکەوتنەوە نابنەوە بە کوتلە دەعە
هاوشـێوە بزوتنەوەٌەکی سۆفـی، وە دوورکەوتـوو لە دنٌـا وکاری سـٌاسی؟ ئاٌا دەتوانێـت وەکو گـروپێـکی فـشار 
ەرجەدا جٌـابکـرێنەوە؟ بەڵام لەناعەتی سـٌاسەت بکات؟ وە لەناعەتی تاٌبەتی من لەگەڵ ئەوەدا نٌە کە لەم هەل وم
من واٌە کە سـٌاسەت کـردن بەو تاکتـٌن و ووردکارٌەی کە پێـوٌـستی پێـٌەتی، بەو (صـراع) وکێـبەرکـێٌەی کە 
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پێـوٌـستی پێـٌەتی، بەو پـسپۆڕبـوون لە پێـشکەش کـردنـی پـرۆژە وخـزمەتکـردنـی ڕاستەوخۆ کۆمەڵگا ئەمە 
ای خزمەتکـردن بە بواری پەروەردە وزانـستی شەرعـی وزٌندوکـردنەوەی ئٌـسلام لەناو کاٌەٌەکە ؼەٌـری دنٌـ
کۆمەڵگا وهٌداٌەتدانـی خەڵـن وئٌصلاحـی ئەخلالی خەڵن وکۆمەڵگا. کەواتە ئەمە دوو فەزای جٌـاوازن، 
ە ئەو کەسەش بڵـێت هەرکەسـێن بڵێـت ئەم دوو فەزاٌە ٌەن فەزان بە ڕەهاٌـی، ئەوە وا دەزانم تێـنەگەٌـشتووە. و
بە ڕەهاٌـی ئەم دوو شتە دوو شـتی جٌاوازن وتێکەڵ نابنەوە بە ٌەکـتری، بەواتا سـٌاسەت شـتێکە وکاری 
ئٌـسلامـٌی پەروەردەٌـی شـتێـکی تـر ئەوٌـش من وا دەزانم هەر تێـنەگەٌـشتووە. لەبەر ئەوە من دەڵـێم 
ٌش درووسـت بکات خۆشـی هەر دەبێت سـٌاسەت بکات. بـزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌـسلامـٌی ئەگەر حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـ
ئەی چۆن (تنالض) درووسـت نەبێت؟ دەبێت ئەم بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامـٌە سـٌاسەت بکات وەکو گـروپـی فـشار، 
 وەکو لۆبـی. بەڵام حـٌزبە سـٌاسٌەکە سـٌاسەت دەکات وەکو حـٌزبـی سـٌاسـی. 
  ەٌە بۆ مومارەسەکـردنـی سـٌاسەت:ئێمە لە زانـستە سـٌاسٌەکان چوار کەناڵمـان ه
کەناڵـی ٌەکەم کەناڵـی تاکە کەسـٌە، لە ڕێگای بەشـداری کـردن لە ڕای      
گـشتی، وەکو ووتار بـێژێـن لەسەر مـٌنبەر، وەکو پێـشکەش کاری بەرنامەٌەن لە تەلەفـزٌۆن، وەکو 
   نـی فەزای گـشتی.نووسەرێـکی بەناوبانگ کە ڕاکانـی زۆر کارٌگەرن لەسەر درووسـت کـرد
کەناڵـی دووەم بـرٌتٌە لە کەناڵـی گـروپەکانـی فـشار، وەکو سەندٌکاکان،     
ڕێکخـراوە جەماوەرٌەکان، پێـشەٌٌەکان، ڕێکخـراوەکانـی کۆمەڵگای مەدەنـی، وە کاتێـن ئەمانە تۆڕێـن لە 
پٌـشەٌی بن، نە جەماوەری، بەڵام نێـوانٌـاندا درووسـت دەبێت دەبنە گـروپـی فـشار. ئەمانەش مەرج نٌە نە 
کۆمەڵێـكن بۆ ئەوەی حکومەت بخەنە ژێـر فـشار لە دٌارٌکـردنـی ىـڕٌارێکـی دٌاری کـراو. من پێم واٌە 
بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامـٌەکان لەسەر ئەم ئاسـتە مومارەسەی سـٌاسەت بکەن. وە ئەگەر ئەمە نەکەن وبە تەواوەتی 
کەناڵـی سـێهەم حـٌزبی   ڵـێن ئاٌن شـتێـکەو سـٌاسەت شـتێـکی تـر. وازٌان هێـنا لە سـٌاسەت، واتە ئە
% سـٌاسـٌە بۆ گـرتنە دەسـتی دەسەڵاتە. حـٌزب بە شـێوەی تٌم ١١٠سـٌاسـٌە، وە ئامانجـی حـٌزبی سـٌاسـٌش 
کارەدەکات وە ڕێکخـستنێـکی سـٌاسی درووسـت دەکات وهەوڵ دەدات بۆ ئەوەی بگات بە دەسەڵات. کەناڵـی 
چوارەم کەناڵـی حکومەتە، هەر کەسـێن کە وەزٌـر ٌان پەرلەمانتار، پارێـزگار بـوو ئٌـتر ئەوە کەسـێـکی 
 سـٌاسـٌە. 
لە بەر ئەوە تۆ دەتوانٌت سـٌاسەت بکەٌت وەکو حکومەت کە لە دەسەڵاتدا بٌت، وەکو حـٌزبـی سـٌاسی، وەکو 
ای گـشتی. لە درووسـتکـردنـی ڕای گـشتٌدا، وە لە گـروپـی فـشار، وە وەکو تاکە کەس بۆ درووسـتکـردنـی ڕ
درووسـتکـردنـی گروپـی فـشار بـزوتنەوەی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەتوانێت سـٌاسەت بکات بە چالاکی. کە هاتە سەر 
ئەوەی وەکو حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی بٌکات، دەتوانێت ئەم کارە بـسپێـرێت بە دەزگاٌەکی سەربەخۆ. وە کاتێـکٌـش کە 
بەخۆش درووست دەکەن ئٌتر گوێ بە هەندێ پێـوەری ئٌـسلامـٌی نادەن بەو واتاٌەی کە لە دەزگاٌەکی سەر
کاری بانگەوازدا پێـوٌـستە، ئەوٌـش ئەوەی ئەم ئەندامە لە ڕووی ئاٌـنٌەوە چەندێـن کەسـێکی وابەسـتەو بە ئەرکە 
موسـڵمانە ٌان نا؟ چونکە حـٌزب  ئاٌنٌەکان، وەکو ئاٌا ئافـرەتێـکی داپۆشـراوە ٌان نا، نوێـژ دەکات ٌان نا،
پەٌوەندی بە پـرۆژەی سـٌاسٌەوە هەٌە. وە ئەم پێـوەرانە کە باسـکـران پێوەری بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌن نەن 
حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی. بەڵام ئێمە ئێـستا چونکە لە ناو ٌەکگـرتوو هەردوو شوناسەکە تێـکەڵە ئٌتر ناتوانٌت بە 
چونکە ٌەکگـرتوو تاکو ئێـستاش وباکگـراوندە مـێژووٌەکەشـی   . ی ئەندام وەرگـرٌتپێوەری حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاس
بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌـسلامـٌە، وە مەرجـی ئەندامێـتی مەرجـی ئەندام بـوونە لە بـزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌـسلامـٌدا. من 
ئەندامێـتی حـٌزبێـکی  لەنائەتم واٌە ئێـستا ئەگەر ٌەکگـرتوو حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـی درووسـت بکات و، بە مەرجـی
سـٌاسی ئەندام مافەکانـی پارێـزراو بێت، وە کاندٌد بکـرێت بـێ هٌـچ گـرفتـێن خەڵكـی زۆر هەٌە ئامادەن ببنە 
 ئەندامـی ئەو حـٌزبە. 
لـێرەدا مەبەسـت ئەوەٌە کاتێـن کە باس لە تەواو بـوون ٌان تەواو نەبوونی ڕۆڵـی بـزوتنەوە ئٌـسلامـٌەکان 
اسـت نٌە ئٌتر ڕۆڵٌـان تەواو بـووبێت. چونکە لە ڕووی والعـٌەوە هێـشتا ڕۆڵٌـان تەواو نەبوو کاتێـن دەکـرێت ڕ
کە سەٌری ئەرزی والع دەکەٌت. تەنانەت ئەوانەش کە ناوی حـٌزبی سـٌاسـٌٌان لە خۆٌان ناوە، هێـشتا هەر 
رجی بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌـسلامـٌە. کە کاری دەعەوی وسـٌاسـٌش پێکەوە دەکەن ومەرجـی ئەندامێـتٌـشٌان هەر مە
 زٌاتـر بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌن وکاری سـٌاسـی دەکەن، نەن حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـی وکاری دەعەوی بکەن. 
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کاتێـن کە سەٌـری ژٌاننـامەی پێؽەمبەر (د. خ) دەکەٌت ئەو کاتە هٌـچ گـرفتێـن نەبوو چونکە لەٌەڵ کاتدا ئاٌن 
شـتەکان بە ٌەکەوە کـراون بـی گـرفت. کاتێـکٌـش کە دەوڵەت درووسـت بـوو، وسـٌاسەت وسەربازی وهەموو 
ئٌتر دەوڵەتەکە هەمو بوارەکانـی ڕێکخـستووە، چونکە هٌـچ ڕکابەرێـکی نەبووە، وە دەوڵەتەکە دەوڵەتێـکی 
ن ئەم جۆرە ئٌـسلامـٌی بووە. بەڵام ئێـستا دەوڵەت شوناسـی بووتە شوناسـێکی سـێکولەر. وە گـروپێـن لە خەڵ
چالاکٌـانە ئەنجام دەدەن، ئەم گـروپەش شەرعٌەتی نوێنەراٌەتی هەموو کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمانٌـان نٌە، وە ناتوانێت 
بە ناوی هەموو کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمانەوە لـسە بکات. تەنهـا شەرعٌەتی خۆٌان وئەو ئەندامانەٌان هەٌە کە دەچـن 
ەوە لـێرە پێـوٌـست بە ئەوە دەکات کە گـروپـی جٌـاواز هەبێت، بە ناوٌانەوە ئەو چالاکٌـانە دەکەن. لەبەر ئ
پێـوٌـست بەوە دەکات هەندێ جار چالاکـی سـٌاسی جٌـابکـرێتەوە لە چالاکی پەروەردەٌـی ودەعەوی. بەڵام هٌـچ 
 مۆدٌـلێـن بـێ گـرفت نٌە. 
ەوتوو نٌن، ئەوە نموونەی وە ئەو مۆدێلانەش کە بـزوتنەوەکە حـٌزبەکە کۆنـترۆڵ دەکات بە ڕای من سەرک
حـٌزبی عـێرالی. ئێـستا حـٌزبی عـێرالی دەٌەوێت هەٌکەلێـکی سـٌاسـی جٌـا لە ئٌخوان درووسـت بکـرێت بۆ 
ئەوەی خەڵکێـکی ناشـٌوناڵێـست لێـٌان کۆ ببـێتەوە، وە خەڵکێـن کە نزٌکـن لە ئٌـسلامٌەکان وئٌـسلامٌەکان 
وازەوە کۆببنەوە لەو هـێزە سـٌاسٌەی کە درووسـت دەبێت. وە کاتێـن کە خۆشـٌان بە مەرجەعٌەتی ئٌسلامٌی جٌا
ئەو هەٌکەلە درووسـت بـوو ئٌتر ئٌخوان وازی لـێ دەهێـنێت. وە ئەو کاتە وەکو نموونەی مەؼربی لـێدێت. 
العمل  بـڕواشـم واٌە نموونەی ئەردەنٌـش سەرکەوتوو نەبـوو ئٌخوان حـٌزبێـکٌان درووسـت کـرد بە ناوی (جبهة
الاسلامـً)، بەڵام نەٌانتوانـی ئامانجەکانـی حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـی لە کۆکـردنەوەی چالاکوانـی سـٌاسی کۆمەڵگا 
لەخۆٌان کۆبکەنەوە. زٌاتر ئەندامێـتی وسەرکـرداٌەتٌەکەی لەدەست ئٌخوانەکاندا ماٌەوە. وە بـڕواشـم واٌە ئەوەی 
مٌن سەربەخۆٌـی نەدەنە حـٌزبە سـٌاسٌەکە لەوەی کە چۆن پێـی کە ئێـستا لە مٌـسر هەٌە، ئەگەر ئٌخوان موسل
باشە وا کاری سـٌاسی بکات لەناعەتم واٌە ئەوٌـش زۆر سەرکەوتوو نابێت. ئەنجا ئٌخوان مەجبور دەبێت کە 
خۆی ڕاستەوخۆ بێت کاری سمٌاسی بکات، ئەوکاتەش تووشـی ئەشکالٌەتی ئەوە دەبێت کە ئٌخوان وەکو 
ئٌسلامـٌی دەٌەوێت لە (صـراع)ی دەسەڵاتدا بـێلان بێت، وەکو نوێنەراٌەتی بەهاٌەن، دەبێتە بـزوتنەوەٌەکـی 
لاٌەن ونوێنەراٌەتی کەسـێن کە لە دەسەڵاتدا بێت. کەواتە لە مونافەسەی دەسەڵاتدا عەٌبدار دەبێت، چونکە 
لاٌەن، کە بـێگومان لاٌەنگـری  ڕکابەرەکان ڕق هەڵدەگـرن، ئٌتر ئەوانٌـش ناتوانـن ئامۆژگارٌان بکەن وەکو بـێ
 کەسـێن دەکەن دژ بە کەسـێکـی تـر. ئەنجـا کادٌـرە دەعەوٌەکانٌـان سەرلاڵ دەبـن بە کاری سـٌاسٌەوە.
 
پ/ کاتـێن کە ٌەکگـرتوو هات وحـٌزبـی ڕاگەٌاند هەر ئەو کادٌـرە دەعەوٌانە بوون کە ئێـستا کاری سـٌاسی 
هەمان کاتدا کۆمەڵێـن کادری تاٌبەتی هەبێت بۆ دەعوە و، کۆمەڵێـکی تـرٌـش دەکەن، ئەی ئٌتر چۆن دەتوانێت لە 
 بۆ کاری سـٌاسەت؟ ئاٌە ئەم ماوەٌە ئەوەندە کادری دەعەوی پـێگەٌاندووە کە ئٌـشی لەبەر بـڕوات؟ 
و/ داعٌەکانـی ئێمە کە سـٌاسەتٌان کـردووە، لە جٌهـانـی دەعوەش نەبـراون. هەر چەندە وەکو کەسانی (متفرغ) 
بۆ دەعوە کارٌان نەکـردووە. هەردوو کارەکەٌان لە ٌەن کاتدا ئەنجام داوە، چونەتە ناو ڕێکخـستنەکان 
ەڵگا لە زۆر شوێـندا کاری پەروەردەٌان وموعظەی پەروەردەٌـی وئەخلالٌـٌان كمردووە و، کە چونەتە ناو کۆم
ئەنجام داوە، کە چونەتە ناوەندە سـٌاسٌەکانٌـش کاری سـٌاسـٌان ئەنجام داوە. ئاٌا ئەم دوو کارە هەردووکٌـٌان ئاوا 
بەٌەکەوە دەکـرێت؟ ئەمە پـرسـٌارێکە، وە ئاٌا ئاوا باشـە ٌان باشـتر واٌە کە جٌـابکـرێتەوە؟ ئەی ئەگەر 
وە چـێ ڕوو دەدات؟ ئاٌا ئەوکات سـٌاسٌەکانمـان تەواو دوور ناکەونەوە لە دنٌـای دەعوە؟ ئەو دوور جٌامانکـردە
کەوتنەشـٌان ئاٌا کارٌگەری لەسەر کوالەتی خۆٌان نابێت؟ ئەمەش کە کاڵکـردنەوەی شوناسـی کەسە سـٌاسٌەکان 
ەی شوناسـی ئٌـسلامٌـٌان ئاسەواری دەگەٌەنێـت بێ گومان ئاسەواری پەروەردەٌـی خۆی هەٌە، وە تۆخـکـردنەو
سـٌاسی ناباشـی هەٌە. چونکە کە شوناسە ئٌسلامٌەکەٌان تۆخ دەکەٌتەوە چـٌنێـن لە جەماوەر دوور دەکەونەوە. 
وە کە شوناسە ئٌسلامٌەکەشـٌان لاواز دەکەٌت چٌـنێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌٌت لـێ دوور دەکەوێتەوە. من لەناعەتی خۆم 
بەم بەش بەشـکردنە نٌە. ئێمە ئەوەی کە گـرفتمـانە کاراٌٌە لە هەردوو بوارەکەدا. ئێمە  واٌە کە ئێمە پێوٌـستمان
ئەگەر هەردوو بواری دەعەوی وسـٌاسـٌش بەهـێز بکەٌن دەتوانٌن هەردوو کارەکە بەٌەکەوە بکەٌن. کەواتە 
عەتی من سـٌاسەت دەبێت باس لە جٌـاکـردنەوەی پـسپۆڕٌەکان لە چوارچێوەی ٌەکگـرتوودا بکەٌن. بە لەنا
پێـوٌـستی بە ئەندامـی زۆر نٌە. کاری سـٌاسی پێـوٌـستی بە کەسـاٌەتی کارٌـزمـی، کەسـاٌەتی ئەکتٌڤ وبەهـێز، 
کەسـاٌەتی خاوەن فٌـکر، وە خاوەن جورئەت هەٌە بۆ درووسـتکـردنـی هەڵوێـست لەسەر شەلام، لەسەر مٌدٌا، 
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بۆ درووسـتکـردنـی پـرۆژ و، جورئەت بۆ درووسـتکـردنـی وە پێـشکەشـکـردنـی پـرۆژە. واتە عەلڵێـن 
هەڵوێـست. کە ئەم دوو شـتە هەبوو عەلڵێـکی بەهـێز، لەگەڵ دڵێـکی بەهـێز بۆ جورئەت وکاراٌی، وە بە جٌدی 
خەمەکانـی خەڵن لە خۆگـرتن وداکۆکـی لـێکـردنٌـان ئاوا دەنگی خەڵن وجەماوەر کۆدەبنەوە لەو حـٌزبە. وە 
نن نوێنەراٌەتی خەڵن بکەن ئٌتر ئٌسلامـٌی بن، ڕٌـشٌان هەبێت، نەٌانبێت ٌان هەر شـتێـن بن خەڵن دەشـتوا
شـوێـنٌـان دەکەوێـت. من نموونەٌەکـی خۆمت پـێ دەڵێم، کاتێـن کە بۆ هەڵـبژاردنەکانـی پەرلەمانی عـێراق خۆم 
دا بەشـداری کـرد، ٠٠١٢ی شوباتی ٧٠انـی دەنگم هێـنا، بەڵام کە لە خۆپٌـشاندانەک ١٠٢٩کاندٌد کـرد نزٌکەی 
وە بە جورئەتەوە کەوتمە بەر چـاوی خەڵن، خەڵن لە نـزٌکەوە زٌاتر منـٌان ناسـی وێب سـاٌتـێن لە کۆتاٌی 
 ٠٠١٢دا ڕاپـرسـٌەکـی کـردبوو لەسەر ئەوەی کە کـێ لە کوردسـتان کارٌگەرتـرٌن کەسماٌەتی ٠٠١٢سـاڵـی 
ناوی مام جەلال ونەوشـٌروان موسـتەفا وکان مەسـعود وم. صـلاح الدٌن  بووە؟ دٌارە ناوی من لەگەڵ
% دەنگەکان بـوو. کان نەوشـٌروان ٠١وژمارەٌەن کەسـاٌەتی تـرٌـش، دەرەنجـام من ٌەکەم دەنگم هێـنابـوو کە 
ل % دەنگەکانـی بە دەست هێـنابوو کە کارٌـزماٌەکـی زۆر هەٌە لەناو کاری ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆن. مام جەلا٢٢
% هێـنابوو. مەبەسـت ئەوەٌە کە چۆن ناوی من چوەتە ئەوێ؟ دٌارە ١٠% هێـنابوو، کان مەسعود ٠نـزٌکەی 
لەو چالاکٌـانەی بەردەم خەڵکە خۆپٌـشاندەرەکە، کاتێـن کە تۆ ئازاٌانە مافەکانـی خەڵن لە ئەسـتۆ بگـرٌت 
  ٌش بٌت. وداکۆکـی لـێ بکەٌت ئەوانٌـش پـشتگٌرٌت لـێ دەکەن با هەر کەسـێک
ٌەکگـرتـوو بە دڵنـٌاٌٌەوە بەڕای من حـٌزبێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌە کێـشەی نەتەواٌەتی بەکارناهـێـنێت بۆ مەبەسـتی 
 سـٌاسـی خۆی، بەڵکـو کێـشەی نەتەواٌەتی لە ئەسـتۆ گـرتووە وەکو بەشـێن لە ئەرکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی. 
 
 پ/ ئاٌا ئێـوە حـٌزبێـکی مەدەنـٌن ٌان ئٌـسلامـٌی؟ 
ێمە ئەو بەهاٌانەی ناشـٌوناڵـٌزم کە بەهای ڕەوان و، بەشـێکـن لە ئەرکـی کوردێـن بەرانبەر بە و/ ئ
نٌـشتمانەکەی، وە بەرانبەر بە نەتەوەکەی، ئەم ئەرکانە بەهاٌەکـن دەبێت لە ناو ئێمەدا جێـٌان بێـتەوە. نٌـشتمانـی 
ەکە، ناشـٌوناڵٌزم بەهاٌەکـی تـرە، دٌموکـراسٌەت بـوون لە چوارچێـوەی ئەو نٌـشتمانەدا کە تێـٌدا دەژٌـت بەهاٌ
بەهاٌەکـی تـرە. من دەڵـێم ئەمانە هەموو بەهاٌەکـن ئٌـسلام جەختـٌان لەسەر دەکاتەوە. هەر بۆٌە منٌـش لەبوڵم، 
ئەمەش وا دەگەٌەنێت کە ئەولەوٌەت لای من ئٌـسلامە. کاتێـن من وەکو کەسـێکی کورد کە دەچمـە بەردەم 
ن بۆ نموونە کاتێـن کە عەرەبێـن ستەمـی لـێ دەکـرێت، وە من پـشتگـٌری لـێنـاکەم لەبەر ئەوە کە هەڵوێـستێـ
عەرەبەو کورد نٌە، مانای ئەوەٌە کە من ئٌـسلامـٌی نٌم لەو کاتە، من ناشـٌوناڵـٌسـتم. وە ئٌـسلامەکەم بەکار 
سلامٌە عەرەبەکان ئاوان. جا هەر ئٌـسلامٌەن دەهێـنم بۆ بٌـانوی ناشـٌوناڵٌـستی. کە بەداخـەوە هەندێـن لە ئٌـ
کاتێـن کە هەر ستەمێـن لەبووڵ دەکەن لەبەر بەرژەوەندی نٌـشتمانەکەی خۆٌان، ئەو کاتە ئٌتر ئەو کەسە لە 
چوارچێوەی شوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی دەچێتە دەرەوە. ئێمە لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە هٌـچ کاتێـن بەرژەوەندی نەتەوەٌٌمـان 
ڵ شوناسـی ئٌـسلامٌمـان. بەڵام ئەگەر دژ بـوون شوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌەکە ئەسـڵە. وە دەبێت شوناسـی دژ نٌە لەگە
نەتەوەٌی بگونجـێنرێت لەگەڵ شوناسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی. وە ئەم شوناسە نەتەوٌٌـانە سەردەمێـکی تـر لەوانەٌە ٌەن 
وناڵٌـستە توندڕەوە کە لەم ووڵاتانە هەٌە نەگـرنەوە لەگەڵ جٌهـانگٌری وچەمکە تازەکاندا. وە بەشـێن لەو ناشـٌ
هـی ئەوەٌە کە نەتەوەکەی ژێـر دەسـتەٌە، وە نەتەوەکەی ستەمی لـێ دەکـرێت. وە هەر ئەو کەسە ناشـٌوناڵٌـستە 
خۆشـی ستەمی لـێ دەکـرێت لەبەر ئەو شوناسە نەتەوەٌٌە. بەڵام لە ئاٌندە کە ستەمەکەی لەسەر نەما تێـڕوانٌنـی 
نموونە ئێـستا لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان زۆر جٌاوازە لە کوردسـتانـی ئێران وتورکٌـا، ئێمە ئێـستا لە  دەگۆڕێت. بۆ
هەرێمـی کوردسـتان تێـگەٌـشتنمان بۆ شوناسـی نەتەوەٌی ڕاسـتتر بووە، وە زۆر جٌـاوازە لە تێگەٌـشتنی ئێـستای 
ڕەخنە لە دەسەڵاتی کوردی هەرێم دەگـرٌن،  ئەوان بۆ شوناسـی نەتەوەٌی. ئێمە کاتێـن کە وەکو ئۆپۆزٌـسٌۆن
ئەوان پێـٌان ناخۆشە وا دەزانن لە دژی بەرژەوەندی کورد کار دەکەٌت. چونکە ئەو لەوێ (محـروم)ە لە هەر 
جۆرە ئازادٌەکی نەتەواٌەتی، بەڵام ئەو نازانێت کاتێـن کە ئەوٌـش گەشـتە ئەم ئاسـتە ئٌتر تێـدەگات کە شوناسی 
نٌە من بٌپەرسـتم، وە بەهاکانـی تـر ئٌتر گـرنگ دەبـن وەکو دٌموکـراسی وئازادی تاکە کەس نەتەوەٌی خۆ بت 
 ومافی مرۆڤ وشەفافٌەت و...هتد. 
لە ڕووی فەلـسەفٌەوە هەندێـن جار بەها لەگەڵ بەرژەوەندی دژ ئەوەسـتن لەگەڵ ٌەکـتری. کاتێـن کە تۆ  
ی خـەٌت، هەندێن جار ٌەن دەگـرێتەوە وە هەندێـن جارٌـش بەرژەوەندٌەکی خۆت ٌان نەتەوەکەت بۆ ئەوی دەسـت
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ٌەن ناگـرێتەوە لەگەڵ بەهاکاندا. بۆ نموونە ئەگەر پارچە زەوٌەن کاتێـن کە هی نەتەوەٌەکـی تـرە، بەڵام 
نەتەوەکی تۆ ئەٌەوێت ئەو پارچە ئەرزەش هـی ئەو بێت، لەمکاتەدا تۆ لە نێوان دوو شـت داٌت، لە نێوان 
نـی بەهای دادگەرٌداٌت، وە لە نێوان سوور بوون لەسەر بەرژەوەندی نەتەوەکەت. لـێرەدا ئەگەر جێبەچێـکرد
تەنهـا کەسـێکی ناشـٌوناڵٌـست بٌت و، گوێ نەدەٌتە بەهاکان داکۆکـی دەکەٌت لە نەتەوەکەت با لەسەر ناحەلٌـش 
بێت پەٌوەسـت بێت بە چەمکـی ماؾ بێت. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە تێگەٌـشتمان بۆ پـرسە نەتەوٌی ونٌـشتمانٌەکان دە
ودادگەری. وە ئەم چەمکـی ماؾ ودادگەرٌٌـانە بەهای ئٌـسلامـن، لە هەمان کاتدا بەهـای نێـودەوڵەتی 
ودٌموکـراسی ومافـی مرۆڤ وژٌانـی سەردەمـن. ئەم بەهاٌانەش تەنهـا لە ئاٌندا باس نەکـرا، بەڵکو لە ٌاسـا 
ئٌنـسانٌەکانٌـشدا باس کـراوە. کاتێـن کە مافێـن دژە لەگەڵ ئەم بەهانەدا، ئٌتر نێودەوڵەتی ودٌموکراتی وفەلـسەفە 
 تۆ دەبێت لەگەڵ نەتەوەکەی خۆت نەبٌت. ئەگٌـنا ئٌتر تۆ کەسـێکی شۆڤێـنٌـستی، تۆ کەسـێکی سـروشـتی نٌت. 
 
 پ/ چـۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێـن، وە چـۆن هەست دەکەٌت وەکو موسـڵمانێـن؟
ێم واٌە مرۆڤ بوون شوناسی ٌەکەمە، موسـڵمان بوون شوناسی دووەمە، کورد بوون شوناسی سێهەمە. و/ من پ
بۆ نموونە هەر بەرژەوەندٌەن کە کورد بە بەرژەوەندی دەزانێت، لای من بەرژەوەندی نٌە ئەگەر ئٌسلام لبوڵـی 
ەرژەوەندٌەکانـی کورد دەخاتە ئاسـتی نەبێت. چونکە لای من ئٌسلام وەکو ئەو بەها ومٌعٌارە سـتانداردانەٌە کە ب
ڕەواٌەتی وناڕەواٌەتی. چۆن کە هەر کێـشەٌەن هەبوو لە ٌاسای نێودەوڵەتی، وە لە دٌموکـراسٌەت وبەهاکانـی 
تـردا، کە چۆن کەسـێن ئەم پێوەر وبەهاٌانە پێـشـێلکات ئٌتر واتای نٌـشتمانـی بوون نەتەوەٌی بوون 
ێـنێت. لای من ئٌـسلامـٌی بوون ئەو سـتانداردەٌە کە بۆ کورد بوونم دٌاری وناشـٌونالٌست بوونت واتای نام
دەکات، وە چوارچێـوە وئامانجی بۆ دٌاری دەکات. لەبەر ئەوە لای من ئٌسلامی بوون بەهای ٌەکەمە، چونکە 
تاکتٌن ئٌسلامـٌی بوون باسە لە بەها وپـرنـسٌپەکان وسـتراتٌـژەکان. کورد بوون باسە لە والع، باسە لە 
 وبەرژەوەندی. بەرژەوەندی وتاکـتٌن بابێت لەگەڵ بەهاکان. 
بەڵام لە کاتێـکدا کە ئاٌن دەچێتە ناو ڕٌـشن وڕەگەز ومـێژووی نەتەوەٌەکەوە ئٌتر دەبێتە بەشـێن لە شوناسـی ئەو 
کە. واتە هەر نەتەوە. وە لە هەمان کاتدا هەر سوکاٌەتی کردنێـن بەو ئاٌنە دەبێتە سوکاٌەتی کـردن بە نەتەوە
سوکاٌەتی کـردنێـن بە ئٌسلام دەبێتە سوکاٌەتی کردن بە کورد. وە هەر سوکاٌەتی کردنێـن بە کورد دەبێتە 
سوکاٌەتی کردن بە بەشـێن لە ئٌسلام. وە ئەم شوناسانە ئەوەندە بە ناو ٌەکدا تێکەڵ بوون ئاسان نٌە کە لە ٌەکٌـان 
دەکـرێنەوە. وە ئٌسلامـٌی بوون دەبێتە سـتاندارد و(معـٌار) بۆ ئەوەی جٌا بکەٌتەوە. بەڵام لە ئاستی تٌۆری جٌا 
 بزانـرێت بەرژەوەندٌەکان ڕەوان ٌان ناڕەوا. 
 
پ/ وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی ٌان ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکی کورد گەر دەتەوێت، چـۆن سەٌری ئٌـسلام دەکەٌت وەکو 
 ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانـی؟ 
ن لە سنورێکـی جوگرافی دٌاری کـراو. باسـکردن لە ئٌسلام باسـکردنە لە و/ کورد بوون بـرٌتٌە لە باسـکرد
ئاٌن وهٌداٌەتێـن بۆ هەموو مرۆڤاٌەتی. بە دڵنـٌاٌەوە ئٌسلام تەنها بۆ کورد ٌان بۆ عەرەب تەنها نٌە، ئٌسلام بۆ 
لە تارٌکی ڕزگارکـردنـی هەموو بەشەرٌەتە. من وا ئەبٌنم کە ئٌسلام ئاٌنێـکی ڕزگار کەری بەشەرٌەتە 
وبەدبەخـتی وچارەڕەشـی کە کۆمەڵگای مرۆڤاٌەتی تێدەکەوێت. لەبەر ئەوە کورد بوون باسە لە شوناسـێکی 
دٌاری کـراو، وە لە جوگـرافٌاٌەکی دٌاری کـراو. وە کاتێـکٌـش کە دێتە ناو باسەوە کە سـتەمێـن ٌان ماؾ 
ٌندوە بۆ ڕزگارکـردنـی هەموو کۆمەڵگاکانی خواردنێـن لە ئارادا بێت. بەڵام ئٌسلام هەمٌشە باسـێکی ز
مـرۆڤاٌەتی. لورئان خۆی دٌاری کردوە کە مانجی ئاٌن برٌتٌە لە لە درووسـتکـردنی دادگەری لە کۆمەڵگا. لە 
بەر ئەوە ئٌسلام داوای دادگەری دەکات بۆ هەموو کۆمەڵگاکانـی مـرۆڤاٌەتی. وە پێکەوە ژٌانی نەتەوەکانٌـش 
ری وخۆشەوٌـستی وپێکەوە ژٌان وهاوکاری. کەواتە ئٌسلام تەنها هی کورد نٌە، هی لەسەر بنەمای دادگە
عەرەب نٌە، ئٌسلام ئاٌنێکە هاتووە بۆ ڕزگاری هەموو کۆمەڵگای مرۆڤاٌەتی بۆ ئەوەی ڕزگاری بێـت لە ستەم. 
ئٌسلام ئاٌنە وە وە هەموو کۆمەڵگای مرۆڤاٌەتی بۆ ئەوەی بە دادگەری وسەلامەتی وبراٌەتی بژٌن. لەبەر ئەوە 
 کورد بوون نەتەوەٌە، ئاٌنٌـش زۆر لە نەتەوە گەورەتـرە وفـراوانـترە. 
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وەکو کوردێکـی موسـڵمان هەست بە دوو شت دەکەٌت، ٌەکەم: هەست بە ئەوە دەکەٌت کە تۆ سەر بە ئومەتێـکی 
ٌەکێـکٌش لە ئەندامانی ئەو ئومەتە ئٌـسلامی کە بەشـێکە لە تۆ،  وە زۆر گەورەتـرە لە نەتەوەکەی تۆ. وە هەموو 
بـرای تۆٌە. دووەم: هەست بەوە دەکەٌت کە پەٌامێـکی گەورە هاتووە بۆ سەر زەوی، تۆ پێوٌستە بەشدار بٌت لە 
ئەوەی کە ئەم پەٌامە وئەم ڕزگارٌە بگەٌەنٌتە هەموو مرۆڤاٌەتی. لەبەر ئەوە تۆ هەست بە بوونی ئەرکێـن 
م. تۆ وەکو موسڵمانێکی کورد ئەم ئٌسلامە وەکو پەٌامێـکی ئاشتی وبراٌەتی وبەها دەکەٌت لە بەرانبەر بە ئٌسلا
جوانەکان پێوٌستە بگەٌەنٌتە هەموو کۆمەڵگای مرۆڤاٌەتی. تۆ وەکو موسڵمان بەرپـرسـٌارەتٌت هەٌە بەرانبەر بە 
برای خۆت بزانٌت. وە  ئٌسلام. بەرپـرسٌارٌەتٌەکی تـر بەرانبەر بە ئٌسلام ئەوەٌە کە هاو ئاٌنەکانی ترت بە
ئازارەکانٌـان بە ئازاری خۆت بزانٌت. وە هاوکاری کردنٌـان بە ئەرکی خۆت بزانٌت. ئەمە پێداوٌستٌەکە ئٌسلام 
وەکو ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانی بەرانبەر بە کەسـێکی موسڵمـانی کورد دروسـتی دەکات. وە جێـبەجێـکردنـی ئەم 
بوونی کەسـێکی موسڵمان. لەبەر ئەوە کوردێکـی موسـڵمان جٌاوازە لە پێداوٌـستٌانە بەشـێکی گرنگە لە موسڵمان 
کوردێکـی لٌـبراڵـی، کوردێکی ناشـٌوناڵٌـست، چونکە ئەم ئەم ڕەهەندە ئٌـسانٌە گەورەشـی هەٌە، وە ئەرکی هەٌە 
 بەرانبەر بە مرۆڤاٌەتی.
 
ەفؽـانـٌەکی موسڵمانی گرنگـترە پ/ ڕەخنەٌەن هەٌە بەرانبەر بە ئٌسلامٌەکان گواٌە ئٌسلامٌەکی مەؼربی ئ
 بەلاٌوە لە هاوڵاتٌەکی خۆی مادام ئٌسلامـٌی نٌە، لەم جٌهانگـٌرٌەی ئٌسلامەدا چۆن سەٌری ئەم بابەتە دەکەٌت؟
و/ خۆی هەموو ئەم شتانە پێوٌست بە بەڵانـس هەٌە، پێوٌستی بە جٌاکـردنەوەی مافەکانە لە ٌەکـتری. کەسـێکی 
کی لەسەر هەٌە جٌاوازە لەو ئەرکەی کە کەسـێکی موسڵمانـی ووڵاتێـکی تـر. ئەمانە هاونٌـشتمانی خۆم ئەرکێـ
ئاسـتی جٌاوازن. سەرەتا ئٌسلام موسڵمان فێری ئەوە دەکات کە ئەوەی خزمتە ئەرکێـکی تاٌبەتی هەٌە لەسەرت، 
سەرت هەٌە، ئەوەی دراوسـێتە ئەرکێـکی تاٌبەتی لەسەرت هەٌە، هاونٌـشتمانەکەت ئەرکێـکی تاٌبەتی لە
موسـڵمانانی تر ئەرکێـی تاٌبەتٌان لەسەرت هەٌە، مرۆڤەکانی تری دنٌا با موسڵمانٌش نەبن ئەرکێـکی تری 
تاٌبەتٌان هەٌە لەسەرت. مرۆڤ ئەرکی لەسەر تۆ هەٌە، تۆ دەبێت بەرانبەر بە هەرٌەن  لەمانە ئەرکی تاٌبەتی 
رانبەر بە نەتەوەکەت دژە لەگەڵ ئەرکەکانت خۆت بەجـێ بهێـنٌت. وە ئەو گرٌمانەی کە ئەرکی خۆت بە
بەرانبەر بە مرۆڤەکانی تر، ٌان بە پێچەوانەوە هەڵەٌە. وە عەلڵ بچوکٌە کە هەندێـن لە ناشـٌوناڵٌـستە شۆڤٌنٌەکان 
ئەو بٌرکردنەوەٌان هەٌە. ئەگٌـنا من ئەرکم بەرانبەر بە نەتەوەکەی خۆم خەباتکـردنە بۆ ڕزگارکـردنـی 
ژٌانێـکی کەرامەتمەندانە بۆی. وە کاتێـن کە ئەرکە مـرۆڤاٌەتٌەکانـی تـرم دێنە ئاراوە، بۆ نموونە  ودابٌـنکـردنـی
کاتێـن کە مرۆڤێـن لە شوێنـێن کە سـتەمی لـێ دەکـرێت من دەبێت داکۆکی لـێ بکەم، ئەمە پێچەوانەی ئەرکە 
ە نێوانٌاندا نٌە. ئەمە وەکو ئەوە واٌە کە نەتەوەٌٌەکانـی خۆم نٌە بەرانبەر بە نەتەوەکەم. وە هٌچ دژاٌەتٌەن ل
کەسـێن لێت بپرسـێت تۆ دەبێت لەگەڵ داٌکـت باش بٌت ٌان لەگەڵ خـێزانەکەت، ٌان لەگەڵ باوکـت؟ ئەمانە هەر 
ٌەکەو ئەرکێـکٌان هەٌە لەسەرت، وە نابێت لەسەر حـسابی ٌەکـتر بن. ئەم گـرٌمانانە هەردەم گرٌمانی خەڵکی 
ـٌن. ئەکـرێت ئەفؽـانٌەکٌـشم خۆشـبوێت، برٌتانٌەکٌـشم خۆشبوێت، ئەمرٌکٌەکٌـشم عەلڵ بچوکی شۆڤٌن
خۆشـبوێت، وە عەرەبێـکٌـشم خۆشـبوێت، بەڵام پێـش لە هەمووٌان کوردەکەی خۆشـم خۆشـدەوێت. ئەرکی 
ات ٌەکەمی من کوردەکانە، چونکە من خۆم کوردم، لە جێگاٌەدا دەژٌم. ئەگەر من ئەمرٌکی بووماٌە، ئەوک
ئەرکی ٌەکەمی من نابێتە کورد چونکە ئەو کۆمەڵگاٌە پێداوٌـستٌەکی تری هەٌە بەو شێوەٌە خەباتی بۆ دەکەم. 
بەڵام کەسـێکی وەکو تۆ با لە بەرٌتانٌا ٌان ئەمرٌکاش بژٌٌت دەبێت هەر خەبات بۆ کورد بکەٌت، چونکە 
  گاٌەش کە تٌاٌدا دەژٌت ئەرکی هەٌە لەسەرت. مٌللەتەکەت پێوٌـستی پێت هەٌە. بەڵام لە هەمان کاتدا ئەو کۆمەڵ
 
پ/ چۆن مامەڵە لەگەڵ پـرسی کەرکون دەکەن؟ وەن کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی چی دەبێت گەر دەسـت بەرداری ئەو 
پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسـڵمانەکانتـان؟ بۆ ئەوەی لانـی کەم خوێن نەڕێـژرێت، ٌان ئەو کێـشەٌە کۆتاٌـی 
 پێـبێت. 
ٌـشتنی ئێمە ماؾ پەٌوەندی بە بـراٌەتی وؼەٌـری بـراٌەتٌەوە نٌە. بۆ نموونە من پرسی نەتەواٌەتی و/ لە تێگە
دەشوبهـێنم بە پرسی مٌـرات، ئەڵێـم کاتێـن کە خوا لە ئاسـمانەوە مٌـراتی دابەشـکردوە لە نێـوان بـرا 
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وڕ وکچـی دابەش کـردووە، وخوشـکەکاندا کە ٌەن باون وٌەن داٌکٌـان هەٌە، خوا خۆی مافەکانـی ژن وک
بۆچـی، بۆ ئەوەی لەٌەکـتری عاجـز نەبن، بۆ ئەوەی تێکەڵ کـردنـی مافەکانٌـان نەبێتە هۆی درووسـت بوونـی 
کێـشەی سـٌاسی ونەتەوەٌی وخوێـن نەڕژێـنرێت. وە کاتێـن کە مٌللەتێـن مٌللەتێـکی تـر داگـٌر دەکات، وە 
بـرا گەورەٌەکە کە دەسـت دەگـرێت بەسەر مٌـراتەکەدا، بەڵام دواٌٌـش مافەکانـی پێـشـێل دەکات، ئەمە وەکو 
دەڵێـت با ئێمە بـراٌەتٌمـان تێـن نەچێت، وە با ئەم ماڵەمان تێـن نەچێت من هەر بـرای ئێوەم لە جٌاتی باوکم 
ڕاست دەکات  خـزمەتتـان دەکەم. ئەمە خەڵەتاندنە. ئٌتر بـرا وخوشکەکانـی تـر نابێت بڵێـن بـرا گەورەکەمان
چٌمان بوێت دەمانداتێ، مەگەر کەسـێکی گەمـژە بێت. ئێمەی ئٌـسلامـٌی نە بـرا ستەمکارەکەٌن کە کلٌلەکان 
بخەٌنە کٌرفان وستەمکار بٌن، وە نە بـرا گەمـژەکەٌـشٌن. چونکە ئێمە دەزانٌن لە نێوان بـرای داٌـن وباوکٌـشدا 
دوون، لەم سەر زەوٌەشـدا ئەوەی بوو بە ماؾ دەبێت دابەش خوا خۆی لە ئاسـمانەوە مافەکانـی دابەش کـر
بکـرێت. دوای ئەوەی کە مافەکەمان بەش کـرد، تۆ وەرەوە مافەکەی خۆت بە پٌاوەتی بدەرەوە بە من. لە بەر 
 ئەوە ئێمەی ئٌسلامـٌی بـرا گەمژەکە نٌن بە ناوی بـراٌەتٌەوە مافەکانمـان بخۆن. 
 
نگتـرن بـۆت: کورد بـوون، موسـڵمان بـوون ٌان کوردسـتانی بـوون؟ ئاٌا ئەوە پ/ کامێـن لەم شـوناسـانە گـر
 ئەهێـنێت لە ناو عـێرالدا لەسەر کوردسـتانـی بوون وعـێرالی بوون کێـشەکان بەردەوام بـن؟
و/ کاتێـن کە مرۆڤ ئازادانە دەچێت ناو هەر چوارچێوەٌەن، ٌان کاتێـن کە خۆی دەبٌنێتەوە لە ناو هەر 
لبوڵـت کـرد، دەبێـت پێداوٌـستٌەکانـی ئەو لبوڵ کـردنە جێـبەجێ بکەٌت. ئەگٌـنا تۆ مرۆڤێـکی  کەێوەٌەکدا چوارچ
بێ پەٌمـانٌت. ئەگەر بـڕٌارە پەٌمانێـکی عـێرالی نٌـشتمانـی هەبێت وە ئازادانە ئەمەمان لبوڵ کـردبێت، ئٌتر 
ان بکەٌن. چونکە خۆمان لبوڵمان کـردووە. وە ئەخلاق وٌاسـا ڕێگەمان پێ نادات نکولی لەو ئەرکانەی خۆم
ئەگەر سەپێـنراوٌـشە بەسەرمان دەبێت ئەوەندەی لـێ لبوڵ کەٌن کە دەتوانٌن ئەنجامی بدەٌن. وە نابێت بڵێٌن 
هەمووی لبوڵ دەکەٌن ودواٌی تەنهـا نٌوەی ئەنجام بدەٌن. وە لەم چوارچێوەٌەدا ئێمە ئەوکات ئەرکمان هەٌە 
اق وە بەرانبەر بە هەرێمەکەمان، ئەنجا بەرانبەر بە مرۆڤاٌەتی. هەموو ئەم ئەرکانەش بەرانبەر بە عـێر
کۆمەڵێـن پەٌماننـامە وە دەسـتوور ڕێکـی خـستوون. تا ئەو کاتەش ئێمە دەستوورەکەمان لبوڵە دەبێت ئەرکەکان 
من لبوڵم نٌەو هەڵنـاسـتم  جێـبەجێ بکەٌن. وە ئەگەر دەستورەکەش هەر کەسـێن لبوڵـی نٌە، دەبێت ئاشـکرا بڵێت
بە ئەرکەکان، چونکە ئەمە سەپێـنراوە بە سەرمدا، وە ئەمە نا عەدالەتٌە. بە ڕای ئێمە هٌچ نەتەوەٌەن نابێت 
زۆری لێ بکـرێت بۆ ئەوەی لە ژێـردەستی نەتەوەکانی تردا، ٌان بە ناچاری لەگەڵ نەتەوەکانی تردا بژٌت. ئەمە 
دەڵێـٌن فارس مافی ئەوەی نٌە کە تورن بخاتە ژێـر دەستی خۆی، تورکٌـش مافی لەناعەتی ئٌسلامٌی ئێمەٌە، وە 
نٌە عەرەب بخاتە ژێـر دەستی خۆی، وە هەموو نەتەوەٌەن دەبێت مافی چارەی خۆنووسـٌنی هەبێت. وە ئەگەر 
بدات. وە لەم لەگەڵ هەر نەتەوەٌەکٌـشدا دەژٌت، دەبێت ئازادانە بـژٌت، وە ئازادانە ڕێکەوتنی لەگەڵدا ئەنجام 
بوارەدا فٌکری ئٌسلامٌی لولـتر لە فٌکـری لٌـبراڵٌـش دەڕوانێتە بابەتەکان. فٌکـری لٌـبراڵـی ڕۆژئاوا مافەکان 
لەسەر بنەمای باڵانـسی هێـز ڕێن دەخات. وە هەر والعٌـن بەسەرتدا فەرزکـرا دەبێت لبوڵـی کەٌت. بەڵام ئٌسلام 
و دادگەری چۆنە ئاوا ڕێکی دەخات، نەن ئەوەی بـسەپێـنرێت. (المٶمنون لەسەر ئەو بنەماٌە ڕێکـی ناخات، بەڵک
علی شروطهم) وە دەبێت مرۆڤ کاتێـن کە مەرجێـکی لبوڵ کـرد پابەند بێت پـێـٌەوە. ئەمەش بەشـێکە لە 
ئەخلالی سـٌاسی وئەخلالی ئٌـنسانٌـش. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە باوەڕمان بە ٌاسای دادگەری هەٌە نەن (صـراع) 
  اندنـی هێـز. سەپ
 
پ/ هەرٌەن لەمانەی خوارەوە چـی دەگەٌەنن بۆت: ئٌـسلام، دەوڵەت، نەتەوە؟ ئاٌا هٌـچ (تنالض)ێـن هەٌە لە 
 نێوانٌـاندا؟ ئاٌا دەکـرێت سەر بە هەمووٌان بٌت؟ 
ٌەکێـن لەوانە و/ بە دڵنٌـاٌٌەوە هٌچ (تنالض)ێـن نٌە لە نێوانٌـان. ئٌسلام باسـی کۆمەڵە شـتێـکی کردووە بۆ ئێمە، 
دەفەرموێت (وجعلنـاکم شـعوبا ولبائل لتعـارفوا ان اکرمکـم عند اللە اتماکم)، واتە ئێوەمان کـردووە بە گەل وهۆز. 
لە شوێـنێـکی تـرٌش باس لە ئوموت دەکات (وأن هذە أمتکـم أمة واحـدة وانا ربکـم فعـبدون)، واتە لورئان باسی 
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. ئوموتٌـش ئەو ٌەکگـرتنەٌە کە لەسەر بنەمای ئاٌن درووست ە) 601 ل وأمةلە سێ شت کردووە کە (شعـوب، لبائ
دەبێت. هەر بۆٌە دەوترێت ئومەتی ئٌسلام ٌان ئومەتی مەسـٌحی ٌان ئومەتی جولەکە. کەواتە ئومەت ئەو 
پەٌوەندٌەٌە کە لەسەر بنەمای ئاٌن درووست دەبێت. ئەی (شـعوب)چٌە؟ ئەو پەٌوەندٌـانەٌە کە لەسەر بنەمای 
زمان درووسـت دەبێت، وەکو (شعب)ی ئەرەبی و(شعب)ی کوردی و(شعب)ی فارسی. (لبائل) چٌە؟ (لبائل) 
ئەو گروپە کۆمەڵاٌەتٌانەٌە کە لەسەر بنەمای پەٌوەندٌە خـێزانی وخوێن وخزماٌەتی درووست دەبێت. ئەم سـٌانە 
ـراوە، چونکە خوا دەفەرموێت ئێمە هەرسێکی لە لورئاندا ڕێزی لێگٌراوە. هٌچکامٌـشٌان دژ بەوی ترٌان دانەن
ئێوەمان جٌاکـردۆتەوە لەسەر بنەمای ئاٌنی جٌاوازم لەسەر بنەمای زمانی جٌاواز ونەتەوەی جٌاواز بۆ ئەوەٌە کە 
 ئێوە ٌەکـتر بناسـن، وە سود لە ٌەکـتری وەرگـرن، وە ئەزمونەکانـی ٌەکـتری بخوێننەوە. 
 
نەدا هاتووە (أن المسلمٌن وٌهود بنً عوؾ أمة) کە باس لە ئومەتی پ/ ئەی ئەو ئاماژەی کە لە دەستوری مەدٌ
 ئاٌنی ناکات، چـٌە؟
و/ ئەمە باس لە ئومەتی سـٌاسی دەکات. بەڵام ئەوەی کە زٌاتر لورئان جەخـتی لێ دەکات وزۆر بەکاری هێناوە 
بەواتەی ئومەتی ئاٌنٌە (وأن هذە أمتـکم أمة واحـدة وانا ربکم فاعبدون). وە (ملة)ٌش بە هەمان شێوە بەواتای 
مارکـسی نٌە کە پەٌوەندٌەکانی گەل ونەتەوەو هۆز پەٌوەندی ئاٌنی لە لورئاندا هاتووە. ئٌـسلام وەکو فٌکـری 
هەڵبوەشێنێتەوە و، پەٌوەندٌەکان بهـێـنێتەوە سەر ئاستی تاکە کەس. ئٌسلام داوا دەکات کە ڕێـز لە مرۆڤ وەکو 
تان بگٌرێت، بەڵام خـێزان لەسەروی تاکەوەٌە، واتا گرنگی خێزان لەسەروی تاکەوەٌە. ئەنجا گەل وهۆزٌش 
ەن. هەموو ئەمانەش نابێت بکرێنە دژی ٌەکتری. واتا نابێت بۆ ئەوەی ئومەتەکەم بپارێزم لەسەروی تاکەو
تاکەکانی گەلەکەم ستەم لێبکرێت. ئەم ئاستانەی تان وهۆز وگەلانە ڕێز لێگـٌراون بە بێ ئەوەی (تنالض) لە 
 نێوانٌـاندا درووسـت بێت. 
اساٌٌە کە کۆمەڵە خەڵکێـن دەبەسـتێتەوە بەٌەکەوە دەوڵەتٌـش برٌتٌە لەو گرێبەستە کۆمەڵاٌەتٌە سـٌاسٌە ٌ
لەچوارچێوەی جوگرافٌاٌەکی دٌاری کـراودا، وە دەسەڵاتێـن دەبەخشـێت بە هەندێکٌـان بۆ ئەوەی دەسەڵاتدار بن، 
وە (التزامێن)ٌش دەبەخشـێت بە گەل. ئەم دەوڵەتە دەکرێت بچون بێت، دەکرێت گەورەبێت، دەکرێت چەند 
بگرێت، دەکرێت ٌەن نەتەوە لە خۆ بگرێت. هاوڵاتی بوونٌـش برٌتٌە لە چونە ناو ئٌلتزامێـکی نەتەوەٌەن لەخۆ 
. ەئەخلالی ٌاساٌی، وە هەسـتان بەو ئەرکانەی کە هاوڵاتی بوون داوای دەکات. نەتەوەٌـش بە ڕای من (شـعب)
ە نەن خودی ئەم شتانە هەموو ئەمانەش ڕێـزلێگراون نەن پٌرۆز، ڕێزلێگرتنەکەش لەبەر ئٌرادەی مرۆڤەکان
خۆٌان بۆ نموونە ئەگەر مرۆڤەکانی ووڵاتێـن بەرژەوەندٌان وابوو کە ووڵاتەکەٌان دابەش بکەن دەبێت ڕێزی 
ئەو دابەش کردنە بگٌرێت لەبەر ڕێزی ئٌرادەی گەلەکە. ٌان ئەگەر ئەمڕۆ کۆمەڵێن هاتن وزمانێکٌان داتاشـی 
ێت وەکو هەر زمانێـکی تر چونکە پێوٌـستی بوون ئەو کۆمەڵە ولسەٌان پێ کـرد دەبێت ڕێز لەو زمانە بگٌر
   .خەڵکەٌە وخواست وئٌرادەٌانە
 
پ/ چۆن دروشمەکانی 'ئازادی وبراٌەتی ودادپەروەری لە ڕوانگەی پەٌوەندٌتان لە گەڵ براٌانی موسڵماندا 
 ڕاڤەدەکەن، بە تاٌبەت کە ئێوە نەتەوەٌەکی بێ دەوڵەتن؟
و/ پێـش هەمووشـتێن ئەم درووشمانەی ٌەکگرتوو بۆ ناوخۆی کوردسـتانە، بۆ ئەو خەڵکانەٌە کە سودمەندن لە 
ٌەکگرتوو، بۆ ئەو کۆمەڵگاٌە ٌە کە ٌەکگرتوو ئەٌەوێت گرفتەکانی چارەسەر بکات. ئێمە بـراٌەتٌمـان لە 
ئاٌنی وبراٌەتی مرۆڤاٌەتٌش هەٌە، بەڵام ئەم ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤی شەڕی ناوخۆ دانٌـاوە، ڕاسە ئێمە بڕوامان بە براٌەتی 
درووشمانە بۆ ناوخۆ دانـراون. وە مەبەسـتمان لە براٌەتی نێوان خەڵکی هەرێمـی کوردسـتانە، کە دەبێت لە 
بارێکـی ئاسـاٌش وبراٌەتٌدا بژٌن. ئەمەش بە هەموو پێکهاتە موسڵمان ومەسٌحی وٌزٌدٌەکانەوە دەبێت بە 
ئێمە دەمانەوێت ڕۆشـنبٌری براٌەتی لە نێو مٌللەتەکەی خۆماندا بچێـنٌن بۆ ئەوەی ڕێگا  براٌەتی پێکەوە بژٌٌن.
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بگرٌن لەهەر جۆرە شێوازێکی ماؾ پێـشێل کردن وتوند وتٌژی وداپڵۆسـاندن. ئازادٌـش مەبەسـتمان لەوەٌە کە 
ازادی خۆی بەدەست بهێـنێت کوردسـتان هەم لە ناوخۆی خۆٌدا ئازاد بێت لە ستەمکاری هەم لە ئاست مٌللەتاندا ئ
بۆ ئەوەی بۆخۆی نەتەوەٌەکی سەربەخۆی خۆی هەبێت. دادپەروەرٌـش مەبەسـتمان لە دووبارە 
جێـبەجێـکردنێـتی لەسەر ئاستی ناوخۆٌـی بۆ خۆمان، وە لەسەر ئاسـتی نەتەوەکاندا ئێمە وبراٌانی عەرەب 
بخات کە چێ مافی ئەوانە وچی مافی ئێمەٌە. واتە  وفارس وتورن دەبێت بە دادگەرانە سنورەکانی نێوانمـان ڕێن
ئەمانە تەواوکاری ٌەکترن وەکو بازنەٌەن، هەر ووڵاتێـن ئازادی تێدا نەبوو هەرگـٌز دادپەروەرٌـشی تێدا نابێت، 
دادپەروەرٌـش نەبوو بـراٌەتی ناکـرێت. من دڵێم ئازادی لە سەروو هەموو بەهاکانەوەٌە، تەنانەت لە سەرو 
بەهای ئٌمانٌـشەوەٌە. چونکە ئٌمان بە بێ ئازادی نابێت (فمن شـاء فلٌٶمن ومن شاء فلٌکفر). وە ئەگەر کەسـێن 
ئٌمانـی بە هەر شـتێن هێـنا بەڵام بە بێ بوونـی ئازادی، ئٌتر ئەوە ئٌمان نٌە بەڵکو نٌفالە. لەبەر ئەوە بەهای هەرە 
نی ئازادی خۆی بۆخۆی نەمانی دادپەروەرٌە. وە ئەگەر گەورە لە بوونی مرۆڤدا برٌتٌە لە بەهای ئازادی. وە نەما
 !ئازاد نەبم وە براٌەتٌش سەپێـنرابێت بەسەرما چ بەهاٌەکی هەٌە
 
 پ/ چۆن دەتوانـن وەکو پارتێـکی سـٌاسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لەگەڵ هەمـوو ئەو پارتە عٌلمـانٌانەدا هەڵ بکەن؟
کەسـێن ئازادە کە لٌـبرالٌـستە ٌان کۆمۆنٌـستە ٌان هەر و/ لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە باوەڕمان بە ئازادی هەٌە. هەموو 
شـتێن. لەبەر ئەوە باوەڕمان بە ئازادی هەٌە باوەڕمان بە مافٌـش هەٌە. ٌەکەم ئازادە کە خۆی چۆنە، ئەنجا مافی 
دادگەری هەٌە لەسەر من کە دەبێت دادپەروەری بۆ دابٌن بکەٌن. دادپەروەرٌـش ئەوەٌە کە مافەکانی خۆی 
. هەر بۆٌە ٌەکگرتوو ئازادی ودادپەروەری وبراٌەتٌـشی وەکو درووشـم دانٌـاوە. چونکە کەسـێن دەتوانێت بدەمێ
لەگەڵ ٌەکێـکی تردا بژٌت، بەڵام ئازادی نەداتێ، کەواتە دادگەری نٌەو براٌەتٌش واتای نٌە. ئەگەر کەسـێن بڵێت 
هەر  ! ٌت لەگەڵ ناکات، ئٌتر کەی ئازادی دراوەئازادٌت دەدەمێ وە براٌەتٌـشت لەگەڵ دەکەم بەڵام دادپەروەر
بۆٌە ئێمە بڕوامان بە پێکەوە ژٌان هەٌە چونکە بڕوامان بەو سێ چەمکی (ئازادی ودادپەروەری وبراٌەتی)ٌە 
هەٌە کە کـردومانن بە درووشـم. ئێمە بڕوامان واٌە کە بەدەر لە بٌرکـردنەوە وباوەڕ وئاٌن وفٌکر دەبێت بـرابٌن. 
واٌە کە نابێت کەسمان (وصً)بێت بەسەر کەسـمانەوە، دەبێت هەموومان ئازادی بدەٌن بە ٌەکتری. بڕواشـمان 
 وە لە کاتێکدا ئەم ئازادی وبراٌەتٌە واتای هەٌە کە دادپەروەری هەبێت. 
 
 پ/ چۆن لە دٌموکـراسی تـێ دەگەن وە چـۆنٌـش بەرجەسـتەی دەکەن؟
سەفەٌەکە وە مٌکانٌزمێکە، بۆ ڕێکخـستنی سـٌستمێـکی سـٌاسی و/ ئێمە لەناعەتمان واٌە کە دٌموکراسی فەل
تەندروست. ئەو بەهاٌانەی کە ئٌسلام لە مێژووی خۆٌدا بەرجەستەی کردووە، ئێـستا لەم سەردەمە ناومان لێ 
ناوە دٌموکـراسی. خەڵکێـن ئەم دٌموکراسٌەی بە عەلل دۆزٌەتەوە، مەرج نٌە لە ئٌسلامٌـشی وەرگرتبێت وە 
وە دٌموکـراسی. ئێمە کاتێـن کە سەٌری دٌموکراسٌەت دەکەٌن، دٌموکراسٌەت ٌەکـسان ناکەٌن لەگەڵ ناوی نا
لٌـبراڵـٌزم. دٌموکراسٌەت شـتێکە لٌبراڵـٌزم شـتێـکی ترە. لٌـبراڵـٌزم کە فەلسەفەٌەکە دەکـرێت جٌاوازی هەبێت 
ـراسی وەکو مٌکانٌزمی بەڕێوەبـردنـی لەگەڵ ئٌسلام، وە بە دڵنٌاٌٌـش هەٌەتی لەگەڵ ئٌسلام. بەڵام دٌموک
دەسەڵاتی سـٌاسی، وە ڕێکخـستنی ژٌانی سـٌاسی کە برٌتٌە لە چەمکە سەرەکٌەکانی بەشداری، ٌەکـسانی، 
هەڵـبژاردن، جٌاکـردنەوەی دەسەڵاتەکان لە ٌەکـتری، هەموو ئەمانە ئێمە پێمان واٌە کە داهێـنانێـکی عەلڵـی 
جاوە لەگەڵ ئٌسلام، وە مٌکانٌزمێـکی زۆر جوانە. وە دەکـرێت مٌکانٌزمێـكی بەشەری ئەم سەردەمەٌە وە گون
زۆر باش بێت بۆ ڕزگار بوون لە کۆمەڵێـكی زۆر لەو کێـشەو ئاڵۆزٌانەی کە دەسڵاتی سـٌاسی درووسـتی 
 دەکەن. 
% ٌەکـسان ١١٠مەرجٌـش نٌە دٌموکـراسٌەت بەم شێوازەی کە ئێـستا بەرجەستە دەکـرێت لە هٌچ دەوڵەتێـکدا 
بێت بە دادگەری. ئێـستا دەبٌنٌت کە خەڵن لە ڕێگای سەرماٌەدارەکان، وە لە ڕێگای کۆنترۆڵکـردنـی مٌدٌا 
چەواشەٌەکی زۆر بۆ دەنگدەران درووسـت دەکەن، دەرەنجام ئەو ئازادٌەی کە دەڵێن داومانە بە دەنگدەران تەواو 
دەنگدەران ئەکادٌمٌەکی بێ لاٌەن نٌە کە هەموو  نٌە چونکە ئەو کەسەی کە ڕای گـشتی درووست کردوە بۆ
% بخاتە بەردەستٌان. ڕێگا دراوە بە دەزگاکانـی ڕاگەٌاندن کە زۆرجار ٌاری بە ١١٠ئٌجابٌەکان وسەلبٌەکان 
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عەلڵی خەڵن ئەکەن وە ڕاسـتٌەکان دەشـێوێـنن، خەڵکـی چان دەکەنە خـراپ وخەڵکـی خـراپٌـش دەکەنە چان. 
جل) وشەٌتانٌەتٌە لە لاٌەن ڕاگەٌاندنەوە بەسەر ڕای گـشتٌەوە ئەنجام بدرێت. وە کێٌـش ئەم ڕێگات داوە ئەم (د
% کارٌگەری ١١٠ڕاگەٌاندنە دەبات بە ڕێوە خاوەن سەرماٌدارەکان، کۆمپانٌا گەورەکانە. ئەمەش دەرەنجام 
% بکەٌت لە هٌچ ١١٠ەی هەٌە لەسەر دەرەنجامەکان. لەبەر ئەوە ناتوانٌت باس لە دٌموکراسٌەتٌەکی ڕاستەلٌن
شوێنـێکی دنٌا. بە پێچەوانەوە ئەگەر بێتو بەها ئٌسلامٌەکان بهێـنرێت وموتوربە بکـرێت بە بٌری دٌموکراسٌەت 
 خزمەتێـکی گەورە بە جوانتر وباشـتر کـردنـی دٌمەکراسٌەت دەکات لەوەی کە ئێـستا ئەنجام دەدرێت. 
 
سـتی تٌـۆری ئاماژە بە سـتراتـٌژی بنـٌاتنـانەوەی کەسـێتی موسـڵمان، پ/ لە ووتاری بـراٌانـی موسـڵماندا، لە ئا
خـێزانـی موسـڵمان، کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمان، حکومەتی ئٌـسلامــٌی وە خـٌلافەتـی ئٌـسلامــٌی دەکات وەکو 
دان، ئاٌا شـێوازی کۆشـشی بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان. ئێـوە وەکو بـراٌانـی موسـڵمانـی کورد لە کوێـی ئەم سـتراتـٌژە
 خـٌلافەت درووسـت دەبـێت؟ 
و/ ئێمە بڕوامان واٌە کە ئٌسلام باسـی فۆرمێـکی دٌاری کـراو لە حوکمـڕانی ناکات، وە خٌلافەتٌـش فۆرمێـن 
بووە لە فۆرمەکان. خٌلافەتی ئٌسلامی ٌەعـنی ٌەکێـتی ئومەتانی ئٌسلام. وە دەکـرێت ٌەکگـرتنێـن بێت لە نێوان 
کاندا هەر ٌەکەٌان شوناسی سـٌاسی خۆشـٌان بپـارێـزن، وە لە سـتراتٌژٌەتێـکی ٌەکگـرتووشـدا دەوڵەتە ئٌـسلامٌە
ٌەن بگرنەوە وسەرۆکێـکٌـشی هەبێت. ئەو سەرۆکەش بە ڕێککەوتنی نێوانٌـان لەسەری ڕێکەون. وەکو ئێـستا 
تمێـکە، وە کۆنفٌدراڵٌـش نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتووەکان کە سـٌستەمێـکە لەو جۆرە، بە هەمان شێوە فٌدراڵٌەت سـٌس
سٌستمێکە. ئێـستا ٌەکێـتی ئەوروپاش سـٌستمێکە، ناتۆ سٌستمێکە کەسـٌش ناڵێـت سٌستەمی ناتۆ ٌان ٌەکێـتی 
ئەوروپا سٌستمێکی دٌکتاتۆرٌە. ٌان ٌەکێـتٌەکە دژ بە مرۆڤاٌەتٌە، دژ بە دادگەرٌە. وە واتای ئەوەش نٌە کە ئٌتر 
ٌـان گرتووە. ئەی بۆچی دەبێت لەسەر هەمان بنەما باس لە ٌەکگرتنـی دەوڵەتە خەڵن بتۆلێت وبڵێن ئەوروپا ٌەک
ئەگەر   !وە خٌلافەت دەخاتە ژێر کۆمەڵێـن پرسٌاری گەورەوە !ئٌسلامٌەکان بکـرێت خەڵن خۆی بتۆلێـنێت
 خٌلافەت برٌتی بێت لەوەی کە دەوڵەتێـن خۆی بسەپێـنێت بەسەر دەوڵەتە ئٌسلامٌەکان، وە بەزۆر داوای
بەٌعەتٌان لێ بکەن، ئەوە بوونـی نٌەو هەر نابێت. ئەوەش کە باس لە خٌلافەتی ئٌسلامٌی دەکات باس لە 
ٌەکگرتنی توانای دەوڵەتە ئٌسلامٌەکان دەکات لە بوارە جٌاکانەوە. ئەمەش بە شێوازێـن کە تەعبٌر لە خواسـتی 
سەپێـنراو. هەروەکو چۆن گەلانی ئەوروپا  گەلە موسـڵمانەکان بکات بە شێوازێکـی سروشـتی، نەن بە شێوازێكی
خۆٌان بڕٌارٌان دا ٌەکێـتی ئەوروپا درووست بکەن، دوای ئەوە دراو درووسـت بکەن، دوای ئەوە پەرلەمان 
 درووسـت بکەن. 
ٌەکگـرتنـی دەوڵەتە موسڵمانەکانٌـش ئەگەر ڕوو بدات نابێت بەو واتاٌە بێت کە ٌەکێـن خۆی بکات بە لوێخا، وە 
سەپێنێت بەسەر خەڵکدا. بەڵکو تەنها گەر زەرور بوو وەکو نموونەی گەلانی ئەوروپا وٌەکێتی ئەوروپا خۆی پ
لەبەر بەرژەوەندی خواسـتە باڵاکانی گەلان موسڵمان بێت. وە مەرجٌـش نٌە بە ناوی خٌلافەتەوە بێت، چونکە 
ە، وە هٌـچ مەشروعٌەتێـکی دٌاری ناوی خٌلافەت ئاٌن نٌە. وە خٌلافەتٌـش تەنها فۆرمێـکی سـٌاسی مێژووٌٌ
کـراوی نٌە. بەڵام لە ئٌسلامدا بەهاٌەن هەٌە کە ئەوٌش ٌەکێـتی ئومەتی ئٌسلامە، ئەوٌـش دەکـرێت بە هەر 
مٌکانٌزمێـن بێت. وە خٌلافەتی ئٌسلامی بەواتای ٌەن دەوڵەت نا، بەڵکو ٌەعـنی ٌەکێـتی ئومەتی ئٌسلام. ئەم 
لەوانەٌە کەڵکی هەبێت. لە والع دا خٌلافەی ئٌسلامـٌی هٌچ کاتێـن دەوڵەتێـکی ٌەکێتٌە لە فٌدراسـٌۆنێـکدا 
سەنتراڵٌزمی مەرکەزی نەبووە. فٌدراڵٌـاتی ٌەکگـرتنـی ئٌسلامـٌی هەبووە. بەڵام خەلٌفە ڕەمزی ٌەکێـتی 
وٌەکێـتی موسڵمانان بووە. وە ئێـستا ئێمە هٌـچ فۆرمێـکی مـێژووٌی واجب نٌە لەسەرمان. بەڵام هاوکاری 
ئومەتی ئٌسلام، وە خەمخواردنـی ٌەکتری ئەمانە ئەرکـی شەرعی وئەخلالٌە لەسەر ئومەتی ئٌسلام. ئەمەش 
چۆن دەخـرێتە بواری پراکتٌزەوە، بە ٌەکێـتی لە بواری سٌاسی، لە بواری ئابوری، لە بواری سەربازی، ئەم 
ەش نەن تەنهـا بۆ ئومەتی ئٌسلام، بەڵکو گەلانی دنٌـا ٌەکێـتٌانە ئامانجێـکی ئاٌنی وسـٌاسٌە لە هەمان کاتدا. ئەم
ئێـستا هەموو بەرەو ٌەکێـتی دەڕوات. ئەمەش بەرژەوەندی مٌللەتەکان لەوەداٌا. بەرژەوەندی هٌچ مٌللەتێـن لەوەدا 
ئەمـڕۆ بەرژەوەندی هەموو گەلان لەوەداٌا کە بەرەو ٌەکێـتی   701نٌە کە لە شەڕدابێت لەگەڵ دراوسـێکەی.
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رتن وتێکەڵاوی بـڕۆن. هەموو ئەمانەش دٌارە لەسەر بنەمای دادگەری وڕێـز لەٌەکـتر گـرتن درووسـت وٌەکگـ
 بووبێت، نەن لەسەر بنەمای سەپاندن. 
پ/ باشـە تێـگەٌـشـتنی ئەندامانتـان هـٌچ جـٌاوازٌەکـی هەٌە لەم تێـگەٌـشتنەی بەڕێـزتان وەکو سەرکـرداٌەتی 
 ٌەکگـرتـوو؟
لەناو ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌسلامٌی دا بەو فۆرمە مێژووٌٌە لە خٌلافەت تێنەگەٌشتووە وە باوەڕٌـشی و/ هٌـچ کەسـێن 
پێـی نٌە. وە هٌـچ ئٌخوانێـن لە دنٌا ئەمڕۆ باوەڕی بەوە نٌە کە چەمکی خٌلافەت برٌتٌە لەو فۆرمە کۆنەی کە 
بووە، نە لە والعٌـشدا ئەمڕۆ ٌەن خەلٌفە فەرمان دەکات وهەمووی بەگوێـی دەکات. چونکە نە لە مێـژوودا وا
دەکـرێت وابێت. جگە لە حـٌزبی تەحـرٌر کە بۆچوونێـکی (تملٌدي)ٌان هەٌە بۆ خٌلافەتی ئٌسلامـٌی هٌـچ 
ئٌخوانێـن ئەمڕۆ وا سەٌری خٌلافەت ناکات. بۆ نموونە کە ئەمـڕۆ ئٌخوان پێکەوە کاردەکەن، بە هٌـچ شێوەٌەن 
ت بۆنموونە لە مٌـسر دەربچێت وئٌتر ووڵاتانی تر بەگوێـی بکەن. وە هٌـچ بڕٌارێکی مەرکەزی نٌە کە بڵێٌ
کاتێـکٌـش کە خەڵن بە تەنزٌمی جٌهانـی ئٌخوان ناوی دەبات لە ڕاسـتی دا هٌچ واتاٌەکـی لەو بارەوە نادات، 
% وەکو ١١٠بەڵکو جۆرە هەماهەنگٌەکە بۆ تەنـسٌك وڕاوێـژکـردن وڕا گۆڕٌنەوە وٌەکـتر ناسـٌن. ئەمەش 
 ئەنتەرناشـٌوناڵ لٌبراڵ دٌموکـراتە. 
 
 پ/ ئاٌا ئێـوە هەسـت بە ڕکابەری دەکەن لە لاٌەن ئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی تـرەوە؟
و/ بە دڵنـٌاٌٌەوە هەموو گروپێـن لەگەڵ گـروپێـکی تر ڕکابەری هەٌە. بەڵام دەبێت ئەو ڕکابەرٌانە بخـرێنە 
  لٌم)انە دژ نەبێت کە ئێمە باسـٌان دەکەٌن بۆ خەڵن.چوارچێوەٌەکی ئەخلالی جوانەوە کە لەگەڵ ئەو بەهاو (
 
پ/ پێـت واٌە بـزوتنەوەی سەلەفـی لە مٌـسر کە دوای شۆڕشەکە پارتێـکی سـٌاسـٌٌان ڕاگەٌاند، هاوکار بـوون 
 ٌان ڕێگـر لە بەردەم بـراٌانـی مٌـسر؟ وە چ وانەٌەن لەم بارەوە هەٌە بۆ ئٌسلامٌەکانـی کوردسـتان؟  
کان وە هەر بزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌسلامـٌی تر کاتێـن کە دەچێتە بواری سـٌاسٌەوە بٌرکـردنەوەی و/ سەلەفٌە
مٌانەڕەوتـر دەبێت. وە باشـتر لە پرسەکان تێـدەگات، هەسـتکـردنـی بە پێـوٌـستی هاوکاری زٌاتر دەبێت. هەر 
جاران تەنها مونافەسەٌەکـی بۆٌە هەوڵدانـی بۆ نزٌکبوونەوەش زٌاتر دەبێت. لە بوارێکـی تـرٌـشدا ئەگەر 
پەروەردەٌی وئاٌنی بوو، ئێـستا مونافەسەکە دەچێتە بوارێکی سـٌاسٌـشەوە. بەڵام ئەگەر ئەو بزوتنەوە ئٌسلامٌانە 
بتوانن لە ئامانجێـکی سـٌاسی گـشتی دا ٌەکبگرنەوە، ئەوا دەتوانن سود لە دوو شـت وەربگرن: ٌەکەم سود لەوە 
سەلەفٌانە بەرەو مٌانەڕەوی دێن، دووەم دەکـرێت سود لەوە وەربگرن کە مادام ئەم وەربگرن کە ئەم بزوتنەوە 
سەلەفٌانە هێـزێکی ئٌسلامٌن دەکـرێت لە ئامانجە گـشتٌەکاندا دۆسـت وبـرا وهاوکار بن. ئێمەش بۆ ئەوان 
ڕۆشـتنٌانە بەرەو ئەوانٌـش بۆ ئێمە. لەبەر ئەوە من وای دەبٌنم کە کارا بوونـی سەلەفٌەکان لە بواری سٌاسی 
مٌانەڕەوی، ڕۆشـتنٌانە بەرەو والعـی بوون، کە تا ئێـستا ئەم دوو ڕەکەزە لای براٌانی سەلەفی گرفتی هەٌە. 
 لەبەر ئەوە من ئەمە بە ئاماژەٌەکی ئٌجابی ئەبٌنم. 
 
ەم سـتراتـٌژە پ/ لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌنتان بـڕٌاردا وەکـو سـتراتـٌژی کارتان، چـۆن ئ
 بەرجەسـتە دەکەن؟ 
و/ ئێمە لە ڕوانگەی ئٌسلامٌمانەوە مافی دەوڵەت بوون بە مافی هەموو نەتەوەٌەکـی دەزانٌن. لە ساڵانی پێـشوو 
ٌەکگرتووی ئٌسلامٌی کوردسـتان کۆمەڵە خەڵکـێکی تورکمانی لەگەڵ بوو، ٌەکگـرتوو هانٌدان کە بچن 
کمانی درووست بکەن. کە ئەمـڕۆ حـٌزبی عەدالەی تورکمانە. زۆربەی حـٌزبێـکی ئٌسلامـٌی نەتەوەٌی تور
زۆرٌان ئەندامـی ئێمە بوون، وە ئێمە هانماندان کە بـڕۆن حـٌزبێـكی تاٌبەت بە خۆٌان بە نەتەوەی خۆٌان 
درووسـت بکەن. چونکە ئەوەی کە ئێمە بە ڕەوای دەزانٌن بۆ خۆمان دەبێت بە ڕەواشـی بزانٌن بە تورکمان 
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رەب وفارس وهەموو نەتەوەکان. هەر بۆٌە ئێمە لەناعەتمان واٌە کە دەبێت نەتەوەی کورد لە حاڵـی خۆی وعە
 ڕازی بێت وە سەربەخۆٌـی خۆی وەرگـرێت. وە ئەمەش مافێـکی سـروشـتی نەتەوەی کوردە. 
 
پ/ لە پـرۆگـرام وپەٌڕەوی ناوخۆی ٌەکگـرتوو، مادەی چوارەم بنەما گـشتٌەکان: ٌەکەم بنەما وبەها ئٌسلامٌە 
نەگۆڕەکان وبەها مـرۆٌٌە چەسـپاوەکان سەرچاوەی کاری سـٌاسـٌمانـن، مەبەست چٌە لە بەها مـرۆٌٌە 
 چەسـپاوەکان؟ 
ئٌسلامـٌی سود وەرناگـرێت. بەڵکو لە (تراث)ی  و/ ئەمە ئەوە دەگەٌەنێت کە ٌەکگرتوو تەنها لە (تراث)ی
ئٌنسانٌـش سود وەردەگـرێت. هەندێ بەها هەن ئٌنسانٌن، لە ؼەٌری ئٌسلامٌـشدا جەختٌان لەسەر کراوەتەوە وە 
گرنگی پێ دراوەو بەرجەستە کراوە. وە ئێـستا سٌستەمی بۆ درووسـتکراوە، وە دەوڵەتان لەسەری کاردەکەن، 
نـی تاٌبەت بە مافی مرۆڤ، ئازادٌە گـشتٌەکان، دٌموکـراسٌەت، مافە سـٌاسی ومەدەنٌەکان، وەکو بەها مرۆٌەکا
دژاٌەتی گەندەڵـی، هەموو ئەمانە ئەو چەمـن وبەهاٌانەن کە بەهای مـرۆڤاٌەتٌن بە واتاٌەن کە مرۆڤاٌەتی هەموو 
بەڵکو کـراوەٌە بۆ وەرگـرتنی لەسەری کۆکـن. وە فٌکری ئێمە داخـراو نٌە تەنها لەسەر کلتوری ئٌسلامـٌی، 
هەموو شتێکی جوان لە هەموو ئومەت ومٌللەتێن. وە ئەمەش دژ نٌە لەگەڵ ئٌسلام، بەڵکو بە عەکسەوە ئەمە 
 بەرجەستەکـردنەوەی ئەو کـرانەوەی عەلڵەٌە کە ئٌسلام دەٌەوێت کەسی موسڵمان هەٌبێت.   
 
شەرٌعەت بەواتا ٌاسا ودادگا، ٌان بە واتای هەموو ئٌسلام پ/ ئاٌا ئێوە چۆن لە شەرٌعەت تێگەٌـشتوون، ئاٌا 
 دێت؟
و/ بەشێوەٌەکی گـشتی بە دوو بەکارهێـنان شەرٌعەی ئٌسلامـٌی بەکار دێت، کاتێـن کە دەڵێٌن شەرٌعەتی 
ئٌسلامـٌی بەواتای مرادؾ وهاو واتای خودی ئٌسلام بەکار دێت، وە جاری واش هەٌە بە واتای ٌاسای ئٌسلامی 
ئەو بەشەی ئٌسلام کە ٌاسا وئەحکامە. لێرەدا ئێمە ئەڵێٌن ئٌسلام دەبێتە سێ بەش: ئٌسلام برٌتٌە لە عەلٌدە، دێت، 
عٌبادەت، شەرٌعەت. ئا لێرەدا شەرٌعەت دەبێتە بەشـی جٌاواز لە عٌبادەت وعەلٌدە. ئا لێرەدا دەبێتە ٌاسا 
، لە بواری عەلٌدە وعٌبادەت چونکە بواری وئەحکام. وە کاتێـن کە دەڵێـٌت دەبێت شەرٌعەت (تطبٌك) بکەٌت
تاکە کەسـٌن گـرفت درووسـت ناکات لەگەڵ هٌچ کۆمەڵگاٌەن، بەڵام کاتێـن هاتە سەر ئەوەی ئەحکام وٌاساکانـی 
شەرٌعەت بکەٌتە ٌاسا بۆ کۆمەڵگا، ئا لێرا سڵەمٌنەوە، ترس، کێـشە لەگەڵ کۆمەڵە کەسـێن درووسـت دەبێت، بە 
کەسە کە لەگەڵ ئٌسلام گرفتٌان هەٌە، وە ئٌسلامٌان وەکو شەرٌعەت لبوڵ نٌە. وە کۆمەڵێـن  تاٌبەت ئەو کۆمەڵە
ؼەٌرە موسڵمانٌـش دەتـرسـن کە ئەو ئەحکامە ئٌسلامٌانە جێگەی مافەکانـی ئەوانـی تێدا نەبێتەوە. لەبەر ئەوە 
ٌعەت. لە لاٌەکی ترەوەش تێگەٌـشتنێـکی هەڵە هەٌە لەسەر ئاستی نێودەوڵەتی لەسەر جێبەجێکـردنـی شەر
کۆمەڵێـکی ئٌسلامـٌی توند ڕەو هەن کە زۆر وێناٌەکی ناشـٌرٌنـٌان لە (تطبٌك)کـردنٌان شەرٌعەت داوە بە 
خەڵن، وە خۆٌان زۆر تێگەٌـشتنێـکی کەم وکورت وخـراپٌـان لەبارەی شەرٌعەتەوە هەٌە. وە بە فٌمهێـکی کۆن 
دڕەوەی خۆٌان ناو بنـێن شەرٌعەت، وە دەشـٌانەوێت بڵێـٌن ئەمە وتوند ودواکەوتوو وە بەو تێگەٌـشتنە تون
ئٌسلامە وجێبەجێـشی کەن لەسەر خەڵن. ئەمەش واٌکـردووە خەڵکـی تۆلاندووە لە شەرٌعەت. لەناعەتی ئێمە 
واٌە ئەوەی کە وێنای بەرجەستەکـردنی شەرٌعەتی لە زٌهـنی خەڵكـدا ناشـٌرٌن کـردووە ئەو جۆرە تێگەٌـشتنە 
ەندرووسـتانەٌە لە ئٌسلام خۆی، وە لە شەرٌعەت خۆی. ئەگٌـنا شەرٌعەت خۆی کۆمەڵێـن ٌاسـا وئەحکامە کە نات
ژٌانـی کەسەکانـی نێو کۆمەڵگا ڕێـن دەخات بە شێوازێـن کە مافی هەموو کەس تٌاٌدا پارێـزراوە. ئەم مافە 
پاراسـتنی مافی هەموو کەس ئەرکـی پارێـزراوەش پارێـزراو دەبێت وەکو بەشـێن لە ئاٌن، بەواتاٌەن کە 
ئاٌنٌمانە. ئەنجا خۆدی ئٌسلام هەر خۆی داوای حوکمی مەدەنـی دەکات کە بە هٌچ شێوەٌەن کەس ناتوانێت 
بەناوی خواوە وە کو ئەوەی لە سەدەکانـی ناوەڕاست دا کەنٌـسە بەناوی خواوە حوکمـی کـردووە وا بێت. بەڵام 
وو لە نموونەی حوکمی تالٌـبان لە ئەفؽـانـستان لەبەر چـاوی خەڵکە وا دەزانن چونکە کۆمەڵێـن نموونەی دواکەوت
ئەوەٌە شەرٌعەت. ئەگەر سەٌری (تراث) ئٌنـسانی بکەٌت، هٌچ شارسـتانٌەتێـن بە لەد (تراث)ی ئٌسلامـٌی 
دێت. کەواتە  ٌاسای نەنووسـٌەتەوە لە هەموو بوارەکانی ژٌاندا. بەڵام ناوی شەرٌعە بووە، کە بە واتای ٌاسـا
شەرٌعەت ٌەعـنی ئەو ٌاسا وسٌستمەی کە دادگەری دەپارێـزێت بۆ موسـڵمان وە ؼەٌرە موسـڵمان. ٌاساش لە 
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هەموو شوێنـێن بەپێـی ٌاسای گـشتی ووڵات دەچێت بە ڕێوە، بۆ نموونە ئٌـستا لە بەرٌتانٌا کە کەسـێكی موسڵمان 
سـڵمانە ئەچەوسـێنرێتەوە چونکە بە ٌاسای ئٌسلام دادگاٌی دادگاٌی دەکـرێت واتای ئەوە نٌە کە ئٌتر ئەو مو
نەکـراوە، گرنگ ئەوەٌە کە دادگەری ڕەچاو وپەٌـڕەو بکـرێت، وە بە چاوی ٌەکـسانی دادگاٌی هەموو هاوڵاتٌان 
بکرێت. ئەمەش کاتێـن کە سەٌری مێژوو دەکەٌت کاتێـن کە ئٌمام عەلی خەلٌفە دەبێت لەگەڵ هاوڵاتٌەکـی 
ولەکە بە ٌەکـسانی دەچـنە بەردەم لازی شورەٌح. کەواتە نە پێوٌـست دەکات بتۆلٌن لە ووشەی ئاساٌی ج
شەرٌعەت، نە سوورٌـش بٌن لەسەر بەکارهێـنانـی، چونکە گرنگ دادگەری پێوٌستە لە بۆ ٌاسا ٌان شەرٌعەت، 
بەشـێن لە شەرٌعەت کە نەبوو وە ٌەکـسانی هاوڵاتٌانـش بەرانبەر ٌاسا ٌان شەرٌعەت گرنگە نەن ناو. ئەنجا هەر 
بە ٌاسا ئٌتر ئێمە مافی ئەوەمان نٌە کە لە دەوڵەتدا جـێبەجێـی بکەٌن. ئەمەش دٌارە لە ڕێگای پەرلەمانەوە ٌاسا 
بڕٌاری لەسەر دەدرێت. سەرچاوەی ئەم ٌاساٌانەش کە لە پەرلەمانەوە دەردەچـن دەکـرێت شەرٌعە بێت، وە 
ستا کە پێوٌـستمان بە ٌاساٌەن هەبوو من وەکو زاناٌەکـی ئٌسلامـٌی پێت دەکـرێت ؼەٌری شەرٌعەت بێت. ئێـ
دەڵێم ئەگەر لە لورئان و(حدٌث) وشەرٌعەت هەبوو باش، ئەگەر نەبوو بـڕۆ لە ئٌـسرائٌل ٌان لای بوذی ٌان 
شەرعی  چـٌنی ٌان ئەمرٌکی بٌهێنە بە ٌەن مەرج دژ نە بێت لەگەڵ ئٌسلام، ئٌتر ئەوە ئٌسلامٌە. با حومێـکٌش
   .بێت، بەڵام بە بێ وەرگرتنی لە پەرلەمان وەکو ٌاسا ئٌتر جێبەجێـکردنی شەرعی نٌە
ئەمەش جٌاوازٌەکـی تـرە لە نێوان بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامـی وحـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی ئٌـسلامـٌی، چونکە بزوتنەوە 
وور وٌاسا دەکات. بە واتاٌەن ئٌسلامٌەکە باس لە شەرٌعەت وپەروەردە دەکات بەڵام حـٌزبی سـٌاسی باسی دەست
دەکـرێت ئێمە وەکو بزوتنەوەٌەکـی ئٌسلامـٌی بانگەواز بۆ ئەوە دەکەٌن کە خەڵن لە ژٌانـی خۆٌاندا شەرٌعەت 
جێبەجێ بکەن، بەڵام لە ئاسـتی ووڵاتدا ٌاسا جێبەجێ دەکـرێت. بۆ نموونە من وتۆ هاوڕێـٌن، من کاتی خۆی 
ەڵام ئێـستا کە داوات لـێ دەکەم کە خانووەکەم بدەٌتەوە تۆ ئٌنکاری دەکەٌت، وە خانووٌەکم کـردووە بە ناوتەوە، ب
دەڵێت بـڕۆ بۆ ٌاسا، ٌاساٌـش چونکە خانووەکە هابەناوتەوە دەڵێت هی تۆٌە. ئێمە هەوڵ دەدەٌن کە تۆ وەکو 
لە من نەکەٌت. موسڵمانێـن پێـش ئەوەی کە ئەو مافە کە ٌاساش بداتێ خۆت شتەکە بە ناشەرعی بزانٌت وستەم 
کەواتە بۆ ئەوەی مافێـن کە هی خۆت نٌە با ٌاساش بداتـێ تۆ دەزانٌت کە ناشەرعٌە خۆت لبوڵـی ناکەٌت. بەم 
شێوەٌەش پەٌوەندی من وتۆ شەرٌعەتە، بەڵام پەٌوەندی من وکۆمەڵگا ٌاساٌە. نموونەٌەکـر تر ئەگەر ئێـستا منٌان 
دەدات کە ئارەق بفرۆشـرێت، من ناتوانم ئەم عارەلە (ممنوع) بکەم هەڵـبژارد بۆ پارێـزگاری سلێمانی، ٌاسا ڕێ
چونکە تەنها ناشەرعٌە. چونکە ئەو خەڵکە منٌـان هەڵـبژاردووە بۆ ئەوەی ئەم ٌاساٌەٌان بەسەردا جێبەجێ بکەم 
ٌەن کە ڕێگا بە فرۆشـتنی ئارەلٌـش دەدات. با مەنع کـردنی ئارەق شەرعٌـش بێت، بەڵام سەپاندنی وەکو ٌاسا
ناشەرعٌە. مافی ئەو خەڵکەٌە کە خۆٌان ٌان شەرٌعەت بەرجەستەکەن وەکو تان بە نە کـڕٌن ونەخواردنـی 
ئارەق، ٌان هەوڵ بدەن نەفـرۆشـتنی ئارەق بکەنە ٌاسا لە ڕێگای پەرلەمان ودەزگای ٌاسا دانانەوە. ٌەکگـرتوو 
حکامـی شەرٌعەت دەکات لەناو ئٌمانداراندا، وەکو بزوتنەوەٌەکی ئٌسلامـٌی کار لەسەر ژٌانەوەی شەرٌعەت وئە
 بەڵام ٌەکگـرتوو وەکو حـٌزبێـی سـٌاسی کار لەسەر سەروەری ٌاسا وچەسـپاندنـی دەکات لەناو کۆمەڵگا.
 
لە مادەی چوارەم: حوکم ڕانی ڕاشـد ودادگەرانە ئامانجێکی ئٌسلامی وپێوٌـستٌەکی ژٌانە، حوکم  ٢٠پ/ بەندی 
 ڕانی ڕاشـد چـٌە؟ 
چەمکێـکە لە دۆکٌومێنتە نێودەوڵەتٌەکاندا زۆر بەکاردێت، ئەو    )ecnanrevog doog( حوکمی ڕەشـٌد و/ 
حوکمەٌە کە پێوەرەکانـی دٌموکـراسی ودادگەری وکەرامەت ومافی مرۆڤ وئەو شـتانە پەٌـڕەوی لـێ دەکات. 
ەکات، چونکە ئٌسلام داوای خەباتی ئێمە بۆ حوکمـی ڕەشـٌد خەباتمانە بۆ ئەو حوکمەی کە ئٌسلام داوای د
حوکمی ڕەشـٌد دەکات. وە مێژووی ئٌسلام پڕێتی لە نموونەی جوانی حوکمی ڕەشـٌد. دٌارە بەشـێکٌـش لە 
مێژووی ئٌسلامـٌی نمونەی زۆری حوکمی ؼەٌرە ڕەشـٌد وخـراپی تٌاٌە، دٌارە ئەمەش لادان بووە لەو حوکمەی 
ە خەڵن نەکـردنە بە خوا، وە ڕێـزگـرتنی خەڵن وکەرامەت کە ئٌسلام داوای دەکات. ئەمەش بەواتای خۆ ل
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  مانـی د. محمـد أحمـد، ئەندامـی مەکتەبـی سـیاسی وسەرۆکـی دەسـتەی سەرکـردایەتی دەڤەری سـڵێ
 
  / چـۆن هەسـت دەکەٌت وەکو کوردێـن، وە چـۆن هەست دەکەٌت وەکو موسـڵمانێـن؟1پ
و/ ناسـنامەی کوردی وناسـنامەی ئاٌنـی دوو چەمکـی دژ بە ٌەن نٌن. من وەکو نەتەوە کوردم وەکو ئاٌنـٌش 
ودژی ٌەکـترٌـش نـٌن. لەبەر موسڵمانم. هەردووکـی بە ٌەکەوە تەواوکاری ٌەکـترن، وە ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤی ٌەن نـٌن، 
ئەوە هەردووکٌان گـرنگـن، چونکە هەموو نەتەوەٌەن ناسـنامەی ئاٌـنی خۆی هەٌە، وە ناسـنامەی نەتەوەٌـی 
خۆی هەٌە. ئێمەش وەکو گەلێـن زۆربەمان موسـڵمانـٌن. بەڵام بەو پەڕی ڕێـزٌـشەوە دەڕوانٌنە هاوڵاتٌەکانـی 
باوەڕێـکن. هەموومان هاوڵاتی ئەم ووڵاتەٌن، هەموومان وەكو ٌەن مافمـان تـرمان کە لەسەر هەر ئاٌن وبـٌرو 
هەٌە، وە هەموومان ئەرکمـان لەسەرە. من ئاٌنەکەم وام پـێ دەڵێـت کە ڕێـز لە ئاٌنـی پێکهـاتەکانـی تـری 
ەی کە موسـڵمانم کوردسـتان بگـرم. وە تەواوی مافەکانٌـان ڕەچاو بکەم. وە لە هەمان کاتٌـشدا شـانازی دەکەم بەو
وئاٌنەکەم ئٌـسلامە. وە هەموومان پێکەوە کوردسـتانٌن وهاوڵاتی ئەم ووڵاتەٌن، وە پێکەوە تێدەکۆشـٌن لە پێـێناو 
 مافەکانمـاندا.
 
/ وەکو کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی ٌان ئٌـسلامـٌٌەکی کورد گەر دەتەوێت، چـۆن سەٌری ئٌـسلام دەکەٌت وەکو 2پ
  ـانٌـبوونـی ئٌـسلام چـی دەگەٌەنێـت؟ ئاٌنێـکی جٌهـانـی؟ جٌه
و/ ئەوەندی من لە ئٌـسلام تێگەشـتووم، ئٌـسلام چەند ڕەهەندێکـی هەٌە، لەوانە ڕەهەندێکـی گەردوونـی. وە 
ئٌـسلام نەهاتووە نەتەوەکان بتـوێـنێـتەوە لە بۆتەٌەکـی جٌهـانٌدا. بەڵکـو هاتووە هاوبەشـی درووسـت کـردووە. 
وان نەتەوەکاندا درووسـت کـردووە وەکو مـرۆڤ. وە لە نێـوان موسـڵمانەکانٌـشدا وەکو ئاٌـن هاوبەشـی لە نێـ
وپەرسـتشەکان کە هەموو موسـڵمانەکان تٌاٌدا هاوبەشـن. بە هەمان شـێوە بازنەٌەکـی تـرٌـش کە بازنەی 
نەتەوە جٌـاوازانە هەبن، هەر  نەتەوەکانە کە ئەوٌـش (جعـل)ێـکی خواٌٌە، واتە بـڕٌارێکـی خواٌٌە کە هەموو ئەم
وەکو لەم ئاٌەتەدا هاتووە (انا خلمـناکم من ذکـر وانثـی وجعلنـاکم شـعوبا ولبـائل لتعـارفو ان اکـرمکـم عند اللە 
اتماکم). دٌارە بۆ ئەوەی ٌەکـتر بناسـٌن، ئەنجا داوامان لـێ دەکات کە هاوکارٌـی ٌەکـتر بکەٌن، وەکو دەفەرموێت 
لی الـبر والتموی ولا تعـاونوا علی الاثم والعدوان). دٌـسان خوا داوامان لـێ دەکات (لاٌنهـاکم اللە عن (وتعـاونوا ع
الذٌن لم ٌماتلوکم فً الدٌن ولم ٌخـرجوکم من دٌارکم أن تـبروهم وتمسـطوا الٌهم) واتە خوای گەورە ڕێگەتان لـێ 
ەگەڵٌـان مادام شەرتان لەگەڵدا ناکەن ودەرتان ناکەن لە ناگـرێت کە لەگەڵ هەموو خەڵکـدا چـان بن ودادگەر بـن ل
ووڵاتەکەتان. چونکە هەمووتان بـران ولە ٌەن داٌن وباون بـوون. کەواتە لەگەڵ هەر مـرۆڤێـن با هەر بـٌرو 
باوەڕێکـٌـشی هەبێت بـڕٌار واٌە کە وەکو بـرا هاوکار وچاکە کاربـٌن لەگەڵ ٌەکــتر. هەروەهـا خوا دەفەرموێت 
ئادەم. هەر بـۆٌە دەبێت مـرۆڤ هەر لەبەر ولمد کـرمنـا بنـً آدم) واتە بە ڕاسـتی ئێمە ڕێـزمان نٌـا لە نەوەکانـی (
 مـرۆڤ بـوونـی ڕێـز بگـٌرٌت. 
لەگەڵ ئەوەشـدا کە بەو شـێوەٌە لەسەر بنەمای ڕێـز لەٌەکـتر گـرتن ودادگەرانە مامەڵەکـردن لە سەر بنەمای 
ەند ئەرکێـکی تـری بۆ دٌاری کـردووم وەکو موسڵمان لەگەڵ موسڵمانەکاندا کە ئەوٌـش مـرۆڤ بـوون، خوا چ
جۆرێکـی تـرە لە بـراٌەتی کە بـراٌەتی ئٌمانٌە لە نێـوانمـاندا. ئەوٌـش لەبەر ئەوە کە لورئانمـان ٌەکە، باوەڕمان 
انـی تـر هـی هەموو موسڵمـانانە. ٌەکە، وە بەٌەکەوە نوێـژی هەٌنـی دەکەٌن، حەج هـی هەموومانە، پەرسـتـشەک
ئەمەش وا دەکات کە کۆمەڵێـن خاڵـی هاوبەش لە نێـوانمـاندا داوامان لـێ بکات کە هاوکاری ٌەن بٌن لەسەر 
بنەمای (وتعاونوا علی الـبر والتموی) چاکە ولە خوا تـرسـان. بەڵام ئەم جۆرە هاوکارٌە لەسەر بنەمای دژاٌەتی 
نەی (تکلٌـؾ)ی مـن لە پێـناو ئاوەدان کـردنەوەی ڕووی زەوی بازنەی نەتەوەکەمە کە کەسـانی تـر نٌە. وە باز
کوردە. لەبەر ئەوە بازنەی (تکٌؾ)ی من گەلەکەی خۆمە. لەبەر ئەوە من گـرنگـی بە ووڵات ومٌللەتی خۆم 
وە ئٌـسلام  ئەدەم. ئەمەش وەکو تەواوکارٌەن بـۆ موسڵمانان و، وەن تەواوکارٌەن بـۆ مرۆڤەکان هەمووٌان.
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تاٌبەتمەندٌەکانـی نەتەوەٌەن ناسـڕێتەوە لە پێـناو جٌهـانـی بـوونـی ئٌـسلامـدا. وە ئٌـسلام ڕەچاوی هەموو 
ڕەهەندەکانـی تـرٌـش دەکات بەڵام لەسەر حـسابـی مافـی ڕەهەندەکانی تـر نا. بۆ نموونە ئٌـسلام باوەڕی بە 
ی گـشتی نا. وە لە هەمان کاتدا ڕەچاوی بەرژەوەندی گـشتٌـش موڵکـداری تاکە کەس هەٌە بەڵام لەسەر حـسابـ
دەکات. بەڵام ئەگەر دژ وەسـتان، (أولوٌة) دەدات بە بەرژەوەندٌە گـشتٌٌەکە. بەڵام لە بنەڕەتـدا هەردوو 
بەرژەوەندٌەکە دەبێت پارێـزراوبێت. بەٌەکەوە هەردووکٌـان ڕۆڵـی تەواوکاری دەبـٌنـن، نەن ڕۆڵـی دژاٌەتی. 
واتەٌەکـی تـر جٌهـانگـٌری ئٌـسلام بەواتای داخـران نٌە بەسەر موسـڵمانەکاندا وبەس، بەڵکـو بەواتای بە
 کـرانەوەٌە بەسەر جٌهـاندا بەشـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی لە شـێوەی هەر سـێ بازنەی نەتەوە وئٌـسلام وجٌهان. 
 
ی چی دەبێت گەر دەسـت بەرداری / چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ کێـشەی کەرکون؟ وەن کوردێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌ3پ
ئەو پرسە بن بۆ برا عەرەبە موسـڵمانەکانتـان؟ بۆ ئەوەی لانـی کەم خوێن نەڕێـژرێت، ٌان لەٌـرانەکە کۆتاٌـی 
 پێـبێت. 
و/ ئەم پـرسە پـرسـێکی ئاٌـنی نٌە، بەڵکـو پـرسـێکی سـٌاسـٌە. لەبەر ئەوە دەکـرێت لە ڕەوانگەی 
رووسـت بـوونـی هاوسەنگٌەکان، بۆ چارەسەری کێـشەکان تێـی بـڕوانٌن. پێـش جێـبەجێـکردنـی دادگەری، د
هەرچتێـن کورد کاتێـن لە عـێرالدا هاوڵاتٌە حەز دەکات وەکو هاوڵاتی پلە ٌەن مامەڵەی لەگەڵـدا بکـرێت، نەن 
ێـکی ڕاسـتەلٌنەی پلە دوو ٌان پلە سـێ. ئەم مامەڵەٌەش تا ئێـستا نەکـراوە. کورد دەٌەوێت لە عـێرالدا سەنگ
هەبێت، وە هاوبەش بێت. وە ئەم هاوبەشـٌەش هاوبەشـٌەکـی ڕاسـتەلٌنە بێت. وە ٌەکێـن لەو فاکتەرانە کە ئەم 
ٌەکـسانـی هاوبەشـٌە بەشـێوەٌەکـی ڕاسـتەلٌـنە ٌەکلاٌـی دەکاتەوە پـرسـی کەرکوکە. لە ڕووی مـێژووٌـی ولە 
ە ئێمە وا ئەزانٌن ئەگەر کەرکون بکەوێتە سەر هەرێمـی ڕووی جوگـرافٌەوە کەرکون کوردسـتانٌە. و
کوردسـتان، کورد (وزن)ی دەبێت لە هاوکێـشەی عـێرالدا. (وزن)ەکەشـی لورسـتر دەبێت. ئەوکاتە ئەو 
هاوبەشـٌەی کە دەٌەوێت درووسـت دەبێت. ئەوکاتەش وەن هاوڵاتی پلە ٌەن لە عـێرالدا ڕۆڵـی دەبێت. پێـش هەر 
ە هەسـتی تاكـی کورد وا دەبێت کە هاوبەشە لە عـێراق و، بەو شـێوەش هاوسەنگـی درووسـت مافێـن، ئەوکات
دەبێت لە عـێراق. لەوێـشەوە عـێراق بەرەو ئٌـستمراری سـٌاسـی دەڕوات. بەڵام ئەگەر کەرکون نەٌەتەوە سەر 
دەمێـنێتەوە. لەو هەرێمـی کوردسـتان هاوسەنگی درووست نابێت و، کوردٌـش هەر بە پلە دوو وپلە سـێ 
ڕوانگەوە، وە بۆ چـارەسەری ئەم کێـشە ئێمە بـڕوامان واٌە کە بە ڕێگەی سـٌاسـی، بە ڕێگەی مەدەنـی، بە 
ڕێگەی ڕۆشـنبٌری هەوڵ بدەٌن ئەم لەناعەتە درووسـت کەٌن کە ئەمە تەنهـا چارەسەرە بـۆ ئەوەی کێـشەی 
ەوە سەر هەرێمـی کوردسـتان. وە بەم شـێوەٌە ئٌـستمراری کورد لە عـێرالدا کۆتاٌـی بێت دەبێت کەرکون بگەڕێت
سـٌاسی لە عـێرالدا درووسـت دەبێت. لەو ڕوانگەوە ئێمە سەٌـری ئەم کێـشەٌە دەکەٌن، وە بۆ ئەوەی کورد وەکو 
پێـکهاتەٌەکـی سەرەکـی سەٌـر بکـرێت، وە دادگەری جێـبەجـێ ببێـت، وە هاوبەشـی ڕاسـتەلٌنە درووسـت بێت، 
ئٌـستمراری سـٌاسـی درووسـت ببـێت، وە (توازن)ی نٌـشتمانـی درووسـت ببـێت، کەرکون بگەڕێتەوە سەر وە 
  دا هاتووە. ١٤٠هەرێم. وە ئەمەش بە ڕێگای دەسـتووری کە لە مادەی 
دٌارە ڕژێمـی پێـشوو (تعـرٌب) و(تبعٌـث)ی کەرکوکـی کـردووە، بە زۆر ماڵە کورد وتورکمـانەکانـی دەرکـرد، 
ە ماڵ وسەروەتەکانـی داگـٌرکـرد، وە خەڵکـی عەرەبـی لە پارێـزگاکانـی تـرەوە ئەهێـنا ولەوێ جێـنـشٌـنی و
کـردن. هەر ئێـستاش بە شـێوەٌەکـی ئاسـاٌی عەرەب لەو پارێـزگاٌانە دێـن ولە سـلێمـانـی وهەولـێر ودهۆن 
و کە بە زۆر بـووە، ئٌـتر سـتەمێـن درووسـت نٌـشتەجـێ دەبـن و، هٌـچ کێـشەٌەکٌـش نٌە. بەڵام ئەوەی پێـشو
بـووە. ئەم سـتەمەش نابێت بەردەوام بێـت، وە دەبێت باری کەرکون بگەڕێتەوە سەر (أصـل)ەکەی خۆی. ئەنجـا 
دادگەری درووسـت دەبێت. ئەو خەڵکەی کە بە زۆر هـێنراون بگەڕێنەوە شـوێـنی خۆٌان، وە ئەوانەش کە بە 
وە شـوێـنی خۆٌان، ئەوکاتە حاڵەتەکە ئاسـاٌـی دەبێتەوە. کە حاڵەتەکەش سـروشـتی زۆر دەرکـراون بگەڕێنە
بووٌەوە ئٌتر ئاسـاٌٌە کە عەرەبێـکی هەر پارێـزگاٌەکـی تـر بێت لە کەرکون نٌـشتە جـێ بێت وەکو ئێـستا لە 
وردێکـی کەرکون شارەکانـی تـری هەرێمـی کوردسـتان نٌـشتەجـێ دەبـن. هەر وەکو ئاسـاٌٌـش دەبێت کە ک
بچـێت لە بەسـرە دانٌـشێت. ئەمەش ناچـێتە چوارچێوەی گۆڕٌـنی دٌمۆگـرافـی بۆ ئامانجـی سـٌاسی وەکو لە 




/ کامێـن لەم شـوناسـانە گـرنگتـرن بـۆت: کورد بـوون، موسـڵمان بـوون ٌان کوردسـتانی بـوون؟ ئاٌا ئەوە ٤پ
  هێـنێت کێـشەکان لەسەر کوردسـتانـی بـوون وعـێرالی بـوون بەردەوام بـن؟ ئە
و/ کورد بوون ناسـنامەٌەکـی نەتەوەٌٌە، موسـڵمان بوون ناسـنامەٌەکـی ئاٌنـٌە، وە هەردوو ئەم دوو ناسـنامەٌە 
ی خۆمـم ئەوێت هەر تەواوکاری ٌەکـن. نە دژ بە ٌەکـن، وە نە ئەڵتەرناتٌـڤی ٌەکـن. من هەر وەکو چۆن نەتەوە
 واش ئاٌنـی خۆمـم دەوێت. وە ناکـرێت جٌـاٌان کەٌتەوە. لەوەٌە پاش وپێـشٌان بخەٌت، هٌـچ گـرفتـێن لەوەدا نٌە. 
وە بۆ کوردسـتانـی بـوون وعـێرالـی بـوون، هەمووی باس لەو نا دادگەرٌەٌە کە لە عـێراق دا کـراوە. بە 
بە سـتەم کـردووە. کٌمـٌاباران کـراوە، ئەنفـال کـراوە، گوند درێـژی مـێژووی عـێراق کورد هەسـتی 
ودێهـاتەکانـی ڕووخـێنراوە. حـسابی بۆ نەکـراوە، هەمٌـشە کەنار خـراوە. ئێـستا لە عـٌرالی نوێـدا دەمانەوێت 
 لەسەر ئەو بنەماٌانەی کە لەسەری ڕێـن کەوتووٌن لەوانە دٌموکـراسـی، سـٌسـتەمی فٌدراڵـی، تەوافمـی
نٌـشتمانـی، هاوبەشـی ڕاسـتەلٌنە، هاوسەنگـی نٌـشتمانـی، دادگەری لە دابەشـکـردنـی سەروەت ودەسەڵاتدا. بـۆ 
نموونە ئێـستا لە هەرێمـی کوردسـتان بە پێـی دەسـتوور کۆمەڵێـن ماؾ دٌاری کـراوە، بەڵام هەندێ جـار 
هەرێم، ئەمەش ئاسـاٌٌە کە درووسـت بێـت، (خلاؾ) درووسـت دەبێت لە نێـوان حکومەتی ناوەندی وحکومەتی 
بەڵام کێـشەکە لەوە داٌا کە دادگاٌەکـی دادگەر نٌە کە جـێی متمـانەی هەموو لاٌەن بێت. لەبەر ئەوە تا نەگەٌنە 
لەناعەت ودڵنـٌاٌـی، وە بە تەوافك وڕێککەوتن نەبێـت ناگەٌنە دەرەنجـامێـکی کـردەٌـی. وە کاتێـکٌـش کە شـتێـن 
ٌەن لەبەر ئەمـری والع لبوڵ دەکـرێت، بەڵام هەر کاتێـن کە بارودۆخـی بەرانبەر باشـتر بـوو کێـشەکان بۆ ماوە
سەر هەڵ دەدەنەوە. وە شـتێکی ئاسـاٌٌە بۆ جێـبەجێ کـردنـی دادگەری ئەوانەی کە ستەمٌان لـێ کـراوە دەبێت 
لـێ بکـرێتەوە. بەمەش مافەکان دەچنەوە باری  لەرەبـوو بکـرێنەوە، ئەوانەش کە سـتەم کار بـوون دەبێت تۆڵەٌان
سـروشـتی خۆی. ئەوکات کە وای لێهـات وە هاوسەنگی نٌـشتمانـی درووسـت بـووٌەوە، ئەوجا پـرۆژەی 
نٌـشتمانـی لەسەر بنەمای هاوڵاتی بـوون درووسـت دەبێت. ئەوکاتەش هەموو عـێرالٌەن هەست بە بوونـی خۆی 
ە عـێرالدا لەبەر ئەوەی کە کوردٌـن سـتەممـان لـێ نەکـراٌە، وخاکمـان داگـٌر دەکات. ئەو کاتەش کە ئێمە ل
 نەکـراٌە و، تەواوی مافـی هاوڵاتـی بـوونمـان پارێـزراو بـوواٌە ئٌـتر ئەم بارە نائاسـاٌٌە درووسـت نە دەبـوو.
ئێـستاش کە دەوڵەت لەسەر بنەمای نەتەواٌەتی درووسـت بـووە، ئێمەش دەڵێـٌن خۆ ئێمەش نەتەوەٌەکـٌن. مافـی 
خۆمانە کە ئێمەش دەوڵەتـی نەتەوەٌٌـمان هەبێت. ئەگٌـنا وەرن با نەتەوەکانـی تـرٌـش واز لە دەوڵەتـی نەتەوەٌـی 
بـێنن، وە پێـکەوە لەسەر شـێوازێکـی تـر ڕێـن بکەوٌـن، ئەو کاتە ئێمە گـرفتمـان نٌە، وە باسـی کوردسـتانـی 
  ناکەٌن.بـوون وعـێرالـی بـوون 
 
/ چـۆن درووشمـەکانـی ئازادی بـراٌەتی دادپەروەری ڕاڤە دەکەن لە ڕوانگەی پەٌوەندٌتـان لەگەڵ بـراٌانـی ٠پ
 موسـڵمان، بە تاٌبەت کە ئێـوە نەتەوەٌەکـی بـێ دەوڵەتـن؟ 
ەکـبٌن. دەبـٌنٌت و/ ئێمە لەسەر بنەمای بـراٌەتی مـرۆٌی، بـراٌەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی، وە بـراٌەتی نەتەوەٌـی هاوکاری ٌ
بـراٌەتی چەند بازنەٌەکە. لە بازنەی بـراٌەتی مـرۆٌـٌدا دەبێت هەمـوومان ئازاد بٌن و وەن ٌەن مافمـان هەبێت. 
وە لە بازنەی بـراٌەتی ئٌـسلامـٌدا، کە تۆی موسـڵمان کۆمەڵێـن مافـت هەٌە، منٌـش دەبێت هەمان مافم هەبێت. بە 
بۆخۆم بە ڕەوای دەبٌـنم، دەبێت بـۆ بـرا موسـلمانەکەشـم، وە بۆ بـرا  هەمان شـێوە ئەو مافانەش کە من
مـرۆٌەکەشـم بە ڕەوای ببـٌنم. لەهەمان کاتدا لە بازنەی نەتەوەشـدا کە بـرای ٌەکـٌن نابێت ٌەکێـکمان سـتەمکار 
ٌن، وە هەموومان لە وٌەکێـکمان سـتەم لێـکراو. وە دەبێـت لە چـوارچێـوەی نەتەوەکەماندا دادگەری جـێبەجێ بکە
بەرانبەر ٌاسـا ٌەكـسان بٌن. وە ٌاسـا سەروەر بێت لەسەر هەمـوومان. لەم ڕێکخـراوەشـدا کە لە پێـناو کۆمەڵێـن 
ئامانجـی هاوبەشـدا تێـدەکۆشـٌن، ئەمەش جۆرێکـی تـرە لە بـراٌەتی. ئەکـرێت لە چوارچێوەی ئەم بـراٌەتی 
ی تـر لەناعەت پـێ بکەٌـن. وە هەوڵ بدەٌـن لەگەڵٌـان بۆ ئەوەی کە بۆ خۆٌان ئٌـسلامٌەدا هەوڵ بدەٌـن نەتەوەکانـ
 پێـٌان خۆشـە ئێمەش هەمان مافمـان هەٌە. لەم ڕوانگەوە ئێمە دەڕوانٌنە چەمکـی بـراٌەتی. 
بەهەمان شـێوە چەمکـی ئازادی هەر لە لە داٌـن بـوونـی مـرۆڤەوە دەسـت پـێ دەکات کە بە ئازادی لە داٌـن 
دەبـن، وە دەبێت بە ئازادٌـش بـژٌـن. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە دەڵێـٌن مـرۆڤەکان دەبێت ئازاد بـن، وە بە ئازادی بـژٌن. 
وە هەموو ئەو مافانەی کە خوا بە مـرۆڤـی داوە ٌەکـسان بن تٌـاٌدا. هەر بۆٌە ئێمە ئرمانەوێت کە ئازادٌەکانـی 
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کان، وە ئازادی مـرۆڤەکان هٌچـٌان ڕەتکـردنەوەی ئەوانـی تان، وە ئازادٌەکانـی خـێزان، وە ئازادی نەتەوە
تـرٌان نەبێـت. وە هٌچـٌان ڕێگـر نەبـن بۆ ئەوانـی تـرٌان، بەڵکـو هەموومان لە دەسـتەبەرکـردنـی ئازادٌەکاندا 
جا چ ئازادی سـٌاسی بێت، ٌان ئازادی مەدەنـی بێت، ٌان ئازادی ئابوری بێت، ئازادٌەکان بەگـشتی بۆ 
ـوومان وەن ٌەن دەسـتەبەر بکـرێت. ئەگەر لەسەر بنەمای هاوڵاتی بـوونە، ٌان لەسەر بنەمای ئٌـسانی هەم
بوونە. خەڵکانێـن هەن بەناوی هاوڵاتی بوون هەموو شـتێـن بۆ خۆٌان فەراهەم دێـنن، بەڵام بەرانبەر بە 
ٌـنێت نەتەوەکانـی تـر بچەوسـێنێتەوە لە هاوڵاتٌەکانـی تـر وانٌن. نەتەوەٌەن، گەلێـن، ووڵاتێـن بە ئاسـاٌی دەب
پێـناو بەرژەوەندی خۆٌدا. ئێمە لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە ئازادٌەکان لە نێـوان هەموو مـرۆڤەکاندا ڕەچاو بکـرێت. 
هەموو ئٌـسانێـن مافـی خۆی هەٌە، وە دەبێت ئازادی هەبێت. ئەمانەش هەموو لە چوارچێـوەی دابٌن کـردنـی 
دادگەرٌدا دەکـرێت. دادپەروەری هەر لە ناو ماڵێـکدا پێوٌـستە، تاوەکو لە ناو حـٌزبەکەدا، وە لە ناو کۆمەڵگادا. 
ئێمە پێـوٌـستە دادپەروەرٌـی جێـبەجـێ بکەٌن لە هەموو ئاستەکاندا، چونکە هەم ئاٌنەکەمان داوامان لـێ دەکات، 
  کـراوە. هەم وەکو نەتەوەٌەکٌـش لە نەبـوونـی دادپەروەرٌدا سـتەممـان لـێ 
 
  / چۆن دەتوانـن وەکو پارتێـکی سـٌاسـی ئٌـسلامـٌی لەگەڵ هەمـوو ئەو پارتە عٌلمـانٌانەدا هەڵ بکەن؟ ٦پ
و/ ئێمە نا بێت مامەڵەکانمـان لە سەر بنەمای ئاٌدۆڵۆجی بێت. هەر وەکو ووتمان بازنەی بـراٌەتی کۆمان 
شتمانـی بـوون کۆمان دەکاتەوە. دەکـرێت لە چەمکە دەکاتەوە لە بـراٌەتی مـرۆٌـی، ئەنجـا بـراٌەتی هاونٌـ
هاوبەشەکانەوە دەست پـێ بکەٌن، مەجالٌـش بدەٌن بۆ جٌـاوازٌەکانمـان. جٌـاوازٌەکانٌـشمان دەکـرێت ڕۆڵـی 
تەواوکاری ببـٌنن نەن دژاٌەتی. ئێمە هەموو لەم ووڵاتە هاوڵاتٌن، تۆ کە عٌلمـانٌت من کە ئٌـسلامـٌم ئەرکـی 
ان هەٌە. لە هەمان کاتدا مافی هاوبەشـٌـشمان هەٌە. کە جٌـاوازٌـشمان هەٌە، جٌـاوازٌەکان بۆ هاوبەشـم
تەواوکاری بێت باشە. وە دەتوانٌن ڕۆڵـی تەواوکاری بدٌنە جٌـاوازٌەکانمـان. واتە من بوونی خۆم لە نەبـوونی 
کەم، تۆٌـش ئازادٌت لە وەرگـرتنی ٌان تۆدا نەبٌنمەوە. من کاتێـن کە بۆچوونێـکم هەٌە، وە ئازادم لە بۆچوونە
 وەرنەگـرتنی بۆچوونەکەم. لەم چوارچێـوەٌەدا ئێمە مامەڵە لەگەڵ ئەم شـتانەدا دەکەٌن. 
 
  / چۆن لە دٌموکـراسی تـێ دەگەن وە چـۆنٌـش بەرجەسـتەی دەکەن؟٧پ
کەوە بۆ شوێـنێـکی تـر واتای و/ دٌموکـراسـی پـرنـسٌپە، وە کۆمەڵێـن مٌکانـٌزمە. پـرنـسٌپەکانـی لە شـوێـنێـ
جۆراو جۆری وەرگـرتووە. بەڵام بە شـێوەٌەکـی گـشتی کۆمەڵێـن مٌکانـٌزمە کە بـرٌتٌە لە ئازادی، بـرٌتٌە لە 
هەڵـبژاردن، بـرٌتئە لە ئازادی بـٌروڕا، بـرٌتٌە لە ئاڵوگۆڕی دەسەڵات، بـرٌتٌە لە دابەش کـردنـی دەسەڵاتەکان. 
ڵە چەمکێـن بۆ دابٌنـکردنـی دادپەروەری وئازادی لە نێـوان مـرۆڤەکاندا. ئێمە بە داناٌـی واتە بـرٌتٌە لە کۆمە
دەزانـٌن، داناٌٌـش لای ئێمە وون بـووی باوەڕدارە، لە هەر شـوێـنێـکەوە دەسـتی کەوت خۆی بە خاوەنـی 
ام واتاکانـی ئازادی وواتاکانـی دەزانێـت. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە زۆر لەناعەتمـان بەم چەمکانەی دٌموکـراسی هەٌە، ماد
بـراٌەتی، واتاکانـی دادپەروەری دابٌن دەکات. ئەو چـوارچێوەی کە درووشـمەکانـی ئێمەی تێدا جـێ بووەتەوە 
مٌکانـٌزمەکانـی دٌموکـراسٌەتە. بە مٌکانـٌزمەکانـی دٌموکـراسٌەت دەتوانٌن بـراٌەتی دەستەبەر بکەٌن، وە 
بکەٌن، وە دەتوانٌن دادپەروەری دەستەبەر بکەٌن. وە دەتوانٌن گەشە بدەٌـن بە ئەتوانٌن ئازادی دەستەبەر 
پـرۆسەی سـٌاسی. دٌموکـراسی ئەزمونێـکی مـرۆٌـی سەرکەوتووە، هٌـچ ڕێگـرێـن نٌە لە وەرگـرتنـٌدا. چونکە 
ـٌانبگەٌن، هەموو ئەو چەمکانەی کە ئٌـسلام داوامان لـێ دەکات، ئێمە وەکو نەتەوەٌەکٌـش دەمانەوێت پێ
 مٌکانـٌزمەکانـی دٌموکـراسٌەت خـزمەت دەکەن لەم بوارە. 
ئێمە وا تێـگەشـتووٌن کە گەل سەرچاوەی دەسەڵاتەکان، دٌموکـراسٌەتٌـش وا ئەڵێـت. مادام گەل سەرچاوەی 
ات، وە دەسەڵاتەکانە ئاڵوگۆڕکـردنـی دەسەڵات، وە شـێوازەکانـی هەڵـبژاردن بەو شـێوەٌەی کە گەل پەسەندی دەک
متمانەی بە کـێ دا ئێمە پێـی ڕازٌن. وە لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە ئەمە ڕاسـتە. وە بەردەوام دوو شـت گـرنگـن کە 
ڕەچاوبکـرێـن، ٌەکەم دەسـتوورە، دووەمٌـش متمـانەی گەلە بـۆ ئەو کەسەی کە ئەم دەسـتوورە جـێبەجـێ دەکات. 
ەر گەل متمـانەی پـێ نەداٌت کەواتە شەرعٌەتت نٌە. لە هەرچەندە تۆ دەسـتورٌـش جێـبەجـێ بکەٌت، بەڵام گ
مـێژوو ئٌـسلامٌدا بۆٌە بە خٌلافەتی ڕاشـدی ووتـراوە ڕەشـٌد چونکە ٌەکەم بەو دەسـتوورە کە گەل پێـی ڕازی 
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بـووە حوکم کـراوە، ئەنجـا گەل ئەو متمـانەٌەی داوە بەو خەلٌفانە. بەڵام کاتێـن بە متمانەی گەل دەسەڵات 
ەگـٌراوە، ئـٌتر حوکمـی ڕەشـٌد نەماوە. هەر بۆٌە حوکمـی ڕەشـٌد بە مٌکانـٌزمەکانـی دٌموکـراسـی دێتە وورن
 دی. ئٌـسلامٌـش داوای حوکمـی ڕەشـٌد دەکات بۆ خەڵن. 
 
/ ئاٌا ئەگەر بە دٌموکـراسـی گەشـتنە دەسەڵات، بەڵام لە هەڵـبژاردنـی دوواتـردا حـٌزبێـکی عٌلمـانـی لە ٨پ
  ژاردندا بـردٌەوە، دەسەڵاتی بە شـێوەٌەکـی ئاشـتٌانە وبەپێـی دٌموکـراسی دەدەنە دەسـت؟ هەڵـب
و/ ئێمە زۆر لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە هٌـچ دەسەڵاتێـن شەرعٌەتی مومارەسەی دەسەڵاتی نامێـنێت با ئٌـسلامٌـش بێت 
نٌە لە ئٌـسلامـدا. لە ئٌـسلامـدا  کاتێـن کە خەڵن متمـانەی پـێ نەدات. بە زۆر سەپاندنـی دەسەڵات شەرعٌەتی
دەبێت خەڵن متمانەت بداتـێ. کاتێـکٌـش کە گەل ئەو دەسەڵاتە دەدات بە هەر کەسـێن با عٌلمانٌـش بێت، دەبێت 
 تۆ دەسەڵاتەکەی بدەٌتـێ. کاتێـن کە نەٌدەٌت ئەوە (ؼضـب)ە، (ؼصـب)ٌـش لە ئٌـسلامـدا حـەرامە. 
 
اندا، لە ئاسـتی تٌـۆری ئاماژە بە سـتراتـٌژی بنـٌاتنـانەوەی کەسـێتی موسـڵمان، / لە ووتاری بـراٌانـی موسـڵم٩پ
خـێزانـی موسـڵمان، کۆمەڵگای موسـڵمان، حکومەتی ئٌـسلامــٌی وە خـٌلافەتـی ئٌـسلامــٌی دەکات وەکو 
سـتراتـٌژەدان، ئاٌا  شـێوازی کۆشـشی بـراٌانـی موسـڵمان. ئێـوە وەکو بـراٌانـی موسـڵمانـی کورد لە کوێـی ئەم
 خـٌلافەت درووسـت دەبـێت؟ 
و/ ئێمە هەمان شـێوازی پەروەردەکـردنـی تان، دواٌـی خـێزان و، پاشـانٌـش کۆمەڵگامان پـێ باشە. بەڵام بابەتـی 
سـٌاسەت ومومارەسەکـردنـی دەسەڵات شـتێـکی گۆڕاوە لە ئٌـسلامـدا. بۆ نموونە عەلٌدە وعـبادة وئەخلاق لە 
نەگۆڕەکانـن لە ئٌـسلامدا، وە هەتا ڕۆژی دواٌـی درۆ هەر درۆٌە بەلای هەموو کەسـێکەوە، بە هەمان شـتە 
شـێوە بۆ دژی وخـٌانەت. کە باوەڕداٌـش بٌت بەردەوام عٌـبادەتەکان ئەنجـام دەدەٌت. ئەمانە لە نەگۆڕاوەکانـن. 
وێـن دەگۆڕێـن. لەبەر ئەوە خٌـلافەتی بەڵام (معـاملات) وسـٌاسەت لە گۆڕاوەکانـن، کە بە پێـی کات وشـ
ئٌـسلامٌی ئەزمونێـکی مـێژووٌـی بـووە لە فۆرمێـکی سـٌاسی، ئەمـڕۆ (ملـزم) نٌن پێـەوە. کلـتوری ئٌـسلامـٌی 
ئەزموونێـکی مـرۆٌٌە، ئەتونٌت هەندێکـی لـێ وەربگـرٌت، ئەتوانٌت هەندێکـی لـێ وەرنەگـرٌت، چونکە 
(ممدس) نٌە. لە زەمانەدا شـتێـکی گونجاو بووە، بەڵام ئێـستا ناگونجـێت. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە دەبێت لە گەڵ 
ڕەوڕەوەی پێـشکەوتنـی ژٌانـی مـرۆڤاٌەتـٌدا بٌن. وە مـرۆڤاٌەتٌـش دەبێت لە گەشەکـردندا بێت. ئێـستا ئێمە بۆ 
ەمای نەتەوە درووسـت ئەوە تێـناکۆشـٌن خٌـلافەت بگەڕێتەوە. ئێمە نەتەوەٌەکـٌن، وە دەوڵەتەکان لەسەر بن
بـوون، ئێمەش پێـوٌـستە لەسەر بنەمای نەتەوە دەوڵەتێکمـان هەبێت بۆ نەتەوەکەی خۆمان. پاشـان دەکـرێت 
نەتەوەکان لەسەر بنەمای هاوبەش پێکەوە لەشـێوەی ڕێکخـراوە نێـو نەتەوەٌەکانـی تـر لە سەر بنەمای 
تانی ناوچەکە. جگە لەوە ئێمە لەناعەتمـان پێـی نٌە. وە بەرژەوەندی هاوبەش جۆرە ڕێکخـراوێن هەبێت بۆ ووڵا
نابێت کەسـێن خۆی بکات بە خەلٌفەو ئٌرادەی خۆی بـسەپێـنێت بەسەر نەتەوەکانـی تـردا. بـۆ نموونە ئێـستا لە 
   .نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتووەکان ووڵاتانـی ئٌـسلامـٌی وؼەٌـرە ئٌـسلامـٌی تێداٌەو هٌـچ گـرفتـێکٌـش نٌە
 
اشـە تێـگەٌـشـتنی ئەندامانتـان هـٌچ جـٌاوازٌەکـی هەٌە لەم تێـگەٌـشتنەی بەڕێـزتان وەکو سەرکـرداٌەتی / ب١٠پ
 ٌەکگـرتـوو؟ 
و/ ئێمە ئٌخوان وەکو لوتابخانەی (وسـط) سـودمان لـێ وەرگـرتووە. وە لە ئەزمونـی خەڵکـی تـرٌـش سود 
انەت دراسەی حـٌزبە ئەورۆپٌەکان دەکەٌن، وە هەر وەردەگـرٌن. بەڵام هەمـوو خۆماڵـی دەکەٌن. ئێمە تەن
ئەزمونێـکمان پـێ گونجاو بـوو لەگەڵ لەبەرچاوگـرتـنی تاٌبەتمەندی ووڵات ومٌللەتی خۆماندا ئەتوانٌن وەری 
بگـرٌن. وەکو لاٌەنێـکی ئٌـسلامـٌی پەٌڕەوی لە مٌـانەڕەوی دەکەٌن، ئٌخوان ٌەکێـکە لەو لاٌەنانەی کە 
ەسەر درووسـتکـردنـی ئەم داٌردەی مٌـانەڕەوٌە. لە زۆر شـتی وەکو ئازادی وبەشـداری (فضـل)ی زۆرە ل
سـٌاسی وپەٌـڕەوی لە دٌموکـراسـی وڕۆڵـی ئافـرەت وڕێـزگـرتن لە پێـکهاتەکانـی تـری کۆمەڵگاکەمان ودابٌن 
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ئێمە کە هەڵموڵاوی ئەو کـردنـی دادگەری، لەوانە هەموو هاوشـێوەٌن. بەڵام والعـی ئێمە چـی دەخوازێت، وە 
والعەٌن کە مٌللەتەکەمان کێـشەٌەکـی هەٌە، سـتەمـی لـێ کـراوە، دەبێت ئەو ستەمە لابەرٌن. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە 
تاٌبەتمەندی خۆمان هەٌە، وە ئازادٌن لە تاٌبەتمەندٌانە. بەڵام هەر وەکو چـۆن سـۆشـٌال دٌموکـراتەکانـی دنٌـا لە 
ێمەش لەگەڵ ئٌـسلامٌە مٌانەڕەوکان بەگـشتی وئٌخوان بە تاٌبەتی کۆمەڵێـن چەمکـی هەندێ شـتدا هاوشـێوەن، ئ
مٌـانەڕەوی دەمانبەسـتێـت بەٌەکەوە. ئەگٌـنا باڵاتـرٌن دەسەڵات لای ئێمە کۆنگـرەٌە، ئەنجـا سەرکـرداٌەتی 
ا ئێمە سـٌستەمی پاشـان مەکتەبـی سـٌاسـی، وە دەسـەڵات وبـڕٌارەکانمـان لەمانەوە وەردەگـرٌن. ئەنجـ
لامەرکەزی نەرم (لامـرکـزي مـرن) پەٌـڕەو دەکەٌن، کە دەزگا (محـلً)ٌەکان ڕۆڵـی خۆٌان هەٌە. لەبەر ئەوە 
لەهەر کوێـی ئەم دنٌـاٌە زانٌمـان هەر شـتێـن لەگەڵ سـتراتـٌژٌەتی گـشتٌمان دەگونجـێت وەری دەگـرٌن وکاری 
  وەی هەر شـتێـن کە ناگونجـێت لەگەڵ ئەزموونەکەمان. پـێ دەکەٌن. وە ئازادٌـشٌن لە ڕەت کـردنە
دەسەڵات لە ئٌـسلامدا دەسەڵاتێـکی مەدەنٌە، نەن ئاٌـنی. چونکە دەسەڵات هـی خەڵکە، وە دەسەڵاتدارٌـش 
وە خەڵن ئازادە کە دەسەڵات دەدات بە هەر کەسـێن، ئەنجا چاودێـری بکات   .نوێنەری خەڵکـە نن خوا
ولێـپرسـٌنەوەی لەگەڵـدا بکات و، بٌـگۆڕێت. ئێمە ئەمەمان لە ڕێگەی تێگەٌـشتنمـان لە ئاٌنەوە دراسە کـردووە. 
 وە سـٌاسەت لە ئٌـسلامدا لە گۆڕاوەکانە وچـی بەرژەوەندی دابٌن بکات ئەوە باشـە. 
 
  اٌا ئێـوە هەسـت بە ڕکابەری دەکەن لە لاٌەن ئٌـسلامـٌەکانـی تـرەوە؟ / ئ٠٠پ
و/ (منـافـسة)ی ئٌجابـی لە نێـوان ئٌـسلامٌەکان خۆٌاندا، عٌلمـانٌەکان لە ناو خۆٌاندا، ئٌـسلامـٌی وعٌلمـانـی 
ە. ئەگەر من وابـزانم ئاسـاٌٌە. وە لە ناو هەر ووڵاتێـکدا مونافەسەی ئٌجـابـی پێوٌـستە. بەڵام دژاٌەتی خـراپ
ئٌـسلام تەنهـا ئەوەٌە کە من دەٌـبٌنم، ئٌتر جگە لەوە گومـڕاٌٌەو کوفـرە نابێت. ئەمەش ئٌـسلام ناٌەوێت. 
ئٌجتهادی سـٌاسـٌش ڕێـزلـێ گـٌراوە لای هەموومان. گـرنگ ئەوەٌە لەسەر هاوبەشەکان کۆببٌنەوە وە 
 مونافەسەی ئٌجابـی بکەٌن.
 
وتنەوەی سەلەفـی لە مٌـسر کە دوای شۆڕشەکە پارتێـکی سـٌاسـٌٌان ڕاگەٌاند، هاوکار / پێـت واٌە بـز٢٠پ
 بـوون ٌان ڕێگـر لە بەردەم بـراٌانـی مٌـسر؟ وە چ وانەٌەن هەٌە لەوبارەوە بۆ ئٌـسلامٌەکانـی کوردسـتان؟ 
و/ ئاسـاٌٌە ئٌـسلامٌەکان کاتێـن کە لە دەرەوەی دەسەڵاتن جٌـاوازٌان زۆرتـر بێت، بەڵام کاتێـن کە دەسەڵات 
دەگـرنە دەست والعێـن بێتە پێـش بتـوانـن بەٌەکەوە (تفاهم) بکەن وهاوکاری بکەن وڕۆڵـی تەواوکاری بۆ ٌەکـتر 
ۆٌان بە بەشـێن، وە بەشـێکی گـرنگٌـش بـزانن، بەڵام بگـێڕن. من ئومێد دەکەم سەلەفـی لە هەموو شـوێـنێـن خ
خۆٌان بە هەموو شـت نەزانن، وە ؼەٌـری خۆٌان سـفر کە. ئەگەر لەسەر بنەمای ٌەکـتر لبوڵ کـردن 
وکارکـردن لەسەر بوارە هاوبەشەکان وعوزر هێـنانەوە بۆ جٌـاوازٌەکانمـان، وە جٌـاوازٌەکانمـان بۆ تەواوکاری 
ت. بەڵام ئەگەر ئەم ڕۆشـنبٌرٌە لاواز بێت هەر زوو تێکدەچـن لە ناو خۆٌاندا. وە نا تەبا دەبـن. وە بێت کێـشە نابێ
سەلفٌەکانٌـش کۆمەڵێـن مـرۆڤـن ولابٌـلی گۆڕان وپێـشکەوتـنن، لە سەرەتاوە لەناعەتٌـان بە هٌـچ جۆرە حـٌزبێـن 
ٌزب درووست دەکەن، وە مومارەسەی کاری سـٌاسی نەبـووە. بەڵام ئێـستا ئەوەتە لە کوٌت لە مٌـسر لە ٌەمەن حـ
دەکەن. ئەمەش پێـشکەوتنـێکە لە (نهج) سەلەفٌەتدا درووسـت بـووە، وە بە تێپەڕٌـنی کات پێـشکەوتنـێکـی 
 ئٌجابـی دەبێت بۆ کارکـردنـی سـٌاسی لەگەڵ ئٌـسلامٌەکانـی تـردا. 
 
بـڕٌاردا وەکـو سـتراتـٌژی کارتان، چـۆن ئەم / لە کۆنگـرەی شەشـدا مافـی چـارەی خۆنـووسـٌنتان ١٠پ
 سـتراتـٌژە بەرجەسـتە دەکەن؟
و/ ئێمە لەناعەتمـان واٌە کە دوو ڕێگامان گـرتۆتە بەر، ٌەکەم هەوڵ دەدەٌن کە کورد ناکۆن نەبـن بەرانبەر بە 
ـشەٌـی لەناو کێـشە دەرەکٌـەکان، دووەمٌـش لەناوخۆشـماندا جٌدی کار بکەٌن بۆ ئەوەی چاکـسازٌەکـی ڕٌ
سـٌستمی ئٌداری وسـٌاسی هەرێم درووسـت ببـێت. بەم شـێوەٌە پـرۆسەی سـٌاسـٌمان گەشە دەکات. وە لەسەر 
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ئاسـتی بەشەکانـی تـری کوردسـتان، هەر بەشەو لە ناو ووڵاتەکەی خۆٌدا لە ڕێگای خەباتـی سـٌاسی ومەدەنـی 
دەسـتەبەرکـردنـی مافەکانـی ئەم نەتەوەٌە. مادام دەوڵەتەکانـی  و، بە شـێوازی دٌموکـراسـٌانە تێـبکۆشـن لە پێـناو
تـر لە ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاسـت لەسەر بنەمای نەتەوەٌی درووسـت بـوون، دەبێت ئەم نەتەوەی ئێمەش دەوڵەتـی 
نەتەوەٌی خۆی هەبێت. ئەوکات نەتەوەکان پێـکەوە لەسەر بنەمای بەرژەوەندی هاوبەش لە شـێوەی بازاڕی 
شـی ئەوروپا ئێمەش دەتوانٌن شـتێـکی ئاوا درووسـتکەٌن کە بەرژەوەندی لازانجـی هەموولاٌەکـی تێـدا هاوبە
بێت. کەواتە ئێمە هەوڵ دەدەٌـن لە ڕێگای دٌموکـراسـی ومافـی مـرۆڤ ومافـی چارەی خۆنووسـٌنەوە دەوڵەتێـن 






 yraterceS remrof eht ,niddahaB dammahuM niddahalaS :21 xidneppA
 UIK eht fo lareneG
 
 صـلاح الدین محمـد بهـاء الدین، ئەمیـنداری پێـشووی یەکگـرتووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان
  ٣٣:١٠، ٥٠١٥/٨٣/٢٥
 
  / هەر لە سەرەتاوە ٌەکگـرتـووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان بۆچـی دروسـتکـرا؟ ٠پ
و/ بـێ گومان ٌەکگـرتـوو لە کەش وهەواٌەكدا پێـن هات کە وامان دەزانـی گۆڕەپانـی کوردسـتان پێوٌـستی هەٌە 
کە لە ڕووی  بە هـێزێکی سـٌاسـی کۆمەڵاٌەتی پەروەردەٌـی بێتە مەٌدان. وە ئەو تواناٌانە کۆ بکاتەوە
پەروەردەٌٌەوە لە ڕووی فٌکـرٌٌەوە لە ڕووی چالاکـی بانگەوازەوە بوونٌـان هەبوو لە کوردسـتاندا وە 
ەوە لە عـێرالدا ٠٧٩٠پەروەردەی دەسـتی ئٌخوان بـوون وەکو لوتابخانەٌەکـی فٌـکری. بەڵام ئٌخوان لە 
الاکٌانە هەبوو ئەگەر چـی پەٌوەندی نەمابوو بە ڕێکخـستنی وەسـتابـوو. بەڵام لە کوردسـتاندا بـوونـی ئەم چ
عـێرالەوە، چونکە وەکو ووتمان لە عـێراق ڕێکخـستن نەمابوو. ئەگەرچـی لە کوردسـتانٌـش پەٌوەندی تەواو بە 
کانەوە لە ١٨٩٠ٌەکەوە هەبوو، بەڵکو محـوری شـارێـن جٌاواز بـوو لە شـارێکـی تـر. وە کۆمەڵێـکٌـش لە 
ە چـالاکٌەکـی زۆر لە ناو ئۆردگاکانـی کورد ئاوارەکان لە ئێران هەبوو. ئەم محوەرانە ئـێران بـوون. و
دەرچوو، ئێمە  ١٩٩٠کۆکـردنەوەٌەکـی دەوٌـست. ئەنجا ٌاسـای حـٌزبەکان لە پەرلەمانـی کوردسـتان لە 
رتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی بـڕٌارماندا ئەو تواناٌانە کۆ بکەٌنەوە، وە حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسی ڕاگەٌەنٌن بە ناوی ٌەکگـ
کوردسـتان. وە لەو کاتەدا گروپێـکی تـری ئٌـسلامـٌی چەکدار هەبوو لە کوردسـتان بە ئەجٌنداٌەکـی تـرەوە. 
دٌارە ئێمە هەر لە هەشـتاکانەوە جٌاواز بـووٌن لەوان کە نەهجێـکی پەروەردەٌٌمـان هەبوو، وە مەدەنـی بـووٌن. 
ە بـوونێـکی مەدەنـی جٌـا لەو بـوونە چەکدارٌە هەبێـت. وە لەوکاتەدا ئەو جٌـاوازٌەش داوای ئەوەی دەکـرد ک
گۆڕەپانـی کوردسـتان پێـوٌـستی بە هێـورکـردنەوە هەبـوو، چونکە پـڕ بـوو لە چەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی وؼەٌرە 
هەروەهـا  ئٌـسلامـٌی. ئێمە دەمانوٌـست شـتێـکی تازە دابهـێنٌن، هـێزێکـی سـٌاسی وفٌکـری وپەروەردەٌـی بێت.
گـرنگـٌمان دەدا بە کاری خـێرخوازی. وە گـرنگٌمـان دەدا بە بواری فەرهەنگی وڕۆشـنبٌرٌش. ئەنجا مەدەنی 
وبـێ چەکٌـش بـووٌن، کە ئەوکات ئێمە ٌەکەم حـٌزب بـووٌن لە کوردسـتان کە مەکتەب عەسکەری نەبوو. وە 
رنـسٌپەکان بە دٌموکـراسـی هەڵسوکەوتمـان دەکـرد. ئێمە حـٌزبێـن بـووٌن هەر لە دامەزراندنەوە تا هەموو پـ
ئێمە بە خوێندنەوەٌەکـی نوێ بۆ ئٌـسلام وکورداٌەتی وکوردبـوون هاتٌنە بوون، کە شـتێـکی زۆر گـرنگ بـوو 
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ەوە کوردسـتان ئازاد ببـوو، هەر حـٌزبەو بە باکگـراوندی ٠٩٩٠بۆ گۆڕەپانـی کوردسـتان. ئەوکاتەش کە لە پاش 
ی حوکمـڕانـی کوردسـتانـی دەکـرد. ئەوکاتە پارتی وٌەکێتی وسۆشـٌالـست وبـزوتنەوەی ئٌـسلامـٌی خۆی داوا
وحـٌزبی شـٌوعـی وحـٌزبی تـرٌـش هەبوون. ئێمە تەنهـا حـٌزبێـن بـووٌن کە پاشـخانـی عەسکەرٌمـان نەبـوو. 
. لەو کاتەش بەلای خەڵکەوە سەٌـر بەو بوونە مەدەنـی ومٌللـی وخـێرخوازٌەوە دەماننـازی، نەن هـٌچـی تـر
بـوو، وە دەٌانووت کە چـۆن حـٌزبێـن لە ناو ئەم جبەخانەو چەکدارٌەدا دەتوانێـت حـٌزباٌەتی بکات. سەرەتا 
 ٢٩٩٠وابـوو، بەڵام سوپاس بۆ خوا بوٌنە پارسەنگـێن بـۆ سەرخـستنی دٌموکـراسی. هەر لە هەڵـبژاردنەکانـی 
سەربەخۆ بەشـدارٌمـان کـرد، ئەنجـا لە هەموو هەڵمبژاردنەکانـی تـردا ئێمە تەنهـا  کە ئەوکات وەکو ئٌـسلامـٌی
لاٌەنێـن بـووٌن کە تەزوٌـرمان نەدەکـرد. وە ئێمە هٌـچ (سلطة)ٌەکمـان نەبـوو، (اعتمـاد)مان لە سەر خەڵن بـوو. 
مەدەنـی هەٌە کە بە پاشخانێـکی  بێگومان وامان دەزانەی کە پێوٌسـتی گۆڕەپانـی کوردسـتان بە ئاوا حـٌزبێـکی
ئٌـسلامـٌی کاری نٌـشتمانـی وخـزمەتگوزاری بۆ مٌللەتەکەی بکات. وە ئەو شـێوانسن وتشـوٌە وتـشوٌـشە کە 
دروسـت ببـوو لە سەر تێگەٌـشتنی ئٌـسلامـٌی، لە سەر تێگەٌـشتنی نەتەواٌەتی، لە سەر (ممـارسة)ی 
لەسەرکـردن زٌاتـر لە بواری ڕاگەٌاندن، کە لورسـاٌی مادی خۆمان حوکمـڕانـی هەموو ئەوانە ئێمە بە کار 
 خـستە سەری هەوڵماندا ئەو بۆشاٌٌـانە پـڕ بکەٌنەوە.
 
 
/ ئەگەر ئەو شـتانەی کە باسـتکـردن پۆلێـن بکەٌن بە سەر دوو بەشـدا: ٌەکەم خواسـتێـکی دەعەوی، دووەم: ٢پ
  ـان پاڵنەری گەورەتـر بـوون؟ خواسـتێـکی گۆڕەپانـی سـٌاسی کوردسـتان. کامٌ
و/ ٌەکەم ڕێکخـستنەوەی کارە دەعەوٌکە، کە پەرتەوازە بـوو، ئەنجـا (اضـافة)ٌەکـی سـٌاسـٌـش. کە ئەوٌـش 
حـٌزبێـکی سـٌاسـی کوردسـتانی بـوو. ئەم حـٌزبە سـٌاسٌەش بە سود وەرگـرتن لە (مرجعٌة)ە فٌکـرٌەکە بـۆ 
نە. لە بەر ئەوە پـرۆژەی سـٌاسی ئێمە (اهتمامات) مٌللـی ونٌـشتمانـی هەبـوو. خـزمەتکـردن بە ئەو گەل ونٌـشتما
 لە هەمانکاتدا پـرسە دەعەوٌکەش ڕێکخـرا وبەگەڕخـرا وبە ٌاسـاٌٌـش کـرا.
 
تا کۆنگرەی شەشەم  ٤٩٩٠/ ئێـوە وەکو ٌەکەم ئەمٌنداری ٌەکگـرتـوو هەر لە دامەزراندنـی ٌەکگـرتوو لە ١پ 
) بەردەوام بـوون، بەڵام لە کۆنگـرەدا خۆتان نە پاڵاوت ئٌتر بۆ ئەو ٢٠١٢کە لە مانگی ماٌـسی ئەمـساڵ (
  ەسـت لەم خۆ کاندٌد نەکـردنە چـی بـوو؟  پۆسـتە، وە لە نێـوان چوار کاندٌد ٌەکێـکٌان هەڵـبژێـردرا؟ مە ب
و/ ئەوە ٌەکێـکە لە موماەرسە دٌموکـراسٌەی کە ئێمە پەٌـڕەوی دەکەٌن، وە باوەڕمان پێٌەتی. باوەڕمان واٌە کە 
دٌموکـراسی بەشـێکی زٌندووە لە ژٌانـی ئەم سەردەمە. دٌموکـراسـٌـش هٌـچ پێچەوانەی ئٌـسلام و تێگەٌـشتنی 
پێـش هەموو شـت سەرچاوەی دەسەڵات گەلە، ئەمەش هەر لە کۆنگـرەی دووەمەوە لە پـرۆگـرامدا ئٌـسلامٌمان. 
دامانٌـاوە. ئەنجـا وازهێـنان لە توند وتـٌژی بە هەموو شـێوازەکانـی، وە داٌەلۆگ وگفـتوگۆ ئالٌەتمـانە. لە باسی 
ٌندار نابێت هەتا هەتاٌە هەر بمێنێتەوە. دەساودەسـی دەسەڵات باوەڕمان هاتە سەر ئەوە کە ماوەی هەبێت، وە ئەم
باسـی ئەم بابەتەم کـردووە، وە ڕام وابـوو کە ٌەکگـرتـوو زۆر شـتی باشـی  ٠١١٢من لە کۆنگرەی چوار لە 
کـردووە، پێم باشـە ئەمەش (اضافة) بکەٌن. وە من لە کاتێکدا خۆم هەڵـبژێـرم دەٌبەمەوە، بەڵام پێم باشە ئەمە 
ـوو ئەوکات پێـشنٌارەکەم وەرنەگـٌرا، ڕەنگە من لە پێـشدا ئامادەسـازٌم نەکـردبێت بۆ ئەو باسە، دابهـێنٌن. ئەوە ب
پێـشنٌاری سـێ سەرۆکاٌەتٌم  ٨١١٢وە وەکو (مفاجئة)ٌەن وابـوو بۆ کۆنگـرە. ئەنجـا لە کۆنگـرەی پێـنجدا لە 
نەش بـرٌتی بـوون لە سەرۆکـی کـرد بۆ ئەوەی دەسەڵاتەکانـی ئەمٌندار بدرێت بەوان. ئەو سەرۆکاٌەتٌا
ئەنجومەنـی سەرکـرداٌەتی وسەرۆکی شورای گـشتی وسەرۆکی مەکتەبـی سـٌاسی. ئەنجـا ئەمٌندارٌـش بمێنێتەوە 
وەکو هێمـا. ئەوە بـوو ئەم بـٌرۆکەٌە سەری گـرت وئەو سـێ سەرۆکە هەڵـبژێـردران. ئەنجـا ئەو سـێ سەرۆکە 
ٌەتٌٌان پێـن دەهێـنا. ئەمەش ئامادەسـازی بـوو بۆ ئەوی کە لە کۆنگـرەی لە گەڵ ئەمٌندارا (هٌئة)ی سەرۆکا
شەش بە تەواوەتـی ئەم داهێـنانە ئەنجام بدەٌن. وە دە مانگ پێـش کۆنگـرەی شەش من باسـی خۆ نەپاڵاوتنم لە 
دەنگ وباس لە  سەرکـرداٌەتی کـرد، بۆ ئەوەی ئامادەٌـی هەبێـت ولە کۆنگـرە نەبێتەوە بە (مفاجئة). ئەنجـا کە
ناو ڕێکخـستنەکان پەٌدابـوو، من سەردانـی هەموو ڕێکخـستنەکانم کـرد و، هەوڵم دا زەمٌنەسـازی وئامادەٌـی 
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درووسـت بکەم لە ناو ئەنداماندا بۆ ئەم هەنگاوە. ئەو بـوو ئەم داهێـنانە بـێ وێنەٌە لە ناو حـٌزبـی کوردٌدا 
لە ناو ئٌـسلامـٌەکان، بەڵکو عٌلمـانٌەکانـی ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاسـت.  ٌەکگـرتوو دەسـتپێـشخەر بـوو، ئەمەش نەن
                                                               .هەر وەها داهێـنانێـکی تـر ئەوە بـوو کە بۆ ٌەکەم جـار دٌـسان کۆنگـرەکە ڕاستەوخۆ پەخـش کـرا
 
کەٌن، بە خەلٌفە راشـدٌنەکانەوەش، دەبٌنٌن هەر کەسـێن کە پ/ ئەگەر سەٌـری مـێژووی ئٌـسلامــٌی ب
هەڵـبژێـردراوە تا مـردن ماوەتەوە لە دەسەڵاتەکەی. ئاٌا ئەم داهێـنانەی ئێـوە کە ماوەتان بۆ ئەمٌندار دٌاری 
 کـردووە کە ئەو پەڕی دوو خوولە، ئٌـسلامـٌی تـرە ٌان ئەو نمـوونە مـێژووٌٌـانە؟ 
ئٌـسلامـٌی تـرە، چونکە شـورا ئەسڵە (وامـرهم شورا بٌنهم). ئەوەتە ئەبو بەکـر کاتێـن و/ ئەمە ئەسـڵ تـر و
هەڵٌانبـژارد ووتی (ولـٌت علٌـکم ولـست بخـٌرکم، فان احـسنت فاعـٌنونـً، وان اسـئت فمومونـً). ئەو وای 
هەٌە کە بەرهەمێـکی زۆر نەزانٌـوە کە هەڵبژاردنـی (تفوٌض)ێـكی خواٌٌە. ئەنجا ئەمـڕۆ مادام دٌموکـراسی 
 باشـی عەلڵـی ئٌـنسانە، ئێمە بە باشـمان زانـی کە پەٌڕەوٌـی بکەٌن.
 
پ/ ئاٌا هـٌچ حەصـانەٌەکـی ئاٌـنی هەٌە بۆ سەرکـردەی ئٌـسلامـٌی، بە واتاٌەن کە هٌـچ لودسـٌەتێـکٌان هەبێت 
 و، نەتواندرێت ڕەخنەٌان لــێ بگـٌردرێت؟
و/  بە دڵنـٌاٌـی نەخـێر. چونکە پێـش هەموو شـتێن سەرکـردە (معصوم) نٌە. ئەنجـا تەنانەت بـۆ پێؽەمبەرانٌـش 
(معصوم) بوون لە پەٌامەکەٌان وگەٌاندنـی ئەو پەٌامە. بەڵام لە مومارەسەکـردنـی سەرکـردەٌـی، (معصوم) 
ێت وەکو نەٌـزانٌـوە دارخورما چۆن (تلمٌح) نەبوون. سەٌـردەکەٌت لە ژٌاننـامەی پێؽەمبەر ئەوە دەردەکەو
دەکـرێت، وە بە سوعبەتەو پـٌی وتوون خەرٌکـی چـٌن خوا ڕازلە، کە چـی ئەو ساڵە دارەکانٌـان بەری نەگـرت. 
کەواتە فەرمانکـردنـی لەو بوارە (معصوم) نەبووە، سەرەنجـام کاتێـن کە هەواڵٌـان پـێ دا پێی فەرموون (انتم 
ٌـاکم). لە جەنگی بەدردا کاتێـن کە لە پلانـی جەنگدا شارەزا نەبـوو، پێـٌان ووت کە چۆن بکەن اعلم بؤمور دن
باشە. لە لورئاندا لەمبارەوە لە چەندٌن شوێندا ڕەخنەی لـێ گٌراوە. کەواتە ئەگەر ئەمە واٌە لەگەڵ پێؽەمبەر، 
ئەو پـٌرۆزٌٌەی کە داهێـنرا لە ناو  ئٌتر چۆن خەڵکـی تـر هەڵە ناکات ونابێت ڕەخنەی لـێ بگٌردرێت؟ بەڵام
خەڵکـدا بۆ دەسەڵاتدار بەرگـی ئاٌنـی دەکـرێت بە بەردا. بەڵام شـتێن هەٌە کە ڕێـزگـرتن وتەلدٌـر دەبێت لە 
 پٌرۆزکـردن وتەلدٌـس جٌـا بکـرێتەوە. 
 
 پ/ چ جۆرە پەٌوەندٌەن هەٌە لە نێـوان حـٌزبە ئٌخـوانٌەکاندا؟ 
وانٌت بڵێٌت ئەو کەسـانەی کە پەروەردە بـوون لە سەر پەروەردەی ئٌخوانـی، ئێـستاش و/ بێگومان ئێـستا نات
ئٌخوانٌن بەو مەفهومەی جاران. پێـش هەموو شـتێـن جاران پـرسـی سـٌاسی لە ئارادا نەبوو، تەنهـا بابەتی 
ناکات. بەڵام کاتێـن بانگەواز هەبوو. بانگەوازٌـش لە هەموو شوێـنێـن وەکو ٌەکە، جوگـرافٌـا کاری لە سەر 
کاری سـٌاسی دێتە پێـش حـٌزبە مەرجعٌەت ئٌخوانٌەکان سەرجەم ناتوانـن ٌەن پرۆژەی سـٌاسـٌٌان هەبێت. 
چونکە ئەجٌندای سـٌاسی هەر وڵاتێـن جـٌاوازە لە وڵاتێـکی تـر. کێـشەو خواسـتی ڕۆژانەی هاوڵاتـی لە وڵاتێـن 
ی درووسـت دەبێت؟ جٌـاوازی درووسـت دەبێت. لەبەر ئەوە حـٌزبە بۆ وڵاتێـکی تـر جٌـاوازە. دەرەنجـام چـ
ئٌخوانٌەکان لە ڕووی ڕەهەندە فٌکری وشـێوازی بانگەواز لە ٌەن دەچـن، بەڵام لە ڕووی پـرۆژەی سـٌاسٌەوە 
جـٌاوازن. بۆ نموونە لە (وسـطٌة) ومٌـانەڕەوی لە فٌـکر ومومارەسەدا تا ڕادەٌەن کۆ دەنگٌـان هەٌە. لە 
گەٌـشتنی (وسطٌة)ٌانە لە لورٌان و(سـنة)، لە بە کارنەهێـنانـی توندوتـٌژی، لە تێگەٌـشتنی (فمە) والع، لە تێ
پـرسـی تێگەٌـشتنی (مماصدي) بۆ ئاٌن، لە پـرسی بە کارهێـنانی مٌکانٌزمەکانـی سەردەم لەوانە دٌموکـراسـی، 
پـرۆژەی سـٌاسی ٌەکگـرتوو جٌاوازە لەگەڵ  ئەمانە هاوبەشـٌەکـن کات وجێگای کارٌان تـێ ناکات. بەڵام
پـرۆژەی سـٌاسی (عدالة والحـرٌة)ی مٌـسر. کەواتە تەنهـا جۆرە (تضامن)ێـن هەٌە لە شێوازی کاردا، ئەگێـنا بۆ 
نموونە لە بارەی کەرکوکەوە حـٌزبی عـێرالی هەڵوێـستی وەکو (عـلاوي)ٌە، ئێمەش هەڵوێـستمان وەکو پارتی 
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انەٌە هەندێ جـار ئەم لێکچونەی کار وجۆرە پەٌوەندٌانە کارٌگەرٌٌـان هەبێت لە سەر ئاسـتی و وٌەکێـتی ٌە. لەو
جۆری مامەڵەی ٌەکـتر، بەڵام (ثوابت)ی نەتەوەٌـی هەٌە. کەواتە هەر ٌەکە لە ئەم پارتە ئٌخوانٌـانە پارتی 
جعٌەتی ئٌـسلامـٌی، هەر وەکو لە سـٌاسی نٌـشتمانٌن هەر ٌەکە بـۆ خـزمەتی گەل و وڵاتی خۆٌان، بەڵام بە مەر




       
 
 
 UIK fo lareneG yraterceS remrof eht ,jaraF dammahoM:31 xidneppA
 محمـد فەرەج، ئەمینداری گـشتی یەکگـرتـووی ئیـسلامـیی کوردسـتان
 
/ ئێـوە وەکو ئەمٌنداری ٌەکگـرتوو چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەگەڵ ڕەخنە گـرتن دا؟ ئاٌا ئێـوە وەکو کەسـی ٠پ
 ٌەکەمی ئەم حـٌزبە هٌـچ حەصانەٌەکـی ئاٌنی هەٌە ئێوە لە ڕەخنە لـێ گـرتن بپـارێـزێت؟ 
ەڵـبژاردن مٌکانـٌزمی دٌاری و/ ئێمـە وەکو ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان لە بەر ئەوە بـڕٌارمان داوە کە ه
کـردن بـێ، ئٌـتر ئەکەوێتە دەسـت ئەو خەڵکانە کە کەسەکان دٌاری دەکەن. ئەمەش چ لە حـٌزبەکەمان دا بێت، 
ٌان بۆ گەلەکەمان. بۆ نمونە کاتێـن کە گەل پەرلەمان هەڵـدەبـژێـرێت، ئـٌتر ئەوە شەرعٌەتە. هەروەهاش لە 
ٌان دابێت بە کەسـێن بۆ پۆسـتێـن. ئەمە ئەوە ناگەٌەنێت کە لە ڕووی ئاٌنەوە ئەو حـٌزبدا ئەوەٌە کە ئەندامان دەنگ
پۆسـتەی وەرگـرتبێت. چونکە ئێمە پێمان وا نٌە کە پۆست ئاٌنی بێت. پۆست خەڵن ئەی بەخـشێت، ئەو خەڵکەی 
او بـوو ئـٌـتر ئەو کە متمانەی پێت هەٌە ئەو پۆستەت پـێ دەبەخـشێت بۆ ماوەٌەکی دٌاری کـراو، کە ماوەکە تەو
شەرعٌەتە نامێنێـت. لە ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی کوردسـتان هٌچ پـٌرۆزٌەن نە بۆ کەسـی ٌەکەم، نە بۆ کەسـی 
 تـر هەٌە. 
ئێمە کاتێـن کە باسی باوەڕبـوون بە ئازادی دەکەٌن، ئازادی واتای باوەڕبـوونە بە جٌـاوازٌەکان. ئەوانەش کە 
ـتر جٌاوازی نامێـنێت، چونکە هەموو ٌەن جۆر بـٌر دەکەنەوە. کە ئازادٌمـان ڕازٌن بە دٌکتـاتۆرٌەت، ئٌ
هەڵـبژارد، ئـٌتر جٌاوازٌەکان دەردەکەون. چونکە هەر کەسەی لەو سنورەی کە ئازادە لـسەی خۆی دەکات، وە 
ت. بە بـٌرو ڕای خۆی ئەخاتە ڕوو. ئەمەش جۆرێـن لە (اخـتلاؾ) وجۆرێـن لە بە ٌەکدا چوون دروسـت دەبێ
چـی ئەمە چـارەسەر دەکەٌن؟ دٌارە بە (لبول) کـردن. هەر بۆٌە دەبێت ڕێـز لە ٌەکـتر وبـٌرو بۆچوونـی ٌەکـتر 
بگرٌن. وە لە ڕێـی مٌکانـٌزمێـكەوە کە لەسەری ڕێـن دەکەوٌن وپێـی دەڵـێٌن دەسـتور ٌان سـٌسـتەم ڕێـن 
ر ئاساٌٌە کە خەڵن شتەکانـی منـی بە دڵ نەبێت، وە دەکەوٌن لە سەر ٌەکلاکـردنەوەی ئەم کێـشانە. ئـٌتر زۆ
ڕەخنەی لێـی هەبێت. منٌـش دەبێت سود لەو ڕەخنانە وەرگـرم. چونکە ئەو خەڵکەی کە ڕەخنەم لـێ دەگـرن دوو 
جۆرن: ٌان منـی بە دڵ نٌە، هەر حەز دەکات من بچوون بکاتەوە، ٌان لە ڕاسـتی دا من هەڵەم هەٌە. ئەگەر 
دەبێت من زۆر ڕێـزی لـێ بگـرم، چونکە ئەو دەبێتە ئاوێنەی من و، هەڵەکانم پٌـشان دەدات. وە بەشـی دووەمە، 
من ئەبێت خـێرا سوپاسی بکەم و، هەڵەکانم ڕاست بکەمەوە. ئەگەر ئەو کەسەی کە هەر حەزی لە من نٌەو 
تی بکەم وهەوڵ بدەم لای دەٌەوێت گـرفتم بۆ درووسـت بکات. دەبێت بـزانم پاڵنەری ئەمە چٌە؟ نەن بـێم دژاٌە
بەرم. بـێ گومان شـتێـن لە مندا دەبٌـنێت بە دڵـی نٌە. دەبێت من چارەسەری ئەو کێـشەٌەی بۆ بکەم. وە دەبێت 
دڵـی ئەو کەسە بەو ئاڵوزٌەدا نەهێڵمەوە، چونکە بـٌرکـردنەوە لە دڵێـکی ئاڵۆزدا کێـشە بۆ خۆشـی وبۆ خەڵکٌـش 
کەم دەبێت ئٌـشی ئەوە بێت کە کەش وهەوای ئازادی وئارامـی ئاسـاٌـش درووسـت دەکات. لێـپرسراوی ٌە
 004
 
بخولمـێـنێت. بۆ ئەوەی خەڵن بە ئارامـی بـٌر بکەنەوە. وە کاتێـکٌـش کە بە ئارامـی بـٌرٌان کـردەوە پێـش کەوتـن 
ن پێـشکەوتن درووسـت دەبێت. بە واتاٌەکـی تـر پـلان درووسـت دەبێت، کە پلانٌـش درووسـت بـوو بـێ گوما
درووسـت دەبێت. ئێمە وەکو ٌەکگـرتوو کاری جٌدی لەم بوارە دەکەٌن، لـێرەشەوە دەمانەوێت ووڵاتەکەمان 
 وحکومەتٌـش وا بێت. 
 
/ لە بەندی ٌەکەمـی پەٌـڕەو وپـرۆگـرامـی ٌەکگـرتوودا هاتووە کە ئێـوە حـٌزبێـکی ئٌصلاحـٌن. ئٌصلاح ٢پ
 چٌە بەلاتانەوە؟ 
و واتای هەٌە، واتاٌەکـی ئٌـسلامـٌی و، واتاٌەکـی سـٌاسی کە لە لێکدانەوەی مارکـسٌانە بەرانبەر و/ ئٌصـلاح دو
بە ڕادٌکاڵە، بە واتای شۆڕش وگۆڕٌنێـکی ڕٌـشەٌـی. بەڵام ئٌصـلاح چان کـردنە. لە کۆمەڵگادا دەبێت پـشت بە 
ە لە ٌەکگـرتوو باوەڕمان واٌە تاکەکان ئٌصـلاح ببەسـتٌن. دەبێت ئێمە بێٌن هەڵەکان ڕاست بکەٌنەوە. وە ئێم
هەموو بەڕێـزن، چونکە خوا دەفەرموێت (ولمد کـرمنـا بـنً آدم)، لە بەر ئەوە  هەموو مـرۆڤێـن وەکو مروڤ بە 
گەورەو دابنـرێت وبە ڕێـزەوە سەٌـر بکـرێت. ئەوەی کە ئێمە لسەمان لە سەرێتی کـردارەکانـی مـرۆڤە. ئێمە 
کان لەکەدار بکەٌن. نابێت لە بەر کـردارێـن کەسەکە لەناوبەرٌن. ڕادٌکاڵ کەسەکەو نابێت هەرگـٌز مرۆڤە
کـردارەکەش لەناو دەبات. ئەمەش هەڵەٌە، ئێمە وا ناکەٌن. ئێمە هەوڵ دەدەٌن کـردارەکەی چان بکەٌن، چونکە 
انـی هەٌە، وە ئەو کەسە مـرۆڤە ئەوٌـش وەکو من مافـی بـٌرکـردنەوەی هەٌە. ئەوٌـش وەکو من مافـی ژٌ
پێـوٌـستی بە ئەوە هەٌە سەرکەوتن بۆ خۆی بە دەسـت بهـێـنێت. ڕاسـتە هەڵە دەکات، بەڵام پێـوٌـستە هەڵەکانـی 
بۆ چان بکەٌنەوە، نەن لە ناوی بەرٌـن. کەواتە چەمکـی ئٌصـلاح لای ئێمە بە واتای ڕاسـکردنەوەی هەڵەی 
کەش بە ٌەکەوە. جاری وا هەٌە کە ئەو کەسە ئەگەر ٌەن کەسەکان دێت، نەن لە ناوبـردنـی کـردارو کەسە
هەڵەی هەبێت، بەڵام دەٌان شـتی جوانـی هەٌە. من ناکـرێت لە بەر ئەم هەڵەٌە دەٌان شـتە جوانەکەی نکولـی لـێ 
بکەم. وە ئەم کەسە کە ئێـستا خـراپە دەکـرێت بکـرێت بە مـرۆڤێـکی زۆر باش. لە لورئانٌـشدا باس لە گۆڕٌـنی 
ـردارەکان هاتووە، وەکو (ان اللە لاٌؽـٌر ما بموم حـتی ٌؽـٌروا ما بؤنفـسهم). کەواتە باس لە خۆکۆڕٌـن وبەرەو ک
باش چـوونە، وە شـتێـکی (ممکن)ٌـشە. وە هەمٌـشە بۆ ئەوەی لە دەرەوەی مـرۆڤەکان چاکـسازی بکـرێت، 
ـرۆڤانە کە دەتەوێت بەرەو چـاکـسازی بچـن پێـوٌـستە لە ناوەوەی مـرۆڤەکان زەمٌنە خۆش بکـرێت. وە ئەو م
 دەبێـت لە ناوەوەی خۆٌان ئامادەٌـی وازهێـنان لە کـردارە خـراپەکان وبەرەو کـردارە چاکەکان ڕۆشـتن هەبێت. 
 
  / فٌمهـی والـع کە زۆر جار باسـی لێوە دەکەن، بە لای ئێـوەوە چـی دەگەٌەنێت؟ ١پ
و/ بەڕێـوەبـردنـی ژٌانـی سـٌاسـی پێوٌـستی بە دوو شـت هەٌە، ئەمەش واٌە تەنانەت بۆ ژٌانی کۆمەڵاٌەتی 
وژٌانی ئابورٌـش، ٌەکەم پێـوٌـستی بە تٌۆر وپلان هەٌە، دووەم پێـوٌـستی بە جـێ بە جـێ کـردن هەٌە. ئەم 
ی ئەم تٌۆر ونەخـشەٌە لە کوێدا جـێبەجـێ تٌۆرەش پێوٌـست دەکەت کە لە لاٌەن خەڵکێکەوە دابنـرێت. دانانـ
دەکـرێت؟ پێـش ئەوەی دەست بکەٌت بە جـێبەجێکـردنـی لە هەر جێگاٌەن دەبێـت سـروشـتی جێگاکە بـزانٌت. 
ئاٌا ئەم خەڵکە دەتوانـن؟ ئاٌا پێـٌان دەکـرێت؟ ئاٌا تەحەمولـی دەکەن؟ ئاٌا سەرکەوتوو دەبێت؟ ئەمە فٌمهـی 
ع بـزانٌت. چونکە هٌـچ تٌۆرێـن بە بـێ لێـكدانەوەٌەکـی ڕاسـت ودروسـتی والـع هەرگـٌز والعـە. دەبێـت والـ
سەرکەوتوو نابێت. تەنانەت ئاٌـنی خوا ئەگەر لێـکۆڵٌـنەوەٌەکـی جوان و ووردی والعـت نەبێـت ناتوانٌـت 
و پێـوٌـست سەرکەوتنـٌان جـێبەجـێـی بکەٌت. لە لورئاندا باسـی پێؽەمبەرەکان دەکات، لە هەندێ شـوێـندا وەک
نەهێـناوە، بـۆ؟ چـونکە والعـەکە ٌارمەتٌـدەر نەبـووە. لە بەر ئەوە زۆر گـرنگە ئەمە ڕەچـاو بکەٌن ئەو 
هەڵوێـست وبـڕٌارانە، ئەو ٌاسـاٌانە کە دەتەوێت جـێبەجـێـٌان بکەٌت دەبێت لە گەڵ والعەکەدا گونجـاو بێت. 
ئەوە چەندە گـرنکە کە پلان دابنـێـٌت، ئەوەندەش گـرنگە والعەکە  ئەگەر نا سەرکەوتـوو نابێت. لە بەر
بخوێنـٌتەوە. ئەم دووانە پێکەوە دەرهاوێـشتەٌەکـی جوانٌـان دەبێـت. ئەگەر نا سەرکەوتـوو نابێـت. وە ئەگەر 
ەردەچـێت، والعـت نە خوێندەوە مەجبور دەبٌت شـتەکانت بسەپێـنٌت، ئٌتر ئەوە لە چـاکـسازی ولە دٌموکـراسـی د
وە دەبێةتە ئٌـسـتبداد. بەڵام گەر دەتەوێت عەدالەتخوازی وئازادی بە کار بهـێنٌت، وە دەتەوێت دٌموکـراسـٌەت بە 
کار بهـێـنٌت، دەبێت ئەم بەرنامەو پلانە کە داٌدەنێـٌت لە گەڵ ئەم والعـە گونجـاو بـێت. سەرەتا والعەکەت 
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ەوڵ دەدەٌن بۆ ناوخۆی حـٌزب و بۆ دەرەوەش ئەم فٌمهـی والعـە لە خوێندبێتەوە ئەنجا هەنگاو بنێـٌت. ئێمە ه
 بەرچـاو بگـرٌن. 
 
/ ئەخـلالـی سـٌاسـی لای ئێـوە چـۆنە؟ بە تاٌبەت کە ئێـوە حـٌزبێـکی ئۆپۆزسـٌۆنـن وە چـاوتان لە سەر ٤پ
گـرنگ نە بێت بە لاٌەوە  دەسەڵاتە دەتانەوێـت ڕەخنەی جـٌدی بگـرٌت، لەوانەٌە بەلای هەندێ خەڵکەوە ئەم شـتە
گـرنگ ئەوەٌە کە چۆن بتـوانێـت ئەو دەسەڵاتە ناشـٌرٌن بکات، وە چۆن لێـی ببـاتەوە وڕای گـشتی بەلای خۆٌدا 
 بگۆڕێت، ئێـوە لە گەڵ ئەمەدا چـۆن مامەڵە دەکەن؟ 
چەندە گـرنگە بەلام ئێمەوە و/ ٌەکەم ئێمە لەگەڵ تٌـۆری مٌکافٌـلـی (الؽـاٌة تـبرر الوسـٌلة) نٌن، دووەم ناوەڕۆن 
ئەو مٌکانـٌزمەش کە ناوەڕۆکەکەی پـێ جـێـبەجـێ دەکەٌت ئەوەندە گـرنگە. وەکو لاعـدەٌەکـی شەرعـی دەڵـێت 
(ماٌـبنی عـلی الفاسـدي فهـو فاسـد). ئەنجـا ئەخلالـی ئٌـسلامـٌی ئێمە کارٌگەری هەٌە لە سەر سـٌاسەتمـان، ئێمە 
ی بەرانبەرمان (حـذؾ) بکەٌن. لە بەر ئەوە ٌاسـای ئێمە واٌە کە بە شـتە باشەکانـی ناتوانٌن هەمـوو شـتەکانـ
خەڵن بڵـێـٌن باش، وە رەخنەش لە شـتە خـراپەکانـی بگـرٌـن. ڕٌخنەکەشـمان بۆ چان کـردنە، نەن بۆ لێـدان 
ەڵکـێـن با نەٌاری ئێمە بـن و(تـشـهٌر) پێکـردن. جٌـاوازی ئێمە ئەوەٌە (لانبخـس الناس آشـٌائهـم)، کاتێـن کە خ
وئێمەشـٌان خۆش نەوێت کاتێـن کە شـتێـکی باش ئەنجـام دەدەن دەسـت خۆشـٌٌـان لـێ دەکەٌن. وە ئەگەر 
پێـوٌـست بکات ٌارمەتٌـٌان دەدەٌن، بـۆ؟ چـونکە مەبەسـت لای ئێمە ئەنجـام دانـی کارە جوانەکەٌە. ئەو 
ەٌن. ئێمە دەڵێـٌن هەرکەسـێن کارێـکی باش ئەنجـام بدات ئێمە پێوٌـستە مەبەسـت نٌە کە ئێمە خۆمان ئەنجـامـی بد
پـشـتگٌری لـێ بکەٌن. وە لە هەرکوێـش کارێکـی خـراپمـان بٌـنی، بێـگومان ڕەخنەی لـێ دەگـرٌن وکار دەکەٌن 
 بۆ چـان کـردنـی وڕاسـتکـردنەوەی.
 
/ کاتێـن کە ئەخـلالـی سـٌاسـی بەکار دەهـێـنن لە کاری سـٌاسـٌتان، بەڵام ڕکابەرەکانتـان ڕەچـاوی ئەم 5پ
 ئەخلالە سـٌاسـٌە ناکەن، ئێـوە چ خەسـارێـن دەکەن؟ 
و/ ئێمە هٌـچ خەسـارێـن ناکەٌن، با بەشـێوەٌەکـی کاتٌـش جەماوەرەکەمان کەم بکەنەوە، ئێمە پێمـان واٌە 
ی سـٌاسـی زۆر گـرنگە دەبێت بٌگـێڕٌنەوە. ئێمە لە کۆمەڵگادا دەژٌـٌن، دەبێت تاکەکانـی کۆمەڵگاکەمان ئەخـلالـ
تەندروسـت بـن. بەرانبەر بە ٌەن هەلپەرسـت نەبن، بەرانبەر بە ٌەن درۆزن نەبن، بەرانبەر بە ٌەن خائن نەبن. 
لاق دەبێـت لە هەموو شـتێـکدا هەبێت، تەنانەت لە دەبێت ئێمە هەوڵ بدەٌن ئەم ڕەوشـتە جوانانە بگـێڕٌنەوە. ئەخـ
ئابورٌدا. دەتوانٌت بڵێـٌت جٌـاوازی ئٌـسلامـٌی وؼەٌـرە ئٌـسلامـٌی لێرەداٌا، بـۆ نمونە کاتێـن لە لورئاندا باس لە 
رەکە پێدانـی لەرز دەکات، وە کاتێـن کە پێوٌـستی کـرد ئەو لەرزە لە کاتـی خۆٌدا بدرێتەوە بەڵام باری لەرزکە
زۆر خـراپ دەبێت لورئان دەفەرموێت (فنظـرة الـی مٌـسرة) داوای پێـدانـی هەلێـکی تـر دەکات، نەن بە 
پێچەوانەوە وەکو ئەوەی لە ئەوروپا بانکەکان ڕەچـاوی بارو دۆخـی لەرز کەرەکە ناکەن وکە سەکە توشـی 
لێبوردەٌٌە لای ئێمە. ئەنجـا هەمٌـشە شـکـستێـکی گەورە دەبێت لە دەرەنجـامـی ئەو لەرزە. کەواتە ئەسـڵ 
لێبوردەٌـی گـرنگـترە تەنانەت لە بەرانبەر بە تاوانبـارٌـش، لورئانٌـش دوپاتـی لێـبوردن دەکاتەوە (والعفو خـٌر). 
ئەمە ئەخلالـی ئٌـسلامـٌە دەبێت دروسـت ببنەوە بۆ ئەوەی کێـشەکانمـان لوڵ نەبـن. بۆ ئەوەی بەرانبەر ڕق 
گـرێت. چونکە ناتوانٌن بە ڕق وکٌنەوە ئێمە بەرانبەر بە ٌەکـتر بـژٌـٌن. دڵێـن ئەگەر ڕق وکٌنەی وکٌـنە هەڵنە
تٌـا بـوو ناتوانێـت بەرهەمـی هەبێت، ئٌـتر ئەمە لە بواری سـٌاسـی بێت ٌان کۆمەڵاٌەتی ٌان ئابوری. ئێمە 
ەکەٌن وە دەمانەوێت ئەمەش ڕەوشـتی باوەڕمان واٌە مـرۆڤاٌەتی ٌەن پارچەٌە، وە ئێمە لـێرەوە دەسـت پـێ د
هەموو مـرۆڤەکان بێت. بەم شـێوەش دەمانەوێت ئەم کارە لەگەڵ کارە جوانەکانـی تـری مـرۆڤاٌەتٌدا ٌەن 
بگـرنەوە.ئێمە دەمانەوێت دوو شـت درووست بکەٌن لە دنٌـا ئەوانٌـش ئاشـتی وئاسـاٌـشن. ئاشـتی وئاسـاٌـشـٌش 
ٌەکەم بە ڕەوشـتی جوان دروسـت دەبـن، ئەنجـا بە متمـانە بە ٌەن بـوون کە ئەمەش لە دەرەنجـامـی ڕەوشـتەوە 
دێتە دی. کە ڕەوشـتمان جوان بوو شەڕمان بەرانبەر بە ٌەکـتر نامێـنێت. کە متمانەمان بە ٌەکـتر هەبوو خٌـانەت 
بەرانبەر بە ٌەکـتر ناکەٌن. کەوٌە ئاوا ئاشـتی درووسـت دەبێت، ئەمەٌە ئاسـاٌـش درووسـت دەکات. چـونکە لە 
ٌەکـتر دڵنـٌا دەبـٌن، کە دڵنـٌاش بـووٌن ناتـرسـٌن. وە ڕق وکٌنەمان بۆ ٌەکـتر نابێت چونکە بەرانبەر بە ٌەکـتر 
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ئاشـتٌن. کاتێـن کە بەرانبەر بە ٌەن ئاشـت بٌن ئەفکارمان بۆ درووسـت دەبێت.لە کەش وهەوای تەندرووسـتدا 
دەتوانٌن بـٌر بکەٌنەوە. هەر کەسـێکٌـش لە کەش وهەوای ئازاددا بـٌری کـردەوە بەرهەمـی جوان وئەفکاری 
 بەرهەم دەهێـنێت. 
 
/ ئێـوە کە دەتانەوێت ئەخلالـی سـٌاسـٌتان ئاوا بێت، بەڵام ئاٌا لە بەر ئەوەی کە ٌەکگـرتوو ئاشـتی خوازە وە 6پ
سەلبی وە شەڕانگـێزە بەرانبەری، ئەوەتە زٌاتر نەرم ونٌانە خەڵکـی تـر ئٌـستؽلالـی ئەمە دەکات بە شـێوازێکـی 
 لە جارێـن مەلەڕتان دەسوتێنن، وە مافتـان دەخۆن، ئێـوە چۆن مامەڵە دەکەن لەم بارەوە؟ 
و/ ئێمە کۆڵ نادەٌن. پەٌـڕەو لەو وەسـێتانەی لولمـانـی حەکٌم دەکەٌن کە وانەی زۆر گەورەی تٌـاٌە کە بە 
دەبێت پێـشەنگێـکی بە هـێز بٌت، وە خەڵن فـێری شـتی جوان بکەٌت'. خەڵن  تۆ لە کۆمەڵگا ' :کوڕەکەی دەڵێـت
لەوانەٌە لە دەرنجـامـی نەزانٌن وسـتەمەوە فـێری زۆر شـتێـکی خـراپ بـووبن وەکو نەزانٌن ونەفامـی وزوڵم 
خەڵن وزۆر وسـتەم ودزی وکوشـتن وخـٌانەت ودرۆکـردن وزۆر شـتی تـری خـراپ. کاتێـکٌـش دەتەوێت کە 
لەم ڕەوشـتە خـراپانە دوور خەٌتەوە پێوٌـستت بە ئارامگـری هەٌە، چونکە ڕووبە ڕووی زۆر شـت دەبٌتەوە 
کاتێن دەتەوێت لەو خـراپانە خەڵن دوورخەٌتەوە، وە  دەبێت خۆ ڕاگـر بٌت (وصـبر علی ما أصـابن). ئێمەش لە 
ار ئازارمان بدەن هەر دووبارەی داکۆکـی کـردن پێـناو چەسـپاندنـی ئەم بەها باڵاٌەنە کۆڵ نادەٌن. سەد جـ
لەمڕەوشـتە جوانانە دەکەٌنەوە. چونکە پێـمان واٌە کە ڕێگای سەرکەوتن ئەمەٌە. ئەم سەرکەوتنەش کە بـرٌتٌە لە 
ڕەوشـتی جوان کە ئاشـتی وئارامـی بەرهەم دەهێـنێت هەم بۆ کۆمەڵگاکەمان هەم بۆ جٌهـانٌـش هەم بۆ خۆمان 
  دوا ڕۆژدا باشە. کەواتە بەم شێوەٌە هەر بەردەوام دەبٌن و، مەنهەجٌەتٌـش ناگۆڕٌن. لای خوا لە 
 
/ لەوانەٌە هەندێـن کە ٌەکگـرتوو نەناسـن وا تێـبگەن کە ٌەکگـرتـوو هەر ئەوەندە دٌموکـراسـی دەوێت 7پ
ا دەگەنە دەسەڵات ومومارەسەی دەکات بۆ مەبەسـتی خۆی، بە واتاٌەن هەر ئەوەندە دٌموکـراسـٌتان دەوێت ت
ئـٌتر نە دٌموکـراسـٌتان دەوێت، نە دەسەڵاتٌـش دەدەنەوە بە خەڵن. ئاٌا ئێوە ئەگەر بە دٌموکـراسـی گەشـتنە 
دەسەڵات، وەگەر لە هەڵـبژاردنـی داوتـردا متمـانەی خەڵکـتان بە دەست نەهێـناوە، ئاٌا دەسەڵات دەدەنەوە بە 
  اوە دەبێت؟ عٌلمـانٌەن کە لەو هەڵـبژاردنەدا بـر
و/ ئەو بە دەست ئێمە نٌە بە دەسـت خەڵکە. بە دەست ئەو خەڵکەٌە کە شەرعٌەتی بە دەسـتە کە بـرٌتٌە لە 
جەماوەری دەنگ دەر، کە ئەمـڕۆ منـی بە دڵە بەٌانـی منـی بە دڵ نٌە. ئٌـتر من شەرعٌەتم نا مێـنێت. بەو 
ەسەڵاتـی بە ئێمە داوە ئەمـڕۆ بە حـٌزبێـێکی تـری دەدات، شـێوەٌەش هٌـچ دەسەڵاتێـکم نامێـنێت. ئەم گەلەش کە د
ئٌـتر ئێمە دەسەڵاتمـان نامێـنێت و، هٌـچ شەرعٌەتێکمـان نٌە. ئەم شەرعٌەتەش لە لای خواوە نەدراوە تاوەکو 
کۆمەڵێـن بە ناوی دٌندارٌەوە داگـٌری بکات.  ئەو شەرعٌەتە گەل داوێتـی وگەلٌـٌش وەری دەگـرێتەوە. دٌارە 
گەلٌـش ئەو شەرعٌەتە دەداتە ئەو کەسەی کە پابەندە بە جێـبەجـێکـردنی خواستەکان وبەرژەوەندٌەکانـی. وە هەر 
ئەمەش چاکە ونابێت بٌگۆڕٌن بە شـتی تـر. تەنانەت کاتێـن لە نوێـژدا خەڵن ڕازی نەبوون کە ئٌمامێـن نوێـژٌان 
ردەوام بێت، بەڵکو فەبێت ئٌمامٌەکە بەجێ بێڵێت. جا ئەمە بۆ بکات نابێت ئەو نوێـژە بکات و، گوناە بار دەبێت بە
کە بۆ عٌبادەت واٌە، بۆ دنٌـا هٌچ گومانێـکی تێدا نٌە کە واٌە. ئٌـتر ئەو حـٌزبە ٌان دەسەڵاتە کە دەنگـی بە 
ە دەست نەهێـناوەتەوە شەرعٌەتی نامێنێت و، هەرچـی لـسە وفەرمانـێ بکات دەبێتە ستەم. وە لە لاٌەن دەکەوێت
بەر نەفـرٌنـی خوا، وە لە دنٌـاش دەکەوێتە بەر نەفـرٌنـی خەڵن. ئەو خەڵکەش لێـی هەڵدەسـتن ودەری دەکەن 
وەکو ئەوەی کە دەٌبٌنٌن لە بەهاری ناوچەکەدا ڕوو دەدات. وە حکومەت وەکٌـلی خەڵکە، خەڵن هەر کاتێـن ئەو 
تێکە لەسەر بنەمای وەکالەت لە گەلەوە بۆ ئەو موکلەی بە دڵ نەبـوو لای دەبات. لای ئێمە دەسەڵات گـرێبەسـ
کەسـانە کە ڕازٌن حوکمـڕانـی بکەن بۆ ئەو ماوەٌەو کاتەی کە لەسەری ڕێـن کەوتوون. وە بـڕٌاری ئەم 




اٌبەت لە لاٌەن / (سـٌادة الامـة لـبل تطـبٌك الـشرٌعـة) چەمکێـکە ئەمـڕۆ بەر گوێ دەکەوێت بە ت8پ
 ئٌـسلامٌەکانەوە، ئێـوە چٶن لەمە تێگەشـتون؟
و/ واباشە کە بڵێـٌن (سـٌادة الـشعب)، چونکە دنٌـا ئەمـڕۆ بەپێـی نەتەوە ٌەکگـرتووەکان بەش بەش بـوو، وە هەر 
لەسەر  گەلێـن (سـٌادة)ی خۆی هەٌە، ئێمەی کورد نەبێت کە بەداخەوە تا ئێـستاش بـێ بەشـٌن. کەواتە گەلەکان
بنەمای سنورەکان جٌاکـراونەتەوە، وە ناتوانـن سـنورەکان ببەزێـنن. کەواتە سەروەری گەل لە دەسـتوردا بەلای 
کەمەوە دەبێـت دووەم مادە بێت پاش مادەی ٌەکەم کە پێـناسەی ووڵاتەکەٌە. ئەمەش شـتێـکی زۆر گـرنگە کە 
نە. ئەم سەروەرٌە گـرنگەو لە پێـش هەموو دٌاری بکـرێت گەل سەرچاوەی دٌاری کـردنـی دەسەڵاتەکا
شـتێکەوەٌە. لە ئٌـسلامدا ئەمە واٌە، وە گەل ئەو دەسەڵاتانە بە پێـی گـرێ بەسـتێـک دەداتە کەسانێـن بۆ ئەوەی 
لەبـری خەڵن کە مومکن نٌە ملٌۆنەها خەڵن هەسـتن بە حوکمـڕانـی. کەواتە بە شـێوازی ئەمـڕۆ دٌموکـراسـٌە. 
ەسەڵاتی خەڵکە کەس ناتوانێت بە ناوی خواوە حوکمـڕانـی بکات. وە بەٌعەت بەتواوەتی ئەم واتاٌە وە دەسەڵات د
دەگەٌەنێت، کە خەڵن دەست دەخەنە ناو دەست ئەو کەسەی کە دەٌانەوێت دەسەڵاتی بدەنـێ وەکو چۆم لە بازاڕدا 
توون. وە ئەمەش گـرێ مامەڵە دەکەن ئەو دەسەڵاتەشـی دەدەنـێ بەو مەرجانەی کە لەسەری ڕێـن کەو
 بەسـتنەکەٌە کە خەڵن ودەسەڵات دەٌبەسـتن.
 
/ کاتێن کە سەٌری مـێژوو ئٌـسلامـٌی دەکەٌت دەبٌنٌت کاتێـن کە دەسەڵاتدار دەسەڵاتی وەرگـرتووە بەردەوام 9پ
و شـێوازە کە بووە تا مردن. بەڵام ئەمـڕۆ لە دٌموکـراسـٌدا ماوەٌەکـی دٌاری کـراو هەٌە، ئاٌە ئەمە باشە ٌان ئە
 لە مێـژوودا هاتووە؟
و/ ئەمە باشـە، چونکە من باوەڕم واٌە کە دەسەڵاتدار گەر بٌەوێت بە جـٌدی کار بکات هەر چوار سـاڵ 
دەتوانێت کار بکات، ئەوپەڕی ئەتوانێت هەشـت سـاڵ کە دوو خولە. چونکە لەوە زٌاتر ئٌـتر دەبێتە شـێوازێکـی 
شـتەکان توشـی دواکەوتـن دەبن. کەواتە دٌاری کـردنـی کات شـتێـکی زۆر  تەللٌدی ولە خەڵن دادەبـڕێت و،
 باشە و، لە سودی گەلانە.
 
/ کە سەٌـری ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاسـت دەکەٌت دەبٌنٌت خـێڵ وهۆز وتاٌفە لە سـٌاسەتدا ڕۆڵٌـان هەٌە، 01پ
ڵٌـان هەٌە. ٌەکگـرتووی ئٌـسلامـٌی ئەوەتە کە چۆن لە عـێرالدا بە ناوی دٌموکـراسـٌٌـشەوە ئەم شـتانە زۆر ڕۆ
 کوردسـتان چۆن مامەڵە لەگەڵ ئەم شـتانە دەکات؟ 
و/ ئێمە کە باوەڕمان هێـنا بە ئازادی، ئـٌتر دەبێت دەهاوێـشتەکانـی ئازادٌمان لەبوڵ بێت. لەم ڕوانگەوە دٌارە 
ی مافـی هاوڵاتـٌانٌـش دەبێت لە دەبێـت ڕێـز لە هەموو پێکهـاتەکانـی کۆمەڵگا بگـرٌن. ڕێـزگـرتـن وپاراسـتن
دەسـتوردا دٌاری کـرابێت و، ئەو دەسـتورەش دەبێت جـێبەجـێ بکـرێت. مافـی هاوڵاتٌـبوونٌـش ٌەکـسانـٌی نێوان 
هەموو پێکهاتەکانـی کۆمەڵگا دەپارێزێت لە گەڵ پاراسـتنی ڕێـزی سەرجەم پێکهاتەکانـی کۆمەڵگا. ماؾ 
رٌـش شـتی گـرنگـن کە دەبێت پارێـزراو بێت بۆ سەرجەم هاوڵاتٌـان. وئازادٌەکان وچەندٌن چەمکـی تـ
ڕێـزگـرتنـی پێکهـاتەکانـی کۆمەڵگاش نابێت لەسەر حـسابـی ئەم چەمن وئازادٌانە بێت. چونکە ئەم چەمن 
وئازادٌانە نەگۆڕەکانـن، ئەم پێکهاتانەش لەوارەکانـی ئەم کۆمەڵگاٌەن، ئەم کۆمەڵگاٌەش بە ٌاسـا دەڕوات 
بەڕێوە، کەسـٌش نابێت لە سەرو ٌاسـاوە بێت. کەواتە هەموو جموجوڵێـن دەبێت لە چوارچێوەی ئەو دەستورە 
 بێت کە هاوڵاتی کـردووە بە بەرزتـرٌن بەهـا. 
/ بەلای تٌـۆرسـتکانەوە، لەوانە ئەنتۆنـی دی سـمث باس لە ڕەهەندەکانـی پـٌرۆزی ناشـٌوناڵـٌزم دەکات. ٠٠پ
  ی پـٌرۆزەو چـی پـٌرۆز نٌە؟ بەلای ئێـوەوە چـ
و/ ئێمە وەکو حـٌزبێـن کە بە مەرجعٌەتی ئٌـسلامـٌٌەوە کار دەکەٌن، هەسـت بەو دەکەٌن کە ئەم شـتانە بە 
ڕوونـی لە لورئاندا دٌارە. کاتێـن کە خەڵن پـرسـٌارٌان لەبارەی کەسـی پێؽەمبەرەوە بۆ درووسـت دەبێت لورئان 
وە دەفەرموێت ئەی پێؽەمبەر پێـٌان بڵـێ (ما أنا الا بـشر مثلکم). هەندوێ جار کە ٌەکـسەرە بـٌرٌان دەخاتەوە، 
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کێـشە هبواٌە لە نێوان دوو کەسـدا واٌان دەوت ئٌـتر ئەوە پێؽەمبەرە خۆی دەزانێت خەتای کاممـانە، ئەی فەرموو 
بدەم بە ئێوە وە ستەم لە  نەخـێر منٌـش مـرۆڤێکم وەکو ئێـوە هەوڵ مەدەن بمخەڵەتێنن، وە هەوڵ بدەن مافەکە
ٌەکێـکی تـر بکەم. کەواتە تەنانەت پێؽەمبەرٌـش خۆی دوورگـرتووە لەوەی کە بە پـٌرۆزی بـزانن، ٌان وابـزانن 
کە ؼەٌب دەزانێت. بەڵام ئەمە ئەوە ناگەٌەنێت کە لە ڕێـزو (مکانة)ی پێؽەمبەر کەم بکـرێتەوە. بەڵام ئەوەی کە 
ەخـێر، ئەمە لە ئٌـسلامدا وا نٌە وەکو لە ئاٌـنەکانـی تـردا سەٌری پێؽەمبەرەکانٌـان پێؽەمبەر وەکو خوا وابێت، ن
دەکەن. هەندێ لە زاناٌان دەڵێن ئەگەر هات وپێؽەمبەر وەکو دادوەر دادوەری کـرد، بەڵام دواتـر دادوەرێکـی تـر 
باش نەزانـی دەتوانێت ئەو دادگەرٌەکـی تـری بە باش زانـی وە ئەو دادگەرٌٌەی پێؽەمبەری بۆ ئێـستا بە 
دادگەرٌەی پێؽەمبەر لابات. تەنهـا لە گەٌاندنـی پەٌامـی ئٌـسلامـدا ناتوانٌت پێچەوانەی پێؽەمبەر بکەٌت. (ما 
آتاکم الـرسول فخذوە) (من التبلٌػ)ە، کەواتە ئەوەی کە لە ئاٌندا پێؽەمبەر بۆی هێـناوٌن دەبێت وەری گـرٌن، بە 
. بـۆ شتەکانـی تـرٌـش واٌە، بەڵام ئەمە پێچەوانەی ئەوە نٌە کە ڕێـزی کەسەکان واتای عەلٌدەو پەرسـتـش
وشـتەکان بگٌردرێت. بەڵام (تمدٌـس) تەنهـا بۆ خواٌە، وە بۆ ئەو فەرمانانەٌە کە پێؽەمبەر لای خواوە هێـناوێـتی. 
ەدا هاتووە (لهدم الکعـبة وە لەسەر حـسابی مرۆڤەکان شـوێن وکات شتەکانٌـش پٌرۆزنٌن، هەروەکو لەو فەرمود
أهـون من دم امـرئ مـسلم). بەڵام ئەمە ئەوە ناگەٌەنێت کە ڕێـزی کەعبە ٌان شوێنەکان نەگٌردرێت. وە من 
دەبێت ڕێـز لەم نٌـشتمانەی خۆم بگـرم، من دەبێت ئەم ووڵاتەم خۆشـبوێت وخەباتی بۆ بکەم. بەڵام ئەمەش ئەوە 
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 السلام علٌكم ورحمة اللە وبركاتە اخً الحبٌب
بالشؤن الكوردي ووحدة الصؾ  لمد كان للاتحاد الإسلامً الكوردستانً دور رائد فً بؽداد فٌما ٌتعلك 
 .3002وتمدٌم النماذج الممٌزة من النواب فً البرلمان العرالً منذ بداٌة سموط نظام صدام حسٌن عام 
فمنذ مشاركة أمٌن عام الحزب الأستاذ صلاح الدٌن محمد بهاء الدٌن فً عضوٌة مجلس الحكم فً العراق 
ختلفت فٌە وجهات نظر الأحزاب الإسلامٌة عن العلمانٌة فً اثبت للجمٌع وحدة كلمة الكورد فً الولت الذي ا
بؽداد لام بؤداء دوره فً التعرٌؾ بالمضٌة الكوردٌة لكل الأطراؾ العرالٌة والأجنبٌة وان المضٌة هً لضٌة شعب 
كوردستان لبل ان تكون المضٌة متعلمة بجانب دٌنً أو اثنوي، وكذلن عمل لتهٌئة الأرضٌة المناسبة وخاصة مع 
 الأحزاب التً تنتمً الى السنة فً العراق من خلال تعرٌفە بالمضٌة من وجهة نظر إسلامٌة معتدلة.
وبعد ذلن كان للاتحاد دور بارز فً التشكٌلات البرلمانٌة المتعددة من خلال مشاركة افراده بشكل متمٌز 
لً فً لجنة وضع الدستور، ثم مع للة عددهم، بدأ من المجلس الوطنً ثم الجمعٌة الوطنٌة والمشاركة بشكل ج
مشاركة أعضاء الحزب فً دورات مجلس النواب العرالً الثلاث لحد الٌوم وٌمكن إعطاء وصؾ مختصر لأهم 
 -ما لام بە أفراد الحزب خلال هذه الفترة مما ٌخدم المضٌة الكوردٌة وكما ٌلً:
 504
 
منفردة لانتخابات مجلس  وحدة الصؾ الكوردي ووحدة الكلمة، بالرؼم من أن الاتحاد نزل بمائمة .1
، الا انە عمل على وحدة الصؾ مع حرمانە لكثٌر من الحموق 5002 1النواب العرالً فً ن
الانتخابٌة وبعد أن لدم تضحٌات وشهداء بسبب اختٌاره النزول بمائمة منفردة، الا انە فضل العمل 
 شعب الكوردستانً.على وحدة الصؾ وخاصة فٌما ٌتعلك بالسٌاسات العامة للإللٌم وحموق ال
المشاركة الجادة فً اللجان المختصة وتمدٌم مشارٌع الموانٌن لصالح العراق ككل ولكن تخصٌص  .2
 جوانب مهمة للشعب الكوردي وخاصة لضحاٌا حلبجة والانفال سٌئة الصٌت.
العمل على ضمان حموق الشعب الكوردي والتخصٌصات المالٌة وخاصة للموظفٌن والبٌشمركة  .3
 وؼٌرها من المضاٌا فً لانون الموازنة العامة للدولة. 041والمادة 
ضمان نسبة الكورد فً لانون الانتخابات وخاصة للمحافظات فً الإللٌم من خلال تمدٌم مشروع  .4
 .0102ممٌز لتدٌل لانون الانتخابات لعام 
وزٌرا دور واضح لوزراء الاتحاد الإسلامً فً مجلس الوزراء العرالً مع ان الاتحاد كلن ٌملن  .5
واحدا فً كل دورة ولكن من خلال مشاركتهم الواضحة وضمان وحدة المطالب والمضاٌا 
 الكوردستانٌة.
المشاركات الجادة فً المإتمرات المحلٌة والدولٌة والحرص على تمدٌم أفضل المشاركات وبٌان  .6
 حموق الإللٌم وشعبە الدستورٌة.
 علام العرالً عامة والاعلام الكوردي خاصة.الدور الممٌز للبرلمانٌٌن من اعضاء الحزب فً الا .7
 
 .أرجو أن ٌكون هذا الجواب المختصر ٌفً بالؽرض أخً الحبٌب وأعتذر عن التؤخٌر فً ارسالە لكم
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 چاوپێکەوتن لە ڕێگای سکایپەوە لەگەڵ خلیل ابراهیم
 
بەرپرسی دۆسٌەی پەٌوەندٌٌەکان لەگەڵ کوردانی باکور وڕۆژئاوا. ئەندامی دەستەی : ٢٠١٥تا  ٥٠١٥لە 
 کارگێڕی مەکتەب سٌاسی وبەرپرسی دۆسٌەی پەٌوەندٌٌەکان.                     
  امی دەستەی کارگێڕی ئەنجومەنی جێبەجێکردن (مەکتەب سٌاسی).    ئەند): ٢٠١٥لە کۆنگرەی حەوتەوە (
  ٢٠١٥/٠١/٥٠بەرواری چاوپێکەوتن: 
 
  / ڕۆڵی یەکگرتوو چی بوو لە پرۆسەی ئاشتی نێوان پارت کرێکارانی کوردستان وتورکیا؟ ٠پ
لەتی خۆی وەکو ٌەکگرتووی ئٌسلامٌی کوردستان، وەکو هێزێکی ئٌسلامٌی مٌانەڕەو، ئٌمانی هەٌە بە پرسی مٌل
پرسێکی نەتەوەٌی ونٌشتمانی. وە پرسی خۆی بە پرسێکی (عادل) وڕاست وڕەوا دەزانێت. هەر بۆٌە 
پەٌوەندٌکانمان سٌاسەتێکی کراوەی هەٌە لەگەڵ هەرکەسێن و، هەر لاٌەنێن، چ دەوڵەت بێت ٌان هێزێکی 
ت بە کێشەکەمان بکات وەکو پرسێن لە سٌاسی بێت. ڕوانگە وئاڕاستەی پەٌوەندٌەکانمان بەرەو ئەوەٌە کە خزمە
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عێراق وتورکٌا وئێران وسورٌا. وە پرسی ئێمەی کورد، پرسێکی ئٌسلامٌی وڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاستی 
وناوچکەٌشە بەگشتی. لەبەر ئەوە ئێمە لەگەڵ تورکٌا هەر لە نەوەدەکانەوە پەٌوەندٌمان هەبووە، بە تاٌبەت لەگەڵ 
دە ووردە پێش دەکەوتن تا گەشتنە دەسەڵات. هەر لە کاتی خوالێخۆشبوو هێز ولاٌەنی ئٌسلامٌٌەکان، کە وور
(نجم الدٌن اربکان)ەوە پەٌوەندٌمان هەبووە. چەندٌن جار ئێمە بەشداربووٌن لە فٌستٌڤاڵی فەتحی لوستەنتٌنٌە، 
ٌە. هەر تەنانەت لٌژنەٌەکی سٌاسی درووستکرا جەنابی م. صلاح الدٌن ئەمٌنداری گشتی ئەندام بوو لەو لٌژنە
لەو کاتەوە باسی پرسی چارەسەری کێشەی کوردمان کردووە. واتا چۆن چارەسەر بکرێت، وە چۆن گرنگە کە 
لەسەر دەستی ئٌسلامٌەکان چارەسەر بکرێت. ئێمە هەر لەوکاتەوە تا پارتی داد وگەشە پێدان هاتە سەر 
(منطلك)ێكەوە باس دەکرد: وەکو  دەسەڵات، بەردەوام باسی پرسی کوردمان کردووە. پرسی کوردمان لە چەند
کێشەٌەکی سٌاسی چەند زەروورە کە چارەسەر بکرێت. چەند گرنگە (اهتمام) بە ناوچە کوردٌەکان بدرێت و، 
پرۆژەی بەرمەمهێنان وهەندێن پرۆژەی گەورە لەو ناوچانە ئەنجام بدرێن بە مەبەستی گرنگی دان بەو ناوچانە 
کوردٌەکان. وە لە هەموو بوارە کۆمەڵاٌەتی و ئابوری وسٌاسٌٌەکان بە مەبەستی خۆشگوزرانی خەڵکی ناوچە 
گرنگە لا لە ناوچە کوردٌەکان بکرێتەوە. باسی مێژوومان دەکرد لەگەڵٌان، کە چۆن هەرکاتێن کورد وتورن 
و پێکەوە بوون؛ هەر لەکاتی زەنکٌٌەکانەوە بگرە تا سەلجولٌٌەکان وتا ئەٌوبٌٌەکان وتا عوسمانٌٌەکان، وەکو دو
نەتەوەی سەرەکی لەم ناوچەٌە هەر کاتێن پێکەوە کارٌان کردووە ولەئاشتی دا بوون وٌەن ووتار بوون ولە ٌەن 
لەوارەدا کارٌان کردووە، وە پێکەوە خۆٌان بە خاوەنی زانٌبێت، هەردوولا بوونەتە هێزێکی گەورە وکارٌگەر لە 
رکاری کەمالٌەکان ئەو جۆرە ڕۆشنبٌرٌەٌان، ناوچەکە. پاشان دوای ڕوخانی دەوڵەتی عوسمانی و، هاتنە سە
 شتەکان گۆڕدران.
ئێمە بەردەوام باسی شوێنەواری نەرێنی ئەو سٌاسەتەمان دەکرد. لەولاوەش زۆر هانی پارتی کرێکارانمان دەدا  
کە هەرچەندە خوێن بڕێژرێت، وە هەر چەند چەن بەکار بهێنرێت، چارەسەر هەر گفتوگۆٌە، چونکە کێشەکە 
سٌاسٌە نەن (امنً) تا بەو شێوەٌە چارەسەر بکرێت. ئێمە هانی هەردوولامان دەدا بۆ چارەسەرکردنی  کێشەٌەکی
پرسی کورد. دٌارە بەردەوام هانمانداون ولسەمان بۆ کردوون وشتمان نووسٌوە وچاوپێکەوتنمان لەگەڵ 
ەسانی ترٌش ڕۆڵٌان هەبووە هەردوولادا ئەنجام داوە تا کار گەشتە ئەوی پرۆسەی ئاشتی دەستی پێکرد. دٌارە ک
لەم پێناوەدا، بەڵام ئێمە وەکو ٌەکگرتوو ڕاستەوخۆ چوٌنە ماڵی پەکەکە ولسەی ئەوانمان برد بۆ ئەنمەرە و، پاشان 
چوٌنە ماڵی ئەکەپە وەکو پارتی دەسەڵاتدار و، وەکو حٌزبٌش لەگەڵ سەرکردەکانٌاندا ڕاستەوخۆ لسەمان کرد. وە 
دەبرد. بەم شێوەٌەش هەردوولامان هاندەدا و، ئێمەش پێشنٌاری خۆمان پێشکەش  لسەی هەردوولامان بۆ ٌەکتر
دەکردن. ئەگەر چی ئێستا پرۆسەکە بەداخەوە وەستاوە ونەما. ئێمە لەماوەی ئەو دوو ساڵ ونٌو تا سێ ساڵەی 
ەکرد. وە پرۆسەکە بەردەوام بووٌن لەگەڵٌان. وە بەردەوام لسەی خێرمان دەکرد وپشتگٌری ئەو پرۆسەٌەمان د
هەوڵمان دەدا کە کورد لە باکور لە ئاستێکی مٌللی لەگەڵ پرۆسەکەدا بن بەسەرجەم هێز ولاٌەن 
وڕێکخراوەکانٌانەوە، حەزمان دەکرد کە ئامادەٌی کۆمەڵانی خەڵن هەبێت بۆ ئەو پرۆسەٌە بۆ ئەوەی فشار 
خوازٌەکی هەموو گەلە. وە تەنها بخرێتە سەر لاٌەنەکان ودەوڵەتٌش بۆ ئەوەی بێتەدەم داخوازٌەکەوە، کە دا
کێشەٌەن نٌە لە نێوان پەکەکە ودەوڵەت. چونکە لە ڕاستٌدا ئەمە کێشەی مٌللەتێکە ونابێت لەتٌس بکرێت لە 
چوارچێوەی هێزێکی سٌاسی دا، چونکە ئەمە پرسێکی ڕەواٌە. ئێمە هەوڵمان دا هەتا نوێنەری لەندٌلٌش بەشدار 
بوڵی کرد. بەڵام دٌارە هەندێ مەرج هەبوو، ئەوە بوو دواٌی هەدەپە هاتە بێت ڕاستەوخۆ، لاٌەنی تورکٌاش لە
کاتێن کە کێشە  ٧١١٢سەر خەت ولەگەڵ بەڕێز عبداللە ئۆجەلان گفتوگۆ دەستی پێکرد. وە ئێمە تەنانەت لە ساڵی 
ناٌە سەر کەوتە نێوان هەرێم وتورکٌا، تا کار گەشتە ئەوەی کە تورکٌا هەڕەشەی لە هەرێم دەکرد وهێزٌشی هێ
سنور، ئەوکاتە لەسەر دەستی جەنابی مامۆستا صلاح الدٌن ئەمٌنداری گشتی ئەو گرێٌە کراٌەوە. دوای ئەوە ئٌتر 
پەٌوەندٌەکانی هەرێم لەگەڵ تورکٌا بەرەو باشی چوو، وە ئەو پشکەوتنەی بە خۆٌەوە بٌنی تا ئێستا. وە ئێمە لە 
ردوە لە نێوان پەکەپە وتورکٌا. بەڵام بە شێوەٌەکی ئاشکرا لە پرۆسەی ئاشتی چەندٌن جار بە نهێنی هاتوچۆمان ک
جەنابی مامۆستا محمد فرج ئەمٌنداری گشتی وبەندە پێکەوە چووٌنە لەندٌل. من پێشتر چەند جار چوومەتە  ١٠١٢
لەندٌل، وە پاشان چووٌنەتە ئەنمەرە، ئەنجا جارێکی تر چووٌنەتە لەندٌل، وە لە لاٌەن هەردوولاوە سوپاسی 
ەکگرتوو کراوە، وە لە کۆنگرەی ڕۆژنامە نووسٌدا صلاح الدٌن دەمٌرتاش ووەفدی هاوەڵی لە سلێمانی باسی ٌ
ڕۆڵی ٌەکگرتووی ئٌسلامٌی کوردستانٌان کرد. لەو پێناوەدا ئێستاش ئەگەرچی دۆخەکە خراپە، بەڵام ئەگەر هەر 
وە تورکەکان دانٌان نەدەنا بە پرسێن لە کاتێن دەرفەت هەبێت لسەی خێر دەکەٌن. ئێمە ئەگەرچی هەر لە سەرەتا
تورکٌا کە پێی بوترێت پرسی کورد، کە ئەوٌش درێژەی بٌر وبۆچوون و(ثمافة)ی کمالٌزم بوو، کە سەرجەم 
تورکەکان کارٌگەر بوون پێی بە ئٌسلامی وؼەٌری ئٌسلامی. ئێمە هەوڵێکی زۆرمان دا تا بگەنە ئەو لەناعەتە 
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، وە پرسێکی ئٌنسانٌە، وە پرسێکی وڵاتی تورکٌاٌە، وە پرسێکی مٌللەتێکە کە کە ئەم پرسە پرسێکی ئٌسلامٌە
پێی دەوترێت کورد ومٌلۆنان کەسن، وە پرسێکی ڕۆژهەڵاتی ناوەڕاستە. وە هٌچ جۆرە سەلامگٌری وگەشە 
 پێدان ودٌموکراسٌەتێن لە تورکٌا دروست نابێت بە بێ چارەسەرکردنی پرسی کورد. ئێمە زۆر کارمان لەسەر
عەلڵی ئٌسلامٌی تورکی کردووە، تا گەشتۆتە ئەو دەرەنجامە. ئێستاش کە پرۆسەی ئاشتی وەستاوە، هەندێن 
 هەوڵمان دا لەگەڵ هەردوو لاٌەن، بە داخەوە ئامادەنٌن.   
 
 
  / ڕۆڵی یەکگرتوو چیە لە ڕۆژئاوای کوردستا؟٥پ
پاش بەرپا بوونی شۆڕشی سورٌا دژی ڕژێمی دکتاتۆری ئەسەد، ئێمە لەگەڵ هێز ولاٌەنە کوردٌەکانی ڕۆژئاوا 
بە هەردوو لاٌەن کە ئەمڕۆ لاٌەنێن پێی دەوترێت ئەنەکەسە کە ژمارەٌەن هێز ولاٌەنی بێ چەن دەگرێتە خۆ، 
پارتی سٌاسٌٌە. وە ئەم  ٢٠وە ژمارەٌان کە برٌتٌٌە لەو پارتە سٌاسٌە کوردٌانە کە لە کۆنەوە خەبات دەکەن، 
ئەنجومەنە زٌاتر پەٌوەندٌٌان گەرم وگوڕە لەگەڵ هەرێمی کوردستان. ئێمە پەٌوەندی بەهێزمان هەٌە لەگەڵ ئەو 
پارتانە، چ وەن پارتی سٌاسی، چ وەن ئەنجومەنەکەش. ئەنجومەنێکی ترٌش هەٌە بە ناوی تەڤدەم کە زٌاتر 
وردستانی بەسەرەوە زاڵە. ئەم ئەنجومەنە برٌتٌە لە پارتی ٌەکێتی دٌموکرات ڕوانگەی پارتی کرێکارانی ک
(پەٌەدە) وٌەکٌنەکانی پاراستنی گەل (ٌەپەگە) وٌەکٌنەکانی پاراستنی ژن (ٌەپەژە)، ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەمانٌش 
الٌة)ی پەٌوەندٌمان هەٌە. دٌارە ئێمە بە هەردوولامان ڕاگەٌاند کە ئێمە لەگەڵ شۆڕشٌن. کورد دەبێت (مصد
 نٌشتمانی هەبێت. 
ئێمە سێ پێوەرمان هەٌە بۆ ڕوانگەٌەکی درووستی کورد لە سورٌا: ٌەکەم، ئاٌا خۆٌان چەند سەر بەخۆن؟ ئێمە 
لەگەڵ ئەوە نٌن کە کێشەی پارچەکانی تر بهێنرێنە ئەوێ. بە واتاٌەن لاٌەنێن سەر بە پارتی دٌموکراتی 
کوردستان ولاٌەنێن سەر بە پارتی کرێکارانی کوردستان بێتت.  کوردستان ولاٌەنێن سەر بە ٌەکێتی نٌشتمانی
چونکە ئەمانە ململانێی سٌاسی خۆٌان دەبەنە ڕۆژئاوا. ئێستا دەرفەتێکی مێژووٌی لە ڕۆژئاوا دروست بووە، 
ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەوەٌن کە خۆٌان سەربەخۆ بن. وە کوردانی بەشەکانی تری کوردستان وهێز ولاٌەنەکانٌان پشتگٌری 
ان بکەن. بۆ ئەوەی خۆٌان خاوەنی بڕٌاری سٌاسی خۆٌان بن. پێوەری دووەم: ئاٌا هەڵوێستٌان بەرانبەر ئەم ئەو
شۆڕشەی سورٌا وبەرەی ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی دژی ئەسەد چٌٌە؟ ئێمە لەگەڵ ئەوە بووٌن کە ئەمانە تاٌبەتمەندی خۆٌان 
م شۆڕشە بێت. سێٌەم: هەڵوێستٌان لە لەبەر چاو بگرن، مەرجی خۆٌان هەبێت، بەڵام هەڵوێستٌان پشتگٌری ئە
ڕژێمی ئەسەد. بۆ ئەوەی وێنەٌان بەو شێوەٌە نەگٌردرێت کە ئەمانە لەگەڵ ئەم ڕژێمەن، چونکە ئەم ڕژێمە 
(مصدالٌة)ی نەماوە، (وطنٌة)ی نەماوە، (شرعٌة)ی نەماوە، وە حٌزبێکی دکتاتۆرە. ئێمە لەسەر ئەو سێ پێەورە 
 ئٌشمان لەگەڵٌان کردوە. 
هەوڵمان دا پەٌوەندٌٌان لەگەڵ ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی عەرەبی درووست بکەن. وە بووٌنە هۆی دروستبوونی  ئێمە
پەٌوەندی نێوان ئەنەکەسە وهێز ولاٌەنی عەرەبی ئۆپۆزسٌۆن. وە ڕۆڵمان هەبوو بۆ ئەوەی ئەوان بچنە ناو 
بوو بە چەند لاٌەنێکی نێو ئٌئتلافی ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی سوری، کە سەرەنجام گەشتنە ئٌمزاکردن. ئێمە پەٌوەندٌمان هە
ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی سوری، تەنانەت چاودێری گشتی براٌانی موسڵمان هاتە کوردستان. ئێمە ڕۆڵمان هەبوو وە 
هەوڵمان دا کە بانگهێشتی فەرمی بکرێت لەلاٌەن سەرۆکی هەرێمەوە. سەرەنجام پەٌوەندٌٌان لە کوردستان 
نٌش لە لاهٌرە پەٌوەندٌٌەکە دروست بوو. لە هەموو ئەمانە وتورکٌا دروست بوو. وە لە نێوان تەڤدەم وئۆپۆزسٌۆ
ڕۆڵمان هەبوو. ئێمە هەم لە ڕێگای لاٌە نە بێ چەکەکانی نێۆ ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی سورٌا وهەم لە ڕێگای براٌانەوە 
هەوڵماندا کە پەٌوەندی هەبێت لە نێوان ئۆپۆزسٌۆن ولاٌەنە کوردٌٌەکانی ڕۆژئاوا. وە ئێمە لەگەڵ لاٌەنی توندو 
ژ پەٌوەندٌمان نٌە و، پەٌوەندٌشٌان لەگەڵ دروست ناکەٌن. بەڵام لەگەڵ لاٌەنە مٌانەڕەوەکانی نێو ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی تٌ
سورٌا پەٌوەندٌمان هەبووە و، ڕۆڵٌشمان هەبووە بۆ ئەوەی پەٌوەندٌٌان لەگەڵ هەردوو ئەنجومەنی کوردی 
  تلافی ئۆپۆزسٌۆنی سوری. ڕۆژئاوا باش بێت. وە هەوڵٌشماندا کە ئەو لاٌەنانە بچنە ناو ئٌئ
وە بۆ پەٌوەندی نێوان هەردوو ئەنجومەنەکەی ڕۆژئاوا ڕێکەوتنی هەولێر ٌەن وهەولێر دوو ودهۆن هەٌە. 
لەوبارەشەوە، ئێمە بەردەوام هەوڵمان لەگەڵ داون بۆ ئەوەی پابەند بن بەو ڕێکەوتنانەوە، وە هانمانداون، وە  
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ردانمان کردوون بە مەبەستی هاندانٌان بۆ دروست بوونی متمانە لە دوابەدوای هەرٌەکێن لەو ڕێکەوتننانە سە
نێوانٌان. ئێمە پەٌوەندٌمان لەگەڵ هەمووٌان باشە. ئەوانٌش متمانەٌان بە هەوڵەکانی ٌەکگرتوو هەٌە، دەشزانن 
جەمسەری دڵسۆزانە وخەمخۆرانە هەوڵٌان لەگەڵ دەدەٌن. ئێمە ڕامان واٌە کە هٌچ کام لەو لاٌەنانە نە چنە ناو 
ناوچەگەرٌٌەوە، بەڵکو بە پێوٌستی دەزانٌن کە ٌەن هەڵوێست بن و، خاوەن ٌەن گوتار وٌەن ستراتٌژ بن بۆ 
خزمەتی پرسی کورد لە ڕۆژئاوا، وە نەچنە ناو هٌچ جەمسەرێن چ ناوچەٌی بێت، چ نێودەوڵەتی. ئێمە وەکو 
ە لەگەڵ هەموو لاٌەنەکاندا بکەٌن بە کورد دەبێت خۆمان بۆ خۆمان لە خەمی کێشەکەماندابٌن، وە مامەڵ
جەمسەرەکانٌشەوە بەو شێوەٌەی کە خزمەت بە نەتەوەکەمان دەکات و، ها لە خزمەت ئاٌندەی گەلەکەمان دا. 
ئێمە وەکو ٌەکگرتوو لە گەڵ ئەو جەمسەرگەرٌٌدا نٌن و، لە گەڵ سەنگەر لە ٌەکتر گرتندا نٌن. ئێمە دەبێت 
چٌنە نێو ململانێٌەکی وەکو سەفەوی وعوسمانی و، ئێمە ببٌنە سوتەمەنی دەرس لە مێژوو وەرگرٌن، وە نە 
شەڕەکان. ئێمە نابێت ببٌنە دار دەست بۆ ئەو لاٌەنانەو سوتەمەنی شەڕەکانٌان. کورد مافی نەتەوەٌی خۆی هەٌە، 
ۆسٌاسی وە ئەمڕۆ هێزێکی دٌنامٌکٌە لە ناوچەکە، وە هێزێکە حٌسابی بۆ دەکرێت. کوردستانٌش گرنگٌٌەکی جٌ
زۆری هەٌە لە چاوی دەوڵەتان، لەبەر ئەوە کورد دەبێت ناو ماڵی خۆی بپارێزێت، وە دەبێت لاٌەنێکی بە هێز 
بێت، وە هێزێکی دپلۆماسی وسەربازی وئابوری گرنگ بێت و، هەموومان لەو بوارانەدا کار بکەٌن. وە خاوەنی 
ندی هەر پارچەٌەن. وە ئێمە بە ٌەکسانی ٌەن هەڵوێست وٌەن سٌاسەت بٌن بە لە بەرچاوگرتنی تاٌبەتمە
 پەٌوەندٌمان لەگەڵ هەموو لاٌەنەکانی ڕۆژئاوادا هەٌە. 
ئێمە هەر لە سەرەتاوە لە سەر چەند تەوەرێن ئٌشمان کردووە لە ڕۆژئاوای کوردستان. تەوەری سٌاسی کە 
دٌامان وڕێکخراوەکانمان و، باسمان کرد. ئەنجا تەوەری ٌارمەتٌدان وکۆمەکی. لێرە هەموو ڕێکخستنەکانمان ومٌ
هەموو دۆستانٌشمان هانداوە بۆ ئەوەی ٌارمەتی ئاوارەکانی ڕۆژئاواو وسورٌا بدەن کە گەلێن زۆرن لە هەرێم. 
وە لە دەرەوەی هەرێمٌش ٌارمەتٌمان داون. وە ڕابٌطەی ئٌسلامٌی کە ڕێکخراوێکی خێرخوازی نزٌن لە 
ت ٌارمەتی لوتابخانەکانٌان. تەنانەت لە گوندەکانی چٌای کوردان لە ٌەکگرتووە ٌارمەتی ڕۆژئاوای داوە، بە تاٌبە
نزٌن دەرٌا ونزٌکی لاذلٌە ٌارمەتی ئێمە گەشتۆتە خەڵکەکەی، بە تاٌبەت لوتابخانەکانٌان. وە بەتاٌبەت بۆ 
دن، کەمپەکان، چ وەکو ٌارمەتی داراٌی و، چ وەکو ٌارمەتی تر زۆر ٌارمەتٌمان داون. هەروەها لە بواری خوێن
ٌارمەتی لوتابخانەکانمان داون، چ لە هەرێمی کوردستان، ٌان لە تورکٌا. کەواتە لەو سێ بواری سٌاسی 
 وخوێندن وٌارمەتی دانی ئاوارەکان ئێمە ٌارمەتی براکانی ڕۆژئاوامان داوە.     
  / لە پاش ڕووخانی ڕژێمی بەعسەوە لە بەغدا تا هەنووکە ڕۆڵی یەکگرتوو چی بووە؟ ٣پ
خانی ڕژێم، ٌەکگرتوو بەشدار بووە لە هەموو دانٌشتنەکانی ئۆپۆزسٌۆن، چ لە نٌوٌۆرن، چ لە لەندەن، پێش ڕوو
لە هاوٌنەهەواری سەڵاحەدٌن لەکوردستان. ئەوە بوو ئەنجومەنێکی ئۆپۆزسٌۆن  ٢١١٢وە دواترٌش لە 
فٌدراڵٌمان کردبوو، وە  دروستکرا. ئێمە ئەندامی ئەو ئەنجومەنەش بووٌن. ئێمە هەر لە سەرەتاوە هەڵبژاردەی
ووتاری کوردی ٌەن ووتار بوو پێش ڕووخانی ڕژێم. وە لە بەرانبەر سەرجەم لاٌەنە عێرالٌەکاندا ٌەن 
هەڵوێست بووٌن لە باەری داخوازٌەکانی گەلەکەمانەوە. دواٌی داخوازٌەکانمان بووە جۆرە دەستورێن بۆ 
پارتی سٌاسی کە کۆبوونەوە بە ئێمەشەوە  ١١ٌاتر لە لە کۆٌە لە کۆی ز ٢١١٢کوردستان وبۆ عێرالٌش. وە لە 
سەرجەم داخوازٌەکانی کورد خرانە ناو ئەو دەستورە. پاش ڕووخانی ڕژێمٌش ئێمە لاٌەنێکی سەرەکی بووٌن، 
وە جەنابی مامۆستا صلاح ئەمٌنداری گشتی بووە ٌەکێن لە ئەندامانی ئەنجومەنی حوکم لە کاتی برێمەر و(سی 
ت ئەنجومەنەکە لە بواری کارگێڕی وسٌاسی عێراق دا ڕۆڵی دەبٌنی. کەواتە ٌەکێن لەو پێنج پی ئەی) کە ئەوکا
 ئەندامە کوردەی ئەنجومەنی حوکم ٌەکگرتوو بوو. 
لەوکاتەوە ئێمە بەردەوام بووٌنە لە هەموو بوارەکاندا. لە ئەنجومەنی نٌشتمانی کاتی کە دوای ئەنجومەنی حوکم 
داممان هەبوو. دواترٌش لە ئەنجومەنی نوێنەران بەردەوام لە هەموو خولەکاندا دەستبەکار بوو؛ لەوێش سێ ئەن
نوێنەرمان هەبووە. ئێمە لە حکومەتی برێمەر وەزٌرمان هەبوو، وە لە هەموو حکومەتەکاتەکانی ترٌشدا 
لە گەڵ  وەزٌرمان هەبووە. کەواتە ئێمە لە عێراق بەردەوام بەشدار بووٌنە، وە هەڵوێستمان ٌەن هەڵوێست بووە
سەرجەم لاٌەنە کوردٌەکان لە بەؼدا.وە بەردەوامٌش هەوڵمان داوە کە لاٌەنە کوردٌٌەکان ٌەن هەڵوێست بن لە 
بەؼدا، بۆ ئەوەی لەمەڕ داخوازٌەکانمان بەهێزتر بٌن. ئێمە وەکو پرسی کورد مافی چارەی خۆنوسٌنمان کردوەتە 
تا دروستکردنی دەوڵەتی سەربەخۆی کوردستان. ئێمە بژاردە. وە هەوڵی پێشخستنی دەستکەوتەکانمان دەدەٌن 
ستراتٌژمان بە دەوڵەت بوونی کوردە. بەڵام ئەم بە دەوڵەت بوونەش پێشەکی دەوێت، زەمٌنە خۆشکردنی دەوێت. 
 904
 
پەسەند کراوە، وە  ٢٠١٢ئێمە تا ئێستا لە مٌانەی ئەو ستراتٌژە کاردەکەٌن. ئەم ستراتٌژەش لە کۆنگرەی شەش لە 
  جارێکی تر پەسەند کراٌەوە.  ٦٠١٢حەوتٌش لە  لە کۆنگرەی
دوو دەستور دانرا، ٌەکێکٌان بۆ عێراق وئەوٌترٌش بۆ  ٢١١٢ئەگەر چی ووتمان لە پێش ڕووخانی ڕژێم لە 
هەرێم، وە ٌەکگرتوو بەشدار بوو لە داڕشتنی ئەو دەستورانە کە لە ڕوانگەی داخوازٌٌەکانی کوردەوە لە هەرێم 
و دەستورەکەش لە پەرلەمانی کوردستاندا پەسەند کران. بەلام دوای ڕووخانی ڕژێم، ئەوە هاتنە ئارا. وە هەردو
بوو هاوکێشەکان گۆڕان، ئٌتر لٌژنەٌەکی تر درووست کرا بۆ داڕشتنی دەستوری عێراق. لەو لٌژنەٌەشدا ئێمە 
بوو دەستوری  هەبووٌن. بۆ کوردستانٌش ئێمە ئەندامی لٌژنەی نووسٌنی دەستوری کوردستان بووٌن. ئەوە
تەواو بوو، وە مافێکی زۆری کوردی تٌا چەسپاوە ئەگەر چی تائێستاش جێبەجێ نەکراون.  ٠١١٢عێراق لە 
 بەڵام بەداخەوە ئەوەی کوردستان تائێستاش تەواو نەبووە.  
 
 


































































































































Appendix 17: The [Second] Draft of Constitution and Bylawsof the KIU: 
































































































































































Appendix 18: the KIU’s New Organisational Hierarchy Adopted by the 
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In my first fieldwork in summer 2012, I had a chance to do the following 
interviews: From Erbil, where the headquarters of the KIU are located:  
1- Mr. Mohammad Faraj, the Secretary General of the KIU (2012-2016). Erbil, 
26 August, 2012.  
2- Dr. Mohammad Ra‟auf, the head of the leader‟s council of the KIU (2012-
2016). Former Trade Minister in the KRG (2006-2010). Erbil, 26 August 2012. 
3- Dr. Salahaddin Babakir, the assistant Secretary General of the KIU (2012-
2014). Erbil, 25 August, 2012. 
4- Mr. Mawlood Bawamurad, a politburo member of the KIU (2012-2016). Erbil, 
26 August, 2012.  
5- Mrs. Bayan Ahmad, a politburo of KIU and a member of the Kurdistan 
Parliament (2009-2013). Erbil, 26 Agust 2012. 
6- Mr. Salahaddin Mohammad Bahaddin, the Secretary General of the KIU 
(1994-2012) and was re-elected in the seventh congress in May 2016. Erbil 26 
August 2012. 
From Sulaimani:  
7- Dr. Mohammad Ahmad, the chairman of the Leadership Council in the 
Sulaimani region (2012-2016).Kalar, 12 August 2012. 
8- Mr. Abubakir Ali (Karwani), a politburo member (2012-2014). Sulaimani, 5 
August 2012. 
9- Dr. Muthana Amin, the head of the KIU's cleric scholar office (2012-2016). 
Currently he is an Iraqi MP and head of the KIU‟s parliamentary bloc in Iraqi 
parliament. Sulaimani, 5 August 2012. 
10- Mr. Hassan Shamerani, the head of the pursuance high council of the KIU 
(2012-to date). Sulaimani, 25 August 2012. 
11- Mrs. Xaraman Jaf, the secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Sisters League 
(KISL) (2012-2016). Email, 18 December 2013. 
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12- Mr. Burhan Ahmad, the head of the Garmian Centre of the KIU in the Kalar 
district (2012-2014). Kalar, 8 August 2012.  
After the first fieldwork, I contacted many other academics and journalists, but 
nobody has replied, except interviewee 13: 
13- Prof. Dlawar Aladdin, the former minister of the Higher Education and 
Scientific Research of the region (2010-2012), who answered my question by 
email. Email, 22 January 2014. 
Interviews 14, 15, 16 and 17 done after I returned from the first fieldwork.  
14- Mr. Hama Salih Ahmad (lives in Kurdistan Region), a Sunni Muslim who has 
Qalkhani relatives and in contact with some of the Qalkhanis, phone called, 
2014. 
15- Mr. Maleek Mahmood (lives in Newcastle, England), a Shaikh, phone 
called, 2014. 
16- Mr. Saman Rabati (lives in London), Representative of Kurdistan Islamic 
Group in the UK, phone called, 14 March, 2015.  
17- Mr. Fuad Salam (lives in London), Representative of the Change movement 
in the UK. London. 11 January 2015. 
During the second fieldwork in May and June 2016, I was able to get 
agreements of the interviewees 18, 19, 20: samples 18 and 20 answered my 
questions and emailed me; however, interviewee 19 preferred to get the 
interview done by Skype.  
18- Mr. Sami Atroshi, former Iraqi MP (2010-2014). Email, 11 July 2016. 
19- Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, (2012-2016) Head of the relationship Dossier of the KIU 
to the Kurdish affairs in northern and western Kurdistan, and member of the 
Executive Body of KIU (Political Bureau). (July 2016 – to date), Skype interview, 
12th July 2016. 
20- Mr. Abubakir Haladni, Currently Kurdistan Region MP, head of the KIU bloc 
in Kurdistan Parliament. Email, 30 August 2016. 
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Interviewee 22, during my first fieldwork promised to answer me in writing, due 
to his own over workloads, after more than three months apologised for not 
been able to answer my questions.  
After returning from my second fieldwork, in August 2016, I called the sample 
21, to verify a list of former KIU cadres and members, who are currently working 
in different political parties and media rather than the KIU.   
21- Mr. Mustafa Abdullah, Head of the membership office of the KIU. Phone 
call, 2016. 
22- Dr. Omar Abdulaziz, Head of the KIU Parliamentary bloc in Kurdistan 
Region Parliament. 
I had a chance to meet the sample 23, in London in July 2016, he promised to 
answer my questions in writing. Similar to sample 21, he apologised to me after 
two months.  
23- Mr. Omar Kochar, Currently Kurdistan Region MP. 
24- Mr. Barzan Ahmad, Head of the elections office of the KIU (2012-2016), 
replied by email. Email, 26 May 2015. 
25- Mr. Amjad Mohamad, the former head of the Islamic Students Union of 
Kurdistan-(ISUK), Email, 15 May 2016. 
26- Jamal Ghareeb, writer at Kurdiu.org, gave me access to the archive of 
official website of the KIU.  
